

Appendix

A1. Outcome Variables

A1.1 Coding of far-right anti-immigration parties

Since the ESS dataset does not provide a pre-coded measure of closeness to far-right parties, I manually created this variable using 1) a variable that asks whether or not the respondent feels close to any political party in general and, for those who indicated an affiliation, 2) party identification, which is asked across different countries. Given the variation in party systems and political landscapes across Europe, this process required careful manual inspection and coding to accurately classify each party as far-right or not. More than half of the respondents (52%) in the sample indicated that they felt close to any political party, not just far-right parties. Individuals who expressed no closeness to any party, or who expressed feeling close to non-far-right parties, are coded as 0. Based on my knowledge and research of each country’s political landscape, I compiled a comprehensive list of parties classified as far-right and anti-immigration. This list is documented in Table [A1](#), which includes the names of such parties and coalitions.

Table A1. Identified Far-Right Anti-Immigration Parties.

Country	Listed Parties/Coalitions
Belgium	Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang Parti Populaire Front National
Czech Republic	Republicans of Miroslav Sladek Úsvit přímé demokracie Tomia Okamury Svoboda a přímá demokracie
France	Front/Rassemblement National Debout la France Mouvement National Républicain
Hungary	Fidesz Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom Mi Hazánk Mozgalom
Italy	Fratelli d'Italia Italexit Lega Fiamma Tricolore Vox Italia Casapound Italia
Netherlands	Party for Freedom Belang van Nederland Forum for Democracy JA21 Group Geert Wilders List Pim Fortuyn
Portugal	CHEGA Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR)/Ergue-te Partido Democrático do Atlântico
Slovak Republic	Slovak National Party SME Rodina ĽS Naše Slovensko
Slovenia	Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka
Spain	VOX
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party Brexit Party British National Party

Note that some of these far-right parties may not have been active or present throughout the entire sample period.

I assigned 0 to individuals who either do not feel close to any political party or who feel closest to a party that is not listed in Table [A1](#) as far-right and anti-immigration, or 1 to individuals who feel closest to any party listed in Table [A1](#) as far-right and anti-immigration.

For further analysis purposes (see Section [A6](#)), I also provide a complementary table (Table [A2](#)) identifying the parties within the other political groups (right, centre, left, far-left).

Table A2. Other Identified Parties (Continued on Next Page)

Country	Position	Parties/Coalitions
Belgium	Right	N-VA, Lijst Dedecker, VLD, Open VLD, DéFI
Belgium	Centre	CD&V, Les Engagés (CDH), NCD, Mouvement Réformateur (MR)
Belgium	Far-left	RESIST, PVDA+/PVDA
Belgium	Left	Agalev/Agalev/Groen!/Groen!, Sp.a (Vooruit), Spirit, Vivant, ECOLO, Ecolo, PS, PTB
Czech Republic	Right	ODA Civic Democratic Alliance, TOP 09, Association of Independents, ODS, Starostové a nezávislí, PB Right Block
Czech Republic	Centre	Naděje (Hope), KDU-ČSL, ANO 2011, ČSNS, VV, KDU-CSL Christian Democratic P., US Freedom Union
Czech Republic	Far-left	KSČM
Czech Republic	Left	ČSSD, SV-SOS P.of Countryside-Assoc.Civic Forces, Česká pirátská strana, SZJ P.for Life Securities, SZ
France	Right	CPNT (Chasse, Pêche, Nature et Traditions), CPNT (Chasse, pêche, nature et traditions), DL (Démocratie Libérale), MPF (Mouvement pour la France), LR (Les Républicains), UDI (Union des Démocrates Indépendants), UDI (Union des démocrates indépendants), RPF (Rassemblement du Peuple Français), UMP (L'Union), UMP (Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle), UMP (Union de la Majorité Présidentielle), UDF (Union pour la démocratie française), UDF-MoDem (Mouvement Démocrate), UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire), LR (Les Républicains), UDF (Union pour la Démocratie Française)
France	Centre	MoDem (Mouvement Démocrate), PR (Parti Radical Valoisien), Nouveau Centre, LREM (La République en Marche)
France	Far-left	LCR (Ligue communiste révolutionnaire), LO (Lutte Ouvrière), NPA (Nouveau Parti Anti-Capitaliste), PCF (Parti Communiste Français), PC (Parti Communiste)
France	Left	La France Insoumise (LFI), Mouvement républicain et citoyen (MRC), Mouvement des citoyens (MDC), Parti de Gauche (PG), Parti Radical de Gauche (PRG), PS (Parti Socialiste), Europe Ecologie Les Verts (EELV), Autres mouvements écologistes
Hungary	Right	ISHP-Independent Small Holders, CM (Civil Mozgalom), HDF- Hungarian Democratic Forum, FKNP (FÜGGETLEN KISGAZDA-, NEMZETI EGYSÉG PÁRT), KDNP, KDP (KERESZTÉNYDEMOKRATAPÁRT- ... YSZOCIÁLIS CENTRUM ÖSSZEFOGÁS), MDF, Kereszténydemokrata Párt - Keresztény Centrum Összefogás, Kereszténydemokrata Part - Keresztény Centrum Összefogás, KDNP (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt), MKP (MAGYARORSZÁGI KISEBBSÉGEK PÁRTJA), MDF/JESZ (Magyar Demokrata Fórum / Jólét És Szabadság), MVPP (MAGYAR VIDÉK ÉS POLGÁRI PÁRT), Magyar Vidék és Polgári Párt, Magyar Videk es Polgari Part
Hungary	Centre	Élőlánc, Centrum Párt (Centrum Összefogás Magyarorszáért), Roma Összefogás Párt (MCF), MAGYARORSZÁGI ROMÁK DEMOKRATIKUS PÁRTJA (MRDP), MAGYARORSZÁGI ROMA ÖSSZEFOGÁS PÁRT (MRÖP), Momentum Mozgalom, NÉP (Normális Élet Pártja), MEMO (Megoldás Mozgalom)
Hungary	Far-left	Munkáspárt 2006, Munkáspárt (Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt)
Hungary	Left	4K (Negyedik Köztársaság), Együtt2014 Mozgalom, Demokratikus Koalíció (DK), Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP), Free Democrats (FFD), Párbeszéd (Párbeszéd Magyarorszáért Párt), Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt (MKKP), Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt (MSZP), Lehet Más a Politika (LMP), SZDSZ (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége - A Magyar Liberális Párt)
Italy	Right	Alternativa popolare, Forza Italia, Popolo della Libertà (PDL), Alleanza Nazionale, CCD-CDU, Noi con l'Italia - UDC, Nuovo PSI, Il popolo della famiglia, La destra
Italy	Centre	La Margherita, + EUROPA, Italia Europa Insieme, Civica Popolare Lorenzin, Scelta Civica (con Monti), SVP-PATT, Südtirol Volkspartei (SVP), UDC, FLI, FARE - Giannino, Lista di Pietro, Civica Popolare Lorenzin, Democrazia Europea, Pannella-Bonino, Italia Viva, Unione Valdotaie, Azione di Calenda
Italy	Far-left	Rivoluzione Civile (Ingroia), Rifondazione Comunista, Potere al popolo, Partito Comunista
Italy	Left	Democratici di Sinistra, Partito Democratico (PD), Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà (SEL), Comunisti Italiani, Verdi, Verdi e SDI (Girasole), SDI, Articolo 1 Mdp, Liberi e Uguali, Sinistra italiana, Radicali Italiani (Amnistia giustizia e libertà), Ulivo, Partito Socialista, Verdi/ Europa Verde
Netherlands	Right	Christian Democratic Appeal, People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, Christian Union, Liveable Netherlands, Reformed Political Party, 50Plus, TON (List Verdonk), Pieter Omtzigt, 50PLUS, BoerBurger-Beweging, Omtzigt/NSC
Netherlands	Centre	Democrats '66
Netherlands	Left	Labour Party, Green Left, Socialist Party, DENK, Article 1, Party for the Animals, Pirate Party, Volt

Table A3. Other Identified Parties (Continued)

Country	Position	Parties/Coalitions
Portugal	Right	A - Aliança, CDS/PP - Centro Democrático Social / Partido Popular, CDS/PP - Centro Democrático Social/Partido Popular, Centro Democrático Social - Partido Popular (CDS-PP), MPT - Movimento Partido da Terra, CDS-PP - CDS-Partido Popular, Movimento Partido da Terra (MPT), PDA - Partido Democrático do Atlântico, Partido Democrático do Atlântico (PDA), IL - Iniciativa Liberal, NC - Nós, Cidadãos!, PND - Partido da Nova Democracia, Nova democracia (PND), PPV/CDC - Partido Cidadania e Democracia Cristã, PPM - Partido Popular Monárquico, MPT - Partido da Terra, PSD - Partido Social Democrata, CDS-PP
Portugal	Centre	Partido Humanista (PH), Juntos pelo Povo (JPP), Partido Social Democrata (PPD/PSD), Partido Democrático Republicano (PDR)
Portugal	Far-left	Partido Comunista do Proletariado Português (PCTP-MRPP), Partido Comunista Português (PCP), Partido Operário de Unidade Socialista (POUS), Movimento Alternativa Socialista (MAS)
Portugal	Left	Bloco de Esquerda (BE), PTP-MAS - Agir, Partido Comunista Português/Partido Ecologista os Verdes (PCP-PEV), Coligação Democrática Unitária (CDU), LIVRE, Partido Socialista (PS), Partido Trabalhista Português (PTP), Pessoas-Animais-Natureza (PAN), Volt Portugal (VP), Partido Ecologista os Verdes (PEV)
Slovak Republic	Right	HZDS Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OLaNO), Obyčajní Ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti, SDKU Slovak Democratic Christian Union, Slovak Democratic Christian Union (SDKU), SMK Party of Hungarian Coalition, Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK), Most-Híd, KDH Christian Democratic Movement, Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), ANO New Citizen's Alliance, Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), Sloboda a Solidarita (SaS), Siet
Slovak Republic	Left	Smer-SD (Direction-Social Democracy)
Slovak Republic	Far-left	Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS)
Slovenia	Right	SDS - Slovenska demokratska stranka, SLS - Slovenska ljudska stranka, LIPA - Party, SDS - Socialdemokratska Stranka Slovenije, NSI - Nova Slovenija - Kršćanski demokrati, DL - Državljsanska lista, Državljsansko gibanje Resni.ca, Povežimo Slovenijo (Konkretno, Zeleni Slovenije, SLS, NLS, NS)
Slovenia	Centre	Demokratska stranka upokojenjcev Slovenije (DESUS), Stranka Alenke Bratušek (SAB), Stranka Mladih Slovenije (SMS)
Slovenia	Left	Liberalna demokracija Slovenije (LDS), Levica, Lista Marjana Šarca (LMŠ), Združena lista socialnih demokratov (ZLSD), Socialni demokrati (SD), Pozitivna Slovenija (PS), Stranka Mira Cerarja (SMC), Stranka za Trajnostni Razvoj Slovenije (TRS), Zavezníštvo Alenke Bratušek (ZAAB), Združena levica (DSD, IDS in Stranka TRS), Zares/nova politika, VERJAMEM - Stranka Igorja Šoltesa, Gibanje svoboda
Spain	Right	Partido Popular (PP), Partido Popular, PP, Partido Popular - PP, Junts x Cat, CDC-PdeCAT, Junts per Catalunya/PDeCAT, Foro de Ciudadanos, UPN, Navarra Suma
Spain	Centre	Convergència i Unió (CiU), Unión, Progreso y Democracia (UPyD), Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), Coalición Canaria-Partido Nacionalista Canario (CC-PNC), Coalición Canaria (CC), Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD), EAJ-PNV, PRC, Ciudadanos
Spain	Left	PSOE, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), AMAIUR, Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds (ICV), Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), Compromís-Podemos-EUPV, Más País, Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG), Coalición Canaria/Nueva Canarias, Partido Andalucista (PA), Chunta Aragonesista (CHA), Nafarroa-Bai (NA-BAI), Geroa Bai, EH Bildu, Podem
Spain	Far-left	Izquierda Unida (IU), Unidas Podemos, En Comú Podem, En Marea, Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP)
United Kingdom	Right	Conservative
United Kingdom	Centre	Liberal Democrat
United Kingdom	Left	Labour, Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, Green Party

A1.2 Coding of standardized scales

The outputs of the Cronbach's alpha analyses are presented in Table A4. The reliability coefficients for all scales fall within the acceptable range of Cronbach's alpha values (0.58-0.97), which is deemed "satisfactory" in line with the standards set by leading science education journals (Taber 2018). Notably, the majority of these coefficients exceed 0.70, placing them within the 'high reliability' category.

Table A4. Outputs of the Cronbach's Alpha Analyses

Scale	Average interitem correlation	Number of items in the scale	Scale reliability coefficient
Standardized scale across countries	0.3177	6	0.7364
Standardized scale within the United Kingdom	0.4153	6	0.8099
Standardized scale within Belgium	0.2798	6	0.6998
Standardized scale within the Netherlands	0.2562	6	0.6739
Standardized scale within France	0.3478	6	0.7619
Standardized scale within Portugal	0.2605	6	0.6788
Standardized scale within Italy	0.3491	6	0.7629
Standardized scale within Spain	0.3598	6	0.7713
Standardized scale within Slovenia	0.2717	6	0.6912
Standardized scale within Hungary	0.2486	6	0.6650
Standardized scale within Czech Republic	0.2879	6	0.7081
Standardized scale within Slovak Republic	0.2853	6	0.7055

A2. Validity of RD specification


A2.1 Density test

Manipulation of the running variable is not a major concern in this setting: eligibility for conscription is determined strictly by birth year, a characteristic that individuals cannot influence. Nevertheless, a jump in the density could, in principle, threaten the comparability of observations just above and below the reform threshold. Originally proposed by McCrary (2008) and later refined through local-polynomial methods by Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2018), density discontinuity or manipulation tests provide a way to evaluate this possibility.

In practice here, global imbalances in the distribution of birth cohorts across survey waves and countries mechanically generate differences in the number of observations on either side of the cutoff. Such differences however do not reflect sorting but arise from sample design and the staggered timing of reforms. I implement the Cattaneo–Jansson–Ma local-polynomial manipulation test (`rddensity`) using a bandwidth in the same order of magnitude as the one optimally selected by `rdrobust` in the main RD specification (approximately 12 cohort years). The resulting density plot, shown in Figure A1, displays smooth densities on both sides of the cutoff, and the corresponding test statistic fails to reject the null of density continuity (p-value > 0.10). Taken together, these results confirm the absence of manipulation of the running variable in the relevant local window, supporting the validity of the RD design.

A2.2 Continuity test

I also examine the individual characteristics of respondents on both sides of the reform date, focusing on their self-reported gender, age, highest level of education, years of education, parental education



Density estimates are obtained using the local-polynomial manipulation test of Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2018), implemented via `rddensity`.

Figure A1. Manipulation Testing Plot.

level, income, unemployment status and whether the individual was born abroad or in the country. The results, presented in Table A5, are based on the same estimation method used in the main paper. They indicate that respondents on either side of the discontinuity are, on average, statistically balanced.

Table A5. Continuity Test.

	Age	Gender	Highest Edu.	Years of Edu.	Edu. Mother	Edu. Father	Income	Unemployed	Foreign Born
Reform	-0.024 (0.170)	0.001 (0.013)	0.029 (0.027)	0.150 (0.103)	0.081 (0.089)	0.059 (0.085)	0.111 (0.096)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.002 (0.002)
N.	12500	31140	14533	12356	2435	3449	18786	18786	33689
Mean	43.760	0.483	1.678	12.458	1.792	1.990	6.612	0.054	0.007
Bandwidth	6	14	7	6	8	10	9	9	15
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Coefficients are estimated using a local linear regression, different polynomial orders to construct the bias-correction, a triangular kernel function to construct the local-polynomial estimator, and the standard Mean Squared Error optimal data-driven bandwidth selector (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014). Data for the main dependent and independent variables come from 11 rounds of the European Social Survey (europeansocialsurvey.org). Standard errors are in parentheses. + denotes $p < 0.1$, * denotes $p < 0.05$, ** denotes $p < 0.01$, and *** denotes $p < 0.001$.

A3. Robustness to modeling choices

A3.1 Alternative bandwidths

Another critical aspect of RD estimation is the selection of the bandwidth, which determines the range of observations considered close enough to the cutoff to be included in the analysis. In Figure A2, I explore the sensitivity of the estimated impact of the abolition of conscription on immigration attitudes to different bandwidths. Specifically, I experiment with both narrower and wider bandwidths than

the original specification, letting them vary between 4 and 15 years around the threshold. I obtain a common trend for all 8 items, although more consistent and pronounced for those variables for which this analysis finds significant effects (i.e., items 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8). More specifically, I obtain negative coefficients in all specifications for each of the variables studied: their magnitude is maximal with a bandwidth of 4 years, then decreases and stabilizes as I widen the sample around the threshold.




Figure A2. Anti-Immigration Attitudes by RD Bandwidth.

A3.2 Alternative polynomial orders and kernel function

Another important modeling choice in RD estimation is the polynomial order used to approximate the functional relationship between the running variable and the outcome. The choice of polynomial order (whether linear, quadratic, or higher) affects the smoothness and flexibility of the estimated relationship. In this section, I present the coefficients for three different polynomial orders. I also test the robustness of the findings by using a rectangular kernel instead of a triangular one in the RD estimation in a second approach. The choice of kernel weights influences the emphasis placed on observations depending on their proximity to the cutoff. A triangular kernel assigns greater weight to observations closer to the threshold, while a rectangular kernel gives equal weight to all observations within the selected bandwidth (Jacob et al. 2012), regardless of their distance from the cutoff. Results of these tests are summarized in Table A6. The direction and magnitude of the treatment effect remain consistent across both specifications, even if weaker across the rectangular kernel specification. This suggests that the estimated effects are not overly sensitive to the weighting of observations immediately around the threshold, which increases confidence in the robustness of the findings.

Table A6. Alternative Polynomial Orders.

Triangular kernel												
	Anti-immigration ("none" only)			Anti-immigration ("none" or "few")			Immigration is bad for the economy			Immigration undermines local culture		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reform	-0.012 (0.017)	-0.019 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.022)	0.000 (0.026)	-0.042* (0.019)	-0.047* (0.023)	-0.042 (0.027)	-0.056** (0.019)	-0.065** (0.023)	-0.062* (0.029)
N	12503	20776	20776	20776	20776	24362	12646	21004	26944	12646	19823	23465
Mean	0.251	0.252	0.252	0.640	0.640	0.641	0.439	0.438	0.438	0.379	0.372	0.371
Bandwidth	12	19	19	19	19	22	12	19	24	12	18	21
Polynomial	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Rectangular kernel												
	Anti-immigration ("none" only)			Anti-immigration ("none" or "few")			Immigration is bad for the economy			Immigration undermines local culture		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reform	-0.061** (0.022)	-0.065** (0.026)	-0.077** (0.028)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.060* (0.028)	-0.076** (0.030)	-0.074+ (0.039)	-0.061* (0.029)	-0.078* (0.031)	-0.075+ (0.039)
N	9185	17441	25799	11131	14471	20366	11438	24621	25799	11438	24621	25799
Mean	0.435	0.435	0.434	0.083	0.081	0.077	0.085	0.082	0.081	0.093	0.083	0.082
Bandwidth	9	16	23	15	19	26	11	22	23	11	22	23
Polynomial	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Rectangular kernel												
	Anti-immigration ("none" only)			Anti-immigration ("none" or "few")			Immigration is bad for the economy			Immigration undermines local culture		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reform	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.023 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.000 (0.024)	-0.035+ (0.019)	-0.043+ (0.023)	-0.060* (0.026)	-0.058** (0.020)	-0.070** (0.022)	-0.062* (0.028)
N	13698	23215	20776	14863	20776	27822	11438	17441	26944	9185	18607	22251
Mean	0.251	0.253	0.252	0.638	0.640	0.641	0.439	0.438	0.438	0.385	0.372	0.371
Bandwidth	13	21	19	14	19	25	11	16	24	9	17	20
Polynomial	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Rectangular kernel												
	Immigration reduces local livability			Feel close to far-right			Anti-immigration scale (across)			Anti-immigration scale (within)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reform	-0.051* (0.022)	-0.058* (0.026)	-0.078** (0.026)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.053+ (0.028)	-0.078* (0.031)	-0.069+ (0.038)	-0.059+ (0.031)	-0.081* (0.032)	-0.084* (0.038)
N	8153	13854	25799	7739	10298	16169	9185	18607	23465	8153	18607	24621
Mean	0.437	0.435	0.434	0.084	0.083	0.080	0.085	0.083	0.083	0.101	0.084	0.083
Bandwidth	8	13	23	11	14	21	9	17	21	8	17	22
Polynomial	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ESS round FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Coefficients are estimated using a local linear regression, different polynomial orders to construct the bias-correction, a triangular kernel function to construct the local-polynomial estimator, and the standard Mean Squared Error optimal data-driven bandwidth selector (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014). Data for the main dependent and independent variables come from 11 rounds of the European Social Survey (europeansocialsurvey.org). Standard errors are in parentheses. + denotes $p < 0.1$, * denotes $p < 0.05$, ** denotes $p < 0.01$, and *** denotes $p < 0.001$.

A3.3 Adjusted p-values for multiple comparisons

To address the issue of multiple comparisons across all the tests, I applied the Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) procedure to adjust the p-values. This adjustment controls the False Discovery Rate (FDR), which represents the expected proportion of false positives among all significant results. By applying this adjustment, I aimed to strike a balance between detecting true effects and minimizing the number of false discoveries. After applying the BH adjustment, the effects that were initially significant at the 1% or 5% level became less pronounced, but p-values largely remained statistically significant (see Table A7). The main findings can therefore be considered still robust to multiple-comparison adjustments.

A4. Robustness to sampling choices

Table A7. Adjusted p-values for multiple comparisons.

	Outcome variables							
	(1) Anti-immigration ("none" only)	(2) Anti-immigration ("none" or "few")	(3) Immigration is bad for the economy	(4) Immigration undermines local culture	(5) Immigration reduces local livability	(6) Feel close to far-right	(7) Anti-immigration scale (across)	(8) Anti-immigration scale (within)
Reform	-0.012 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.042* (0.019)	-0.056* (0.019)	-0.061* (0.022)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.060* (0.028)	-0.061* (0.029)
Observations	53572	53572	53572	53572	53572	38888	53572	53572
Bandwidth	13	19	13	13	10	16	12	11
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ESS round FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Coefficients are estimated using a local linear regression, different polynomial orders to construct the bias-correction, a triangular kernel function to construct the local-polynomial estimator, and the standard Mean Squared Error optimal data-driven bandwidth selector (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik [2014](#)). Data for the main dependent and independent variables come from 11 rounds of the European Social Survey (europeansocialsurvey.org). Standard errors are in parentheses. + denotes $p < 0.1$, * denotes $p < 0.05$, ** denotes $p < 0.01$, and *** denotes $p < 0.001$.

A4.1 Excluding short conscription terms

To account for the concern that extremely short conscription spells may not allow sufficient time for socialization effects to materialize, I re-estimate the main results excluding treated individuals with less than six months of conscription. This addresses the possibility that very brief enlistment periods (such as four or six months) may be unlikely to meaningfully influence attitudes. Table [A8](#) presents the estimated effect of conscription reforms on anti-immigration attitudes when restricting the treated sample to those who served at least six months. As expected, the results remain substantively similar to the main findings. This suggests that the main results are not only driven by symbolic exposure to conscription, but are consistent with mechanisms operating through more substantive institutional socialization.


Table A8. The Effect of Ending Compulsory Conscription on Anti-immigration Attitudes (1 year and longer).

	Outcome variables							
	(1) Anti-immigration ("none" only)	(2) Anti-immigration ("none" or "few")	(3) Immigration is bad for the economy	(4) Immigration undermines local culture	(5) Immigration reduces local livability	(6) Feel close to far-right	(7) Anti-immigration scale (across)	(8) Anti-immigration scale (within)
Reform	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.043* (0.020)	0.057*** (0.020)	-0.060** (0.022)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.059* (0.025)	-0.060* (0.029)
N	53534	53534	53534	53534	53534	38863	53534	53534
Bandwidth	13	19	13	12	10	20	11	11
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ESS round FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All specifications are estimated using local linear regression using the Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik ([2014](#)) optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel. The reported optimal bandwidth is rounded down to the nearest integer. Standard errors are in parentheses. + denotes $p < 0.1$, * denotes $p < 0.05$, ** denotes $p < 0.01$, and *** denotes $p < 0.001$.

A4.2 Alternative country sampling

I conduct a leave-one-out analysis by systematically excluding each country from the sample, one at a time. The results, presented in Figure A3, show that the estimated treatment effects remain generally stable in both direction and magnitude across these subsamples. Previously statistically significant estimates are denoted with one or two asterisks (*, $p < 0.05$; **, $p < 0.01$). For most outcomes, the exclusion of a single country does not materially change the conclusions. However, some outcomes appear sensitive to the exclusion of particular countries (i.e., Belgium, Hungary or Slovak Republic). These patterns underscore that while the overall findings are robust, the influence of certain countries merits careful interpretation, reflecting the importance of the regional context in shaping the treatment effects.



For each line, the country indicated at the right of the figure is deleted. Each plot is obtained using the rdrobust package developed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) based on IMSE-optimal binning and triangular dummy weights. 95% confidence interval. Country and ESS-wave fixed effects apply.

Figure A3. Robustness to One-Country Deletion.

A4.3 Alternative anti-immigration attitudes measures

In Table A9, I show that the impact of the abolition of conscription on anti-immigration attitudes is very similar and consistent across the individual components (upper table) that make up the measures for (1) Anti-immigration (“none” only) and (2) Anti-immigration (“none” or “few”). Additionally, the treatment effect remains consistently significant, with a similar negative direction, when examining items 4-6 in their original, non-recoded form (lower table).

Table A9. Alternative Mesures.

	Same race/ethnic group			Different race/ethnic group			Poorer countries outside Europe		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reform	-0.021 (0.036)	-0.029 (0.043)	-0.045 (0.061)	-0.032 (0.037)	-0.042 (0.043)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.033 (0.036)	-0.041 (0.044)	-0.047 (0.049)
N	15688	23789	20295	13427	21533	22709	13553	20501	28594
Mean	0.087	0.093	0.090	0.086	0.091	0.091	0.092	0.094	0.095
Bandwidth	15	22	19	13	20	21	13	19	26
Polynomial	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
	Immigration is bad for the economy			Immigration undermines local culture			Immigration reduces local livability		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reform	-0.098* (0.038)	-0.104* (0.047)	-0.099+ (0.054)	-0.101* (0.039)	-0.095+ (0.052)	-0.092 (0.058)	-0.069+ (0.041)	-0.093* (0.044)	-0.098+ (0.056)
N	13579	20552	27481	13563	17053	22915	12381	24022	26274
Mean	0.109	0.109	0.109	0.122	0.118	0.115	0.088	0.095	0.095
Bandwidth	13	19	25	13	16	21	12	22	24
Polynomial	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ESS round FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Coefficients are estimated using a local linear regression, different polynomial orders to construct the bias-correction, a triangular kernel function to construct the local-polynomial estimator, and the standard Mean Squared Error optimal data-driven bandwidth selector (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik [2014](#)). Data for the main dependent and independent variables come from 11 rounds of the European Social Survey (europeansocialsurvey.org). Standard errors are in parentheses. + denotes $p < 0.1$, * denotes $p < 0.05$, ** denotes $p < 0.01$, and *** denotes $p < 0.001$.


A4.4 Comparison to female cohorts

Given the presence of an exclusively male conscription, I do not expect to detect any impact on anti-immigration attitudes among women. I examine in Figure [A4](#) and Table [A10](#) the effect of conscription reforms on women to confirm that the end of conscription did not entail any effect on women from the same cohorts.

Table A10. The Effect of Ending Compulsory Conscription on Anti-immigration Attitudes (Female Cohorts).

	Outcome variables							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Anti-immigration ("none" only)	Anti-immigration ("none" or "few")	Immigration is bad for the economy	Immigration undermines local culture	Immigration reduces local livability	Feel close to far-right	Anti-immigration scale (across)	Anti-immigration scale (within)
Reform	-0.005 (0.013)	0.005 (0.016)	0.017 (0.018)	0.022 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.016 (0.025)	0.022 (0.025)
N	66552	66552	66552	66552	66552	48438	66552	66552
Bandwidth	20	17	15	14	19	13	14	14
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ESS round FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All specifications are estimated using local linear regression using the Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik ([2014](#)) optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel. The reported optimal bandwidth is rounded down to the nearest integer. Standard errors are in parentheses. + denotes $p < 0.1$, * denotes $p < 0.05$, ** denotes $p < 0.01$, and *** denotes $p < 0.001$.



Figures are obtained using the `rdrobust` package developed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014), based on IMSE-optimal binning and triangular dummy weights; 95% confidence interval. Please refer to the Table A10 below for estimates. Item numbering is equivalent.

Figure A4. Anti-immigration Attitudes among Cohorts around Compulsory Conscription Ending Reforms, Pooled across Reforms (Female Cohorts).

A4.5 Country-level estimates

Table A11 presents all the country-level reduced form RD estimates of the effect of ending compulsory conscription on anti-immigration attitudes across all outcomes.

A5. Heterogeneity Analysis

Table A11. The Effect of Ending Compulsory Conscription on Anti-immigration Attitudes (All Country Estimates).

	Outcome variables							
	(1) Anti-immigration ("none" only)	(2) Anti-immigration ("none" or "few")	(3) Immigration is bad for the economy	(4) Immigration undermines local culture	(5) Immigration reduces local livability	(6) Feel close to far-right	(7) Anti-immigration scale (across)	(8) Anti-immigration scale (within)
Belgium	-0.182* (0.092)	-0.058 (0.077)	-0.346*** (0.101)	-0.259* (0.105)	-0.169 (0.106)	-0.003 (0.032)	-0.404** (0.131)	-0.424** (0.141)
Bandwidth	4	7	5	5	4	7	5	5
Observations	4198	4198	4198	4198	4198	3876	4198	4198
Czech Republic	0.091 (0.106)	-0.025 (0.064)	0.114 (0.096)	0.030 (0.099)	-0.082 (0.095)	0.041 (0.036)	0.067 (0.112)	0.096 (0.109)
Bandwidth	5	6	6	6	6	8	6	6
Observations	6302	6302	6302	6302	6302	4055	6302	6302
France	-0.024 (0.066)	-0.072 (0.106)	-0.014 (0.091)	-0.007 (0.080)	-0.067 (0.091)	-0.012 (0.072)	-0.133 (0.161)	-0.142 (0.169)
Bandwidth	5	4	5	6	5	5	4	4
Observations	5723	5723	5723	5723	5723	5209	5723	5723
Hungary	-0.224* (0.108)	-0.043 (0.066)	-0.216* (0.100)	-0.177+ (0.099)	-0.260** (0.095)	-0.069 (0.090)	-0.415* (0.163)	-0.377** (0.146)
Bandwidth	6	5	6	6	7	7	5	5
Observations	5401	5401	5401	5401	5401	5205	5401	5401
Italy	-0.103 (0.085)	-0.104 (0.098)	-0.036 (0.095)	-0.116 (0.090)	-0.216* (0.114)	-0.038 (0.063)	-0.213 (0.134)	-0.211 (0.133)
Bandwidth	6	5	6	7	7	6	7	7
Observations	3849	3849	3849	3849	3849	2821	3849	3849
Netherlands	0.066 (0.069)	0.102 (0.118)	0.051 (0.099)	0.068 (0.099)	-0.037 (0.145)	-0.044 (0.402)	0.069 (0.111)	0.074 (0.126)
Bandwidth	5	5	6	5	3	7	5	5
Observations	4703	4703	4703	4703	4703	4665	4703	4703
Portugal	-0.151+ (0.089)	-0.001 (0.127)	-0.008 (0.118)	-0.055 (0.119)	-0.117 (0.133)	-0.033* (0.017)	-0.121 (0.145)	-0.184 (0.161)
Bandwidth	5	7	7	7	6	7	7	7
Observations	5254	5254	5254	5254	5254	4814	5254	5254
Slovak Republic	0.331 (0.219)	0.125 (0.167)	0.006 (0.187)	-0.377* (0.151)	0.027 (0.241)	-0.123 (0.145)	-0.086 (0.242)	-0.107 (0.237)
Bandwidth	3	4	5	5	4	4	4	4
Observations	3645	3645	3645	3645	3645	2667	3645	3645
Slovenia	0.118 (0.096)	0.126 (0.112)	0.052 (0.134)	0.066 (0.128)	0.126 (0.121)	-0.040** (0.015)	0.172 (0.163)	0.179 (0.168)
Bandwidth	7	7	6	6	7	6	7	7
Observations	3920	3920	3920	3920	3920	3159	3920	3920
Spain	-0.071 (0.061)	-0.006 (0.076)	-0.080 (0.078)	-0.175* (0.086)	-0.048 (0.070)	-0.069 (0.138)	-0.178 (0.114)	-0.203 (0.126)
Bandwidth	6	8	7	5	7	5	6	6
Observations	5642	5642	5642	5642	5642	869	5642	5642
United Kingdom	0.015 (0.056)	0.101 (0.053)	-0.016 (0.065)	-0.013 (0.061)	0.002 (0.047)	-0.011 (0.058)	-0.010 (0.092)	-0.009 (0.092)
Bandwidth	8	7	6	7	12	9	7	7
Observations	5908	5908	5908	5908	5908	985	5908	5908
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ESS wave FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All specifications are estimated using local linear regression using the Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel. The reported optimal bandwidth is rounded down to the nearest integer. Standard errors are in parentheses. + denotes $p < 0.1$, * denotes $p < 0.05$, ** denotes $p < 0.01$, and *** denotes $p < 0.001$.

A5.1 Heterogeneity by graduality of conscription phaseout

To evaluate the potential measurement error in the eligibility-based intention-to-treat approach, I rely on the methodology and data from Bove, Di Leo, and Giani (2022). Their data includes qualitative information about the dates of conscription reform approvals in each sampled country prior to the formal end of conscription. While some EU countries abolished conscription in the same year that the

relevant legislation was passed, others implemented a more gradual phase-out. Using their data and approach, I observe the date when the law suspending conscription was first approved and calculate the time between this approval and the point at which no conscripts remained. Bove, Di Leo, and Giani (2022) draw from various sources, including War Resisters’ International (WRI), a global organization that tracks conscription reforms and related legislation. They identify the key laws that initiated the conscription phase-out process and provide a detailed timeline for each country.

Table A12. Effects by Graduality of Conscription Phaseout.

	More than 1 Year							
	Anti-immigration ("none" only)	Anti-immigration ("none" or "few")	Immigration is bad for the economy	Immigration undermines local	Immigration reduces local livability	Feel close to far-right	Anti-immigration scale (across)	Anti-immigration scale (within)
Reform	0.003 (0.016)	0.002 (0.020)	-0.040+ (0.022)	-0.028 (0.020)	-0.026 (0.025)	-0.009 (0.013)	-0.029 (0.031)	-0.029 (0.033)
N	12655	11915	9795	11213	6937	8632	9795	9079
Mean	0.208	0.588	0.421	0.355	0.422	0.052	0.019	0.098
Bandwidth	18	17	14	16	10	17	14	13
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1 Year or Less							
	Anti-immigration ("none" only)	Anti-immigration ("none" or "few")	Immigration is bad for the economy	Immigration undermines local	Immigration reduces local livability	Feel close to far-right	Anti-immigration scale (across)	Anti-immigration scale (within)
Reform	-0.058 (0.048)	-0.018 (0.041)	-0.059 (0.047)	-0.130** (0.046)	-0.135** (0.046)	-0.028 (0.046)	-0.160* (0.070)	-0.154* (0.071)
N	1510	1510	1943	1943	1943	1103	1578	1578
Mean	0.353	0.742	0.469	0.445	0.467	0.129	0.217	0.094
Bandwidth	5	5	6	6	6	5	5	5
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ESS round FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All specifications are estimated using local linear regression using the Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel. The reported optimal bandwidth is rounded down to the nearest integer. Standard errors are in parentheses. + denotes $p < 0.1$, * denotes $p < 0.05$, ** denotes $p < 0.01$, and *** denotes $p < 0.001$.

Table A12 demonstrates that countries where conscription was phased out more quickly (i.e., within one year of reform approval) experienced a higher treatment effect, based on the main specification. Conversely, countries that implemented the reform over a longer period (i.e., more than one year between approval and completion) did not show statistically significant results. This suggests that in this case, the potential for measurement error is greater in countries with a gradual reform implementation. The ambiguity in the timing of the treatment makes it harder to distinguish between treated and untreated populations, which likely contributes to the lack of significant effects. On the other hand, in countries with a more rapid phase-out, the sharper identification of the treatment group results in clearer and more robust outcomes, reducing the noise associated with measurement error.

A5.2 Heterogeneity by reform date

Table A13 shows that treatment effects are notably present only for reforms completed in 2002 or later, with earlier reforms (before 2002) exhibiting almost no discernible impact, except for perceptions of the economy. This exception is largely driven by Belgium, which implemented its conscription reform

in 1995. The 2002 threshold was chosen as the median year of reform implementation, highlighting that the influence of these reforms on anti-immigration attitudes is much more pronounced in more recent cases.

Table A13. Effects by Reform Date (before/after 2002).

Before 2002								
	Anti-immigration ("none" only)	Anti-immigration ("none" or "few")	Immigration is bad for the economy	Immigration undermines local culture	Immigration reduces local livability	Feel close to far-right	Anti-immigration scale (across)	Anti-immigration scale (within)
Reform	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.021)	-0.041+ (0.023)	-0.033 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.025)	-0.017 (0.017)	-0.036 (0.033)	-0.049 (0.035)
N	9996	9996	8182	9384	6929	5317	8182	8182
Mean	0.200	0.583	0.410	0.331	0.397	0.063	-0.002	0.113
Bandwidth	16	16	13	15	11	14	13	13
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2002 or Later								
Reform	-0.035 (0.041)	-0.026 (0.040)	-0.041 (0.046)	-0.095* (0.045)	-0.139** (0.047)	-0.022 (0.031)	-0.130* (0.066)	-0.109+ (0.060)
N	2275	1840	2354	2354	1908	1908	1908	2354
Mean	0.333	0.709	0.474	0.470	0.502	0.100	0.218	0.074
Bandwidth	6	5	6	6	5	6	5	6
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ESS round FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All specifications are estimated using local linear regression using the Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel. The reported optimal bandwidth is rounded down to the nearest integer. Standard errors are in parentheses. + denotes $p < 0.1$, * denotes $p < 0.05$, ** denotes $p < 0.01$, and *** denotes $p < 0.001$.

A5.3 Heterogeneity by political context of reform adoption

Table A14 shows that effects are politically contingent: reforms enacted under left-wing governments produce nearly twice the reduction in anti-immigration sentiment compared to those adopted under right-wing governments. This observed heterogeneity across political contexts suggests that the social meaning of conscription, and the narratives surrounding its abolition, also conditions how institutional change translates into attitudes toward immigration.

Table A14. Effects by Political Context of Reform Adoption (Left vs. Right-Wing Government).

Reforms enacted under left-wing governments								
	Anti-immigration ("none" only)	Anti-immigration ("none" or "few")	Immigration is bad for the economy	Immigration undermines local culture	Immigration reduces local livability	Feel close to far-right	Anti-immigration scale (across)	Anti-immigration scale (within)
Reform	-0.068 (0.036)	-0.025 (0.041)	-0.069 (0.035)	-0.067** (0.039)	-0.111 (0.037)	-0.031 (0.030)	-0.123* (0.055)	-0.114* (0.054)
N	2250	2791	3450	2859	3450	1960	2859	2859
Mean	0.203	0.560	0.434	0.352	0.405	0.090	-0.024	0.049
Bandwidth	4	5	6	5	6	4	5	5
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Reforms enacted under right-wing governments								
Reform	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.030 (0.024)	-0.040 (0.028)	-0.073* (0.028)	-0.042 (0.028)	0.001 (0.022)	-0.073* (0.037)	-0.075* (0.037)
N	2275	1840	2354	2354	1908	1908	1908	2354
Mean	0.277	0.688	0.439	0.423	0.462	0.055	0.127	0.112
Bandwidth	20	15	13	13	13	14	15	15
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ESS round FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All specifications are estimated using local linear regression using the Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel. The reported optimal bandwidth is rounded down to the nearest integer. Standard errors are in parentheses. + denotes $p < 0.1$, * denotes $p < 0.05$, ** denotes $p < 0.01$, and *** denotes $p < 0.001$.

A5.4 Heterogeneity by socioeconomic background

Conscription can have heterogeneous effects that vary based on the socio-economic background of individuals (Di Pietro [2013](#)). To evaluate how socio-economic status influences the treatment effects, I analyze the data by subsetting respondents according to their parents' educational attainment—specifically, whether their father or mother completed upper secondary education. Table [A15](#) reveals that individuals from more educated families experience significantly larger treatment effects, with the exception of perceptions related to economic impacts of immigration. In contrast, for individuals whose parents did not complete secondary education, the results are largely insignificant, underscoring the limited effect of conscription reform on this group.

Table A15. Effects by Socioeconomic Background.

Parents <i>Without</i> Secondary Education								
	Anti-immigration ("none" only)		Anti-immigration ("none" or "few")		Immigration is bad for the economy		Immigration undermines local culture	
	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
Reform	0.018 (0.039)	0.032 (0.045)	0.001 (0.045)	0.016 (0.047)	-0.095* (0.043)	-0.104* (0.049)	-0.055 (0.039)	-0.051 (0.050)
N	2958	2313	2627	2313	3656	2612	4367	2333
Mean	0.236	0.242	0.653	0.656	0.438	0.450	0.365	0.393
Bandwidth	13	12	12	12	15	13	17	12
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Immigration reduces local livability		Feel close to far-right		Anti-immigration scale (across)		Anti-immigration scale (within)	
	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
Reform	-0.078+ (0.043)	-0.063 (0.046)	0.015 (0.034)	-0.004 (0.037)	-0.077 (0.061)	-0.065 (0.069)	-0.083 (0.061)	-0.063 (0.072)
N	3302	2880	1707	1461	3656	2612	4024	2612
Mean	0.468	0.474	0.068	0.065	0.089	0.107	0.151	0.180
Bandwidth	14	14	12	12	15	13	16	13
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Parents <i>With</i> Secondary Education								
	Anti-immigration ("none" only)		Anti-immigration ("none" or "few")		Immigration is bad for the economy		Immigration undermines local culture	
	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
Reform	-0.018 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.018)	-0.034 (0.021)	-0.033 (0.022)	-0.057** (0.021)	-0.057** (0.022)
N	10740	10190	12440	12899	9184	10313	10861	9393
Mean	0.255	0.253	0.635	0.634	0.436	0.436	0.378	0.377
Bandwidth	13	12	15	15	12	12	13	11
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Immigration reduces local livability		Feel close to far-right		Anti-immigration scale (across)		Anti-immigration scale (within)	
	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
Reform	-0.070** (0.026)	-0.064* (0.025)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.067* (0.031)	-0.065* (0.032)	-0.068* (0.033)	-0.065* (0.032)
N	6656	6820	9269	10270	9119	8514	8281	8514
Mean	0.424	0.425	0.089	0.087	0.078	0.076	0.079	0.074
Bandwidth	8	8	16	17	11	10	10	10
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ESS round FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All specifications are estimated using local linear regression using the Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik [\(2014\)](#) optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel. The reported optimal bandwidth is rounded down to the nearest integer. Standard errors are in parentheses. + denotes $p < 0.1$, * denotes $p < 0.05$, ** denotes $p < 0.01$, and *** denotes $p < 0.001$.

A6. Complementary Analysis of Political Behaviors

I use the same approach as described in Section A1.1 to construct variables coding respondents’ closeness to other political groups. The identification of the parties within these groups is presented in Table A2 within Section A1.1

Table A16. The Effect of Ending Compulsory Conscription on Closeness to Political Party Groups.

	Outcome variables				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Feel close to far-right	Feel close to right	Feel close to centre	Feel close to left	Feel close to far-left
Reform	-0.008	-0.005	0.008	-0.005	0.002
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.017)	(0.007)
Bandwidth	16	13	15	11	5
Observations	38888	48221	43426	48223	32091
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ESS wave FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All specifications are estimated using local linear regression using the Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel. The reported optimal bandwidth is rounded down to the nearest integer. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A16 shows that more positive perceptions of immigration after the reform do not translate into significant changes in political affiliation. While none of the estimates are statistically significant, small directional shifts are observable: a slight decline in closeness to far-right and right-wing parties, and modest increases for centrist and far-left parties. Although not significant, these trends could suggest a possible weakening of right-wing alignment and a slight shift toward moderation or ideological opposition to conscription.

Appendix References

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