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Abstract

Global inequality has undergone significant shifts over the last four decades, with declines between countries but substantial increases within many nations. While objective inequality remains a critical concern for policymakers, perceptions of inequality also play an important role, as they influence political preferences and policy outcomes in democratic settings. This study, therefore, aims to explore the determinants of individuals' perceptions of ideal income inequality, with particular attention to political mobilization as a key driver of such perceptions. Using World Values Survey (WVS) Wave VII data, we applied multilevel mixed-effects ordinal logit models and found that individuals with varying levels of political mobilization differ in their perceptions of ideal income inequality, with country-specific conditions significantly shaping this relationship. Among the eight parameters measuring political mobilization, four in the overall sample suggest that politically mobilized individuals are less likely to support greater income differences. However, this finding varies across country groups. Overall, the study provides empirical evidence on how perceptions of ideal income inequality differ and highlights the role of political mobilization in shaping these perceptions.

Keywords: Income Inequality, Political Mobilization, Democracy, People's Perception, Multilevel Mixed-Effect Ordinal Logit Model

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Data availability statement

All data available in public domain on the World Values Survey (WVS) website.

Introduction

Over the last four decades, global inequality has remained relatively stagnant; however, within countries, inequality has undergone significant changes (Chancel & Piketty, 2021). Inter-country inequality has either increased or remained the same for Europe (0.4 in 1980 to 0.5 in 2022) and Africa (0.7 in 1980 to 0.7 in 2022) (Chancel et al., 2022). For Asia, the decrease was 0.1 during the same period. The report further finds that the global bottom 50% captures only 7.9% of total income measured at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), while the global top 10% owns 53.3% of total income in 2022. These figures were 6.2% and 52.2% respectively in 1980, reflecting persistent structural inequalities (Chancel et al., 2022). Such objective measures raise concerns about the effectiveness of global efforts to reduce inequality and highlight the importance of examining its complex socio-political consequences.

Beyond objective inequality, research increasingly emphasizes the importance of subjective perceptions. The perception of inequality, rather than the actual existence of inequality, often determines political attitudes and behavior (Faggian et al., 2023; Franko, 2017; García-Sánchez et al., 2018). This “paradox of inequality” suggests that people’s beliefs about the fairness and legitimacy of income distribution can be more politically consequential than actual levels of inequality (Faggian et al., 2023).

Perceptions of inequality are also linked to collective action and mobilization. Robust democracies empower citizens to mobilize and solve common problems; however, high levels of inequality often disempower people and lead to political consequences (Calhoun et al., 2022). Jetten et al. (2020) examined the Yellow Vest movement in France, which emerged from perceptions of illegitimacy in the widening income gap. In later work, Jetten *et al.* (2021) argued that inequality fosters “us” versus “them” dynamics, exacerbating intergroup hostility and reducing prosocial behavior. More broadly, higher perceived inequality has been shown to fuel mass mobilization, including pro-democratic events such as demonstrations and strikes (Nord et al., 2024). Cross-country analyses support this link, showing that perceptions of inequality can lead to voter discontent (Pata et al., 2022), political mobilization (Amat & Beramendi, 2016), and even conflict and violence (Gethin et al., 2022; Justino, 2022; Muller, 1985).

Despite the growing attention to perceptions of inequality, fewer studies explore why individuals differ in their perceptions of the ideal level of inequality. At the macro level, democratic capitalism provides a framework for understanding how distributive policies, through social entitlements or market allocation, shape perceptions and mobilization (Streeck, 2011). Political trust also plays a role: when citizens trust government institutions, they may accept higher income differentials as recognition of individual effort, thereby legitimizing inequality. At the micro level, several theoretical approaches explain variation in perceptions. Relative deprivation theory posits that perceptions of inequality arise when individuals compare their socioeconomic status with that of others and feel disadvantaged (Davis, 1959; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015). This sense of deprivation can mobilize individuals politically, especially if they view inequality as excessive and unjust. The structural position thesis posits that socioeconomic status directly influences perceptions, with individuals in more privileged positions being less likely to demand redistribution (Gijssberts, 2002).


Empirical work has begun to explore these dynamics in specific contexts. Wong et al. (2009) found in Hong Kong that individuals with higher socioeconomic status were less likely to favor reducing inequality compared to those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Similarly, Lee and Kwon (2019) and Fetscher and Rueda (2023) demonstrate that individuals in more advantaged positions tend to be more tolerant of inequality. Cadenas (2024), using

experimental data from Western Europe, demonstrated that mass mobilizations, such as protests, can increase demand for redistribution, thereby shaping perceptions of inequality.

Other studies have linked perceptions of inequality to politics and political participation. For example, Pontusson and Rueda (2008) analyzed the impact of inequality on party politics and found that different forms of inequality (e.g., wage and household income inequality) have different consequences for partisan politics. Similarly, Anderson and Beramendi (2008) inspected the relationship between economic and political inequality by focusing on the relationship between individual income, income inequality, and electoral participation. The study by Bartels (2016) and McCall (2005) examined the role of political information, identification, and knowledge in shaping an individual's perception of income inequality. Foos (2012) examined how perceived income inequality shaped voting behaviors among Democrats and Republicans in the United States. More recently, Kim et al. (2025) found that perceptions of inequality interact with beliefs about social mobility, producing divergent effects on political behavior in East Asian democracies. These studies found that perceptions of inequality are shaped by both structural and psychological factors, where political ideology, political information, and education significantly shape the individual's perception.

In this study, we hypothesize that an individual's political mobilization significantly influences their perception of the ideal level of income inequality. Political mobilization is measured using eight parameters: *signing a petition, joining a boycott, attending peaceful demonstrations, participating in strikes, donating to a group or campaign, contacting a government official, encouraging others to take action on political issues, and encouraging others to vote*. Accordingly, the present study aims to provide empirical evidence on how political mobilization influences individuals' preferences for the ideal level of income inequality while utilizing several socio-political, economic and psychological factors as control variables (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of the study



Source: Authors' Conceptualization

Data and Methodology

Data

The study overall utilizes data from the World Values Survey (WVS), waves II to VII, covering 1990-2022, where the regression model uses the latest WVS-VII data. The WVS, initiated as the European Values Survey in 1981 by Ronald Inglehart, now spans 120 countries, representing 94.5% of the global population. Conducted every five years, it offers data on over 600 indicators, focusing on beliefs, values, and motivations alongside demographic information. The survey employs a standardized questionnaire translated into regional languages spoken by at least 15% of the population. A minimum sample size of 1,200 is randomly selected per country, including individuals aged 18 and above. Data collection involves face-to-face interviews, ensuring participant anonymity.

Variables

Outcome Variable: Perception of income inequality

The outcome variable of this study is the perception of income inequality, measured on an ordinal scale of 1 to 10, where 1 indicates the least preferred level of income inequality, and 10 indicates the most preferred level of income inequality. Value 1 refers to "Incomes should be made more equal," while value 10 refers to "There should be greater incentives for individual effort." Thus, a scale of 1 to 10 implies people's perception of income inequality, favouring higher income differences.

Explanatory Variables

The primary explanatory variable of this study is political mobilization, which encompasses various forms of political action and socio-political activism that individuals can undertake. The political action comprises "signing a petition," "joining a boycott," "attending peaceful demonstrations," and "joining strikes." Socio-political activism comprises political and social activism such as "donating to a group or campaign," "contacting a government official," "encouraging others to take action about political issues," and "encouraging others to vote." The responses for each type of political action and socio-political activism are categorized into a binary category consisting of 0 "will do" and 1 "will not do."

In addition to the primary explanatory variables, the study also considers other demographic, social, economic, and political variables that may help explain people's perceptions of income inequality. We have included social factors such as sex, marital status, education level, religion, and access to information (media influence). Independent and other essential control variables are derived from political factors, including interest in politics, membership in a political party, confidence in the government, participation in national elections, and political mobilization.

Method

The dependent variable in this study, perception of ideal income inequality, is measured on an ordered scale ranging from 1 ("Incomes should be made more equal") to 10 ("There should be greater incentives for individual effort"). Given the ordinal nature of this variable outcome, linear regression models are inappropriate as they assume cardinality and equal distances

between response categories. Instead, ordinal logistic regression (Ologit) provides a suitable framework by explicitly accounting for the ordered structure of the response.

Ordinal logistic regression can be viewed as a generalization of binary logistic regression to outcomes with more than two ordered categories. The model estimates cumulative probabilities of the dependent variable being equal to or below a given category. If the ordinal outcome has J categories, the model estimates $J - 1$ cumulative logits, each corresponding to a different cut-point on the underlying latent scale. These cumulative odds are modeled as a function of explanatory variables, under the assumption that the effects of predictors are constant across response thresholds. This assumption is commonly referred to as the parallel lines or proportional odds (PO) assumption.

Formally, the ordinal response variable is assumed to arise from an unobserved continuous latent variable $INEQ^*$, which represents individuals' underlying perception of the ideal level of income inequality. The relationship between the observed ordinal outcome and the latent variable is governed by a set of threshold parameters.

The data used in this study have a hierarchical structure, with individuals nested within countries. Such nesting implies a deliberate violation of the assumption of independent observations, as individuals within the same country are likely to share common institutional, economic, and cultural contexts. Ignoring this clustering may result in biased standard errors and misleading inference. To address this issue, the study employs a multilevel mixed-effects ordinal logistic regression model (M-Ologit) (Hedeker, 2008), which explicitly accounts for country-level heterogeneity.

At Level 1 (individual level), the latent perception of ideal income inequality for individual i in country c is modeled as:

$$INEQ_{ic}^* = \beta_{0c} + \beta_c X_{ic} + \varepsilon_{ic} \quad (1)$$

Where i refers to the individual ($i = 1, 2, \dots, n$), c refers to the countries cluster ($c = 1, 2, \dots, t$), where X_{ic} denotes a vector of individual-level explanatory variables, β_c is the corresponding vector of coefficients, and ε_{ic} is an idiosyncratic error term assumed to follow a logistic distribution. The term β_{0c} represents a country-specific intercept, allowing the baseline propensity to support income inequality to vary across countries.

At Level 2 (country level), the country-specific parameters from the Level 1 equation are modeled as functions of country-level characteristics:

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_{0c} &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_0 W_c + u_{0c} \\ \beta_{1c} &= \gamma_{10} + \gamma_1 W_c + u_{1c} \\ &\vdots \\ \beta_{mc} &= \gamma_{m0} + \gamma_m W_c + u_{mc} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where W_c denotes a vector of country-level covariates, γ parameters represent fixed effects, and u_{0c} captures unobserved country-level random effects. In the empirical implementation, the model is specified as a random-intercept model, allowing intercepts to vary across countries while slope coefficients remain fixed.

Substituting the Level 2 expressions into the Level 1 equation yields the combined model:

$$INEQ_{ic}^* = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_0 W_c + \sum_{j=1}^m \beta_j X_{ic} + u_{0c} + \varepsilon_{ic} \quad (3)$$

The observed ordinal outcome $INEQ$ is generated by discretizing the latent variable $INEQ^*$ using a set of threshold parameters $\lambda_k (k = 1, 2, \dots, 9)$. The relationship between the latent and observed variables is defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} INEQ &= 1 \text{ if } INEQ^* \leq \lambda_1 \\ INEQ &= 2 \text{ if } \lambda_1 \leq INEQ^* \leq \lambda_2 \\ &\vdots \\ INEQ &= 9 \text{ if } \lambda_8 \leq INEQ^* \leq \lambda_9 \\ INEQ &= 10 \text{ if } INEQ^* \geq \lambda_9 \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Hence, the unobserved variable $INEQ^*$ can be estimated as follows.

$$E(INEQ^*) = Z_i = \sum_{m=1}^m \beta_m X_{mi} \quad (5)$$

Where $X_m (m = 1, 2, 3, \dots, m)$ are the independent variables of the model.

By assuming that the disturbance term follows a logistic distribution and using the estimated value of $INEQ_i^* (Z_i)$, the ordered logit model estimates the probability that the unobserved dependent variable ($INEQ_i^*$) will fall within or beyond the threshold limits (λ_k).

Hence, the cumulative logit model for the dependent variable $INEQ$ can be written as follows.

$$Logit (INEQ \leq j) = \log \left(\frac{P(INEQ \leq j)}{1 - P(INEQ \leq j)} \right) = \beta_{ij} X_1 + \dots + \beta_{i10} X_m \quad (6)$$

The present study devises four multilevel mixed-effect ordinal logit models. MODEL I considers the overall sample of respondents, while MODEL II, MODEL III, and MODEL IV include samples from low-, middle-, and high-income countries, respectively. The countries are classified according to the World Bank's income classification, where lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income countries are combined into a single category of middle-income countries.

Results and Analysis

Trends of the Perception across Waves

The World Values Survey has included a question about perceptions of income inequality since its second wave. Our analysis identified nine countries where this question was posed in all subsequent waves. The heatmap in Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of respondents in each country favouring various levels of inequality across different waves of the World Values Survey. Notably, in countries such as Argentina, Chile, China, Japan, and the USA, the proportion of respondents favouring high inequality has diminished in subsequent waves. Conversely, it has increased in Mexico, South Korea, and Spain. Generally, the preference for a medium level of inequality surpassed both high and low-income inequality preferences in almost all countries across different waves. In subsequent waves, countries with a declining inclination towards high inequality also exhibited an increasing preference for low inequality.

Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of perceptions of income inequality across the survey waves for the countries included in all waves. Simultaneously, Appendix 1 demonstrates a wave-wise compilation of countries and the corresponding percentage distribution of respondents across inequality preference levels. In Wave II, 42.4% of respondents favoured high income inequality over low and medium inequality, which decreased to 33.2% in Wave III. After a slight increase in Wave IV, this percentage declined to its lowest point of 26.5% in Wave VI, only to rise again to 36.2% in the latest Wave VII survey. Although low inequality was favoured by almost 31% of respondents in Wave VII, it hovered around 25% in other waves. Medium inequality emerged as the most favoured level of income inequality in the last three waves of the World Values Survey, representing approximately 39% of total respondents.

Figure 2: Perception of Income Inequality in Selected Countries across Waves (1990-2022)


Country	Wave II (1990-1984)			Wave III (1995-98)			Wave IV (1999-2004)			Wave V (2005-09)			Wave VI (2010-14)			Wave VII (2017-22)		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
Argentina	15	26	55.5	25	35.5	37.3	38	31.4	27.2	37	28.6	32.1	30	47.5	17.3	25	44.9	27.1
Chile	25	34.8	38.9	30	44.5	25.2	51	32	16.5	39	36.3	22.4	59	30.1	9.3	45	44.2	9.4
China	7.1	24.1	68.3	38	34	26.1	24	24.2	42.6	25	25.4	36.1	44	31.9	17.8	27	44.4	28.5
Japan	14	53.7	16.1	16	61.1	13.4	15	59.2	17.1	11	59.7	23.7	20	59.1	12.3	17	64.7	12.6
Mexico	25	31.6	40	23	38.3	36.6	39	22.6	30.4	27	26.2	43.6	33	32.7	33.3	29	33.8	36.7
South Korea	38	31.6	29.1	18	33.4	48.4	18	38.5	43.6	19	40.1	41.1	16	46.9	37.4	5.5	62.6	32
Spain	34	36.9	24	27	39.4	31.2	34	37.8	25.9	24	46.4	27.7	29	50.1	19.3	33	36.7	27.5
Turkey	44	28.2	24.9	41	23	32.6	52	25.4	22.2	38	33.7	26.2	43	37.2	17.5	28	47.1	22.3
USA	12	38.1	46.5	25	45.7	25.7	21	51.6	27.6	12	60.4	24.2	22	51.9	24.5	32	47	19.5

Source: Author's Calculation

The insights derived from Figures 2 and 3 yield three primary observations. Initially, perceptions of income inequality exhibit a bias towards higher income inequality levels.

Secondly, medium levels of inequality garner the highest preference. Thirdly, there exists a divergence in perception among countries.

Figure 3: Perception of Income Inequality across Various Waves



Source: Author's Calculation

Descriptive Statistics of the Inequality Perception Model

Table 1 illustrates the perceptions of ideal income inequality across low-, middle-, and high-income countries, taking into account respondents' socioeconomic, demographic, and political characteristics. In low- and middle-income countries, most respondents favoured high income inequality across various factors, while in high-income countries, a medium level of inequality was preferred. Preferences for low inequality were associated with individuals who had lower education, income, and social class, or those who were unemployed, retired, or lacked access to information. Conversely, high inequality was favoured by those with higher education, employment, or the upper social class. Regarding social activism and political mobilization, 53% of respondents in low-income countries with negative views on these activities preferred high inequality, compared to 50% with affirmative views. In middle-income countries, about 40% preferred high inequality, irrespective of their stance. In high-income countries, 46% favoured medium inequality, while 34% held negative views and 32% held affirmative views, preferring high inequality.

Table 1: Descriptive Analysis of Perception of Income Inequality in Different Country groups categorized by their Income Level

Covariates	Overall			Low-Income Country			Middle-Income Country			High-Income Country		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
Income Group												
Low-Income Country	19.77	29.35	50.88									
Middle-Income Country	22.61	37.42	39.98									
High-Income Country	21.52	45.73	32.74									
Age												
Young adult	20.57	37.67	41.76	21.03	29.62	49.35	21.68	39.14	39.18	18.07	49.87	32.06
Adult	20.73	37.29	41.98	19.47	29.36	51.17	21.88	37.88	40.24	20.84	45.79	33.37
Middle age	21.36	37.75	40.89	19.52	28.41	52.07	23.3	36.87	39.83	20.91	44.66	34.43
Old age	23.3	39.7	37	19.7	30	50.3	26.04	33.65	40.31	23.19	44.84	31.97
Sex												
Female	21.99	38.43	39.58	20.04	29.73	50.22	23.05	37.27	39.68	22.56	46.18	31.26
Male	20.67	37.75	41.58	19.5	28.94	51.56	22.12	37.58	40.3	20.33	45.26	34.41
Marital Status												
Single	20.46	39.95	39.59	18.58	30.53	50.89	20.69	39.99	39.32	21.78	47.59	30.63
Divorced	23.3	37.38	39.32	21.18	29.07	49.75	22.98	34.78	42.24	24.54	43.24	32.23
Married	21.33	37.44	41.24	20	28.95	51.05	23.35	36.85	39.8	20.62	45.49	33.89
Household Size												
One people	23.34	41.43	35.23	19.04	33.07	47.9	19.16	38.12	42.72	25.94	44.61	29.45
Two people	22.54	41.29	36.17	18.44	32.07	49.5	22.8	37.28	39.92	23.47	45.2	31.33
Three people	20.93	39.47	39.6	21	29.9	49.1	21.29	39.63	39.08	20.56	45.75	33.69
Four people	19.76	38.35	41.89	19.74	29.38	50.87	22.5	37.25	40.25	17.04	47.4	35.56
Five people	21.04	36.06	42.9	20.58	29.01	50.41	22.7	36.89	40.41	18.45	49.59	31.96
Six and more people	21.67	33.33	45	19.16	27.77	53.07	24.66	35.99	39.36	21.57	42.63	35.79
Educational Level												
Lower	26.39	35.42	38.19	26.29	28.41	45.3	27.37	37.58	35.05	24.8	42.64	32.57
Middle	20.6	38.56	40.84	18.06	28.47	53.47	21.08	37.62	41.3	21.94	45.77	32.29
Upper	16.89	40.36	42.74	12.04	31.95	56	17.38	36.73	45.9	19.28	47.4	33.32
Employment Status												
Unemployed	25.38	34.76	39.86	20.41	29.75	49.84	27.52	34.14	38.33	30.33	42.79	26.87
Employed	19.81	38.76	41.44	18.54	28.85	52.61	21.02	37.94	41.04	19.64	46.91	33.45
Retired	22.71	39.05	38.24	16.72	31.23	52.05	24.11	35.57	40.32	23.57	42.1	34.32
Housewife	24.05	35.38	40.57	23.72	29.31	46.97	25.77	36.03	38.2	21.61	46.94	31.75
Student	21.37	40.13	38.5	20.33	31.12	48.56	21.69	41.02	37.28	22.64	50.49	27.17
Social Class												
Lower	24.92	35.52	39.56	21.76	28.45	49.8	26.25	36.39	37.36	26.88	42.37	30.75
Middle	18.99	39.41	41.6	18.2	30.14	51.65	20.14	38.22	41.64	18.59	47.59	33.82
Upper	19.78	32.63	47.59	21	25.17	53.83	23.64	30.32	46.04	14.77	43.77	41.46
Income Level (Subjective)												
Low	28.48	33.36	38.16	25.88	25.12	48.99	29.32	33.15	37.53	30.11	41.97	27.92
Medium	19.04	40.43	40.53	17.21	31.6	51.19	20.34	40.33	39.33	19.4	47.58	33.02
High	18.23	33.23	48.53	19.38	24.95	55.67	17.88	30.67	51.46	17.78	40.61	41.61
Religion												
No Religion	21.17	43.93	34.9	11.52	30.97	57.52	24.33	39.72	35.95	21.77	47.94	30.29
Christianity	21.55	37.06	41.39	20.68	32.28	47.04	20.69	34.22	45.09	22.78	42.28	34.94
Islam	21.89	32.45	45.67	20.31	27.23	52.47	23.96	37.57	38.47	21.67	50.47	27.86
Others	19.48	42.1	38.42	22.98	27.28	49.74	22.64	46.95	30.41	15.01	48.62	36.36
Information Access												
No	27.11	30.67	42.23	24.57	26.97	48.46	30.35	32.18	37.47	29.5	40.49	30.01
Yes	21.24	38.26	40.51	19.6	29.44	50.96	22.45	37.54	40.01	21.45	45.76	32.79
Job Insecurity												
No	20.96	40.79	38.24	18.9	31.06	50.03	23.18	37.57	39.26	20.86	46.62	32.52
Yes	21.39	36.15	42.46	20.09	28.68	51.23	22.14	37.49	40.37	21.97	44.18	33.85
Interest in Politics												
Not Interested	21.57	37.56	40.87	20.38	29.94	49.68	23.54	36.44	40.02	20.56	45.33	34.11
Interested	21.08	38.75	40.17	19.01	28.6	52.38	21.24	38.79	39.97	22.47	46.17	31.36
Political Party Membership												
Not A Member	21.24	38.06	40.7	19.89	29.11	51	22.85	36.78	40.37	20.86	46.18	32.96
Inactive Member	21.02	40.57	38.41	17.76	33.38	48.94	20.66	41.77	37.57	24.03	45.21	30.76
Active Member	24.08	33.81	42.11	21.22	26.59	52.2	22.41	39.58	38.01	29.05	38.5	32.46
Confidence in Government												
No	22.03	38.19	39.78	17.79	31.8	50.41	22.92	35.8	41.28	24.09	44.35	31.57
Yes	20.48	38.25	41.28	21.68	26.83	51.48	22.17	39.33	38.5	17.68	47.82	34.5
Vote in National Election												
Never	20.96	36.82	42.22	22.24	27.22	50.54	19.27	40.8	39.93	20.57	45.81	33.62
Usually	18.8	41.62	39.58	18.55	32.45	49	17.18	42.88	39.85	20.25	49.21	30.55
Always	22.14	36.45	41.4	19.17	28.92	51.91	24.23	33.93	41.84	22.4	43.88	33.72
Signing a Petition												
No	21.08	34.44	44.48	20.37	27.62	52.01	22.37	36.34	41.29	20.08	44.97	34.95
Yes	21.58	41.03	37.39	18.72	32.26	49.02	22.9	38.47	38.63	21.96	45.92	32.12

Joining in Boycotts												
No	21.14	35.79	43.07	20.28	28.06	51.66	22.66	36.13	41.2	20.24	44.67	35.09
Yes	21.74	42.13	36.13	18.31	33.09	48.6	22.55	40.24	37.22	22.72	46.78	30.51
Attending Lawful Demonstrations												
No	20.56	36.73	42.7	19.9	28.39	51.71	22.47	37.86	39.67	19.03	45.78	35.19
Yes	22.16	39.49	38.34	19.47	30.9	49.63	22.8	36.72	40.48	23.1	45.68	31.22
Joining Unofficial Strikes												
No	20.38	36.4	43.22	20.31	27.87	51.82	22.04	37.1	40.87	18.51	45.66	35.83
Yes	22.94	40.88	36.17	18.16	33.6	48.24	23.78	37.89	38.32	24.44	45.68	29.88
Donating to a campaign												
No	22	34.67	43.33	21.92	27.71	50.37	22.8	35.16	42.04	21.13	43.97	34.9
Yes	20.9	40.39	38.71	17.28	31.17	51.54	22.54	38.88	38.58	21.61	46.45	31.94
Contacting a Govt. Official												
No	21.41	35.85	42.74	20.3	27.35	52.36	23.39	36.2	40.42	20.23	45.56	34.21
Yes	21.3	40.19	38.51	19.06	31.87	49.07	21.75	38.72	39.53	22.26	45.8	31.94
Encouraging to Act on Political Issues												
No	20.91	36.24	42.85	19.73	27.77	52.5	23.21	36.54	40.25	19.23	45.2	35.57
Yes	20.8	41	38.2	17.81	34.06	48.13	21.44	39.14	39.42	22.04	45.92	32.04
Encouraging Others to Vote												
No	21.55	35.86	42.6	20.27	27.71	52.02	22.86	37.28	39.87	21.31	44.66	34.03
Yes	21.18	40.02	38.79	19.1	31.35	49.54	22.43	37.38	40.19	21.55	46.26	32.19

Source: Authors' Calculation

Table 2 illustrates a significant variation across income groups, with high-income countries consistently exhibiting higher participation rates. For instance, 76.66% of respondents in high-income countries reported signing petitions, compared to 37.36% in low-income and 47.57% in middle-income countries. Similarly, attending lawful demonstrations (61.01%) and joining boycotts (51.31%) were more prevalent in high-income nations. Moreover, 70.68% of respondents in high-income countries donated to political campaigns, compared to 46.89% in low-income countries. Encouraging others to vote was also highest in high-income nations (67.79%). These trends highlight the stronger civic and political engagement associated with greater economic development.

Table 2: Proportion of respondents across individual and household characteristics in different income group countries

	Overall	Low-Income Country	Middle-Income Country	High-Income Country
Perception of Ideal inequality				
Low inequality	21.39	19.63	22.66	21.67
Medium inequality	38.15	29.54	37.33	45.77
High inequality	40.45	50.82	40.00	32.55
Age				
Young adult	2.76	4.15	2.98	1.61
Adult	44.88	55.45	48.49	34.50
Middle age	29.05	26.89	31.12	28.86
Old age	23.31	13.50	17.41	35.02
Sex				
Female	52.85	51.15	53.20	53.90
Male	47.15	48.85	46.80	46.10
Marital Status				
Single/never married	29.93	24.37	23.94	23.56
Divorced/widowed/separated	12.56	8.84	12.59	15.50
Currently Married	63.52	66.79	63.48	60.94
Household Size				
One people	9.89	4.41	7.17	16.66
Two people	19.12	9.74	14.26	30.89
Three people	17.99	16.03	19.02	18.63
Four people	20.82	21.9	21.86	19.03
Five people	13.22	18.55	15.98	6.52
Six and more people	18.96	29.37	21.71	8.27
Educational Level				
Lower	32.16	40.24	39.5	19.05
Middle	34.52	33.35	32.47	37.3

Upper	33.32	26.41	28.02	43.65
Employment Status				
Unemployed	8.87	12.51	8.3	6.45
Currently Employed	59.4	55.46	61.91	60.34
Retired	12.84	5.93	9.09	21.7
Housewife	13.29	18.75	15.17	7.25
Student	5.6	7.35	5.54	4.26
Social Class				
Lower/WC Class	38.26	42.39	40.82	32.04
Middle Class	60.06	55.52	57.78	66.37
Upper Class	1.68	2.1	1.4	1.58
Income Class				
Low	24.92	26.32	28.06	20.85
Medium	65.19	65	62.53	67.79
High	9.9	8.68	9.41	11.36
Religion				
No Religion	25.13	10.03	18.33	43.33
Christianity	38.77	32.35	40.03	42.79
Islam	26.89	48.97	33.48	3.3
Others	9.2	8.66	8.16	10.58
Access to Information				
No	2.02	3.64	1.85	0.88
Yes	97.98	96.36	98.15	99.12
Job Insecurity				
no	38.96	30.00	28.14	56.69
yes	61.04	70.00	71.86	43.31
Interest in Politics				
Not interested	55.03	55.76	59.33	50.60
Interested	44.97	44.24	40.67	49.40
Political Party Membership				
not a member	85.24	83.5	86.23	85.74
Inactive member	9.61	9.5	9.74	9.57
Active member	5.15	7	4.03	4.69
Confidence in Government				
No	55.85	51.25	55.20	59.94
Yes	44.15	48.75	44.80	40.06
Vote in National Election				
Never	17.43	24.06	13.45	15.27
Usually	21.23	23.51	19.88	20.47
Always	61.34	52.43	66.66	64.27
Signing a Petition				
No	44.62	62.64	52.43	23.34
Yes	55.38	37.36	47.57	76.66
Joining in Boycotts				
No	63.64	74.42	70.79	48.69
Yes	36.36	25.58	29.21	51.31
Attending Lawful Demonstrations				
No	51.22	61.86	55.42	38.99
Yes	48.78	38.14	44.58	61.01
Joining Unofficial Strikes				
No	63.09	74.35	67.62	50.06
Yes	36.91	25.65	32.38	49.04
Donating to a campaign				
No	40.41	53.11	41.53	29.32
Yes	59.59	46.89	58.47	70.68
Contacting a Govt. Official				
No	48.91	56.89	54.50	37.55
Yes	51.09	43.11	45.50	62.45
Encouraging to Act on Political Issues				
No	61.73	67.70	68.64	50.17
Yes	38.27	32.30	31.36	49.83
Encouraging Others to Vote				
No	46.58	55.21	54.98	32.21
Yes	53.42	44.79	45.02	67.79

Source: Author's calculation

Estimated Results of the Inequality Perception Model

To account for the hierarchical structure of the data, both a standard ordered logit (Ologit) model and a multilevel ordered logit (M-Ologit) model were estimated. As reported in Table 3, the multilevel model yields a higher log-likelihood (−153,373.3) than the Ologit specification (−157,049.6), along with substantially lower information criteria (AIC = 306,838.5; BIC = 307,261.3), compared to the corresponding values for the Ologit model (AIC = 314,189.3; BIC = 314,602.9). The likelihood-ratio test strongly rejects the single-level specification ($\chi^2 = 7,352.75$, $p < 0.001$). In addition, the intraclass correlation coefficient indicates that approximately 12.5% of the total latent variance in perceptions of ideal income inequality is attributable to between-country differences. Taken together, these results confirm the superiority of the multilevel ordinal logit model, which is therefore used for all subsequent analyses.

Table 3: Model Comparison between Ologit and M-Ologit

Model	Log-likelihood	df	ICC	AIC	BIC
Ologit	−157049.6	45		314189.3	314602.9
M-Ologit	−153373.3	46	0.125	306838.5	307261.3

Source: Author's Estimation

Note: ICC = Intraclass Correlation Coefficient; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion.

Table 4 presents the estimated odds ratios and standard errors for the different covariates in the multilevel mixed-effects ordinal logit models. Using the overall sample of respondents in Model I, we found that participation in political mobilization through signing a petition [OR: 1.057; $p < 0.01$] significantly increased the odds of favouring a high-income difference compared to non-participation. In contrast, those joining unofficial strikes [OR: 0.907; $p < 0.01$] and joining boycotts [OR: 0.907; $p < 0.1$] significantly lower the odds of favouring a high-income difference compared to non-participation. In other words, respondents who participated in or agreed to participate in political mobilization were more likely to favour lower levels of income inequality than respondents who did not participate in these activities. Similarly, respondents who either participated or agreed to participate in social activism through donating to a campaign [OR: 0.972; $p < 0.01$] and encouraging others to act on political issues [OR: 0.939; $p < 0.01$] were less likely to favour higher levels of income differences compared to their non-participating counterparts. Among the demographic variables, male respondents [OR: 1.062; $p < 0.01$] compared to their female counterparts were more likely to favour higher levels of income inequality. Higher levels of education [Middle – OR: 1.172, Upper – OR: 1.267; $p < 0.01$], social class [Middle – OR: 1.065; $p < 0.01$], and income class [Medium – OR: 1.214, Upper – OR: 1.645; $p < 0.01$] were increasing the odds of favouring higher levels of income differences. Additionally, respondents who believe in religion, feeling job insecurity [OR: 1.059; $p < 0.01$], employed [OR: 1.118; $p < 0.01$] were more likely to favour higher levels of income inequality.

In the low-income countries group, presented in Model II, we found respondents who participated in or agreed to participate in political mobilization through joining boycotts [OR: 0.938; $p < 0.1$]. Similarly, respondents who participated or agreed to participate in social

activism through contacting a government official [OR: 0.953; $p < 0.1$] were less likely to favour higher levels of income differences. However, respondents who were encouraged others to vote [OR: 1.069; $p < 0.05$] were more likely to favour higher levels of income inequality. Respondents who were divorced [OR: 0.855; $p < 0.01$], retired [OR: 0.851; $p < 0.05$] were less likely to favour higher levels of income inequality. Additionally, in the low-income countries group, age [OR: 1.007; $p < 0.01$] and job security [OR: 1.076; $p < 0.01$] positively contributed to increasing the odds of favouring higher levels of income inequality.

The results of the middle-income countries group are presented in Table 4 (MODEL III). Respondents who participated or agreed to participate in political mobilization through donating to a campaign [OR: 0.941; $p < 0.1$] and joining unofficial strikes [OR: 0.936; $p < 0.05$] were less likely to favour higher levels of income differences than their non-participating counterparts. In this group, respondents having more members in households [OR: 0.987; $p < 0.01$] were less likely to favour higher levels of income differences. We also found that having access to information [OR: 1.339; $p < 0.01$] through various print or digital sources significantly increased the odds of favouring higher levels of income inequality.

In the high-income countries group, presented in MODEL IV, we found that respondents who participated or agreed to participate in political mobilization through joining unofficial strikes [OR: 0.814; $p < 0.01$], or through attending lawful demonstrations [OR: 0.919; $p < 0.05$], were less likely to favour higher income differences than their non-participating counterparts. Similarly, respondents who participated or agreed to participate in social activism by encouraging others to act on political issues [OR: 0.811; $p < 0.01$] were less likely, while those who encouraged others to vote [OR: 1.159; $p < 0.01$] or contacted a government official [OR: 1.089; $p < 0.01$], were more likely to favour higher levels of income inequality.

Table 4: Results of Two-Level Mixed-Effects Ordinal Logit Regression (M-Ologit) of Perception of Ideal Income Inequality on Individual and Country-Level Covariates

Covariate	MODEL I		MODEL II		MODEL III		MODEL IV	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Age	1.002***	0.001	1.007***	0.001	0.999	0.001	0.998	0.001
Sex (Ref.-Female)								
Male	1.062***	0.154	1.011	0.027	1.037	0.026	1.143***	0.028
Marital Status (Ref.-Single)								
Divorced	0.985	0.027	0.855***	0.047	1.002	0.046	1.075	0.048
Married	1.019	0.019	0.946	0.033	1.003	0.032	1.102***	0.035
Household Size	0.995*	0.003	0.998	0.005	0.987**	0.006	0.996	0.007
Educational Level (Ref.-Lower)								
Middle	1.172***	0.021	1.149***	0.035	1.124***	0.033	1.125***	0.045
Upper	1.267***	0.254	1.439***	0.051	1.152***	0.038	1.199***	0.048
Employment Status (Ref.-Unemployment)								
Employed	1.118***	0.282	1.046	0.041	1.108**	0.049	1.262***	0.066
Retired	1.047	0.036	0.851**	0.055	1.132**	0.071	1.232***	0.076
Housewife	1.063*	0.033	0.974	0.047	1.072	0.057	1.255***	0.085
Student	0.991	0.037	0.999	0.057	0.963	0.063	0.997	0.075
Social Class (Ref.-Lower)								
Middle	1.065***	0.062	1.010	0.026	1.061**	0.027	1.155***	0.033
Upper	1.052	0.584	0.867	0.076	0.878	0.088	1.791***	0.182
Income Level (Subjective) (Ref.-Low)								
Medium	1.214***	0.021	1.119***	0.034	1.222***	0.034	1.309***	0.043
High	1.645***	0.045	1.344***	0.065	1.745***	0.078	1.911***	0.095
Religion (Ref.-No Religion)								
Christianity	1.046**	0.022	0.900**	0.047	1.035	0.042	1.107***	0.032
Islam	1.048	0.037	0.916	0.058	1.062	0.068	1.082	0.080
Others	1.086***	0.033	1.113*	0.067	0.990	0.073	1.115***	0.047
Information Access (Ref.-No)								
Yes	1.125**	0.061	1.008	0.074	1.339***	0.127	1.083	0.153
Job Insecurity (Ref.-No)								
Yes	1.059***	0.016	1.076***	0.031	1.105***	0.029	0.994	0.025
Interest in Politics (Ref.-Not Interested)								
Interested	1.003	0.015	1.033	0.026	1.011	0.025	0.963	0.025
Political Party Membership (Ref.-No)								
Inactive Member	1.009	0.024	0.927*	0.037	1.042	0.040	1.063	0.047
Active Member	0.993	0.031	0.926*	0.043	1.041	0.060	1.040	0.068
Confidence in Government (Ref.-No)								
Yes	0.969**	0.014	0.892***	0.024	0.989	0.025	1.033	0.025
Vote in National Election (Ref.-Never)								
Usually	0.981	0.022	1.023	0.037	0.947	0.038	0.932*	0.037
Always	1.040*	0.021	1.119***	0.037	1.015	0.036	0.956	0.035
Gini Index	0.292	0.311	0.936	2.396	0.018*	0.043	0.447	0.720
HDI	0.075***	0.065	0.350	0.598	0.153	0.460	0.010	0.040
Political Mobilization								
Political Action (Ref.-No)								
Signing a Petition	1.057***	0.019	0.986	0.030	1.023	0.030	1.224***	0.044
Joining in Boycotts	0.967*	0.018	0.938*	0.033	0.983	0.032	1.004	0.031
Attending Lawful Demonstrations	1.013	0.019	1.081**	0.035	1.024	0.032	0.919**	0.030
Joining Unofficial Strikes	0.907***	0.017	0.988	0.035	0.936**	0.031	0.814***	0.026
Socio-political Activism (Ref.-No)								
Donating to a campaign	0.972*	0.016	0.989	0.029	0.941*	0.027	0.974	0.029
Contacting a Govt. Official	0.989	0.017	0.953*	0.029	0.958	0.027	1.089***	0.033
Encouraging to Act on Political Issues	0.939***	0.017	0.967	0.031	1.044	0.033	0.811***	0.026
Encouraging Others to Vote	1.069***	0.019	1.069**	0.033	1.001	0.029	1.159***	0.038
Country [variance (constant)]	0.469	0.089	0.439	0.144	0.435	0.143	0.449	0.147
Wald χ^2 (34)	953.99***		338.36***		316.51***		730.92***	
LR test vs. ordered logit model	7352.75***		2127.52***		1780.13***		2146.97***	
Observations	72520		23639		24996		23885	
Groups	57		19		19		19	
/cut1	-4.295	1.048	-2.519	1.840	-5.312	3.029	-6.160	3.650
/cut2	-3.917	1.048	-2.188	1.840	-4.955	3.029	-5.692	3.650
/cut3	-3.534	1.048	-1.891	1.840	-4.616	3.029	-5.161	3.650
/cut4	-3.199	1.048	-1.617	1.840	-4.306	3.029	-4.742	3.650
/cut5	-2.593	1.048	-1.067	1.840	-3.688	3.029	-4.092	3.650
/cut6	-2.199	1.048	-0.722	1.840	-3.312	3.029	-3.630	3.650
/cut7	-1.715	1.048	-0.338	1.840	-2.890	3.029	-2.972	3.650
/cut8	-1.076	1.048	0.188	1.840	-2.328	3.029	-2.078	3.649
/cut9	-0.649	1.048	0.574	1.840	-1.880	3.029	-1.592	3.649

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Authors' Estimation

Robustness Check

The main analysis relies on a multilevel mixed-effects ordinal logit (M-Ologit) model, which assumes proportional odds across response categories. As a robustness check, this assumption was formally assessed, and alternative model specifications were estimated to ensure that the substantive findings are not driven by potential violations of the proportional odds constraint.

First, proportional odds diagnostics were conducted using a generalized ordered logit (G-Ologit) framework. The chi-square test for the final generalized ordered logit model is statistically insignificant ($\chi^2(40) = 53.76$, $p = 0.072$), indicating that the proportional odds or parallel lines assumption cannot be rejected. This suggests that the cumulative logit structure imposed in the M-Ologit model is appropriate for the data.

Second, partial proportional odds models were estimated using G-Ologit, which relaxes the proportional odds assumption where necessary and allows covariate effects to vary across outcome thresholds. The generalized ordered logit estimates produce multiple equations corresponding to different cut-points of the ordinal dependent variable. Rather than interpreting each threshold-specific coefficient separately, the robustness assessment focuses on whether the direction, statistical significance, and relative magnitude of key explanatory variables, particularly those capturing political mobilization, are consistent with the main multilevel ordinal logit results.

Across the generalized ordered logit specifications, the estimated effects of the core political mobilization variables remain substantively consistent with the M-Ologit results. Variables that are statistically significant in the multilevel model retain the same sign and comparable levels of significance in the generalized ordered logit model, while variables that are insignificant in the main specification remain largely insignificant across outcome thresholds. Importantly, no systematic sign reversals are observed for the key variables of interest. Hence, the consistency of estimates across models confirms the robustness of the multilevel ordinal logit results reported in the main analysis.

Table 5: Comparison of Multilevel Ordinal Logit and Generalized Ordered Logit Results

Political Mobilization Variable	M-Ologit (OR)	G-Ologit (OR Range) [#]	Robust
Political Action			
Signing a petition	1.057***	0.88 – 0.94***	Yes
Joining in boycotts	0.968*	0.96 – 1.15***	Yes
Attending lawful demonstrations	1.012	0.88 – 1.02***	Yes
Joining unofficial strikes	0.907***	0.79 – 0.87***	Yes
Socio-political Activism			
Donating to a campaign	0.972*	1.03 – 1.10***	Yes
Contacting a govt. official	0.990	0.94 – 0.98**	Yes
Encouraging action on political issues	0.939***	0.89 – 1.03	Yes
Encouraging others to vote	1.069***	0.95 – 1.06*	Yes

Source: Authors' estimation

Note: $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

[#] for the generalized ordered logit model, odds ratios vary across outcome thresholds; reported values indicate the observed range across cut points.

Discussion

The study finds that political mobilization significantly shapes individuals' perception of ideal income inequality, with differences across countries by income level. Overall, engagement in contentious and participatory forms of mobilization such as joining strikes, boycotts, donating to campaigns, and encouraging others to act on political issues, was associated with a lower likelihood of favouring higher income inequality, whereas petition signing is associated with greater tolerance for inequality. These associations differ across income groups. In low-income countries, boycotts and contacting officials were linked to lower inequality tolerance, while encouraging voting increases it. In middle-income countries, strikes and campaign donations were associated with lower inequality preferences. In high-income countries, protest-oriented actions reduce, whereas institutional political engagement increases the tolerance for income inequality.

Overall, we found that individuals with high incomes and high political knowledge regarding political participation tend to favour high-income inequality in low- and medium-income countries. While it slightly changes in high-income countries, where higher income levels are associated with a higher probability of supporting lower income inequality. This supports the previous study by Xu and Garand (2010) on the American context in terms of political knowledge, but offers differing opinions on the association between an individual's income level and their perception of income inequality. Our findings on the role of political actions can largely be attributed to membership in unions and organizations, which help provide information and ideological impetus. The study of Ahlquist (2017) focused on the connection between labour unions and the distribution of economic resources through political channels. The study finds that 'with varying levels of effectiveness and durability, unions' political activities appear to generate policies tending to equalize the distribution of income'. Studies have shown that economic inequality cannot be ignored in a complete explanation of the political polarization phenomenon (Proaño, Peña & Saalfeld, 2024), and to understand the complexity of sociopolitical behaviours, including political mobilization, it is important to explore their perception of economic inequality (Jetten et al., 2021).

The results reveal important differences across low-, middle-, and high-income countries. This aligns with the relative deprivation theory (Davis, 1959; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015), suggesting that citizens in resource-constrained contexts are more sensitive to distributive injustices and are more likely to mobilize in favor of reducing inequality. However, the finding that donating to campaigns was positively associated with support for inequality may reflect the influence of elite-driven mobilization, where donations often serve groups aligned with wealthier segments of society (Fetscher & Rueda, 2023). In middle-income countries, while signing petitions and joining strikes led to lower support for inequality, lawful demonstrations were associated with higher support. One explanation may lie in the framing of demonstrations: in some middle-income contexts, demonstrations are linked not to redistribution but to demands for market reforms or nationalist issues (Amat & Beramendi, 2016; Borah, 2011). Similarly, in transitional economies, exposure to market-oriented discourse can normalize the larger income gaps as a sign of economic progress (Binelli & Loveless, 2016).

In high-income countries, strikes and encouraging others to engage in political action reduced support for inequality, consistent with the literature on how strong democratic institutions

enable redistributive claims (Streeck, 2011). Yet, encouraging others to vote was linked to higher support for inequality. This might reflect that in established democracies, voting mobilization is often conducted by mainstream parties, which may not challenge prevailing income structures (Foos, 2012). These findings suggest that the relationship between political mobilization and perceptions of inequality is context-dependent, shaped by institutional strength, framing of mobilization, and socioeconomic conditions.

The present study provides an alternative approach to understanding people's perceptions of income inequality, taking into account an individual's socioeconomic attributes, access to information, political attitudes, and perseverance. The study by Franko (2017) points out that considering perceived inequality through exposure to information on various economic issues, such as poverty, economic growth, and the stock market, rather than perceiving inequality as a distributional issue, is more practical. His study highlights that the perception of income inequality reflects objective indicators of economic disparities, where the perception is built on more general information about social and macroeconomic aspects of the economy, rather than on changes in economic distribution. Another study by Xu and Garand (2010) argues that individual factors and contextual variables, which also influence individual attitudes, determine the perception of income inequality. According to their study, the economic settings shape a person's day-to-day perception of rising or falling income inequality.

Conclusion

Drawing on a comprehensive dataset from the World Values Survey spanning Waves II to VII, our study provides empirical evidence on how people's perceptions of ideal income distribution are connected to their participation in political actions and socio-political activism.

The findings of this study contribute to the existing literature by addressing three critical gaps. First, it explicitly examines the impact of political mobilization on shaping perceptions of the ideal level of income inequality. Understanding how people perceive inequality is important because higher inequality can undermine socio-political and economic stability, particularly when less attention is given to diverse forms of political participation (McCarty et al., 2016; Solt, 2008, 2010, 2011; Stiglitz, 2012). Hence, to address the problem of persistent inequality, it is essential to understand how individuals perceive it and what factors determine their perceptions. Second, this study offers a unique perspective by predicting individual perceptions of the ideal level of income inequality using ordered categorical variables, rather than relying on continuous indicators such as the Gini coefficient. Third, the findings highlight that individuals' perceptions of the ideal level of income inequality are significantly shaped by the geographical and contextual setting in which they live. We observe this association across different income groups and countries. Medium levels of income inequality are consistently preferred, indicating a delicate balance that individuals seek. However, this preference is not uniform and varies across countries, underscoring the importance of cultural and contextual factors in shaping opinions.

We also acknowledge some limitations of the study that could not be avoided. First, we were unable to present an inter-temporal analysis, as the WVS dataset does not provide longitudinal data on respondents. For this reason, we relied on one cross-section, Wave VII (2017–2022), for the present analysis. Second, the study faced a theoretical constraint in that it could not

incorporate psychological factors that may influence an individual's perception of income inequality, as the dataset did not contain such variables. Lastly, respondents' perceptions of the ideal level of income inequality and their preferences for political participation may have been influenced by contemporary circumstances. This limitation may be addressed in future research as more advanced datasets and models become available.

Declaration of conflicting interests:

The authors declare no conflicting interests.

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Appendix 1: Perception of Ideal Income Inequality across WAVEs (1990-2022)

Country	Wave II (1990-1994)			Wave III (1995-1998)			Wave IV (1999-2004)			Wave V (2005-2009)			Wave VI (2010-2014)			Wave VII (2017-2022)		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
Albania				27	58	12	18	53	27							38	19	42
Algeria							8	24	66				18	33	42			
Andorra										20	43	36				24	33	43
Argentina	15	26	56	25	36	37	38	31	27	37	29	32	30	48	17	25	45	27
Armenia				18	40	39							29	30	40	13	27	59
Australia				23	52	24				21	50	26	34	46	18	23	34	41
Austria																34	46	19
Azerbaijan				20	39	30							24	37	38	22	49	23
Bangladesh				16	25	54	9	31	54							50	36	14
Belarus	9	32	56	14	39	41							31	51	18	21	40	37
Bolivia																19	34	45
Bosnia-Herzegovina				25	51	24	16	52	32							49	35	15
Brazil	26	33	38	31	29	39				29	34	36	39	29	30	37	30	29
Bulgaria				29	39	28				24	45	29				25	34	38
Burkina Faso										11	31	49						
Canada	17	29	53				25	50	24	19	52	28				26	46	28
Chile	25	35	39	30	45	25	51	32	17	39	36	22	59	30	9	45	44	9
China	7	24	68	38	34	26	24	24	43	25	25	36	44	32	18	27	44	29
Colombia				22	35	43				36	25	39	32	44	23	24	30	46
Croatia				31	45	22										38	38	22
Cyprus										33	40	27	56	33	10	37	42	20
Czechia	5	24	72	22	36	40										24	44	30
Denmark																21	57	21
Dominican Rep.				12	21	66												
Ecuador													34	31	35	24	36	40
Egypt							5	18	77	15	37	47	53	21	26	22	29	49
El Salvador				21	18	54												
Estonia				22	51	25							49	41	8	14	52	29
Ethiopia										10	52	36				31	13	55
Finland				43	47	9				30	55	15				24	50	23
France										32	42	26				33	42	23
Georgia				10	28	60				14	32	47	21	39	37	3	12	84
Germany				30	52	17				37	44	13	42	50	7	22	49	26
Ghana										12	17	70	17	32	51			
Great Britain																23	44	31
Greece																28	47	22
Guatemala										19	24	57				13	33	53
Haiti													49	37	11			
Hong Kong SAR										9	86	2	15	59	26	11	57	31
Hungary				54	32	13				35	51	12				30	36	33
Iceland																36	40	22
India	21	38	35	51	19	16	44	20	17	39	21	22	66	21	5			
Indonesia							8	41	47	6	37	48				18	30	52
Iran							16	45	15	51	30	18				16	31	52

Iraq							34	32	34	32	36	20	30	41	26	43	32	25
Israel							52	35	12									
Italy										18	52	28				26	45	27
Japan	14	54	16	16	61	13	15	59	17	11	60	24	20	59	12	17	65	13
Jordan							11	25	59	24	14	57	9	40	50	10	20	69
Kazakhstan													30	45	26	6	43	49
Kenya																21	38	40
Kuwait													19	35	44			
Kyrgyzstan							32	35	32				21	43	36	5	17	77
Latvia				13	46	39										16	40	39
Lebanon													22	41	34	20	44	35
Libya													19	25	52	19	25	43
Lithuania				34	37	26										35	46	16
Macau SAR																15	61	23
Malaysia										10	51	39	16	40	45	12	51	37
Maldives																37	32	30
Mali										10	27	58						
Mexico	25	32	40	23	38	37	39	23	30	27	26	44	33	33	33	29	34	37
Moldova				16	30	52	12	34	45	21	47	29						
Mongolia																11	43	46
Montenegro				32	27	38	37	26	32							34	51	14
Morocco							16	22	58	29	42	27	26	27	18	24	30	45
Myanmar																33	19	48
Netherlands										22	53	25	21	57	18	22	54	19
New Zealand				24	48	22				25	46	23	29	43	21	22	33	38
Nicaragua																17	29	54
Nigeria	12	22	65	22	23	53	23	32	44				14	48	38	15	23	61
North Macedonia				32	37	25	28	42	25							23	30	42
Northern Ireland																26	40	34
Norway				24	59	17				27	55	17				19	59	22
Pakistan							33	37	3				17	35	48	17	26	56
Palestine													20	44	32			
Peru				21	27	48	11	29	59	12	25	62	24	39	33	23	41	34
Philippines				19	47	34	16	43	41				20	38	42	22	37	42
Poland	10	16	71	17	31	48				13	34	47	22	34	41	13	29	57
Portugal																34	40	25
Puerto Rico				22	34	42	16	19	64							17	21	62
Qatar													17	36	47			
Romania				19	37	40				42	31	23	30	25	42	16	22	61
Russia	10	37	42	15	41	40				25	25	47	56	28	9	19	39	40
Rwanda										23	39	37	37	59	4			
Saudi Arabia							10	49	40									
Serbia				37	32	29	27	34	34	19	43	36				32	38	27
Singapore							8	46	46				20	52	28	7	49	44
Slovakia	17	34	50	31	35	33										29	45	25
Slovenia				39	45	15				37	41	19	53	40	4	27	42	29
South Africa	50	15	32	39	31	27	35	33	32	31	34	33	17	49	32			
South Korea	38	32	29	18	33	48	18	39	44	19	40	41	16	47	37	6	63	32
Spain	34	37	24	27	39	31	34	38	26	24	46	28	29	50	19	33	37	28

Sweden	13	46	39	16	58	25				17	48	34	32	49	17	14	48	38
Switzerland				42	29	27				58	34	8				31	47	20
Taiwan roc				17	50	31				12	45	43	19	51	26	8	40	53
Tajikistan																6	24	70
Tanzania							43	19	33									
Thailand										5	51	44	31	43	26	23	50	25
Trinidad and Tobago										15	26	59	14	33	52			
Tunisia													18	44	28	26	28	45
Turkey	44	28	25	41	23	33	52	25	22	38	34	26	43	37	18	28	47	22
Uganda							19	19	61									
Ukraine				14	37	41				12	39	45	58	32	10	19	39	39
United Kingdom				28	49	20				27	47	25						
United States	12	38	47	25	46	26	21	52	28	12	60	24	22	52	25	32	47	20
Uruguay				38	28	30				26	46	23	33	35	27	26	29	45
Uzbekistan													40	29	21			
Venezuela				29	34	31	35	27	38							12	33	56
Vietnam							19	35	40	25	34	38				6	17	77
Yemen													22	26	43			
Zambia										21	38	39						
Zimbabwe							22	20	57				16	37	47	29	18	53
Wave Total	22.4	31.6	42.4	25.5	37.7	33.2	25.5	33.4	36.4	24.3	38.3	33.9	30.9	39.4	26.5	23	38.9	36.2

Source: World Values Survey; <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp>

Source: Author's Calculation