Research Square

Preprints are preliminary reports that have not undergone peer review.
They should not be considered conclusive, used to inform clinical practice,
or referenced by the media as validated information.

State Reinforced Self Governance and the Persistence of the Resource Curse in Indonesia's Extractive Sector

Ikhsan Ikhsan

ikhsan.baharudin@utu.ac.id

Universitas Teuku Umar

Vellayati Hajad

Universitas Teuku Umar

Ilham Mirza Saputra

Universitas Teuku Umar

Effendi Hasan

Syiah Kuala University

Aulia Putri Rezky

Universitas Teuku Umar

Research Article

Keywords: State Reinforced Self Governance, Resource Curse, Extractive Governance, Elite Capture, Institutional Fragmentation

Posted Date: July 7th, 2026

DOI: https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9948640/v1

License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Read Full License

Additional Declarations: No competing interests reported.

Abstract

This study examines how State Reinforced Self Governance (SRSG) shapes the persistence of the resource curse in Indonesia's extractive sector. While governance reforms such as decentralization, transparency initiatives, and participatory mechanisms have been widely promoted to improve resource governance, their effectiveness in addressing structural inequalities remains contested. Drawing on political ecology, critical institutionalism, and collaborative governance perspectives, the study investigates the interaction between state authority and local governance arrangements in Indonesia's extractive sector between 2010 and 2024. Using a qualitative case study approach, the analysis is based on policy documents, legal frameworks, and civil society reports examined through qualitative content analysis supported by NVivo. The findings identify three mechanisms through which SRSG operates: selective decentralization that redistributes authority without strengthening accountability, procedural participation that formalizes inclusion while limiting substantive influence, and institutional fragmentation that facilitates elite capture across governance levels. Together, these mechanisms produce a form of performative self-governance that maintains the appearance of participation and decentralization while preserving unequal power relations and limiting grassroots influence. The findings suggest that governance reforms alone are insufficient to address the resource curse when accountability mechanisms remain weak and decision-making power continues to be concentrated among state and economic elites. The study recommends strengthening accountability institutions, promoting substantive rather than procedural participation, and improving coordination across governance levels to support more inclusive and sustainable resource governance in resource-rich developing countries.

1 Introduction

The paradox of natural resource wealth continues to challenge resource-rich countries across the developing world. Despite possessing abundant mineral, oil, and gas reserves, many countries experience persistent poverty, environmental degradation, social conflict, and unequal development outcomes, a phenomenon commonly described as the resource curse (Auty, 2007; Sachs & Warner, 2001). While resource extraction generates substantial revenues and contributes significantly to national economic growth, these benefits are often distributed unevenly, leaving local communities exposed to ecological risks and socioeconomic marginalization. This paradox has stimulated extensive debates regarding the role of governance institutions in shaping the developmental outcomes of natural resource exploitation.

Indonesia provides a particularly important case for examining these dynamics. Since the democratic reforms of the late 1990s, the country has introduced a range of governance reforms intended to improve accountability and public participation in the extractive sector (Fernando et al., 2024; Hadiz, 2004; Susniwati et al., 2021). These reforms include decentralization policies, transparency initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and the increasing involvement of civil society organizations in oversight processes (Ikhsan et al., 2024; Yanuardi et al., 2021). Despite these

efforts, governance challenges remain persistent. Resource-rich regions such as Papua, East Kalimantan, and Aceh continue to experience environmental degradation, land conflicts, unequal benefit distribution, and limited local influence over resource-related decision making (McCarthy, 2004; Resosudarmo et al., 2023). The persistence of these problems raises an important question: why do governance reforms frequently fail to transform the underlying conditions associated with the resource curse?

Existing scholarship has generated substantial insights into the role of decentralization, transparency, and participatory governance in extractive industries (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; Bebbington et al., 2008). Studies generally argue that strengthening accountability mechanisms and expanding stakeholder participation can improve resource governance outcomes (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). However, the empirical record remains mixed. In many contexts, governance reforms have produced new institutional arrangements without fundamentally altering existing power relations (Bridge, 2004). Decentralization may redistribute administrative responsibilities while leaving decision-making authority concentrated among political and economic elites (Hajad, 2021). Similarly, participatory mechanisms often create formal opportunities for inclusion without ensuring meaningful influence over policy outcomes (Buchenrieder et al., 2017; Kothari, 2006). Consequently, reforms that appear progressive at the institutional level may reproduce rather than transform patterns of exclusion and inequality(Stolle & Hooghe, 2011).

To understand these dynamics, this study draws on the concept of State Reinforced Self Governance (SRSG) proposed by DeCaro et al. (2025). Rather than treating SRSG as a normative solution to governance problems, this article uses it as an analytical lens for examining the interaction between state authority and local governance arrangements. The concept highlights how governments may selectively support participatory and decentralized governance structures while simultaneously retaining significant control over decision-making processes. Under such conditions, self-governance can become embedded within broader state strategies that shape the scope, limits, and outcomes of local participation. This perspective provides an opportunity to investigate how governance reforms operate in practice and how they may contribute to the persistence of the resource curse.

Despite growing attention to collaborative and participatory governance, limited research has examined how state-supported governance reforms may simultaneously expand participation and reproduce existing power asymmetries. The literature on political ecology has demonstrated how environmental governance is deeply embedded in unequal power relations (Purwins, 2022; Robbins, 2020), while critical institutionalism highlights how formal institutions frequently interact with informal practices in ways that produce unintended outcomes (Cleaver & Whaley, 2018). Collaborative governance scholarship, meanwhile, emphasizes coordination and stakeholder engagement but often pays less attention to the political dynamics that shape participation itself (Ansell & Gash, 2008). This study seeks to bridge these perspectives by examining how governance reforms become institutionalized within existing political and economic structures, thereby sustaining rather than resolving resource-governance challenges.

This study addresses the following research question: How does State Reinforced Self Governance (SRSG) shape the persistence of the resource curse in Indonesia's extractive sector? To answer this question, the analysis focuses on three interrelated dimensions: (1) the relationship between decentralization and accountability; (2) the relationship between participation and substantive influence in decision making; and (3) the role of institutional fragmentation in facilitating elite capture across governance levels.

This study contributes to resource governance scholarship by developing SRSG as an analytical framework for understanding how governance reforms can reproduce rather than transform structural inequalities in resource-rich settings. Empirically, the article examines governance reforms in Indonesia's extractive sector between 2010 and 2024, a period characterized by significant institutional restructuring and expanding participatory initiatives. The findings demonstrate how selective decentralization, procedural participation, and institutional fragmentation interact to create a form of performative self-governance that preserves unequal power relations while maintaining the appearance of accountability and inclusion. By identifying these mechanisms, the study contributes to ongoing debates on the governance of natural resources and offers insights for strengthening accountability, substantive participation, and institutional coordination in resource-rich developing countries.

2 Materials and Methods

This study employs a qualitative governance analysis based on documentary evidence to examine how governance arrangements in Indonesia's extractive sector shape the persistence of the resource curse. Qualitative governance analysis is particularly suitable for investigating institutional processes, policy arrangements, and state–society interactions embedded within governance systems (Bevir, 2011). Documentary evidence provides an important source of data for examining formal institutions, regulatory frameworks, and governance practices because public policies and governance reforms are primarily articulated and implemented through official documents and policy instruments (Bowen, 2009).

Indonesia serves as the empirical context of analysis because it is a resource-rich country that has implemented extensive governance reforms, including decentralization, transparency initiatives, and participatory governance mechanisms, while continuing to experience uneven development outcomes and persistent governance challenges. The Indonesian experience therefore provides a useful setting for exploring broader governance dynamics relevant to other resource-rich developing countries. The study focuses on extractive sector governance, particularly mining and natural resource management, during the period 2010–2024.

This period was selected because it encompasses major governance reforms and institutional changes, including the implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), decentralization and recentralization policies, regulatory restructuring, and efforts to strengthen public participation and accountability in natural resource governance. Rather than evaluating individual policies in isolation, the

study examines how multiple governance arrangements interact and shape governance outcomes over time.

The empirical materials consist of policy documents, legal frameworks, government reports, academic publications, and civil society assessments. These include national laws and regulations governing mining and natural resources, government policy documents, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) reports, reports produced by non-governmental organizations, and scholarly studies on extractive governance in Indonesia. Documentary sources were selected purposively based on their relevance to extractive governance, coverage of governance reforms and implementation processes, and their contribution to understanding accountability, participation, transparency, and institutional coordination (Patton, 2015). These sources provide evidence of governance reforms, institutional contestation, implementation gaps, and policy outcomes across different governance levels.

Data were analyzed using qualitative content analysis supported by NVivo software. Qualitative content analysis enables researchers to systematically interpret textual materials and identify patterns, themes, and relationships within complex policy environments (Elo et al., 2014). The analysis combined deductive and inductive coding procedures (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Deductive coding was guided by the State Reinforced Self Governance (SRSG) framework, particularly its core dimensions of state facilitation, participation, and accountability. Inductive coding was subsequently employed to identify recurring governance patterns emerging from the empirical materials, including selective decentralization, procedural participation, institutional fragmentation, elite capture, and asymmetrical access to information. Through iterative coding and thematic comparison, the analysis traced how these governance mechanisms operated across different policy domains and institutional settings (Byrne, 2022).

To enhance analytical rigor and transparency, the study employed source triangulation by comparing information across government documents, civil society reports, and academic literature (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Coding categories were reviewed and refined throughout the analytical process to ensure consistency between theoretical concepts and empirical findings. An audit trail was maintained through systematic documentation of source selection, coding decisions, and thematic development within NVivo, thereby strengthening transparency and analytical reliability (Enworo, 2023). Themes were retained only when supported by multiple sources and observed consistently across different documents. This process strengthened the credibility, dependability, and confirmability of the findings (Nowell et al., 2017).

The analysis ultimately focuses on explaining how state interventions, institutional arrangements, and participatory mechanisms interact to shape governance outcomes in Indonesia’s extractive sector. By identifying recurring patterns across documentary sources, the study moves beyond descriptive accounts of policy reform and develops a mechanism-based explanation of how governance arrangements contribute to the persistence of the resource curse.

3 Result and Discussion

3.1 Selective Decentralization and Accountability

The findings indicate that governance reforms in Indonesia's extractive sector have produced a complex and often contradictory process of decentralization. Since the implementation of regional autonomy, authority over natural resource governance has been redistributed across different levels of government with the expectation that decision-making would become more responsive, accountable, and participatory. In practice, however, decentralization has generated uneven outcomes. While subnational governments gained greater involvement in licensing and resource management, institutional mechanisms for transparency, monitoring, and public accountability did not develop at the same pace. As a result, governance reforms frequently altered the location of authority without fundamentally transforming the distribution of power within the extractive sector.

Within the State Reinforced Self Governance (SRSG) framework, this pattern is conceptualized as selective decentralization, whereby governance authority is formally dispersed while accountability remains fragmented and weakly enforced. Rather than creating more democratic and inclusive governance arrangements, decentralization often enables multiple actors to exercise authority without clear responsibility for social and environmental outcomes. This selective redistribution of authority creates opportunities for regulatory inconsistency, overlapping jurisdictions, and elite influence across governance levels. The analysis identifies two interconnected mechanisms through which selective decentralization operates in Indonesia's extractive sector: decentralization-induced regulatory fragmentation and the persistence of a fragmented legal architecture that diffuses accountability and facilitates unequal access to decision-making processes.

3.1.1 Decentralization and Regulatory Fragmentation

The qualitative content analysis identified decentralization as one of the most significant governance reforms shaping Indonesia's extractive sector since the democratic transition of 1998. Analysis of policy documents, legal frameworks, government reports, and academic studies indicates that decentralization was introduced to transfer substantial authority over natural resource governance from the central government to subnational governments, particularly in sectors such as mining, forestry, and energy (Hajad et al., 2025; Latif et al., 2024; Nasution, 2017). The reform was expected to improve local accountability, strengthen regional autonomy, and increase public participation in decision-making processes. However, documentary evidence consistently suggests that the transfer of authority was not accompanied by equivalent improvements in institutional oversight, transparency, or accountability mechanisms. As a result, decentralization altered the distribution of administrative authority while creating new governance challenges within the extractive sector(Al Hindasi et al., 2026; Kapinga et al., 2026).

The documents reviewed reveal recurring patterns of overlapping authority between central, provincial, and district governments in the regulation and supervision of extractive activities. Government assessments, civil society reports, and academic studies repeatedly highlight inconsistencies between mining regulations, spatial planning frameworks, environmental laws, and forestry policies (Heijlen & Duhayon, 2024; Hidjaz, 2019; Rosyida et al., 2018). These overlapping mandates generated uncertainty regarding which institutions possessed authority to issue permits, monitor compliance, and enforce regulations. Rather than creating a more coherent governance structure, decentralization frequently fragmented decision-making processes and weakened coordination across governance levels. The resulting institutional ambiguity created opportunities for regulatory loopholes, uneven enforcement, and reduced public oversight.

Documentary evidence further indicates that these governance challenges were particularly visible in resource-producing regions. Reports from East Kalimantan documented cases of overlapping mining permits issued in protected forest areas and near settlements, contributing to environmental degradation, river pollution, and social conflict (Durani et al., 2026; Setiawan et al., 2016; Werner et al., 2024). Similar governance issues emerged in Papua, where mining permits were granted in customary territories without meaningful consultation with Indigenous communities, generating disputes over land rights and resource access (Rosser & Kartika, 2020; Winanti & Hanif, 2020). In Aceh, assessments of mining governance identified tensions between extractive licensing, spatial planning regulations, environmental protection requirements, and community interests (Hajad & Susetiawan, 2022). Across these cases, governance failures were linked not only to resource extraction itself but also to fragmented institutional arrangements that limited accountability and public control over extractive decision-making (see Table 1).

Table 1
Regional Cases of Regulatory Fragmentation and Mining Governance Conflicts in Indonesia

Location	**Main Issue**	**Condition/ Impact**
Kutai Kartanegara, East Kalimantan	Overlapping mining permits with protected forests and settlements	Social conflict, river pollution, ecosystem degradation
Berau, East Kalimantan	Mining permits issued without proper environmental assessment	Deforestation, river sedimentation, public protests
Mimika, Central Papua	Mining in customary land without community consent	Indigenous conflict, destruction of customary lands
Nabire, Central Papua	Permits issued without public consultation and proper EIA	Community rejection, forest degradation
West Aceh, Aceh	Mining permits not aligned with spatial planning, near settlements	Pollution, public unrest, lack of transparency
Nagan Raya, Aceh	Permits near conservation areas without central approval	Forest damage, risk of landslides
Source: Processed by Authors (2025)		

In response to these governance problems, the Indonesian government enacted Law No. 23/2014, which transferred significant authority over mineral and energy governance from district governments to provincial and central institutions. Analysis of legal and policy documents suggests that this reform aimed to reduce licensing irregularities, improve regulatory coordination, and strengthen state oversight over extractive activities (Akhmaddhian et al., 2023; Marquardt, 2014). Nevertheless, government reports and civil society assessments indicate that many governance challenges persisted despite this institutional restructuring. Licensing opacity, weak monitoring systems, limited transparency, and inadequate protection of Indigenous and local community rights remained recurring concerns across extractive regions (Le Billon & Spiegel, 2022; Makinde & Le Billon, 2023).

Within the State Reinforced Self Governance (SRSG) framework, these findings reveal a mechanism of selective decentralization. The coding process identified a recurring pattern in which authority was redistributed across governance levels without a corresponding strengthening of accountability institutions. Documentary evidence suggests that decentralization expanded the role of local governments in extractive governance while leaving significant gaps in monitoring, enforcement, and public oversight. Consequently, politically connected actors, local elites, and corporate interests often retained disproportionate influence over licensing and resource allocation processes. The formal redistribution of authority therefore did not translate into a comparable redistribution of accountability or decision-making power.

The findings suggest that decentralization in Indonesia's extractive sector has functioned less as a process of governance democratization than as a selective redistribution of authority within existing power structures. Although governance reforms created the appearance of local empowerment and increased participation, strategic control over extractive resources remained concentrated among powerful state and economic actors. Responsibility became dispersed across multiple institutions, while accountability mechanisms remained fragmented and weakly enforced. This pattern contributed to the persistence of the resource curse by reproducing institutional conditions that facilitate elite influence, limit meaningful public oversight, and constrain the capacity of local communities to shape governance outcomes. Rather than fundamentally transforming governance relations, decentralization frequently reconfigured existing power arrangements in ways that maintained unequal access to decision-making authority and resource benefits.

3.1.2 Legal Fragmentation in Extractive Governance

The qualitative content analysis identified legal fragmentation as a recurring governance pattern across policy documents, legal frameworks, government reports, and civil society assessments. Analysis of Indonesia's extractive governance framework reveals a complex regulatory environment characterized by multiple laws, regulations, and administrative arrangements operating simultaneously across mining, energy, forestry, environmental, and regional governance sectors. Key legal instruments include Law No. 3/2020 on Mineral and Coal Mining, Law No. 22/2001 on Oil and Gas, Forestry Law No. 41/1999, Environmental Protection and Management Law No. 32/2009, as well as various presidential regulations,

ministerial regulations, and regional bylaws. Collectively, these regulations create a dense governance architecture in which authority and responsibility are distributed across multiple institutions (see Fig. 1).

Source: Processed by Authors (2025)

The documentary evidence indicates that fragmentation extends beyond the existence of multiple regulations. Government reports, academic studies, and governance assessments consistently highlight weak coordination among regulatory frameworks governing mining, forestry, environmental protection, and regional administration (Sahide & Giessen, 2015). These legal frameworks often operate according to different objectives, administrative procedures, and institutional mandates, creating uncertainty regarding authority, enforcement responsibilities, and regulatory priorities. As a result, governance actors frequently encounter overlapping requirements, inconsistent interpretations, and conflicting institutional directives.

The analysis further reveals that legal fragmentation contributes to implementation gaps across governance levels. Civil society assessments and policy reviews document recurring inconsistencies in environmental licensing, environmental impact assessment procedures, corporate social responsibility obligations, and revenue transparency mechanisms (Hajad et al., 2023; Rusiana, 2022a). In many cases, implementation depends on the interpretation and administrative capacity of individual agencies rather than on standardized governance procedures. This situation creates uneven regulatory outcomes across regions and limits the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms intended to oversee extractive activities.

Documentary sources also indicate that legal fragmentation intersects with legal pluralism in resource-producing regions. State regulations frequently overlap or conflict with customary institutions and Indigenous land governance systems, particularly in Papua and Aceh (Tias et al., 2026; Watofa et al., 2025). When customary governance arrangements are inadequately recognized within formal regulatory frameworks, local communities often experience reduced influence over resource-related decision-making processes. Consequently, governance disputes emerge not only from competing economic interests but also from competing legal claims regarding authority, ownership, and resource access.

Within the State Reinforced Self Governance (SRSG) framework, legal fragmentation functions as more than an administrative challenge. The qualitative content analysis suggests that fragmented legal arrangements create opportunities for selective enforcement, regulatory negotiation, and elite influence over governance outcomes. Ambiguities regarding institutional authority enable powerful actors to navigate multiple regulatory channels, delay enforcement processes, and exploit inconsistencies between sectoral regulations. At the same time, fragmented accountability arrangements make it difficult for communities and civil society organizations to identify which institutions are responsible for monitoring and enforcement.

The consequences of this fragmentation are evident across Indonesia’s extractive regions. Governance assessments from East Kalimantan document overlapping mining and forestry permits that weakened

environmental enforcement and enabled continued extraction despite ecological concerns. Similar patterns appear in Papua and Aceh, where fragmented authority between state regulations and customary governance systems complicated the recognition of Indigenous land rights and reduced community bargaining power. Rather than strengthening adaptive governance, fragmented legal arrangements dispersed accountability across institutions and limited the capacity of affected communities to challenge extractive decisions effectively.

These findings indicate that legal fragmentation constitutes an important component of selective decentralization within the SRSG framework. Although governance authority is formally distributed across multiple institutions and regulatory levels, accountability remains fragmented and weakly coordinated. This institutional configuration creates the appearance of comprehensive governance while preserving unequal access to decision-making authority and regulatory influence. As a result, legal fragmentation contributes to the persistence of the resource curse by reproducing accountability deficits, facilitating elite capture, and constraining meaningful public oversight of extractive governance.

3.2 Procedural Participation and Limited Influence

3.2.1 Transparency and Reform Initiatives

Transparency has emerged as one of the most significant governance reforms in Indonesia's extractive sector since the early 2000s. Documentary evidence from government regulations, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) reports, policy evaluations, and civil society assessments consistently identifies transparency as a central strategy for addressing governance failures associated with natural resource management (Murombo, 2022). The adoption of EITI standards in 2010 marked an important institutional milestone, reflecting Indonesia's commitment to improving public disclosure of extractive revenues, licensing information, production activities, and governance procedures. Within official policy discourse, transparency was expected to reduce information asymmetries, strengthen accountability, and create opportunities for greater public oversight of extractive activities.

Analysis of the documentary sources indicates that these reforms have generated measurable changes in governance practices. Government agencies have expanded reporting requirements, established public disclosure mechanisms, and increased the availability of information concerning extractive revenues and sectoral performance. EITI reports demonstrate improvements in the publication of revenue data, production statistics, and information related to extractive sector governance. These initiatives have enhanced the visibility of governance processes and reduced some of the informational barriers that historically limited public scrutiny of natural resource management.

Despite these advances, documentary evidence consistently reveals a gap between formal transparency commitments and their practical effectiveness. Across government reports, EITI assessments, academic studies, and civil society evaluations, recurring concerns emerge regarding the accessibility, completeness, and usability of governance information. Although information is increasingly available, many documents highlight difficulties in accessing, interpreting, and utilizing such information,

particularly among communities directly affected by extractive activities. Data concerning contracts, licensing procedures, environmental compliance, revenue allocation, and corporate obligations often remain fragmented across institutions, reported in inconsistent formats, or published without sufficient contextual explanation explanation (Fenton Villar, 2022). Consequently, greater information disclosure has not necessarily translated into stronger accountability or more equitable governance outcomes.

The findings further suggest that transparency reforms have been considerably more successful in improving information disclosure than in enhancing public influence over governance decisions. Documentary sources repeatedly distinguish between access to information and the capacity to shape policy outcomes. Government reports tend to emphasize compliance with transparency standards and reporting obligations, whereas civil society assessments frequently highlight continuing limitations in community oversight, public accountability, and stakeholder influence. As a result, transparency often functions as a mechanism for information reporting rather than as a means of redistributing authority within extractive governance institutions.

This limitation has gradually encouraged governance reforms to move beyond transparency and toward broader forms of stakeholder participation. Policy documents increasingly present transparency as a foundation for participatory governance rather than as an end in itself. Alongside information disclosure initiatives, reform efforts have promoted public consultation, multi-stakeholder dialogue, environmental oversight mechanisms, and collaborative governance arrangements involving government agencies, private companies, civil society organizations, Indigenous communities, and local stakeholders. These initiatives reflect a broader recognition that accountability cannot be achieved through information disclosure alone but requires the active involvement of affected actors in governance processes.

The reform trajectory identified across documentary sources can therefore be understood as a sequence of interconnected governance initiatives progressing from transparency toward accountability and participation (see Fig. 2). This progression reflects an institutional assumption that improved access to information will strengthen oversight, generate accountability, and ultimately facilitate more inclusive forms of decision-making. However, documentary evidence indicates that progress across these reform stages has been uneven and frequently constrained by structural governance challenges (see Fig. 2).

Source: Processed by Authors (2025)

Figure 2 summarizes the governance reform trajectory identified across policy documents, EITI assessments, and civil society evaluations. The process begins with transparent information sharing aimed at reducing informational asymmetries and improving public access to governance information. The second stage emphasizes contextual environmental auditing designed to strengthen monitoring and oversight of extractive activities. The third stage focuses on the development of stronger institutional mechanisms intended to improve accountability, compliance, and regulatory enforcement. The final stage seeks to expand civil society participation through more inclusive governance arrangements and collaborative decision-making processes. While these reforms collectively reflect efforts to improve governance quality, the documentary evidence suggests that transparency has advanced more rapidly

than accountability and participation mechanisms. Consequently, information disclosure has expanded without a corresponding increase in public influence over governance outcomes.

The limitations of participatory governance become particularly visible when examining how participation is structured within extractive governance processes. Across multiple documentary sources, participation is concentrated primarily in the implementation stage rather than in agenda-setting or decision-making stages. Communities are frequently invited to attend consultations, provide feedback, or participate in public hearings after key policy decisions have already been formulated. Under such circumstances, participation serves largely to communicate decisions and secure procedural legitimacy rather than to influence the substance of governance outcomes. Although stakeholders are formally included within governance processes, their ability to alter decisions remains limited.

Documentary evidence also reveals significant inequalities in participatory capacity among governance actors. Government agencies, political elites, and corporate actors generally possess greater access to information, technical expertise, financial resources, and decision-making channels than local communities or civil society organizations. Even within formally inclusive governance forums, these asymmetries shape whose perspectives are prioritized and whose interests ultimately influence policy outcomes. As a result, participation often occurs within institutional environments characterized by unequal distributions of power and resources.

Within the State Reinforced Self Governance (SRSG) framework, these patterns illustrate the emergence of procedural participation as a distinct governance mechanism. State institutions formally encourage participation through transparency initiatives, consultation procedures, reporting requirements, and multi-stakeholder platforms. These mechanisms create the appearance of inclusiveness and strengthen the legitimacy of governance reforms. However, documentary evidence indicates that participation rarely results in a substantive redistribution of authority or decision-making power. Instead, participation is structured in ways that preserve existing governance hierarchies while simultaneously demonstrating compliance with principles of openness and inclusion.

The findings further indicate that contemporary governance reform discourse increasingly emphasizes collaborative governance, Indigenous rights recognition, community empowerment, and multi-stakeholder engagement as pathways toward more sustainable natural resource governance (Annahar et al., 2023; Ikhsan et al., 2025; Mursyidin et al., 2022). Nevertheless, documentary evidence suggests that institutional fragmentation, uneven implementation capacity, weak enforcement mechanisms, and persistent elite influence continue to constrain the effectiveness of these reforms. These structural limitations reduce the transformative potential of participatory mechanisms and weaken efforts to strengthen downward accountability within extractive governance systems.

The documentary evidence suggests that transparency reforms have expanded formal opportunities for participation while leaving underlying power relations largely intact. Transparency has increased the visibility of governance processes and improved the availability of information, yet it has not fundamentally altered who exercises authority within extractive governance systems. Within the SRSG

framework, transparency therefore functions as an important but incomplete governance mechanism. It facilitates procedural inclusion and strengthens institutional legitimacy, but it does not necessarily enable affected communities to exert meaningful influence over extractive governance decisions. Consequently, governance reforms may improve administrative performance and reporting standards while leaving deeper patterns of inequality, exclusion, and resource control largely unchanged.

3.2.2 State Facilitation and Power Asymmetries

The qualitative content analysis identified state facilitation as a recurring theme across policy documents, governance reports, and civil society assessments. Within the State Reinforced Self Governance (SRSG) framework, the state is expected to play a dual role: providing regulatory oversight while simultaneously enabling meaningful participation by local communities and non-state actors. Documentary evidence indicates that Indonesia has formally adopted a facilitative governance approach through decentralization policies, transparency initiatives, public consultation requirements, and multi-stakeholder governance mechanisms. Programs such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the One Map Policy reflect institutional efforts to improve coordination, transparency, and stakeholder involvement in natural resource governance.

However, the analysis reveals a significant gap between formal commitments to participation and the actual distribution of decision-making authority. Government regulations and policy frameworks increasingly recognize the importance of stakeholder engagement, yet governance assessments consistently indicate that strategic decisions concerning licensing, resource allocation, and regulatory enforcement remain concentrated within state institutions and politically influential actors (Kinda & Mien, 2024a). While local governments, civil society organizations, and affected communities are frequently invited to participate in consultation processes, their influence over final policy outcomes often remains limited. Consequently, participation is facilitated procedurally, but substantive control over extractive governance continues to be exercised through centralized decision-making structures.

Documentary sources further suggest that state facilitation operates unevenly across governance levels. Transparency initiatives have improved public access to certain categories of information, particularly concerning revenues and licensing data. Nevertheless, reports from civil society organizations and governance monitoring institutions indicate that access to strategic information, policy deliberations, and enforcement processes remains highly restricted in many extractive regions. This asymmetry creates unequal opportunities for participation because actors with stronger political, bureaucratic, or economic connections possess greater capacity to influence governance outcomes than local communities directly affected by extraction activities.

Within the SRSG framework, these findings demonstrate that state facilitation can simultaneously expand participation and preserve existing power hierarchies. The state formally supports participatory governance through consultation forums, transparency mechanisms, and stakeholder engagement processes, yet retains substantial control over the scope and consequences of participation. This creates a form of managed participation in which governance appears inclusive while strategic authority

remains concentrated among state and economic elites. Rather than redistributing decision-making power, facilitative governance often functions as a mechanism through which participation is institutionalized without fundamentally altering existing governance relations (Naseemullah, 2023).

The findings therefore suggest that state facilitation in Indonesia's extractive sector operates through persistent power asymmetries. While governance reforms have broadened opportunities for engagement and consultation, they have not consistently strengthened the capacity of local communities to influence resource-related decisions. As a result, facilitative governance contributes to the appearance of collaborative governance while reproducing unequal access to authority, information, and decision-making power. This pattern reinforces the broader argument of this study that governance reforms may create the appearance of inclusion while sustaining institutional conditions associated with the persistence of the resource curse.

3.2.3 Deliberative Participation and Inclusion

Documentary evidence indicates that participatory governance has become an increasingly prominent feature of extractive sector reform in Indonesia. Government regulations, policy frameworks, EITI reports, and governance assessments consistently emphasize stakeholder engagement, public consultation, and multi-stakeholder collaboration as important mechanisms for improving accountability and legitimacy in natural resource governance. These reforms reflect a broader shift toward governance arrangements that formally recognize the role of civil society organizations, Indigenous communities, local governments, and affected populations in extractive sector decision-making.

Despite this institutional commitment to participation, the analysis reveals a persistent gap between formal inclusion and substantive influence. Across multiple documentary sources, participation is frequently incorporated into governance processes through public consultations, stakeholder forums, disclosure mechanisms, and community engagement procedures. However, governance assessments consistently suggest that strategic decisions concerning licensing, resource allocation, environmental approvals, and regulatory enforcement remain concentrated within state institutions and politically influential actors (Kinda & Mien, 2024). As a result, participation often occurs within predetermined institutional boundaries that limit the capacity of non-state actors to influence final policy outcomes.

The findings further indicate that participatory mechanisms are frequently structured around consultation rather than deliberation. While affected stakeholders are commonly invited to provide input, documentary evidence suggests that opportunities for meaningful dialogue and joint decision-making remain limited. In many instances, consultation processes occur after key policy directions have already been established, reducing participation to a mechanism for gathering feedback rather than shaping decisions. Consequently, participation functions more as a procedural requirement than as a deliberative process capable of influencing governance outcomes.

Civil society assessments repeatedly identify structural barriers that constrain the effectiveness of participatory governance. These barriers include unequal access to information, disparities in technical

expertise, limited organizational capacity, and asymmetrical power relations between local communities and state or corporate actors. Reports from governance monitoring organizations indicate that vulnerable groups, including Indigenous peoples, women, and communities directly affected by extraction activities, often face significant obstacles in accessing deliberative spaces and influencing policy processes (Basu & Mishra, 2024; Mishra et al., 2024). Such constraints reduce the capacity of participation mechanisms to address underlying governance inequalities.

The documentary evidence also suggests that participatory outcomes vary considerably across governance contexts. In some regions, stakeholder engagement remains largely symbolic, with consultations conducted primarily to satisfy procedural requirements. Governance assessments from several extractive regions indicate that community participation frequently occurs after licensing or development processes have substantially progressed, limiting opportunities for meaningful intervention. Under such conditions, participation contributes to procedural legitimacy while leaving existing distributions of authority largely unchanged.

Conversely, documentary sources also identify examples where stronger institutional support, greater transparency, and multi-stakeholder accountability mechanisms have enhanced the effectiveness of participation. Governance assessments of local initiatives, including experiences documented in Bojonegoro, suggest that when access to information is strengthened and institutional arrangements provide genuine opportunities for dialogue, participation can contribute to more responsive and context-sensitive governance outcomes (Aziz & Roziqin, 2020; Putri & Lujala, 2023). These experiences demonstrate that the effectiveness of participation depends not only on the existence of participatory mechanisms but also on the broader institutional conditions within which participation occurs.

Within the State Reinforced Self Governance (SRSG) framework, these findings illustrate the distinction between procedural and deliberative participation. State institutions formally promote participation through consultation forums, EITI mechanisms, transparency initiatives, and stakeholder engagement processes. These mechanisms expand opportunities for involvement and strengthen the legitimacy of governance reforms. However, documentary evidence suggests that participation rarely results in a substantive redistribution of authority or decision-making power. Instead, participation is frequently managed within institutional structures that preserve existing governance hierarchies while creating the appearance of inclusiveness.

The findings therefore suggest that deliberative participation remains constrained by persistent power asymmetries within Indonesia’s extractive governance system. Although governance reforms have broadened formal opportunities for engagement, the ability of local communities and civil society actors to shape governance outcomes remains uneven. Consequently, participation often serves as a mechanism of procedural legitimacy rather than a vehicle for transforming governance relations. This pattern reinforces the broader argument of the study that governance reforms can expand formal inclusion while simultaneously reproducing institutional conditions associated with the persistence of the resource curse.

3.3 Institutional Fragmentation and Elite Capture

3.3.1 Institutional Flexibility and Accountability

Documentary evidence indicates that institutional fragmentation remains a persistent feature of governance in Indonesia's extractive sector. Government regulations, governance assessments, and civil society reports consistently identify overlapping authorities, fragmented regulatory frameworks, and inconsistent coordination between national and subnational institutions as major challenges affecting extractive governance. Although decentralization reforms were intended to increase local responsiveness and improve governance effectiveness, the distribution of authority across multiple agencies and governance levels has often generated institutional ambiguity rather than adaptive governance.

The analysis reveals that governance responsibilities related to licensing, environmental oversight, revenue management, and regulatory enforcement are frequently dispersed across multiple institutions with differing mandates and priorities. This fragmentation creates coordination challenges and weakens accountability because responsibility for governance outcomes becomes difficult to trace. Documentary sources repeatedly highlight situations in which regulatory responsibilities overlap, while enforcement mechanisms remain inconsistent across jurisdictions. As a result, institutional arrangements often struggle to respond effectively to local governance challenges and environmental concerns.

The findings further suggest that accountability mechanisms remain unevenly distributed across governance actors. Formal accountability instruments, including audits, anti-corruption oversight, reporting requirements, and public consultation procedures, have been incorporated into governance frameworks. However, governance assessments indicate that these mechanisms often operate within highly bureaucratic structures that limit meaningful public scrutiny and reduce opportunities for downward accountability (Joseph et al., 2016). While local communities are frequently expected to comply with regulatory procedures, their ability to hold state institutions and corporate actors accountable remains comparatively limited.

Documentary evidence also identifies elite capture as a recurring governance pattern within fragmented institutional environments. Reports produced by civil society organizations repeatedly highlight concerns regarding non-transparent resource allocation, preferential access to licensing processes, and unequal influence over regulatory decisions (Addison & Roe, 2024). In such contexts, fragmented governance structures create opportunities for politically connected actors to navigate institutional complexity more effectively than local communities or civil society organizations. Consequently, governance outcomes often reflect unequal access to authority, information, and decision-making channels.

The analysis indicates that institutional flexibility varies considerably across governance contexts. While many governance arrangements remain characterized by bureaucratic rigidity and limited responsiveness, documentary evidence also identifies examples where stronger transparency

mechanisms, improved information access, and more inclusive accountability arrangements have contributed to more adaptive governance practices. These experiences suggest that institutional flexibility is not determined solely by formal institutional design but also by the extent to which governance arrangements facilitate coordination, accountability, and stakeholder engagement.

Within the State Reinforced Self Governance (SRSG) framework, these findings demonstrate that accountability is frequently reinforced selectively rather than uniformly. State institutions formally support accountability through regulatory oversight, auditing mechanisms, and governance monitoring systems, yet the effectiveness of these mechanisms varies significantly across actors and governance levels. Communities and local stakeholders are often subject to regulatory obligations, while politically influential actors may retain greater capacity to shape or circumvent accountability processes. Consequently, accountability contributes to institutional legitimacy without necessarily ensuring equal scrutiny across governance actors.

The documentary evidence suggests that institutional fragmentation and uneven accountability mechanisms reinforce a form of performative self-governance rather than adaptive governance. Governance reforms have expanded formal accountability structures, yet fragmented institutional arrangements continue to constrain coordination, weaken oversight, and create opportunities for elite influence. Within the SRSG framework, these dynamics contribute to the persistence of unequal governance relations despite ongoing reform efforts.

3.3.2 Revisiting the Resource Curse

The findings of this study suggest that the persistence of the resource curse in Indonesia cannot be explained solely by resource abundance or weak institutional capacity. Instead, documentary evidence indicates that governance outcomes are shaped by the interaction of selective decentralization, procedural participation, institutional fragmentation, and uneven accountability mechanisms. These governance arrangements influence how authority, participation, and benefits are distributed across actors and governance levels, thereby shaping the broader political economy of resource extraction.

Across the documentary sources analyzed, governance reforms have frequently expanded formal mechanisms of transparency, participation, and accountability without fundamentally altering underlying power relations. Decentralization has redistributed certain administrative responsibilities to subnational governments, yet strategic authority over resource governance often remains concentrated within state institutions and politically influential actors. Similarly, participatory mechanisms have increased opportunities for consultation and stakeholder engagement while providing limited influence over licensing decisions, environmental oversight, and revenue allocation. These patterns suggest that governance reforms may improve procedural inclusion without substantially redistributing decision-making power.

The findings therefore support institutional perspectives that emphasize the importance of governance quality in shaping resource governance outcomes (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2008; Mehlum et al., 2006).

However, the analysis also suggests that governance quality cannot be understood solely through the presence of formal institutions. In Indonesia's extractive sector, institutions frequently adopt transparency, participation, and accountability mechanisms while continuing to operate through governance arrangements that privilege actors with greater political, economic, and bureaucratic resources. Governance outcomes consequently depend not only on institutional design but also on how institutional rules are implemented and contested in practice.

Documentary evidence further indicates that extractive governance functions as a contested arena in which state institutions, private actors, local governments, civil society organizations, and affected communities compete over access to resources, authority, and benefits. Governance conflicts are therefore not simply disputes over resource ownership but also struggles over who possesses the authority to participate, influence decisions, and shape governance outcomes. This finding is consistent with recent scholarship that views natural resources as politically contested governance spaces rather than as purely economic assets (Ploeg, 2011a; Siakwah, 2017).

Within the State Reinforced Self Governance (SRSG) framework, the persistence of the resource curse emerges from the selective reinforcement of governance mechanisms. Transparency improves information disclosure but does not necessarily redistribute power. Participation expands formal inclusion but often remains procedural. Accountability mechanisms strengthen institutional legitimacy but are applied unevenly across actors. Together, these dynamics produce a governance system that appears increasingly participatory and accountable while continuing to reproduce asymmetrical power relations.

Figure 3 synthesizes the mechanism identified throughout the analysis. Rather than viewing decentralization, participation, and transparency as inherently transformative reforms, the SRSG framework highlights how these governance mechanisms can be selectively implemented and unevenly enforced. In such contexts, governance reforms expand procedural inclusion while preserving existing distributions of authority and resource control. Selective decentralization redistributes administrative responsibilities without transferring substantive decision-making power. Participation broadens formal inclusion but remains constrained within consultation-oriented processes. Fragmented accountability mechanisms further weaken oversight and create opportunities for elite influence. As these mechanisms interact, governance reforms generate institutional legitimacy while reproducing unequal power relations and patterns of resource control.

Source: Processed by Authors (2025)

The Indonesian case therefore demonstrates that the resource curse is not simply a consequence of natural resource abundance. Rather, it is sustained through governance arrangements that distribute authority, participation, and accountability unevenly across governance actors. The persistence of the resource curse emerges not from an absence of governance reforms, but from the selective operation of governance mechanisms that simultaneously promote participation and constrain influence. Governance reforms may therefore create the appearance of institutional transformation while leaving

deeper structures of power, resource control, and inequality largely intact. Within the SRSG framework, the resource curse is best understood as the outcome of selective governance processes that reproduce asymmetrical power relations within formally reformed governance systems.

5 Conclusion

This study examined how State Reinforced Self Governance (SRSG) shapes the persistence of the resource curse in Indonesia's extractive sector. Drawing on political ecology, critical institutionalism, and collaborative governance perspectives, the analysis demonstrates that the persistence of the resource curse cannot be explained solely by resource abundance or weak institutions. Instead, it is closely linked to the ways governance reforms are structured, implemented, and mediated through state–society interactions. The findings show that governance reforms such as decentralization, transparency initiatives, and participatory mechanisms have not fundamentally transformed existing power relations despite their formal commitment to accountability and inclusion.

The qualitative content analysis identified three interrelated mechanisms through which SRSG operates in Indonesia's extractive governance. First, selective decentralization redistributed administrative authority without strengthening accountability institutions, creating opportunities for fragmented oversight and elite influence. Second, procedural participation expanded formal opportunities for stakeholder engagement while limiting substantive influence over policy decisions. Third, institutional fragmentation generated overlapping regulatory frameworks and dispersed responsibilities that facilitated regulatory ambiguity and elite capture across governance levels. Together, these mechanisms produced a form of performative self-governance that maintained the appearance of participation, decentralization, and accountability while preserving unequal distributions of power and limiting meaningful community influence.

The study contributes to resource governance scholarship by developing SRSG as a mechanism-based analytical framework for understanding how governance reforms may reproduce rather than transform structural inequalities in resource-rich settings. By moving beyond conventional debates between centralization and decentralization, the study highlights how governance outcomes are shaped by the interaction between state authority, institutional arrangements, and participatory processes. The Indonesian case demonstrates that governance reforms alone are insufficient to address the resource curse when accountability mechanisms remain weak, participation remains procedural, and institutional arrangements continue to privilege politically and economically powerful actors.

The findings suggest that effective resource governance requires more than the formal expansion of participation or the redistribution of administrative authority. Sustainable governance outcomes depend on strengthening accountability institutions, enabling substantive participation in decision-making processes, and improving coordination across fragmented regulatory systems. Without addressing these underlying governance mechanisms, reforms risk reinforcing existing inequalities while maintaining the appearance of institutional progress.

5.1 Policy Implications

- Strengthen accountability mechanisms across all levels of extractive governance, including licensing, monitoring, and enforcement processes.
- Improve transparency by expanding public access to strategic information related to extractive contracts, revenues, environmental compliance, and regulatory decisions.
- Move beyond procedural consultation by creating institutional mechanisms that enable affected communities to influence decision-making outcomes substantively.
- Harmonize overlapping legal and regulatory frameworks governing mining, forestry, environmental protection, and regional administration to reduce regulatory fragmentation.
- Strengthen the recognition of Indigenous and local community rights within formal governance systems to reduce governance conflicts and improve distributive justice.
- Enhance coordination among central, provincial, and local institutions to ensure that decentralization is accompanied by effective accountability and oversight mechanisms.

5.2 Limitations and Future Research

This study is based on qualitative governance analysis using documentary evidence and therefore focuses primarily on institutional arrangements, policy frameworks, and governance narratives. While documentary sources provide valuable insights into governance processes, they may not fully capture the experiences and perceptions of communities directly affected by extractive activities. Future research could incorporate interviews, ethnographic approaches, or comparative case studies to examine how governance mechanisms are experienced and contested at the local level.

The analysis focuses exclusively on Indonesia during the period 2010–2024. Although the findings offer broader theoretical insights into resource governance in developing countries, governance dynamics may differ across political, institutional, and socio-economic contexts. Comparative research involving other resource-rich countries could further assess the applicability of the SRSG framework and identify variations in how governance reforms shape resource governance outcomes.

Future studies may also explore the interaction between SRSG and emerging governance challenges, including energy transition policies, critical mineral governance, environmental justice, and Indigenous resource rights. Such research would contribute to a deeper understanding of how governance arrangements evolve in response to changing political, economic, and environmental conditions.

Declarations

Funding

Ministry of Higher Education, Science, and Technology for their generous financial support through the Fundamental Research Scheme (105/UN59.7.LPPM-PL/2024).

Data availability

The datasets generated and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Clinical trial number

Not applicable.

Ethics approval

This study received ethical approval from the Research Ethics Committee of Universitas Teuku Umar prior to data collection (Approval No. 124/UN59.L1/AL.04/2024).

Ethical accordance

All research procedures were conducted in accordance with relevant ethical guidelines and regulations for social science research involving human participants, including the principles of voluntary participation, informed consent, anonymity, and confidentiality.

Consent to participate

Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to data collection.

Consent to publish

Not applicable.

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

Author Contribution

II: Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Formal Analysis, Data Curation, Writing – Original Draft, Visualization, Project Administration, Funding Acquisition. VH: Conceptualization, Supervision, Validation, Writing – Review & Editing, Theoretical Framework Development. IMS: Data Curation, Investigation, Formal Analysis, Software, Writing – Review & Editing. EH: Validation, Supervision, Writing – Review & Editing, Policy Analysis, Critical Revision of the Manuscript. APR: Data Curation, Literature Review, Visualization, Writing – Review & Editing.

Acknowledgement

We thank the Ministry of Higher Education, Science, and Technology for their generous financial support through the Fundamental Research Scheme (105/UN59.7.LPPM-PL/2024). We are also profoundly grateful to Universitas Teuku Umar, Indonesia, for their steadfast support throughout the research process.

References

1. Addison, T., & Roe, A. R. (2024). *Extractive industries: addressing transparency, corruption, and theft* (WIDER Working Paper, Vol. 2024). UNU-WIDER. https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2024/490-8
2. Akhmaddhian, S., Budiman, H., Bhandari, R., & Najicha, F. U. (2023). The Strengthening Government Policies on Mineral and Coal Mining to Achieve Environmental Sustainability in Indonesia, Africa and Germany. *BESTUUR*, *11*(1 (August)), 95. https://doi.org/10.20961/bestuur.v11i1.71279
3. Al Hindasi, Y., Ilbeigi, M., Ebrahimi Tajadod, O., karimi, M., A. Baitfarhan, M., Yavarinoori, S., & Alnejem, M. (2026). Performance driven form finding methodology for energy efficient building design based on energy consumption optimization. *Discover Sustainability*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43621-026-03743-3
4. Annahar, N., Widianingsih, I., Paskarina, C., & Muhtar, E. A. (2023). A bibliometric review of inclusive governance concept. *Cogent Social Sciences*, *9*(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2168839
5. Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *18*(4), 543–571. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum032
6. Arellano-Yanguas, J. (2011). Aggravating the Resource Curse: Decentralisation, Mining and Conflict in Peru. *The Journal of Development Studies*, *47*(4), 617–638. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220381003706478
7. Auty, R. M. (2007). Natural resources, capital accumulation and the resource curse. *Ecological Economics*, *61*(4), 627–634. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.09.006
8. Aziz, F. N., & Roziqin, A. (2020). The Perspective of Bureaucratic Reform (Kang Yoto's Leadership) in Bojonegoro. *JAKPP (Jurnal Analisis Kebijakan & Pelayanan Publik)*, 126–142. https://doi.org/10.31947/jakpp.v6i2.10014
9. Basu, D., & Mishra, S. (2024). Mine reclamation practices and effects of stakeholder perception — a case study of Saoner mines, Maharashtra, India. *Journal of Engineering and Applied Science*, *71*(1), 62. https://doi.org/10.1186/s44147-024-00393-y
10. Bebbington, A., Humphreys Bebbington, D., Bury, J., Lingan, J., Muñoz, J. P., & Scurrah, M. (2008). Mining and Social Movements: Struggles Over Livelihood and Rural Territorial Development in the Andes. *World Development*, *36*(12), 2888–2905. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.11.016
11. Bevir, M. (2011). Governance and governmentality after neoliberalism. *Policy & Politics*, *39*(4), 457–471. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557310X550141

12. Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method. *Qualitative Research Journal*, *9*(2), 27–40. https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027
13. Bridge, G. (2004). Contested Terrain: Mining and the Environment. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, *29*(1), 205–259. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.energy.28.011503.163434
14. Brunnschweiler, C. N., & Bulte, E. H. (2008). The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, *55*(3), 248–264. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2007.08.004
15. Buchenrieder, G., Dufhues, T., Theesfeld, I., & Nuchanata, M. (2017). Participatory local governance and cultural practices in Thailand. *Cogent Social Sciences*, *3*(1), 1338331. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2017.1338331
16. Byrne, D. (2022). A worked example of Braun and Clarke's approach to reflexive thematic analysis. *Quality & Quantity*, *56*(3), 1391–1412. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-021-01182-y
17. Cleaver, F., & Whaley, L. (2018). Understanding process, power, and meaning in adaptive governance: a critical institutional reading. *Ecology and Society*, *23*(2), art49. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-10212-230249
18. DeCaro, D., Schlager, E., & Frimpong Boamah, E. (2025). The State-reinforced self-governance framework: conceptualizing and diagnosing legal and other institutional foundations of adaptive and transformative environmental governance. *Ecology and Society*, *30*(2), art1. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-15567-300201
19. Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2011). *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Sage.
20. Durani, F., Abbas, H. G., Yeo, S. F., Keoy, K. H., Asif, M. F., Syed, Q. R., & Anwar, A. (2026). Examining the role of geopolitical risk, economic complexity, and renewable energy on environmental quality for proposing sustainable development goals policy framework. *Discover Sustainability*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43621-026-03676-x
21. Elo, S., Kääriäinen, M., Kanste, O., Pölkki, T., Utriainen, K., & Kyngäs, H. (2014). Qualitative Content Analysis. *Sage Open*, *4*(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244014522633
22. Enworo, O. C. (2023). Application of Guba and Lincoln's parallel criteria to assess trustworthiness of qualitative research on indigenous social protection systems. *Qualitative Research Journal*, *23*(4), 372–384. https://doi.org/10.1108/QRJ-08-2022-0116
23. Fenton Villar, P. (2022). An assessment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) using the Bayesian Corruption Indicator. *Environment and Development Economics*, *27*(5), 414–435. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X21000383
24. Fereday, J., & Muir-Cochrane, E. (2006). Demonstrating Rigor Using Thematic Analysis: A Hybrid Approach of Inductive and Deductive Coding and Theme Development. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, *5*(1), 80–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/160940690600500107
25. Fernando, H., Larasati, Y. G., Abdullah, I., Ismail, I., Yunani, A., Nastain, M., & Morin, L. (2024). The Controversy of Indonesian Democracy Practices in The Post-Reform. *Al-Risalah: Forum Kajian Hukum Dan Sosial Kemasyarakatan*, *24*(2), 159–177. https://doi.org/10.30631/alrisalah.v24i2.1594

26. Hadiz, V. R. (2004). Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives. *Development and Change*, *35*(4), 697–718. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0012-155X.2004.00376.x
27. Hajad, V. (2021). The dilemma of natural resources: Economic opportunities and challenges post-conflict. *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, *11*(1). https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.10326
28. Hajad, V., Fadhly, Z., Husna, C. A., Ikhsan, I., & Setiawan, D. (2025). Mobilizing for Conservation: The Role of Social Movements in Damaran Baru Ecovillage, Indonesia. *Forest and Society*, *9*(1), 216–239. https://doi.org/10.24259/fs.v9i1.36337
29. Hajad, V., Ikhsan, I., Herizal, H., Latif, I. R., & Marefanda, N. (2023). Poverty and the Curse of Natural Resources in Indonesia. *Journal of Contemporary Governance and Public Policy*, *4*(1), 41–58. https://doi.org/10.46507/jcgpp.v4i1.92
30. Hajad, V., & Susetiawan, S. (2022). Diffusion of Ideology and Role of Local Party Control to Understand Aceh Post-War. *Journal of Government and Civil Society*, *6*(1), 71. https://doi.org/10.31000/jgcs.v6i1.5518
31. Heijlen, W., & Duhayon, C. (2024). An empirical estimate of the land footprint of nickel from laterite mining in Indonesia. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, *17*, 101421. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2024.101421
32. Hidjaz, K. (2019). Effectiveness of Environmental Policy Enforcement and the Impact by Industrial Mining, Energy, Mineral, and Gas Activities in Indonesia. *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, *9*(6), 79–85. https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.8146
33. Ikhsan, I., Hajad, V., & Saputra, I. M. (2024). *Good Extractive Governance: Membangun Kesejahteraan Masyarakat Di Kawasan Pertambangan*. Deepublish.
34. Ikhsan, I., Hajad, V., Saputra, I. M., Herizal, H., & Latif, I. R. (2025). Governance-Driven Solutions for Empowering Women in the Mining Sector: Tackling Gender Inequality Through Inclusive Policies. *Journal of Contemporary Governance and Public Policy*, *6*(1).
35. Joseph, C., Gunawan, J., Sawani, Y., Rahmat, M., Avelind Noyem, J., & Darus, F. (2016). A comparative study of anti-corruption practice disclosure among Malaysian and Indonesian Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) best practice companies. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, *112*, 2896–2906. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.10.091
36. Kapinga, A. G., Mushi, C. W., & Amanzi, N. (2026). Rethinking household energy transition in Tanzania through the lens of poverty and social norms. *Discover Sustainability*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43621-026-03765-x
37. Kinda, H., & Mien, E. (2024a). Does transparency pay? Natural resources, financial development and the extractive industries transparency initiative (EITI). *World Development*, *179*, 106603. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106603
38. Kinda, H., & Mien, E. (2024b). Does transparency pay? Natural resources, financial development and the extractive industries transparency initiative (EITI). *World Development*, *179*, 106603.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106603

39. Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. (2009). It's the rents, stupid! The political economy of the resource curse. *Energy Policy*, *37*(12), 5317–5325. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.055
40. Kothari, U. (2006). From Colonialism to development: Reflections of former Colonial Officers. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, *44*(1), 118–136. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662040600624502
41. Latif, I. R., Hajad, V., Handayani, S. W., Sudarman, S., & Aziz, C. I. (2024). Sustainable Forests, Divided Power: Navigating the Complexities of Customary Forest Resource of Management in Aceh Jaya. *Journal of Governance and Social Policy*, *5*(1), 46–62. https://doi.org/10.24815/gaspol.v5i1.36219
42. Le Billon, P., & Spiegel, S. (2022). Cleaning mineral supply chains? Political economies of exploitation and hidden costs of technical fixes. *Review of International Political Economy*, *29*(3), 768–791. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2021.1899959
43. Makinde, O., & Le Billon, P. (2023). Artificial intelligence and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as anti-corruption tools for Canadian extractive companies. *Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law*, *41*(1), 27–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/02646811.2022.2087340
44. Marquardt, J. (2014). A Struggle of Multi-level Governance: Promoting Renewable Energy in Indonesia. *Energy Procedia*, *58*, 87–94. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2014.10.413
45. McCarthy, J. F. (2004). Changing to Gray: Decentralization and the Emergence of Volatile Socio-Legal Configurations in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. *World Development*, *32*(7), 1199–1223. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.02.002
46. Mehlum, H., Moene, K., & Torvik, R. (2006). Institutions and the Resource Curse. *The Economic Journal*, *116*(508), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01045.x
47. Mishra, P. P., Sravan, Ch., & Mishra, S. K. (2024). Extracting empowerment: A critical review on violence against women in mining and mineral extraction. *Energy Research & Social Science*, *109*, 103414. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2024.103414
48. Murombo, T. (2022). The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in Zimbabwe: an appraisal of prospects and challenges. *Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law*, *40*(1), 133–153. https://doi.org/10.1080/02646811.2021.1894006
49. Mursyidin, M., Hajad, V., & Ikhsan, I. (2022). Aceh's Local Elite Power Strategy. *Journal of Governance and Public Policy*, *9*(2), 124–136. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.18196/jgpp.v9i2.12930
50. Naseemullah, A. (2023). The political economy of national development: A research agenda after neoliberal reform? *World Development*, *168*, 106269. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106269
51. Nasution, A. (2017). The government decentralization program in Indonesia. In *Central and Local Government Relations in Asia*. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786436870.00017
52. Nowell, L. S., Norris, J. M., White, D. E., & Moules, N. J. (2017). Thematic Analysis. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, *16*(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/1609406917733847

53. Patton, M. Q. (2015). *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and Practice* (4th ed.). Sage Publication.
54. Ploeg, F. van der. (2011). Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing? *Journal of Economic Literature*, *49*(2), 366–420. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.49.2.366
55. Purwins, S. (2022). Bauxite mining at Atewa Forest Reserve, Ghana: a political ecology of a conservation-exploitation conflict. *GeoJournal*, *87*(2), 1085–1097. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-020-10303-3
56. Putri, P., & Lujala, P. (2023). Assessing the Transformative Potential of Extractive Sector Transparency Initiatives: Evidence from Local Oil Revenue Management in Indonesia. *The Journal of Development Studies*, *59*(12), 1787–1806. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2023.2244635
57. Resosudarmo, B. P., Rezki, J. F., & Effendi, Y. (2023). Prospects of Energy Transition in Indonesia. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, *59*(2), 149–177. https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2023.2238336
58. Robbins, P. (2020). Is less more … or is more less? Scaling the political ecologies of the future. *Political Geography*, *76*, 102018. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.04.010
59. Rosser, A., & Kartika, W. (2020). Conflict, contestation, and corruption reform: the political dynamics of the EITI in Indonesia. *Contemporary Politics*, *26*(2), 147–164. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2019.1693244
60. Rosyida, I., Khan, W., & Sasaoka, M. (2018). Marginalization of a coastal resource-dependent community: A study on Tin Mining in Indonesia. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, *5*(1), 165–176. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.11.002
61. Rusiana, A. (2022). Regulations for sustainable development in the environment and forestry. *South Florida Journal of Development*, *3*(5), 6237–6254. https://doi.org/10.46932/sfjdv3n5-042
62. Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). The curse of natural resources. *European Economic Review*, *45*(4–6), 827–838. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00125-8
63. Sahide, M. A. K., & Giessen, L. (2015). The fragmented land use administration in Indonesia – Analysing bureaucratic responsibilities influencing tropical rainforest transformation systems. *Land Use Policy*, *43*, 96–110. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.11.005
64. Setiawan, E. N., Maryudi, A., Purwanto, R. H., & Lele, G. (2016). Opposing interests in the legalization of non-procedural forest conversion to oil palm in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. *Land Use Policy*, *58*, 472–481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.08.003
65. Siakwah, P. (2017). Are natural resource windfalls a blessing or a curse in democratic settings? Globalised assemblages and the problematic impacts of oil on Ghana's development. *Resources Policy*, *52*, 122–133. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2017.02.008
66. Stolle, D., & Hooghe, M. (2011). Shifting Inequalities . *European Societies*, *13*(1), 119–142. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2010.523476
67. Susniwati, M. Si., Zamili, Moh., & Sriwahyuni, N. (2021). Democracy, transparency, and participation through the openness of public information in pemalang regency, Indonesia. *Public Administration*

and Regional Development, (12), 493–511. https://doi.org/10.34132/pard2021.12.09

68. Tias, P. A., McDermott, C. L., & Mulyani, M. E. (2026). Navigating the nexus between customary norms and state laws in shaping rural forest governance: A case study in Aceh Province, Indonesia. *Forest Policy and Economics*, *182*, 103672. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2025.103672
69. Werner, T. T., Toumbourou, T., Maus, V., Lukas, M. C., Sonter, L. J., Muhdar, M., Runting, R. K., & Bebbington, A. (2024). Patterns of infringement, risk, and impact driven by coal mining permits in Indonesia. *Ambio*, *53*(2), 242–256. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-023-01944-y
70. Winanti, P. S., & Hanif, H. (2020). When global norms meet local politics: Localising transparency in extractive industries governance. *Environmental Policy and Governance*, *30*(5), 263–275. https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.1907
71. Y. R. Watofa, Y., Amir, M., Huda, M., & Pitriani, P. (2025). Integration of Customary Law and State Law in Resolving Natural Resource Conflicts in Indigenous Areas. *Journal of the American Institute*, *2*(8), 1212–1219. https://doi.org/10.71364/178dhm07
72. Yanuardi, Y., Vijge, M. J., & Biermann, F. (2021). Improving governance quality through global standard setting? Experiences from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Indonesia. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, *8*(3), 100905. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2021.100905

Figures




Figure 1

Regulatory Complexity in Indonesia’s Extractive Governance Framework

Source: Processed by Authors (2025)




Figure 2

Reform trajectory from transparency to participatory extractive governance

Source: Processed by Authors (2025)




Figure 3

State-Reinforced Self-Governance and the Persistence of the Resource Curse

Source: Processed by Authors (2025)