Online Appendices

"What Kind of Bias Do I Want?" How Cross-Pressured Voters Select Political Media

March 11, 2026

Contents

A Quota Sampling Distributions

The original survey (OS) uses quotas to make the sample more representative of the UK population. Prolific allows one to create these quotas based on two variables. I select gender and past voting behavior in 2019, to ensure that the sample is gender-balanced and politically representative.

For sex, the quota is straightforward. I use the 2021 UK Census and sum the numbers of men and women in England/Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, which are provided separately (ONS 2023a,b; NISRA 2022). In total, women are 51.1 per cent of the UK population and men are 48.9 per cent. No other sex categories are included. Since Prolific only allows whole numbers for quotas, I round these numbers and sample for 51 per cent women and 49 per cent men. British Prolific participants currently skew more female than this (62.5 per cent),[1] so this quota distribution makes the sample more representative.

For past voter behavior, I use the most recent general election available on Prolific — the 2019 election. I obtain the election results from the BBC election page and the turnout statistics from the Commons Library (BBC 2019; McInnes 2020). Table A1 shows the breakdown. Since the party percentages in column "Party Share" do not account for non-voters, I calculate another column ("Total Share") which includes them and recalculates the percentages of the other parties accordingly. Finally, "Sample" displays the rounded numbers that I use for the Prolific quotas, which must be whole numbers.

Table A1: Population and Sample Percentages for the 2019 UK General Election

Party	Party %	Total %	Sample %
Did not vote		32.70	33
Conservatives	43.6	29.34	29
Labour	32.2	21.67	22
Liberal Dems	11.5	7.74	8
SNP	3.9	2.63	3
Green	2.7	1.82	2
Brexit Party	2.0	1.35	1
DUP	0.8	0.54	1
Independent	0.8	0.54	1
Sinn Fein	0.6	0.40	0
Plaid Cymru	0.5	0.34	0
SDLP	0.4	0.27	0
Alliance	0.4	0.27	0
Ulster Unionist	0.3	0.20	0
Change UK	0.0	0.00	0
Other	0.2	0.14	0

Note: "Party Share" refers to the percentages of election participants who supported each party. "Total Share" includes non-voters and recalculates the party percentages to sum to 100. "Sample" rounds to the nearest whole number for Prolific.

[1] This percentage is calculated on August 28th, 2025.

B Original Survey (OS)

Figure A1 includes the entire survey. Respondents would only see one condition for each experiment. However, I include all conditions for each experiment below.

The survey includes four additional experiments that are used for another paper. There are three experimental blocks, and the two experiments for this current paper are in a single block. The three blocks are presented in random order. In Appendix I, I display results by groups of participants that saw different blocks first. These do not change the results.

There are two factorial experiments that manipulate perceptions of party positions. Respondents are exposed to a hypothetical news excerpt that alters perceptions of the Labour Party's economic and cultural positions. They are then exposed to a similar news excerpt for the Conservative Party. Each factor (i.e., ideological dimension) for each party has three conditions. Furthermore, I randomly change the order of the ideological dimensions in the excerpt. This means that this block of the survey has $3 \times 3 \times 2 \times 2 = 36$ possible excerpt combinations. To be concise, I only include each condition per party and ideological dimension once below, rather than including every combination. Thus, this survey block only includes six excerpts in Figure A1.

Similarly, the final experiment — which randomly exposes participants to an outlet — has somewhat different wording based on whether the respondent is being exposed to the outlet that they selected or not. Therefore, here, I include one version for people who are assigned to their selected outlet ("The Connect") and the other version for people who are assigned to the outlet that they did not select ("The Nation Live"). Nevertheless, in the actual survey, both versions are used for both outlets, depending on whether the participant was randomly assigned to the outlet that they selected or not.

The order of the blocks, many questions, experiments, and question categories is often random. In Figure A1, I only show one possible order of these questions, experiments, and categories, though there are many other possible combinations. The general order is: consent form, Prolific ID capture, CPV filter (random question order), instructions, three experimental blocks (in random order), questions about probability to vote for the Labour and Conservative parties (in random order), a question about voting participation, and questions about past media consumption and political interest (in random order).

I administer two pilot versions of this survey to 50 Prolific participants each. These are sampled using the same process described in the main paper and are later excluded from the final survey. There are five opportunities for them to provide free-text suggestions about different parts of the survey. I do not examine the actual results of these pilot surveys. Most of the free-text comments are quite positive about the survey. I use the suggestions to improve the clarity of some questions and answer categories, particularly the initial CPV filter.

Figure A1: Full Original Survey (OS)



Information

You are invited to take part in a research study about online news. Please read the following information carefully. You will be asked to consent to several conditions below. You can change your mind at any time before submitting the survey. You will receive payment for your time if you complete it. All information will be anonymous and stored securely. The data will be used for a study and may be shared with news websites, companies, academics, journals and on public data repositories.

Consent

Based on the information above, please select whether you consent to the following conditions:

- I have read, understood and been fully informed above.
- Taking part in this study is entirely voluntary.
- Not taking part will have no negative impact on me.
- I can leave this study at any time without giving a reason.
- The researcher will use and share anonymous information about me as described above.

Do not consent | Consent

→

What is your Prolific ID?

(Please note that this response should auto-fill with the correct ID.)

→

Please place the sliders to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement below on a scale from 0 to 10.

Strongly disagree **Strongly agree**

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

The government should allow more people to immigrate to the UK.

The government should raise tax rates to increase funding for public services.

The government should ensure that businesses pay similar incomes for different jobs.

The government should ensure that more civil service jobs (at all levels) go to women.

→

Throughout this survey, you will see several excerpts from recent online news articles about economic/cultural issues. We are interested in your opinions about these websites and issues. Please read the excerpts and questions carefully.

→

Please read the following from a news website:

British politicians have increasingly focused on policies related to the UK's benefits system. There is widespread discussion over the positive and negative effects of state benefits.

→

Please read the following from a news website:

Recent economic figures suggest that state benefits for low-income people are highly effective. According to the UK General Economic Report 2024, when low-income people receive higher benefits, they have leeway to obtain further training, perform better, find higher-paid jobs and contribute more to the economy. Countries with stronger welfare systems also have much higher levels of life satisfaction and lower levels of depression. Furthermore, these benefits reduce the growing levels of economic inequality and deprivation in the UK.

→

Please read the following from a news website:

Recent economic figures suggest that state benefits for low-income people simply do not work. According to the UK General Economic Report 2024, when low-income people receive higher benefits, they lose much of their motivation to work hard, obtain further training, find better jobs, and contribute to the economy. Countries with expensive welfare systems also have much higher taxes, costs-of-living and unemployment levels. Furthermore, these benefits reduce the UK's economic performance and average incomes.

→

How much do you agree or disagree with the idea that the government should increase benefits for low-income people?

Strongly disagree — Strongly agree

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

→

Please read the following from a news website:

The issue of asylum for refugees has become increasingly prominent in the British media over the last decade. Some outlets portray refugees in a positive light while others portray them more negatively.

→

Please read the following from a news website:

The recent British Demographics Report indicates that refugees bring vital skills and perform jobs that help to support our aging population, including in high-demand sectors like healthcare, construction and service. Furthermore, people often forget how refugees enrich our lives with their cultures, cuisines and arts. Finally, the study also finds that the vast majority of refugees are fleeing war, violence and persecution. Contrary to partisan rhetoric from some politicians, these refugees want a peaceful life for themselves and their families.

→

Please read the following from a news website:

The recent British Demographics Report indicates that the UK lacks the housing, schools and hospitals needed to sustain the growing numbers of refugees in the UK. Furthermore, when refugee policy is administered carelessly, we experience a loss of social cohesion, common identity, and safety. Finally, the study also finds that many refugees are not fleeing any form of oppression. Contrary to optimistic claims from some politicians, these economic migrants are taking advantage of the UK's refugee system and its taxpayers.

→

How much do you agree or disagree with the idea that the government should increase the yearly numbers of refugees that can settle in the UK?

Strongly disagree — Strongly agree

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

→

Which two issues were discussed in the last two news quotes and questions?
(select two)

- Monetary policy
- Refugees
- Gender equality
- Benefits

→

Please read the following from a news website:

Labour Party leaders are set to meet next week to discuss their cultural policies for 2025. Their future approach to cultural issues is currently unknown. However, on economic issues, the Labour Party has actually promised quite extreme policies in 2025. The party plans to substantially increase income taxes on middle-class and especially on wealthy people and impose staggering business tax hikes. The government's budget is equally ambitious, with record high levels of funding for public agencies. According to political scientist Dr Damien Gort, 'Labour wants to appeal to very economically-leftist voters, even if this is unpopular among more economically-moderate voters.'

→

Please read the following from a news website:

The Labour Party has actually promised quite extreme cultural policies in 2025. The party's migration act is set to increase immigration considerably. Furthermore, Labour promises to crack down on language that it considers to be racist, sexist or transphobic. According to political scientist Dr Damien Gort, 'Labour wants to appeal to very culturally-progressive voters, even if this is unpopular among more culturally-moderate voters.' Labour Party leaders are also set to meet next week to discuss their economic policies for 2025. Their future approach to economic issues is currently unknown.

→

Please read the following from a news website:

The Labour Party has promised quite moderate economic and cultural policies in 2025. The party plans to keep income taxes low and ensure that businesses are incentivised to remain in the UK. The government's budget is equally moderate, with lower levels of funding for public agencies. Similarly, Labour's new cultural policies are also centrist. The party's migration act is set to allow only low levels of immigration. Furthermore, Labour's recent policy briefs do not contain any controversial race, gender or LGBT policies. According to political scientist Dr Damien Gort, 'Labour wants to appeal to moderate voters, even if this is unpopular among more extreme voters.'

→

Political parties can have economic ideologies that are **left-wing** (supporting redistribution, government spending, etc.), **right-wing** (supporting low taxes, the free market, etc.), or **somewhere in between**. Where would you place the current economic policies of the Labour Party?

Very left-wing (on economic issues) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very right-wing (on economic issues)

Political parties can have cultural policies that are **progressive** (supporting multiculturalism, feminism, etc.), **conservative** (supporting border control, traditional gender roles, etc.), or **somewhere in between**. Where would you place the current cultural policies of the Labour Party?

Very progressive (on cultural issues) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very conservative (on cultural issues)

→

Please read the following from a news website:

The Conservative Party intends to convene several meetings to focus on economic and cultural policies for 2025. It is currently unclear what kinds of positions they will adopt on these issues for this new year.

→

Please read the following from a news website:

Conservative Party insiders have revealed that the party's cultural goals are 'clearly becoming more and more centrist' in 2025. The party hopes that these policies will appeal to former Labour voters. For instance, many Tory MPs say they will support Labour plans to restrict 'racist and xenophobic rhetoric that is increasingly expressed by fringe influencers.' Conservative leaders are even introducing measures to reduce the gender pay gap. However, the party is increasingly *right-wing* on economic issues, hoping to draw support from voters who 'despise government meddling,' according to the party. The Conservatives now support slashing public services and cutting taxes for large businesses. Conservative Party leaders are increasingly emphasising policies that mostly favour wealthy people.

→

Please read the following from a news website:

Conservative Party insiders have revealed that the party's economic goals are 'clearly becoming more and more centrist' in 2025. The party hopes that these policies will appeal to former Labour voters. The Conservatives now support gradual tax increases on wealthy people and large businesses to reduce income inequality. Unlike before, Conservative leaders are increasingly emphasising policies that support working-class people. However, the party is increasingly *conservative* on cultural issues, hoping to attract Reform UK supporters. The Conservative Party's migration plans are more restrictive than ever before and the party now supports mass deportations. Furthermore, several former Tory MPs have even called the party's gender-related policies a 'radical MANifesto that will roll back women's job prospects.'

→

Political parties can have cultural policies that are **progressive** (supporting multiculturalism, feminism, etc.), **conservative** (supporting border control, traditional gender roles, etc.), or **somewhere in between**. Where would you place the current cultural policies of the Conservative Party?

Very progressive (on cultural issues) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very conservative (on cultural issues)

Political parties can have economic ideologies that are **left-wing** (supporting redistribution, government spending, etc.), **right-wing** (supporting low taxes, the free market, etc.), or **somewhere in between**. Where would you place the current economic policies of the Conservative Party?

Very left-wing (on economic issues) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very right-wing (on economic issues)

→

Which two political parties were discussed in the last two news quotes and questions? *(select two)*

- The Liberal Democrats
- Reform UK
- The Scottish National Party
- The Labour Party
- The Conservative Party

→

Please read the following from a news website:

There are many different types of political issues. The economic and cultural categories are among the most prominent within the realm of domestic politics.

→

Please read the following from a news website:

According to one of our readers, 'politicians often focus on hot-button cultural issues to distract us from the state of the economy that impacts us every day.' Indeed, economic issues are important for people's day-to-day lives. Inflation determines whether parents can afford to put healthy food on the table. High unemployment levels devastate entire communities. The housing market can make the dream of home ownership a reality or a mirage for hard-working people. In short, economic issues deal with the challenges and opportunities that are most important to us and that impact our lives in a real and physical way.

→

Please read the following from a news website:

According to one of our readers, 'politicians often focus on materialistic economic issues to distract us from the big picture – our culture as a nation.' Indeed, cultural issues are important for defining who we are. Immigration determines who actually forms the fabric of our society. Gender roles and LGBT issues shape lifestyles, families, relationships and everyday interactions. Criminal justice policy can determine whether our society is safe and fair or dangerous and unjust. In short, cultural issues deal with the challenges and opportunities that are most important to us and that impact our lives in a broad and profound way.

→

Many political issues can be grouped into two categories: **economic** (unemployment, government spending, etc.) and **cultural** (immigration, gender, etc.). Which of these two groups is more important to you?

Economic issues are much more important — Equal importance — Cultural issues are much more important

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

→

Which two types of issues were discussed in the last news quote and question?
(select two)

- Environmental
- Economic
- Foreign policy
- Cultural

→

Later, you will select whether to read an article about either economic or cultural issues.

The Connect and *The Nation Live* are two British news websites. Please read their political perspectives below. From which website would you rather pick the article that you will eventually read?



→

Which of these two articles from *The Connect* would you prefer to read now?





→

Suppose that you had to select an article from *The Nation Live* instead. Which of these two articles from *The Nation Live* would you prefer to read now?

→

You will not actually read the article that you selected. You can proceed below.

What is the likelihood that you would ever vote for the following parties in any future election?

0% Likelihood **100% Likelihood**

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Conservative Party

Labour Party

→

What is the likelihood that you will vote for any party in the next general election?

0% Likelihood **100% Likelihood**

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

→

Which of these news outlets have you accessed (on their websites, apps or newspapers) for at least five minutes in the last week?
(select as many as apply or 'None')

- The BBC
- The Daily Express
- The Daily Mail
- The Guardian
- The Independent
- The Metro
- The Mirror
- The Sun
- The Telegraph
- Other outlets
- None

→

How interested are you in politics?

Not at all	A little	Moderately	Fairly	Very
1	2	3	4	5

→

Please note that the news excerpts, websites and articles in this survey are not real. The excerpts do not necessarily reflect factual information or opinions. To form well-informed perspectives on these important issues, we recommend that you access high-quality sources from several viewpoints.

If you wish to view the sources and licences for images that we used, you can download them here.

Thank you for filling out this survey. Your response has been recorded and you will be paid in due course. Please click the button below to be redirected back to Prolific and register your submission.

→

C Identifying Cross-Pressured Voters

To maximize the sample size of the original survey (OS), I must filter out non-CPVs. However, Prolific does not have pre-collected variables that allow one to do so. Fortunately, the platform has recently released a function that allows researchers to screen out participants based on custom questions in the survey itself. These screened-out participants are paid a lower rate commensurate with the much shorter amount of time that they spend on the survey.

I develop a unique method to identify CPVs quickly and effectively using the survey software Qualtrics. The survey begins with four policy-related statements. Participants use a slider to rate each statement from 0-10 based on how much they agree. These include two economically leftist statements (about income inequality and taxes for public services) and two culturally progressive statements (about immigration and gender equality). Appendix B displays the exact statements, along with the rest of the survey. The order of the statements is random.

The survey calculates the average economic and cultural positions for each respondent based on these answers. Since there are two questions for each ideological dimension and only whole numbers are available for each question, the averages can only be in increments of 0.5 from 0 to 10. The survey then identifies people who are left-conservative or right-progressive and these are allowed to continue the survey. To create this filter, I must specify thresholds for "leftist versus rightist" and "progressive versus conservative." The statements are all quite leftist/progressive, so the middle category of 5 (neither agree nor disagree) for each question is still somewhat leftist/progressive, while 4 is slightly rightist/conservative. Therefore, those with an economic score of 4.5 or higher (leftist) and a cultural score below 4.5 (conservative) are considered left-conservatives. Meanwhile, those with an economic score below 4.5 (rightist) and a cultural score of 4.5 or higher (progressive) are considered right-progressives.

In Appendix L, I use a stricter definition of CPVs that omits those who are somewhat moderate on one or both ideological dimensions. The regression results do not change much.

Figure A2 displays a scatterplot of the economic and cultural positions of the full Prolific sample. The two ideological dimensions are divided by dashed lines at the aforementioned thresholds. Red dots are left-conservatives, blue dots are right-progressives, and gray dots are non-CPVs. Darker red and blue dots denote those participants who are CPVs using the stricter definition (i.e., the only ones included in the analysis in Appendix L).

Figure A2: Scatterplot of CPVs in the Original Survey (OS)



Note: Red dots indicate left-conservatives and blue dots indicate right-progressives. Darker colors are CPVs with stricter thresholds (see Appendix L). Non-CPVs are gray. I include a jitter of 0.015.

D Descriptive Figures for Original Survey (OS) Respondents

It is often important to understand the demographic distribution of survey respondents. I display these below for cross-pressured voters (CPVs) in the OS. Figure A3 shows the age distribution. Figure A4 shows their regions of residence in the UK. Finally, Figure A5 shows various categorical distributions — that is, sex, education, personal income, and vote choice in 2019 (the last election available on Prolific).

Importantly, these distributions do not necessarily need to match the demographics of the UK as a whole. The population is not all inhabitants of the UK, but rather British CPVs specifically. This sample is of CPVs, who likely have different demographic attributes from the UK population as a whole. The quotas described in Appendix A apply to the original Prolific sample, but once I filter for CPVs, these distributions may change.

It is also possible that the original Prolific sample is skewed. Given the age distribution in Figure A3, there may be a particular skew toward younger participants, who are more likely to use this online platform (Douglas et al. 2023).

Figure A3: Age Distribution of CPV Sample



Figure A4: Region Distribution of CPV Sample



Figure A5: Distributions of CPV Sample: Sex, Education, Income, and Voting

(A) Sex

(B) Education



(C) Personal Income

(D) Vote Choice in 2019



E Image Rights

All images in the survey are from Unsplash, Pexels, Canva, and Google Creative Commons under the conditions of their licenses. Google Creative Commons often requires attribution. Therefore, I included a link to a document with these attributions at the end of the survey. Table A2 provides these same attributions here. The URLs for some images and their licenses may change over time. Images from Unsplash, Pexels, and Canva are free to use and do not require attribution.

Table A2: Attribution for Google Creative Commons Image Rights

Image: People graphic **URL:** https://pxhere.com/en/photo/1625062 **License:** https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
Image: Keir Starmer meeting business leaders **URL:** https://www.flickr.com/photos/number10gov/53876568591 **License:** https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/
Image: Keir Starmer with UK flags **URL:** https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Prime_Minister_Keir_Starmer_calls_Benjamin_Netanyahu_(54036200300).jpg **License:** https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
Image: Socialist Appeal **URL:** https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Capitalism_is_killing_the_planet_(51659064676).jpg **License:** https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
Image: BLM protest **URL:** https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/world/2021/03/31/report-draws-ire-after-finding-uk-not-institutionally-racist/ **License:** https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Image: Economy graphic **URL:** https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/wharton-expert-discusses-inflation-and-possible-recession **License:** https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/
Image: People talking graphic **URL:** https://www.needpix.com/photo/1708701/social-media-crowd-human-communication-balloons-silhouettes-personal-group-of-people-group **License:** https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/deed.en
Image: Two workers **URL:** https://timelessmoon.getarchive.net/amp/media/men-onsite-man-people-44d40a **License:** https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
Image: Conservative Women's Organisation **URL:** https://www.flickr.com/photos/conservativeparty/53228296242 **License:** https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
Image: Business leaders meeting **URL:** https://www.flickr.com/photos/financialtimes/5880517570 **License:** https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
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Image: Police arrest **URL:** https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/world/2023/11/12/uk-police-arrest-over-120-as-pro-palestinian-rally-draws-counter-protests/ **License:** https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

F Categories and Scales for Original and Panel Survey Variables

Below are tables with information about all variables included in the models from the main paper.

In Table A3, I display information about each variable used in the models with the original survey (OS) data. This includes the categories/scales, the distribution of participants across categories (for categorical variables), and the mean (for numeric variables).

In the pre-registration for this study, I do not plan to recode most of the numerical variables on a 0-1 scale, like I do in the main paper (Author 2025). However, this does not change the results, only the scales. As indicated in the main paper, I rescale the variables in this way for ease of interpretation and comparability between different variables.

Table A3: Categories and Scales for Original Survey (OS) Variables

Name	Description	Categories/Scales
group	CPV group	"LEFT-CONSERVATIVE" (591), "RIGHT-PROGRESSIVE" (546)
exp_salience	excerpt/image that emphasizes importance of economic/cultural/neither issues (experiment)	"CONTROL" (484), "CULTURAL" (328), "ECONOMIC" (322)
salience	economic-versus-cultural salience	11-point scale, 0-1 (0 is much higher cultural salience, 1 is much higher economic salience), mean of 0.647
outlet	which outlet participant selected	0 (left-progressive, 394), 1 (right-conservative, 738)
exp_outlet	which outlet participant is randomly assigned to (experiment)	"LEFT-PROGRESSIVE" (568), "RIGHT-CONSERVATIVE" (563)
article	which article participant selected	0 (cultural, 480), 1 (economic, 651)
days	days since beginning of survey fielding period (2025-01-24 00:00:00)	interval scale, 0.481 (minimum) - 4.403 (maximum), mean of 2.396
pre_econ	economic position (based on filtering questions at the beginning)	11-point scale, 0-1 (0 is very leftist, 1 is very rightist), mean of 0.568
pre_cult	cultural position (based on filtering questions at the beginning)	11-point scale, 0-1 (0 is very progressive, 1 is very conservative), mean of 0.577
sex	sex	"Female" (572), "Male" (565)
ethnicity	ethnic group	"Asian" (93), "Black" (109), "Other/Mixed" (37), "White" (898)
immigrant	whether participant was born in UK or not	"Born in UK" (935), "Immigrant" (202)
uk_country	current UK constituent country of residence	"England" (1000), "Northern Ireland" (16), "Scotland" (80), "Wales" (41)
age	age in years	interval scale, 18 (minimum) - 81 (maximum), mean of 41.519
education	highest education level completed	"Below Secondary" (10), "Secondary" (379), "Technical College" (143), "Undergraduate" (406), "Postgraduate" (198)
income	personal income category	"£0-30k" (703), "£30-60k" (283), "Above £60k" (49),[2] "No Answer" (102)
vote_2017	party supported in 2017 UK general election	"Conservatives" (312), "Labour" (224), "Other" (193), "None" (408)

[2]This category collapses several higher-income categories mentioned in the pre-registration. I do this because there are so few people in these categories — 49 altogether (Author 2025).

vote_2019	party supported in 2019 UK general election	"Conservatives" (357), "Labour" (208), "Other" (169), "None" (403)
party	previous party identification	"Conservatives" (237), "Labour" (339), "Other" (375), "None" (186)
pol_interest	amount of interest in politics	5-point scale, 0-1 (0 is uninterested, 1 is very interested), mean of 0.533
pre_media_econ	average economic position of media repertoire[3] based on data from Author (2026)	interval scale, 0-1 (0 is very leftist, 1 is very rightist), mean of 0.395
pre_media_cult	average cultural position of media repertoire based on data from Author (2026)	interval scale, 0-1 (0 is very progressive, 1 is very conservative), mean of 0.380

Tables A4, A5, and A6 display information about the variables for the British Election Study (BES), American National Election Study (ANES), and German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) panel datasets, respectively. This includes the categories (for categorical variables) and the scales (for numeric variables).

For the most part, the variables in these tables match each other and the OS. However, some of these panel studies either (1) do not ask a question, (2) do not ask a question in sufficient waves, or (3) have a lot of missing data for a question. Therefore, the panel data models have some minor differences in the list of covariates. The most important variables are available in each dataset.

Sometimes, the measurement for a variable also differs considerably from one dataset to the next. For example, in the original dataset and GLES, economic and cultural saliences are measured against one another on a scale. However, for the BES and ANES, such a measure is not available. Instead, I use a question about the most important issue, and code it as economic or cultural.

Table A4: Categories and Scales for BES Variables

Name	Description	Categories/Scales
econ	redistribution (economic) position	11-point scale, 0-1 (0 is very leftist, 1 is very rightist)
cult	immigration (cultural) position	11-point scale, 0-1 (0 is very progressive, 1 is very conservative)
group	CPV group	"LEFT-CONSERVATIVE," "RIGHT-PROGRESSIVE'
salience	whether participant's "most important issue" is economic[4] or cultural[5]	0 (cultural) or 1 (economic)
media	ideological score of participant's preferred newspaper[6] based on data from Author (2026)	interval scale, 0 (left-progressive) to 1 (right-conservative)

[3]Possible options include the websites, apps, or newspapers of the following outlets: *BBC*, *Daily Express*, *Daily Mail*, *Guardian*, *Independent*, *Metro*, *Mirror*, *Sun*, and *Telegraph*.

[4]This includes the following issues: "Austerity," "Covid-economy," "Debt/deficit," "Economy-general," "Economy-personal," "Health," "Housing," "Inequality," "Inflation," "International trade," "Living costs," "Pensions/ageing," "Pol values-left," "Pol values-right," "Poverty," "Taxation," "Transport/infrastructure," "Unemployment," and "Welfare'.

[5]This includes the following issues: "Immigration," "Terrorism," "Crime," "Racism/discrimination," "Nat ident, goals-loss," "Morals," "Pol values-liberal," "Pol values-auth," "Asylum," and "Gender/sexuality/family'.

[6]Possible options include the following: *Guardian*, *Herald*, *Independent*, *Mirror / Daily Record*, *Western Mail*, *Daily Mail*, *Daily*

wave	BES survey wave	interval scale, 1-29[7]
gender	dichotomous variable for female gender	"Female," "Other"
ethnicity	dichotomous variable for white ethnicity	"White," "Other"
country	current UK constituent country of residence	"England," "Scotland," "Wales"
age	age in years	interval scale, 18 (minimum) - 110 (maximum)
education	highest education level completed	"Below_GCSE," "A/GCSE," "Undergraduate," "Postgrad"
income	personal income category	"Below £20k," "£20k-£40k," "£40k-£60k," "Above £60k," "No answer"
financechange	how household finances changed over previous year	5-point scale, 0-1 (0 is "got a lot worse," 1 is "got a lot better")
class	rescaled National Readership Survey (NRS) social grades	6-point scale, 0-1 (0 is lower class, 1 is higher class)
vote_2015	Participant's previous voting in the 2015 UK general election	"Conservative," "Labour," "Other," "None"
brexit	Participant's support for Brexit	"Leave," "Other"
marital	marital status	"Married," "Other"

Table A5: Categories and Scales for ANES Variables

Name	Description	Categories/Scales
econ	economic position (on healthcare)	12-point scale, 0-1 (0 is very leftist, 1 is very rightist)
cult	cultural position (on race and immigration)	interval scale, 0-1 (0 is very progressive, 1 is very conservative)
group	CPV group	"LEFT-CONSERVATIVE," "RIGHT-PROGRESSIVE"
salience	whether participant's "most important issue" is economic[8] or cultural[9]	0 (cultural) or 1 (economic)
media	trust for right-conservative outlet (*Fox*) minus trust for left-progressive outlet (*MSNBC*)	9-point scale, 0 (much higher *MSNBC* trust) to 1 (much higher *Fox* trust)
wave	ANES survey wave	1, 2, 3
gender	gender category	"Male," "Female"
ethnicity	ethnicity category	"White," "Hispanic," "Black," "Other"
region	region of residence	"Northeast," "Midwest," "South," "West"
urban	whether participant resides in a rural or urban area	"Rural," "Urban"
age	age in years	interval scale, 18 (minimum) - 80 (maximum)
education	highest education level completed	"HS or less," "Vocational or some tertiary," "Bachelor's," "Postgraduate"
income	personal income category	"Below $20k," "$20k-$40k," "$40k-$75k," "$75k-$125k," "Above $125k"
finances	personal financial situation	5-point scale, 0-1 (0 is worse, 1 is better)
relationship	relationship status	"Never married," "Living with partner," "Married," "Divorced/Separated," "Widowed")
vote_2016	Participant's previous voting in the 2016 US presidential election	"Republican," "Democrat," "Other," "None"
pol_interest	how politically informed the participant is	5-point scale, 0-1 (0 is politically uninformed, 1 is politically informed)

Telegraph, *Express*, *Scotsman*, *Sun*, *Times*, *Daily Star*, and *Financial Times*.

[7]Not all waves have the questions used to determine CPV groups, so the CPV dataset has fewer waves (7, 10-17, 20-23, 25-27, and 29)

[8]This includes the following issues: "The economy," "Health & health care," and "Economic inequality."

[9]This includes the following issues: "Immigration & border security," "Abortion," and "Race relations."

Table A6: Categories and Scales for GLES Variables

Name	Description	Categories/Scales
econ	economic position	6-point scale, 0-1 (0 is very leftist, 1 is very rightist)
cult	cultural position	6-point scale, 0-1 (0 is very progressive, 1 is very conservative)
group	CPV group	"LEFT-CONSERVATIVE," "RIGHT-PROGRESSIVE"
salience	economic-versus-cultural salience	9-point scale, 0-1 (0 is much higher cultural salience, 1 is much higher economic salience)
media	how many days per week the participant consumes right-conservative versus left-progressive outlets[10]	interval scale, 0 (very left-progressive media repertoire) to 1 (very right-conservative media repertoire)
wave	GLES survey wave	interval scale, 1-27[11]
gender	gender category	"Male," "Female"[12]
religion	ethnicity category	"Christian (non-Catholic)," "Catholic," "Muslim," "Other," "None"
region	region of residence	"North," "East," "South," "West"
urban	whether participant resides in a rural or urban area	"Rural," "Urban"
yob	year of birth	interval scale, 1956 (minimum) - 2003 (maximum)
education	highest education level completed (Germany's tripartite secondary school system)	"low," "medium," "high"
income	monthly income	"Below €1500," "€1500-€4000," "Above €4000"
finances	confidence in financial situation	4-point scale, 0-1 (0 is worse, 1 is better)
marital	marital status	"Never married," "Married," "Divorced/Separated," "Widowed")
vote_2013	Participant's previous (second) vote in the 2013 German federal election	"CDU/CSU," "SPD," "Other," "None"
pol_interest	interest in politics	5-point scale, 0-1 (0 is low interest, 1 is high interest)

[10]The right-conservative options are *Bild*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, and *Welt*. The left-progressive options are *Frankfurter Rundschau*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, and *taz* (Dallmann et al. 2015; Hinrichs et al. 2025).

[11]Many waves lack the necessary questions, so the models often have only a few waves.

[12]No other categories are available.

G Covariate Balance

The conditions for each experiment are assigned using a random number generator. Therefore, it is unlikely that there is any correlation between covariates and experimental assignments. Nevertheless, Figures A6 and A7 show balance plots with Standardized Mean Differences (SMDs) for each covariate. See Appendix F for more information about the covariates.

SMDs indicate how similar the different experimental condition groups are on given covariates (Austin 2009). For example, an SMD below 0.1 for the "income_ £60k" covariate means that the proportion of people with an income above £60,000 is similar for each experimental condition group. The same is true for interval and dichotomous covariates. The equation to calculate SMDs for dichotomous variables (including categorical dummy variables) across three condition groups is as follows:

$$\text{SMD}_{T_a,(C+T_b)} = \frac{p_{T_a} - p_{C+T_b}}{\sqrt{\frac{p_{T_a}(1-p_{T_a})+p_{C+T_b}(1-p_{C+T_b})}{2}}} \tag{A1}$$

where p_{T_a} is the proportion of treatment group A that has $X = 1$ and p_{C+T_b} is this proportion in the combined control and treatment group B. The corresponding equation for interval variables is:

$$\text{SMD}_{T_a,(C+T_b)} = \frac{\bar{X}_{T_a} - \bar{X}_{C+T_b}}{\sqrt{\frac{(n_{T_a}-1)s^2_{T_b}+(n_{C+T_b}-1)s^2_{C+T_b}}{n_{T_a}+n_{C+T_b}-2}}} \tag{A2}$$

where $\bar{X}_{T_a}$ is the mean of covariate X in treatment group A, $\bar{X}_{C+T_b}$ is the mean of X in the combined control and treatment group B, $s^2_{T_a}$ and $s^2_{C+T_b}$ are the variances of X in the two groups, and n_{T_a} and n_{C+T_b} are the respective sample sizes.

Figure A6 pertains to the salience experiment. It indicates that none of the SMDs exceed the conventional threshold of 0.1, indicated by the dashed vertical line. This means that the values of the covariates are quite similar between the three experimental condition groups (control, economic treatment, and cultural treatment).

Meanwhile, Figure A7 is similar. Out of the 40 covariate categories, only one (the pre-existing economic position) is above the threshold of 0.1. It is still within an acceptable range. By chance, there are often differences in covariates between randomly-assigned condition groups (Austin 2009).

Figure A6: Balance Plot for Salience Experiment



Note: This figure displays the SMDs for each covariate between the salience experiment conditions.

Figure A7: Balance Plot for Outlet Ideology Experiment



Note: This figure displays the SMDs for each covariate between the outlet ideology experiment conditions.

H Panel Data Recoding Details

In the main paper, I do not have space to describe the variables from the individual panel datasets in detail. Below, I describe each panel dataset and its variables. Some information below will be somewhat repeated from Section 3.3 from the main paper.

H.1 British Election Study (BES)

In order to identify CPVs in the BES panel dataset, I use an economic ideology question (about income inequality) and cultural ideology question (about immigration). I only keep participants who are left-conservative or right-progressive in a given wave. Among CPVs, there are 45,724 individuals measured 106,975 times.

To measure salience, I use a question which asks respondents to write which political issue is most important to them. These answers are then coded by the BES into 50 policy categories. I recode these into economic, cultural, or neither issues, which can be seen in Appendix F.

I measure media ideology with a question about which British newspaper the respondent reads most often. This data is actually measured by YouGov separately and the BES then merges these responses before the next closest BES wave. Unfortunately, this means that the timing may not always line up precisely with waves. Furthermore, this variable has less intra-individual variation across waves than other variables, since YouGov does not ask this question as often as the BES administers waves. This may affect the results for the BES models that use individual fixed effects. Therefore, in Appendix J, I also include models with just wave fixed effects and additional time-invariant covariates. There is no other question about media outlet consumption that works better. For each participant, I use the combined media ideology score (economic plus cultural) of their preferred newspaper, based on measurements from Author (2026).

For covariates, I use variables that measure the following: CPV group, economic position, cultural position, ethnicity, gender, UK constituent country, age, education level, income, marital status, personal financial change, class, voting in the 2015 UK general election,[13] and Brexit Referendum support.

H.2 American National Election Study (ANES)

To identify CPVs in the ANES Social Media Panel Study, I use a variable that measures attitudes toward government funding of healthcare (economic dimension) and variables that capture attitudes toward race and immigration (cultural dimension). As before, I only include people who are CPVs in a given wave. This produces 2855 individuals who are measured 4330 times. This dataset is smaller than the other panel datasets. It may have less statistical power, particularly for models with individual fixed effects, so I also include models with just wave fixed

[13]This election occurred before the first included BES wave, since the CPV group ideology variables are not available in the first seven BES waves.

effects and additional time-invariant covariates in Appendix J.

For salience, I use a question that asks respondents to choose which is the most important political issue between nine options. These are coded as either economic, cultural, or neither. These codings can be seen in Appendix F.

There is no question that measures media selection exactly. However, two questions ask how much participants trust *Fox News* and *MSNBC* on five-point scales. Since there is a strong association between trust in outlets and media consumption (Metzger et al. 2020; Stroud 2011), I use these variables to measure media selection. I subtract *MSNBC* trust from *Fox* trust to construct a single scale measuring media trust/selection from very left-progressive to very right-conservative.

For covariates, I use variables that measure the following: CPV group, economic position, cultural position, ethnicity, gender, region, age, education level, income, relationship status, personal finances, urban/rural residence, voting in the 2016 US presidential election, and political information.

H.3 German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES)

To identify CPVs in the GLES, I use variables that measure attitudes toward taxes and government spending (economic dimension) and immigration (cultural dimension). Once again, I only include people who are CPVs in a given wave. There are 15,511 CPVs measured 54,235 times.

For salience, there are two questions that ask about the importance of taxes and social services spending (economic salience) and immigration (cultural salience) on five-point scales. I subtract the latter from the former to create a combined measure of economic-versus-cultural salience.

For media outlet selection, I use a series of questions that ask how many days per week people read six news outlets, either via their newspapers or websites. Three of these are recognized by media researchers to be left-progressive (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, and *taz*), while similarly three are right-conservative (*Bild*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, and *Welt*) (Dallmann et al. 2015; Hinrichs et al. 2025). To make a combined scale, I subtract the number of outlet-days that people read left-progressive outlets from the number of outlet-days that people read right-conservative outlets.

The only waves that include both the salience and media selection variables are waves 4, 7, and 8. Therefore, while the descriptive results rely on a much larger number of waves, the H_1 results with GLES panel data only include three waves. Like the previous panel datasets, this reduces the amount of intra-individual variation in these variables. Therefore, as before, I include a model with individual and wave fixed effects in the main paper, but also a model with only wave fixed effects in Appendix J. The latter captures more variation — between individuals.

Covariates include the following: CPV group, economic position, cultural position, religion (as ethnicity is unavailable), gender, region, year of birth, education level, income, marital status, personal finances, urban/rural residence, voting in the 2013 election, and interest in politics (Plutzer 2017). Some of these are only measured once or a few times per person, especially if they do not change often. In these cases, I apply a custom function to

fill each individual's empty waves with their closest response. When two waves are equidistant to an empty wave, I use the earlier one. These variables include religion, region, education level, income, marital status, personal finances, urban/rural residence, and interest in politics.

I Logistic Regressions

As mentioned in the main paper, the pre-registration states that the models based on the original survey (OS) data should use logistic regression, since they all have dichotomous dependent variables (Author 2025). The main paper displays linear probability models for ease of interpretation. However, to ensure that the results are consistent with the pre-registration, I display the logistic regression versions for all pre-registered models in the tables below. This includes the models from the main paper and some additional (less important) models that are not displayed in the paper. It excludes some models that are shown in the paper but are not pre-registered. None of these excluded versions are preferred models, however.

Tables A7, A8/A9, and A10 refer to models for H_1, H_2, and H_3, respectively. The model numbers below are different from those in the main paper because they correspond to the pre-registration models (Author 2025). Nevertheless, they can be easily compared to the models in the main paper based on the model names in those figures and the parameters described below. The model numbers here have an "l-" prefix (for "logit") to differentiate these from other models.

Table A7 includes eight models that test the effects of salience and covariates on outlet selection. Unless otherwise indicated, these models use the experimental measure of salience, all covariates, and all data. Model l-1 is the preferred model, with all of these specifications. Model l-2 is identical, but does not include the covariates. Models l-3a, l-3b, and l-3c include only participants who are randomly exposed to the "ideological positions block," "depictions of party positions block," and "salience block" first in the survey (see Appendix B), respectively. This helps to determine if there are any order or attrition effects. Models l-4a and l-4b include only participants who answer the survey in Stage 1 and Stage 2 of sampling (see Author (2025)), respectively. These stages ended up being quite similar to one another time-wise. In my pre-registration, I indicate that I would run Models l-3a, l-3b, l-3c, l-4a, and l-4b, but that these might be included in the appendices as they exclude data (Author 2025). Finally, Model l-5 uses the non-experimental measure of salience.

I include summarizing information about the models under the model numbers: "preferred" means a model with covariates and all data; "simple" means no covariates; "block" means that the data only includes participants who randomly saw experimental block A, B, or C first; "stage" means that participants answered the survey in the first or second sampling stage; and "obs" means that the observational measure of the independent variable (salience) is used. I also use similar descriptors for other tables below.

I include all experimental and other relevant variables (e.g., group, salience) in the table. Except for Model l-2, these models also include the following covariates: days, pre_econ, pre_cult, sex, ethnicity, immigrant, uk_country, age, education, income, vote_2017, vote_2019, party, pol_interest, pre_media_econ, and pre_media_cult. These variables are included for covariate adjustment and are not the focus of this study. Some of them have many categories, which would make the table quite long. In Table A7, I exclude the non-political covariates: days, sex, ethnicity, immigrant, uk_country, age, education, and income.

I also abbreviate some of the variables and covariate categories so that the table is not too wide. "Sal" is salience, "RP" is right-progressive, "CULT" is cultural, and "ECON" is economic. For dichotomous and categorical variables, the categories are indicated in uppercase letters. For example, in "exp_sal_CULT," "exp_sal" is the (experimental) variable and "CULT" is the category. Otherwise, the variable and category names match those from Appendix F.

Table A7: Logistic Regressions Using Original Survey (OS) Data for H_1

	(l-1) preferred	(l-2) simple	(l-3a) block A	(l-3b) block B	(l-3c) block C	(l-4a) stage A	(l-4b) stage B	(l-5) obs
group_RP	-0.662^{*}	-0.247^{***}	0.154	-1.623^{*}	-0.546	-0.018	-0.848^{*}	-0.886
	(0.335)	(0.043)	(0.601)	(0.649)	(0.645)	(0.719)	(0.406)	(0.569)
exp_sal_CULT	0.187	0.007	0.232	-0.273	0.592	0.203	0.093	
	(0.261)	(0.047)	(0.472)	(0.452)	(0.568)	(0.517)	(0.322)	
exp_sal_ECON	0.341	0.043	0.235	0.867	0.278	1.230^{*}	0.107	
	(0.274)	(0.048)	(0.483)	(0.544)	(0.537)	(0.613)	(0.328)	
sal								0.062
								(0.552)
group_RP:exp_sal_CULT	-0.212	0.022	-0.529	0.650	-0.433	-0.417	-0.013	
	(0.358)	(0.068)	(0.651)	(0.643)	(0.748)	(0.725)	(0.440)	
group_RP:exp_sal_ECON	-0.233	-0.007	0.215	-0.482	-0.659	-1.507	0.156	
	(0.366)	(0.068)	(0.678)	(0.712)	(0.718)	(0.789)	(0.442)	
group_RP:sal								0.201
								(0.776)
vote_2017_LABOUR	-0.087		0.387	-0.270	-0.490	-0.854	0.274	-0.077
	(0.297)		(0.532)	(0.537)	(0.601)	(0.592)	(0.367)	(0.296)
vote_2017_NONE	-0.158		1.144^{*}	-0.926	-0.646	-1.599^{*}	0.396	-0.138
	(0.295)		(0.553)	(0.533)	(0.591)	(0.640)	(0.354)	(0.295)
vote_2017_OTHER	-0.243		0.323	-0.489	-0.505	-1.044	0.166	-0.233
	(0.294)		(0.556)	(0.539)	(0.572)	(0.610)	(0.358)	(0.293)
vote_2019_LABOUR	-0.837^{**}		-0.741	-1.208^{*}	-0.349	-0.161	-1.141^{**}	-0.832^{**}
	(0.302)		(0.542)	(0.564)	(0.602)	(0.610)	(0.373)	(0.301)
vote_2019_NONE	-0.469		-0.573	-0.455	-0.346	0.419	-0.688^{*}	-0.477
	(0.287)		(0.523)	(0.568)	(0.549)	(0.634)	(0.350)	(0.286)
vote_2019_OTHER	-0.867^{**}		-0.932	-1.220^{*}	-1.016	-0.709	-1.048^{**}	-0.867^{**}
	(0.296)		(0.547)	(0.589)	(0.573)	(0.605)	(0.366)	(0.295)
party_LABOUR	-0.536^{*}		-0.922	0.055	-0.795	-0.265	-0.735^{*}	-0.528
	(0.273)		(0.504)	(0.519)	(0.554)	(0.566)	(0.333)	(0.273)
party_NONE	-0.075		-0.717	1.049	-0.419	0.073	-0.018	-0.057
	(0.304)		(0.556)	(0.589)	(0.582)	(0.633)	(0.369)	(0.303)
party_OTHER	-0.432		-0.999^{*}	-0.254	-0.072	-0.336	-0.479	-0.433
	(0.262)		(0.466)	(0.508)	(0.534)	(0.523)	(0.328)	(0.261)
pre_econ	3.992^{***}		3.454^{*}	5.015^{***}	5.373^{***}	3.642^{*}	4.433^{***}	3.879^{***}
	(0.759)		(1.379)	(1.447)	(1.565)	(1.611)	(0.916)	(0.762)
pre_cult	5.333^{***}		8.229^{***}	3.369^{*}	6.421^{***}	7.131^{***}	5.540^{***}	5.315^{***}
	(0.817)		(1.639)	(1.343)	(1.705)	(1.827)	(0.990)	(0.812)
pol_interest	-0.447		-0.459	-0.520	-0.372	-0.325	-0.425	-0.460
	(0.290)		(0.553)	(0.518)	(0.553)	(0.616)	(0.350)	(0.289)
pre_media_econ	-1.922		-4.457^{*}	0.981	-3.613	-1.332	-1.911	-1.943
	(1.184)		(2.259)	(2.149)	(2.382)	(2.226)	(1.497)	(1.179)
pre_media_cult	2.525^{*}		4.864^{*}	-0.656	4.819	1.347	2.971	2.553^{*}
	(1.244)		(2.415)	(2.212)	(2.467)	(2.340)	(1.574)	(1.237)
Constant	-3.989^{**}	0.752^{***}	10.102	-3.669	-5.656^{*}	7.827	-5.450^{***}	-3.803^{**}
	(1.251)	(0.029)	(1,435.415)	(2.102)	(2.318)	(693.548)	(1.502)	(1.329)
Observations	1,073	1,077	375	363	335	304	769	1,073
Log Likelihood	-558.726	-695.379	-177.854	-178.651	-160.882	-148.127	-383.986	-559.564

Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,191.451	1,402.757	429.707	431.302	395.764	370.254	841.972	1,189.129

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

In Figure 7 of the main paper, the results using OS data are almost never statistically significant. Likewise, in Table A7, the independent variables (exp_salience, salience, and their interactions with group) are rarely statistically significant. This includes the preferred model (l-1) and the model that uses salience rather than exp_salience (l-5). The results are also generally in the same direction as in Figure 7.

Table A8 is quite similar to Table A7, but refers to H_2. All of the models have the same specifications as in Table A7. For example, Model l-6 is like Model l-1, Model l-7 is like Model l-2, etc. There are two main differences. First, the dependent variable is now article selection, rather than outlet selection. Second, these models do not interact the independent variable (exp_salience or salience) with group, since H_2 is not dependent on the CPV group. Otherwise, the covariates are the same. Models l-10a and l-10b are displayed in Table A9 as they do not fit in Table A8. Therefore, Model 11 is displayed out of numeric order (before Models l-10a and l-10b). These latter two models only include people who are assigned to their selected outlet (l-10a) or non-selected outlet (l-10b), as indicated below each model number.

Table A8: Logistic Regressions Using Original Survey (OS) Data for H_2

	(l-6)	(l-7)	(l-8a)	(l-8b)	(l-8c)	(l-9a)	(l-9b)	(l-11)
	preferred	simple	block A	block B	block C	stage A	stage B	obs
group_RP	0.203		0.046	0.581	0.120	0.727	0.189	0.198
	(0.256)		(0.435)	(0.495)	(0.497)	(0.551)	(0.305)	(0.257)
exp_sal_CULT	−0.099	−0.106	−0.080	−0.482	−0.098	−0.149	−0.065	
	(0.154)	(0.148)	(0.276)	(0.295)	(0.293)	(0.322)	(0.184)	
exp_sal_ECON	−0.130	−0.086	−0.008	−0.631*	0.060	−0.353	−0.059	
	(0.155)	(0.150)	(0.277)	(0.294)	(0.287)	(0.312)	(0.187)	
sal								0.990**
								(0.325)
vote_2017_LABOUR	0.166		−0.459	0.253	0.408	−0.427	0.437	0.181
	(0.259)		(0.455)	(0.480)	(0.504)	(0.508)	(0.321)	(0.260)
vote_2017_NONE	0.066		−0.124	−0.254	0.313	−0.110	0.115	0.076
	(0.248)		(0.446)	(0.460)	(0.465)	(0.542)	(0.291)	(0.248)
vote_2017_OTHER	0.383		0.262	0.506	0.279	−0.122	0.568	0.432
	(0.255)		(0.474)	(0.485)	(0.449)	(0.523)	(0.309)	(0.256)
vote_2019_LABOUR	−0.108		−0.225	0.228	−0.433	0.534	−0.427	−0.121
	(0.263)		(0.459)	(0.507)	(0.503)	(0.532)	(0.323)	(0.264)
vote_2019_NONE	0.051		−0.180	0.092	0.284	−0.193	0.081	0.061
	(0.243)		(0.435)	(0.496)	(0.436)	(0.532)	(0.290)	(0.243)
vote_2019_OTHER	0.092		0.084	0.416	−0.070	0.216	−0.048	0.046
	(0.262)		(0.469)	(0.531)	(0.463)	(0.537)	(0.318)	(0.264)
party_LABOUR	0.276		0.622	0.140	0.181	0.122	0.373	0.316
	(0.222)		(0.408)	(0.427)	(0.418)	(0.460)	(0.265)	(0.223)
party_NONE	0.023		0.087	0.379	−0.153	0.176	−0.068	0.038
	(0.244)		(0.431)	(0.478)	(0.447)	(0.519)	(0.288)	(0.244)
party_OTHER	−0.125		−0.027	−0.346	0.039	−0.627	0.098	−0.076
	(0.209)		(0.367)	(0.423)	(0.388)	(0.414)	(0.254)	(0.210)
pre_econ	0.239		0.434	−0.707	0.661	−0.169	0.143	0.217
	(0.649)		(1.087)	(1.282)	(1.244)	(1.371)	(0.774)	(0.653)

pre_cult	0.238		−0.455	1.259	−0.435	0.285	0.337	0.144
	(0.612)		(1.118)	(1.076)	(1.236)	(1.271)	(0.733)	(0.614)
pol_interest	−0.344		−0.266	−0.382	−0.509	−0.208	−0.414	−0.315
	(0.250)		(0.465)	(0.451)	(0.465)	(0.523)	(0.298)	(0.251)
pre_media_econ	1.233		1.704	1.856	0.574	0.967	1.319	1.336
	(0.948)		(1.773)	(1.791)	(1.689)	(1.773)	(1.176)	(0.953)
pre_media_cult	−1.104		−2.410	−1.665	0.223	−1.034	−1.066	−1.176
	(0.975)		(1.848)	(1.800)	(1.705)	(1.856)	(1.206)	(0.981)
Constant	−1.814	0.354***	0.399	−16.737	−0.960	−18.114	−1.016	−2.590*
	(1.068)	(0.094)	(1.974)	(726.412)	(1.850)	(705.947)	(1.280)	(1.099)
Observations	1,073	1,076	375	363	335	304	769	1,073
Log Likelihood	−707.050	−733.581	−238.784	−216.901	−218.820	−186.625	−499.152	−702.772
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,484.101	1,473.161	547.569	503.803	507.640	443.249	1,068.304	1,473.544

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A9: Logistic Regressions Using Original Survey (OS) Data for H_2 (by Selected/Non-Selected Outlet)

	(l-10a) selected	(l-10b) non-selected
group_RP	0.118	0.049
	(0.374)	(0.386)
exp_sal_CULT	0.075	−0.310
	(0.227)	(0.231)
exp_sal_ECON	−0.152	−0.202
	(0.226)	(0.242)
vote_2017_LABOUR	−0.071	0.175
	(0.391)	(0.386)
vote_2017_NONE	0.002	−0.075
	(0.358)	(0.381)
vote_2017_OTHER	0.705	−0.062
	(0.386)	(0.369)
vote_2019_LABOUR	−0.403	0.455
	(0.403)	(0.387)
vote_2019_NONE	0.107	0.292
	(0.367)	(0.360)
vote_2019_OTHER	−0.244	0.390
	(0.408)	(0.377)
party_LABOUR	0.352	0.172
	(0.323)	(0.330)
party_NONE	−0.372	0.281
	(0.363)	(0.369)
party_OTHER	−0.427	0.191
	(0.306)	(0.314)
pre_econ	−0.248	1.324
	(0.950)	(0.994)
pre_cult	−1.107	1.653
	(0.931)	(0.910)
pol_interest	0.062	−0.763
	(0.354)	(0.395)
pre_media_econ	1.207	0.981
	(1.403)	(1.419)
pre_media_cult	−1.380	−0.809
	(1.443)	(1.464)
Constant	−14.440	−2.404
	(636.900)	(1.505)
Observations	544	529

Log Likelihood	−346.194	−322.134
Akaike Inf. Crit.	762.388	714.267

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

As before, the models in Tables A8 and A9 have similar results as those seen in the main paper (Figure 8). The experimental treatments are statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, the observational measure of salience in Model l-11 is positive (the hypothesized direction) and has strong statistical significance (p=0.0023). They are also generally similar to the linear probability models.

Finally, Table A10 shows the logistic regression models that test H_3. Models l-12 through l-15b have similar specifications as Models l-6 through l-9b in Table A8. In addition, I include Models l-16a and l-16b in this table, which are comparable to Models l-10a and l-10b in Table A9. The dependent variable in Table A10 is article selection and the primary independent variable is exp_outlet (the randomly assigned outlet ideology).

Table A10: Logistic Regressions Using Original Survey (OS) Data for H_3

	(l-12)	(l-13)	(l-14a)	(l-14b)	(l-14c)	(l-15a)	(l-15b)	(l-16a)	(l-16b)
	preferred	simple	block A	block B	block C	stage A	stage B	selected	non-selected
group_RP	−0.153	−0.914***	−1.090	1.172	−0.792	1.110	−0.289	−1.333	0.941
	(0.521)	(0.188)	(0.911)	(0.959)	(1.037)	(1.043)	(0.636)	(0.773)	(0.789)
exp_outlet_RC	−1.772***	−1.639***	−1.681***	−2.040***	−2.063***	−1.645***	−1.859***	−1.870***	−1.842***
	(0.198)	(0.187)	(0.341)	(0.389)	(0.389)	(0.409)	(0.239)	(0.363)	(0.346)
sal	1.709***		0.626	2.641**	2.044*	2.018*	1.713**	1.295*	2.267**
	(0.483)		(0.864)	(0.891)	(0.954)	(0.906)	(0.601)	(0.649)	(0.767)
group_RP:	2.085***	1.947***	1.808***	2.482***	2.708***	2.279***	2.002***	2.001***	2.388***
exp_outlet_RC	(0.273)	(0.259)	(0.494)	(0.526)	(0.526)	(0.560)	(0.329)	(0.453)	(0.439)
group_RP:sal	−1.080		0.396	−2.827*	−1.044	−2.712	−0.756	0.020	−2.369*
	(0.695)		(1.260)	(1.270)	(1.343)	(1.440)	(0.841)	(1.024)	(1.050)
vote_2017_LABOUR	0.038		−0.530	0.167	0.227	−0.578	0.271	−0.308	0.172
	(0.272)		(0.478)	(0.504)	(0.537)	(0.543)	(0.335)	(0.406)	(0.406)
vote_2017_NONE	0.045		−0.063	−0.176	0.214	−0.063	0.098	−0.046	−0.084
	(0.261)		(0.469)	(0.481)	(0.496)	(0.566)	(0.308)	(0.374)	(0.398)
vote_2017_OTHER	0.457		0.419	0.571	0.490	−0.063	0.639	0.853*	0.010
	(0.270)		(0.498)	(0.508)	(0.491)	(0.557)	(0.329)	(0.405)	(0.385)
vote_2019_LABOUR	−0.117		−0.250	0.130	−0.351	0.338	−0.375	−0.598	0.462
	(0.276)		(0.483)	(0.534)	(0.537)	(0.554)	(0.338)	(0.421)	(0.405)
vote_2019_NONE	0.114		−0.191	0.069	0.606	−0.232	0.173	0.034	0.402
	(0.257)		(0.460)	(0.522)	(0.473)	(0.566)	(0.307)	(0.384)	(0.377)
vote_2019_OTHER	0.055		0.016	0.335	0.007	0.066	−0.024	−0.516	0.427
	(0.277)		(0.490)	(0.566)	(0.500)	(0.569)	(0.336)	(0.429)	(0.394)
party_LABOUR	0.349		0.680	0.161	0.432	0.100	0.469	0.471	0.303
	(0.233)		(0.424)	(0.450)	(0.446)	(0.498)	(0.278)	(0.333)	(0.350)
party_NONE	−0.005		−0.096	0.282	0.087	−0.032	−0.050	−0.271	0.251
	(0.257)		(0.453)	(0.509)	(0.476)	(0.565)	(0.302)	(0.376)	(0.384)
party_OTHER	−0.129		−0.181	−0.251	0.140	−0.667	0.121	−0.384	0.156
	(0.220)		(0.378)	(0.457)	(0.414)	(0.439)	(0.268)	(0.316)	(0.328)
econ	0.077		−0.055	−0.781	0.832	0.404	−0.233	0.033	0.701
	(0.688)		(1.143)	(1.389)	(1.338)	(1.470)	(0.814)	(1.011)	(1.059)
cult	0.256		−0.631	1.491	−0.902	0.202	0.391	−0.747	1.522
	(0.642)		(1.169)	(1.145)	(1.333)	(1.367)	(0.768)	(0.979)	(0.971)
pol_interest	−0.314		−0.286	−0.695	−0.212	−0.171	−0.414	−0.020	−0.542
	(0.264)		(0.488)	(0.480)	(0.492)	(0.545)	(0.316)	(0.371)	(0.412)
pre_media_econ	1.378		1.584	2.254	1.749	0.248	1.760	1.316	1.084
	(0.992)		(1.868)	(1.847)	(1.762)	(1.874)	(1.242)	(1.455)	(1.465)
pre_media_cult	−1.210		−2.310	−1.814	−0.946	−0.283	−1.509	−1.348	−0.888
	(1.021)		(1.948)	(1.852)	(1.784)	(1.946)	(1.276)	(1.501)	(1.512)
Constant	−2.615*	1.139***	0.123	−17.714	−2.177	−18.560	−1.869	−14.588	−4.078*
	(1.217)	(0.143)	(2.149)	(724.763)	(2.185)	(679.153)	(1.441)	(604.896)	(1.728)
Observations	1,073	1,076	375	363	335	304	769	544	529
Log Likelihood	−656.283	−689.520	−224.526	−199.303	−199.430	−175.103	−461.000	−327.404	−302.373
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,386.567	1,387.041	523.052	472.606	472.860	424.207	996.000	728.808	678.747

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Once again, the results are quite similar to the linear probability models in the main paper (Figure 9). Among left-conservatives, the coefficients for "exp_outlet_RC" are always negative and statistically significant at the $p < 0.001$ level, as expected by H_3. Among right-progressives ("group_RP:exp_outlet_RC"), the coefficients are always positive and also statistically significant at the $p < 0.001$ level, relative to left-conservatives (but not alone).

Overall, these results demonstrate that the linear probability models from the main paper that use the OS data are consistent with models that follow my pre-registration (Author 2025). It is therefore valid to include the more interpretable linear probability models in the paper. The logistic regressions above also serve as robustness checks, and they do demonstrate robustness.

J Full Regression Tables

I now display full regression tables for the linear probability models displayed in the main paper. Here, the model numbers are prefixed with "f-" for "full." For tables that include different datasets (i.e., not just the original survey), I indicate these below the model number with "OS" (original survey), BES, ANES, or GLES. As in Appendix I, I remove non-political covariates and fixed effects from the tables so that they fit here more easily. Unless otherwise stated, models use original survey data, the full dataset, an interaction between the independent variable and CPV group, covariates, and individual/wave fixed effects (for panel data models). These are considered "preferred" models.

Tables A11 and A12 consist of the descriptive results and correspond with Figure 5 in the main paper. The former has salience as the dependent variable and the latter has media/outlet (ideology) and article (topic) as the dependent variables. See Appendix F for more information about how these variables (and others below) are coded. They have wave fixed effects and weights, but not individual fixed effects. These models are meant to examine the average values of the dependent variables for left-conservatives and right-progressives. The constant can be interpreted as the mean value of the dependent variable for left-conservatives, whereas the coefficient for group_RP is added to this constant to compute the mean value for right-progressives.

Table A13 includes the manipulation tests and corresponds with Figure 6 from the main paper. These models are meant to test the effectiveness of the treatments exp_sal_CULT and exp_sal_ECON (along with their interactions with group) in influencing salience. Below the model numbers, "ungrouped" indicates if the model pools the CPVs together and "grouped" indicates if there is an interaction between the independent variable (exp_salience) and CPV group.

Tables A14 and A15 test H_1 and correspond with Figure 7 in the main paper. The former has the OS models and the latter has the panel data models. The dependent variable is outlet selection and the independent variable is exp_salience or salience (and their interactions with group). In the model descriptions, "exp" and "obs" refer to experimental and observational independent variables for OS data, respectively. "Simple" refers to models without covariates. For panel data models, "No ID FE" indicates models without individual fixed effects, while all models have wave fixed effects. I combine the previous voting behavior covariates for the BES (vote_2015), ANES (vote_2016), and GLES (vote_2013) so that pre_vote_RCP is voting for the main right-conservative parties (Conservatives, Republicans, and CDU/CSU), pre_vote_LPP is voting for the main left-progressive parties (Labour, Democrats, and SPD), and pre_vote_NONE is not voting.

Table A16 tests H_2 and corresponds with Figure 8 in the main paper. The dependent variable is article selection and the independent variable is exp_salience or salience (and their interactions with group).

Finally, Table A17 tests H_3 and corresponds with Figure 9 in the main paper. The dependent variable is also article selection and the independent variable is exp_outlet and its interaction with group. In the model descriptors, "selected" refers to people who are randomly assigned to the outlet that they selected and "non-selected" is those

who are assigned to the other outlet.

The panel datasets do not include a content selection variable — the dependent variable for H_2 and H_3 — so the latter two tables only include models with the OS dataset.

I use abbreviations for some variables (like "sal" for salience) and covariate categories. For dichotomous and categorical variables, the categories are indicated in uppercase letters. See Appendix I for more information about these formatting decisions.

Table A11: Full Regression Table for Descriptive Results (Salience)

	(f-1) OS	(f-2) BES	(f-3) ANES	(f-4) GLES
Constant	0.663^{***}	0.319^{***}	0.627^{***}	0.629^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.003)
group_RP	-0.027^{*}	0.118^{***}	-0.006	-0.059^{***}
	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.003)
Observations	1,078	54,366	2,551	21,904
R^2	0.004	0.307	0.031	0.024
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.306	0.030	0.023

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A12: Full Regression Table for Descriptive Results (Media/Article)

	Dependent variable:				
	media				article
	(f-5) OS	(f-6) BES	(f-7) ANES	(f-8) GLES	(f-9) OS
Constant	0.766^{***}	0.674^{***}	0.518^{***}	0.518^{***}	0.559^{***}
	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.021)
group_RP	-0.242^{***}	-0.090^{***}	0.023^{***}	-0.004^{**}	0.033
	(0.028)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.030)
Observations	1,077	44,097	3,589	20,401	1,076
R^2	0.064	0.032	0.015	0.001	0.001
Adjusted R^2	0.063	0.032	0.015	0.001	0.0002

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A13: Full Regression Table for Manipulation Tests

	(f-10) ungrouped	(f-11) grouped
group_RP	-0.008	-0.028
	(0.025)	(0.028)
exp_sal_CULT	-0.027	-0.036
	(0.015)	(0.020)
exp_sal_ECON	0.004	-0.022
	(0.015)	(0.021)
group_RP:exp_sal_CULT		0.019
		(0.030)
group_RP:exp_sal_ECON		0.053
		(0.030)
vote_2017_LABOUR	-0.020	-0.020
	(0.025)	(0.025)
vote_2017_NONE	-0.018	-0.018
	(0.024)	(0.024)
vote_2017_OTHER	-0.048^{*}	-0.048^{*}
	(0.024)	(0.024)
vote_2019_LABOUR	0.011	0.010
	(0.025)	(0.025)
vote_2019_NONE	-0.0001	0.001
	(0.023)	(0.023)
vote_2019_OTHER	0.042	0.041
	(0.025)	(0.025)

party_LABOUR	−0.034	−0.034
	(0.021)	(0.021)
party_NONE	−0.021	−0.022
	(0.024)	(0.024)
party_OTHER	−0.045*	−0.046*
	(0.020)	(0.020)
pre_econ	0.046	0.041
	(0.063)	(0.063)
pre_cult	0.073	0.071
	(0.059)	(0.059)
pol_interest	−0.023	−0.022
	(0.024)	(0.024)
pre_media_econ	−0.075	−0.072
	(0.091)	(0.091)
pre_media_cult	0.051	0.046
	(0.094)	(0.094)
Constant	0.718***	0.736***
	(0.095)	(0.095)
Observations	1,073	1,073
R^2	0.057	0.060
Adjusted R^2	0.027	0.028

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A14: Full Regression Table for H_1 (Original Survey Data)

	(f-12) exp	(f-13) exp, simple	(f-14) obs	(f-15) obs, simple
group_RP	−0.153*	−0.247***	−0.229*	−0.433***
	(0.060)	(0.043)	(0.101)	(0.096)
exp_sal_CULT	0.022	0.007		
	(0.044)	(0.047)		
exp_sal_ECON	0.053	0.043		
	(0.045)	(0.048)		
sal			−0.007	−0.006
			(0.089)	(0.093)
group_RP:exp_sal_CULT	−0.015	0.022		
	(0.064)	(0.068)		
group_RP:exp_sal_ECON	−0.028	−0.007		
	(0.064)	(0.068)		
group_RP:sal			0.107	0.300*
			(0.135)	(0.141)
vote_2017_LABOUR	−0.017		−0.016	
	(0.053)		(0.053)	
vote_2017_NONE	−0.031		−0.028	
	(0.051)		(0.051)	
vote_2017_OTHER	−0.044		−0.042	
	(0.052)		(0.052)	
vote_2019_LABOUR	−0.153**		−0.150**	
	(0.054)		(0.054)	
vote_2019_NONE	−0.078		−0.079	
	(0.050)		(0.050)	
vote_2019_OTHER	−0.156**		−0.156**	
	(0.054)		(0.054)	
party_LABOUR	−0.083		−0.083	
	(0.046)		(0.046)	
party_NONE	0.006		0.008	
	(0.051)		(0.051)	
party_OTHER	−0.068		−0.068	
	(0.044)		(0.044)	
pre_econ	0.700***		0.678***	
	(0.135)		(0.136)	
pre_cult	0.857***		0.856***	
	(0.127)		(0.127)	
pol_interest	−0.082		−0.085	
	(0.052)		(0.051)	
pre_media_econ	−0.288		−0.292	
	(0.196)		(0.196)	
pre_media_cult	0.397		0.401*	
	(0.203)		(0.202)	
Constant	−0.145	0.752***	−0.102	0.770***
	(0.206)	(0.029)	(0.218)	(0.065)
Observations	1,073	1,077	1,073	1,077
R^2	0.226	0.066	0.225	0.071
Adjusted R^2	0.199	0.061	0.200	0.068

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A15: Full Regression Table for H_1 (Panel Data)

	(f-16) BES	(f-17) BES No ID FE	(f-18) ANES	(f-19) ANES No ID FE	(f-20) GLES	(f-21) GLES No ID FE
group_RP	0.02	0.02	−0.01	0.03	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
sal	0.00	−0.04***	0.00	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
group_RP:sal	−0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
econ	−0.02	0.07***	0.03	0.09***	−0.00	0.03*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
cult	0.02	0.20***	0.06	0.14***	−0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
pre_vote_RCP		0.07***		0.08***		0.01**
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)
pre_vote_LPP		−0.03***		−0.06***		0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)
pre_vote_NONE		0.01		0.02		0.00
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)
brexit_LEAVE		0.03***				
		(0.01)				
pol_interest			0.01	0.04**	0.01	0.01**
			(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant		0.35***		0.33***		0.87**
		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.30)
R^2	0.93	0.16	0.92	0.24	0.90	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.83	0.15	0.73	0.23	0.72	0.02
Num. obs.	23280	23280	2541	2531	8575	3060
RMSE	0.11	0.24	0.08	0.14	0.03	0.06
N Clusters	14417	14417	1759	1753	5354	1927

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A16: Full Regression Table for H_2

	(f-22) exp	(f-23) exp simple	(f-24) exp grouped	(f-25) obs	(f-26) obs simple	(f-27) obs grouped
group_RP	0.047		0.069	0.046		0.137
	(0.061)		(0.070)	(0.060)		(0.116)
exp_sal_CULT	−0.023	−0.026	−0.003			
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.050)			
exp_sal_ECON	−0.030	−0.021	−0.013			
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.051)			
sal				0.231**	0.226**	0.293**
				(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.101)
group_RP:exp_sal_CULT			−0.042			
			(0.073)			
group_RP:exp_sal_ECON			−0.036			
			(0.074)			
group_RP:sal						−0.143
						(0.154)
vote_2017_LABOUR	0.039		0.039	0.043		0.044
	(0.061)		(0.061)	(0.061)		(0.061)
vote_2017_NONE	0.016		0.016	0.018		0.018
	(0.059)		(0.059)	(0.059)		(0.059)
vote_2017_OTHER	0.089		0.090	0.099		0.099
	(0.060)		(0.060)	(0.060)		(0.060)
vote_2019_LABOUR	−0.024		−0.024	−0.027		−0.031
	(0.062)		(0.062)	(0.062)		(0.062)
vote_2019_NONE	0.012		0.011	0.014		0.013
	(0.058)		(0.058)	(0.057)		(0.057)
vote_2019_OTHER	0.020		0.020	0.010		0.009
	(0.062)		(0.062)	(0.062)		(0.062)
party_LABOUR	0.064		0.065	0.072		0.072
	(0.053)		(0.053)	(0.052)		(0.052)
party_NONE	0.006		0.007	0.010		0.009
	(0.058)		(0.058)	(0.058)		(0.058)
party_OTHER	−0.029		−0.028	−0.018		−0.018
	(0.050)		(0.050)	(0.050)		(0.050)
pre_econ	0.057		0.064	0.050		0.066
	(0.155)		(0.156)	(0.154)		(0.155)
pre_cult	0.056		0.059	0.032		0.038
	(0.146)		(0.146)	(0.145)		(0.145)
pol_interest	−0.081		−0.081	−0.075		−0.072
	(0.059)		(0.059)	(0.059)		(0.059)
pre_media_econ	0.292		0.295	0.312		0.317
	(0.225)		(0.226)	(0.224)		(0.225)
pre_media_cult	−0.261		−0.264	−0.276		−0.282

	(0.233)		(0.233)	(0.232)		(0.232)
Constant	0.091	0.588^{***}	0.070	-0.084	0.427^{***}	-0.152
	(0.234)	(0.023)	(0.237)	(0.239)	(0.051)	(0.250)
Observations	1,073	1,076	1,073	1,073	1,076	1,073
R^2	0.044	0.001	0.045	0.052	0.008	0.053
Adjusted R^2	0.013	-0.001	0.011	0.022	0.008	0.022

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A17: Full Regression Table for H_3

	(f-28) preferred	(f-29) simple	(f-30) selected	(f-31) non-selected	(f-32) ungrouped
group_RP	-0.047	-0.201^{***}	-0.278	0.168	0.047
	(0.113)	(0.041)	(0.165)	(0.161)	(0.060)
exp_outlet_RC	-0.382^{***}	-0.380^{***}	-0.380^{***}	-0.388^{***}	-0.166^{***}
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.030)
sal	0.334^{***}		0.257	0.407^{**}	0.250^{***}
	(0.097)		(0.133)	(0.145)	(0.075)
group_RP:exp_outlet_RC	0.453^{***}	0.454^{***}	0.409^{***}	0.503^{***}	
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.093)	(0.090)	
group_RP:sal	-0.187		0.042	-0.425^{*}	
	(0.148)		(0.219)	(0.208)	
vote_2017_LABOUR	0.011		-0.054	0.034	0.032
	(0.059)		(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.060)
vote_2017_NONE	0.014		0.0005	-0.016	0.010
	(0.056)		(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.058)
vote_2017_OTHER	0.098		0.185^{*}	0.002	0.087
	(0.057)		(0.086)	(0.079)	(0.059)
vote_2019_LABOUR	-0.024		-0.130	0.091	-0.030
	(0.060)		(0.090)	(0.081)	(0.061)
vote_2019_NONE	0.020		-0.002	0.076	0.026
	(0.055)		(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.056)
vote_2019_OTHER	0.010		-0.109	0.081	0.023
	(0.059)		(0.090)	(0.080)	(0.061)
party_LABOUR	0.072		0.099	0.065	0.071
	(0.050)		(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.052)
party_NONE	0.0001		-0.057	0.057	0.006
	(0.056)		(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.057)
party_OTHER	-0.028		-0.075	0.035	-0.022
	(0.048)		(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.049)
pre_econ	0.004		-0.019	0.114	0.011
	(0.149)		(0.218)	(0.213)	(0.152)
pre_cult	0.057		-0.150	0.292	0.030
	(0.139)		(0.210)	(0.193)	(0.143)
pol_interest	-0.070		-0.003	-0.109	-0.071
	(0.056)		(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.058)
pre_media_econ	0.305		0.293	0.229	0.351
	(0.215)		(0.314)	(0.304)	(0.221)
pre_media_cult	-0.268		-0.309	-0.179	-0.305
	(0.222)		(0.323)	(0.315)	(0.228)
Constant	0.016	0.757^{***}	0.251	-0.269	0.013
	(0.240)	(0.029)	(0.336)	(0.355)	(0.236)
Observations	1,073	1,076	544	529	1,073
R^2	0.131	0.081	0.164	0.140	0.079
Adjusted R^2	0.101	0.078	0.105	0.077	0.049

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

K Regressions for Descriptive Results

Section 4.1 of the main paper displays descriptive results about the sample. These include the distributions and/or means of three important variables — salience, ideological outlet selection, and topic selection. However, since these are simple distributions and means, they do not include fixed effects or weights. In Figure A8, I show the means or proportions of these variables based on regression models that allow one to apply wave fixed effects and post-stratification weights. Thus, the left-conservative dots are the constants from the regressions (since left-conservatives are the "reference group"), and the right-progressive dots are the constants plus the coefficients for right-progressives. This allows these results to be more representative of the respective national populations across time. I include the simpler descriptive results in the main paper because they are more easily interpretable and provide more information about the distributions.

Dots are proportions or means and whiskers are 95% confidence intervals (sometimes too small to see). Model numbers are prefixed by "d-" for "descriptive."

These results are very similar to those in Section 4.1. Here, economic salience in the BES and ANES datasets is somewhat lower than before (d-2 and d-3). Or, alternatively, this could be interpreted as cultural salience being somewhat higher. Also, the outlet selections' average ideologies are more clearly statistically significant in favor of right-conservatism here (d-6 to d-8). This is simply due to the more explicit 95 per cent confidence intervals, rather than violins. Nevertheless, they only slightly favor right-conservatism.

Figure A8: Descriptive Regression Results



Note: "OS" is the original survey, "LC" is left-conservatives, and "RP" is right-progressives. "BES," "ANES," and "GLES" refer to the British, American, and German panel studies. Depending on the model, higher numbers on the x-axis indicate more CPVs who (1) have higher economic-versus-cultural salience, (2) select more right-conservative outlets, or (3) select more economic-versus-cultural content.

L Stricter Definition of CPVs

In the main paper, I define CPVs quite broadly. Left-conservatives are anyone that is more leftist than an economic dividing line and more conservative than a cultural dividing line. Right-progressives are more rightist than the economic line and more progressive than the cultural line. Due to the way the ideological questions are asked (see Appendix C), this dividing line is 0.56 for both ideological dimensions (on scales from 0-1, where 1 is rightist/conservative). Note that this is a reversed scale from the original one used to calculate CPVs in the Qualtrics embedded data. Since there are two 11-point questions for each ideological dimension, participants can only have values from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.05. Thus, the dividing line at 0.56 groups people by whether they are 0.55 and below or 0.6 and above.

However, it is possible that this broad definition of CPVs includes some people who are moderates on one or both ideological dimensions. Therefore, I also perform the main statistical tests (preferred models using original survey data) using a stricter definition of CPVs. I create a gap in the thresholds of 0.2 (0.56 ± 0.1). Thus, in Figures A9 and A10, left-conservatives are below 0.46 on the economic dimension and above 0.66 on the cultural dimension. Meanwhile, right-progressives are above 0.66 on the economic dimension and below 0.46 on the cultural dimension. This reduces the sample for the experiments to 130 left-conservatives and 124 right-progressives. See a visualization of this in Figure A2. In Figures A9 and A10, dots are proportions or means and whiskers are 95 per cent confidence intervals. Model numbers are prefixed by "s-" for "strict."

Figure A9 shows the main descriptive results for mean salience, media outlet selection, and media topic selection by CPV group. These are based on regressions, like in Appendix K. The figure also indicates the dependent variable alongside the model numbers. Even using a stricter definition of CPVs, the results are very similar to those in Figures 5 (from the main paper) and A8 (from Appendix K). Right-progressives are now slightly less likely to select the right-conservative outlet than when I use the looser definition of CPVs. Due to fewer CPVs, the standard errors are larger in Figure A9.

Meanwhile, Figure A10 shows a manipulation test and the preferred models that test H_1, H_2, and H_3 using the original survey (OS) data and experimental and observational measures of the independent variables. (For H_3, there is no observational measure of the independent variable, which is outlet assignment.) Under "Model," the figure indicates the manipulation or hypothesis test, specifications, and model number. All models include the covariates mentioned in Table A3. I only include the grouped models, as those ones are most likely to differ with the stricter definition of CPVs.

Once again, the results do not change considerably. The biggest difference is that Model s-8 here has a negative and statistically insignificant coefficient for left-conservatives, while this coefficient in the corresponding model from Figure 9 (Model 15) from the main paper is positive and significant. Since the results in Figures A9 and A10 are generally similar to those in the main paper, I conclude that the broader definition of CPVs is valid and representative enough of people who are "strongly cross-pressured" too. This also serves as a robustness check,

showing that the models are usually robust to different samples.

Figure A9: Descriptive Results Using Stricter CPV Groups



Note: "LC" denotes left-conservatives and "RP" denotes right-progressives. Depending on the model, higher numbers on the x-axis indicate more CPVs who (1) have higher economic-versus-cultural salience, (2) select the right-conservative outlet, or (3) select the economic article.

Figure A10: Manipulation and Hypothesis Tests Using Stricter CPV Groups



Note: The dots indicate the effect of the main independent variable by CPV group for each model. "MT" is manipulation test, "exp" is experimental, "obs" is observational, "LC" is left-conservatives, and "RP" is right-progressives. Depending on the model, higher numbers on the x-axis indicate an increase in (1) economic-versus-cultural salience, (2) selecting the right-conservative outlet, or (3) selecting the economic article. Lower numbers indicate the opposite.

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