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Misled From Within: Domestic Origin Attributions of Fake News Rise With Media- disinformation Beliefs and Perceived Exposure in Hungary

Tamás Tóth

toth.tamas3@uni-nke.hu

Ludovika University of Public Service

Erik Palusek

Ludovika University of Public Service

Márton Demeter

Ludovika University of Public Service

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Abstract

Although disinformation attitudes are widely studied, we know far less about whether citizens see fake news as spread mainly by domestic or foreign actors. Drawing on cultivation theory, we test whether media-disinformation beliefs and perceived exposure to fake news predict domestic–foreign origin judgments, and whether perceived exposure moderates the association between disinformation beliefs and origin attributions. We analyze a quota-based CATI survey of Hungarian adults (November 2025; N = 1,006) in a polarized media and political environment. Across OLS models, stronger media-disinformation beliefs and higher perceived exposure were each independently associated with more domestic origin attributions. Crucially, perceived exposure amplified this association: disinformation beliefs predicted domestic blame primarily at moderate-to-high exposure levels. A complementary logistic model showed that stronger disinformation beliefs and greater perceived exposure were associated with higher certainty in origin judgments, whereas age was associated with greater indecision. Together, the findings suggest that perceived exposure conditions when media-related disinformation beliefs translate into domestically anchored blame attributions.

Introduction

The proliferation of fake news is a pressing topic in contemporary social sciences because it can shape citizens' perceptions of reality and polarize societies[1–3]. Although scholars analyze when, why, and for whom fake news appears credible[4], we still know surprisingly little about how citizens perceive the origins of fake news—specifically, whether they attribute it primarily to domestic or foreign sources. If citizens perceive that fake news is pervasive, the crucial issue is not only whether they believe that disinformation exists, but where they think it comes from and what factors drive their judgments. Origin attributions can influence how citizens perceive the political-media environment, the countermeasures they support, and which actors they view as legitimate or illegitimate in public discourse[4]. Our paper aims to address this gap by analyzing the attribution of fake news origins.

We aimed to learn whether perceived regular exposure to fake news is a conditioning factor that may strengthen the association between media-disinformation beliefs and origin attributions. Our theoretical background leans on cultivation theory, which suggests that repeated exposure to a coherent symbolic environment shapes audiences' perceptions of reality over time[5,6]. Although cultivation theory was originally developed to analyze long-term effects of regular exposure to television content[7], it also operates in the case of fake news among individuals[8]: the (perceived) repeated exposure to fake news can implicitly construct a distorted informational reality that can shape social trust, political cynicism, populist attitudes, and confidence in institutions[9,10]. Therefore, cultivation theory is a relevant theoretical-analytical bridge between disinformation beliefs and origin attributions as it reflects (1) the perceived magnitude of fake news exposure and (2) respondents' cultivated perceptions of fake news origin attributions.

We focus on Hungary, a country characterized by extreme polarization in politics, media discourse, and society[11–15]. Hungary's media environment has been described as an "informational autocracy" in which political influence is regularly exercised through media-centered campaigns and accusations of manipulation, while trust in news sources is lower than in many other European countries[16–18]. Attributing fake news to domestic versus foreign sources is not a trivial distinction in this country: pro-government media outlets are blamed for spreading (Russian) propaganda[19–22], while those segments of the media that criticize the government are blamed for being funded by Brussels, NGOs, and foreign business and are accused of eroding national sovereignty[23,24]. Against this backdrop, domestic-foreign attributions of fake news' origin are particularly relevant because they structure blame and legitimacy in a polarized public sphere where the foreign-backed disinformation is depicted not only as a possibility but an institutionalized tool of the domestic political-media field.

The current study and the general research question

In Hungary, media pluralism is formally preserved but substantively and severely contested as the media have been transformed into an instrument for the stabilization of political power[25]. Scholars also argue that two distinct journalistic cultures prevail in Hungary—one aligned with pro-government narratives and the other criticizing the ruling parties—where mutual allegations of disinformation serve as recurring narratives on both sides[26]. This situation has undermined the incentives that would otherwise reward credible, fact-based, and verified journalism[27]. Moreover, the 2026 general election campaign has produced an unprecedented long-time challenger to the ruling coalition: the Tisza Party led by Péter Magyar, which, according to several polling firms, is ahead of the government by more than 10 percentage points among voters[28,29]. Amid this political situation, the proliferation of fake news in Hungary's 2026 election campaign has been fueled by unlabeled, AI-generated political content, including deepfake videos, to such an extent that it has drawn international attention. As a result, pundits and the European Parliament have raised serious concerns about the harmful effects of such deceptive information that can mislead voters, discredit political agents, and undermine the integrity of the upcoming elections[30,31].

Researchers argue that, in Hungary, trust in mediated "facts" is fragile[32,33]. In this context, attributing fake news to domestic versus foreign sources is more than a descriptive judgment: it is a way to allocate responsibility for intentionally misleading the audience and to clarify who informs news consumers by the highest journalistic standards. In this light, we argue that the above narratives, along with the current political tensions surrounding the 2026 general elections in Hungary, shape citizens' broader interpretive orientations—especially the belief that the media deliberately disseminates disinformation. Yet these orientations may matter most when people feel that fake news is a frequent feature of their everyday media diet. This motivates our cultivation-inspired focus on perceived exposure as a moderator of the relationship between disinformation beliefs and origin attributions.

Against this backdrop, our main research question is the following:

Is the relationship between media-disinformation beliefs and domestic versus foreign origin attributions stronger when there is higher perceived exposure to fake news?

Methods

Participants. In spring 2025, the study protocol and survey instrument were reviewed by the Department for Science Strategy at Ludovika University of Public Service, which at the time—among other institutional responsibilities—also performed the University's internal ethics (IRB-equivalent) review function. The study was deemed to pose minimal ethical risk. The survey questions were deemed to pose minimal ethical risk. All methods were carried out in accordance with relevant guidelines and regulations. Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to participation. A total of 1,006 respondents participated in a cross-sectional CATI survey conducted in Hungary in November 2025 by a professional polling company. Recruitment drew from representative quotas for Hungary for gender, age, education, and type of residence. The mean age was 48.79 (SD = 16.49). Most respondents did not hold a bachelor's degree (N = 708, 70.4%); nearly a fifth of them lived in the capital city (N = 191, 19%), and the majority were female (N = 516, 51.3%).

Materials and procedure. The dependent variable (DV) asked respondents to evaluate: "Does fake news originate from foreign or domestic sources?" on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = entirely domestic sources, 2 = rather domestic sources, 3 = equally domestic and foreign sources, 4 = rather foreign sources, to 5 = entirely foreign sources. Respondents selecting "99 = I cannot decide the origin of fake news" were excluded from the main models. In line with other works[34], we deliberately used the term "sources" instead of "media outlets" in the item measuring the DV because the theory suggests that besides the media, "authentic social media users, opinion leaders, domestic political actors, foreign political actors, … and trolls or bots are all central players"[35] in disseminating disinformation. Additionally, the primary estimates utilized complete-case data across all model variables, yielding an analytic sample of 826 respondents.

Since the DV's measure allowed respondents to select "99 = I cannot decide the origin of fake news," a non-trivial share of the sample did not report origin attribution. In total, 180 respondents were excluded from the primary complete-case models, including 101 respondents who selected "cannot decide" on the DV and 79 additional cases with item non-response on one or more predictors required for the regression models. To assess whether this exclusion could bias the statistical associations, we compared respondents retained in the complete-case analytic sample (N = 826) with excluded cases (N = 180). The two groups did not differ in educational attainment, $\chi^2(1) = 0.92$, $p = 0.338$, Cramer's V = 0.03, or in residence, $\chi^2(1) = 0.001$, $p = 0.971$, Cramer's V = 0.001. In turn, the analytic sample was slightly younger on average (M = 48.02, SD = 16.4) than the excluded respondents (M = 52.34, SD = 16.15), Welch's t = − 3.24, $p = 0.001$, Cohen's d = 0.26, indicating a small age-related difference between these groups. Gender composition also differed modestly: excluded respondents were more likely to be women (N = 106, 58.9%) than the retained analytic sample (N = 410, 49.6%), $\chi^2(1) = 4.70$, $p = 0.030$,

Cramer's V = 0.07. Overall, demographic differences between retained and excluded respondents were small.

Predictors were measured on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), except for age and the nominal-level variables. The predictors, except the nominal ones, were mean-centered. The model included disinformation beliefs, political polarization by fake news, perceived frequency of fake news exposure, and age. Dummy-coded variables were education (college degree or higher: 0 = no, 1 = yes), residence (0 = not residing in the capital city, 1 = residing in the capital city), and gender (0 = female, 1 = male).

Media-disinformation belief (hereafter, disinformation belief) was measured using a six-item scale adapted from Hameleers[3]. Specifically, respondents evaluated the extent to which they agreed with statements describing the news media as intentionally deceptive, politically biased, or responsible for spreading false information. The items included: "the news media try to mislead citizens" (M = 3.74, SD = 1.11), "the news media are an enemy of ordinary people" (M = 2.79, SD = 1.26), "the news media are responsible for spreading fake news" (M = 3.85, SD = 1.13), "the news media try to force their own political agenda on us" (M = 4.1, SD = 1.09), "the news media deliberately lie to citizens" (M = 3.6, SD = 1.18), and "the news media are dominated by their own biased ideological views" (M = 4.22, SD = 1.101). The internal consistency of the disinformation belief scale was high across the six items (Cronbach's α = 0.81, M = 3.7, SD = 0.85). The overall scale mean was 3.69 (SD = 0.85), and the item variances ranged from 1.02 to 1.58.

Political polarization by fake news was measured with a single item created by the authors: "fake news divides people politically" (M = 4.26, SD = 0.866).

The perceived frequency of fake news exposure was measured with a single item constructed by the authors: "Based on your perceptions, how frequently are you exposed to fake news?" (1 = never, 2 = yearly, 3 = monthly, 4 = weekly, 5 = daily; M = 4.37, SD = 0.909).

Analytic strategy. We completed the complete-case analyses with a sensitivity check using multiple imputation (MI) to address missing values in the independent variables (IV) among respondents who provided a substantive answer by not selecting the "cannot decide" option for the DV. MI replaces missing responses with plausible values based on observed response patterns, allowing the analysis to retain cases that would otherwise be lost due to item non-response. Re-estimating the models with MI yielded results similar to those from the complete-case analysis, strengthening confidence that the outcomes are not artifacts of listwise deletion (results are reported below).

We ran ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to examine whether disinformation belief, fake news' political polarization, and perceived exposure frequency predict perceptions of fake news origin. We also tested whether perceived exposure and polarization condition the association between disinformation belief and origin attributions.

Results

According to the descriptive statistics, the mean DV score was 2.6 (SD = 0.723), indicating that respondents, on average, attributed fake news to domestic sources more than to foreign sources. Nonetheless, those respondents who provided a substantive DV response (e.g., those who did not select "99 = I cannot decide the origin of fake news," N = 905), most located fake news as originating equally from domestic and foreign sources (N = 528; 58.3%). A sizable minority attributed fake news more to domestic than foreign sources (rather domestic: N = 264; 29.2%; entirely domestic: N = 74; 8.2%), whereas relatively few located fake news primarily on the foreign side (rather foreign: N = 32; 3.5%; entirely foreign: N = 7; 0.8%). Regarding the predictors, the disinformation scale correlated moderately with perceived exposure (Spearman's rho = 0.303, $p < 0.001$) and respondents' assessments of fake news' polarization (Spearman's rho = 0.370, $p < 0.001$).

Our main OLS models were estimated on the complete-case analytic sample (N = 826), which reflects listwise deletion of (1) respondents who selected "cannot decide" on the DV (n = 101) and (2) respondents with missing values on predictors (n = 79). To check robustness, we also ran ordinal logistic regressions, which were consistent with the OLS results (see the robustness check at https://osf.io/c5hg7/overview?view_only=912d2bc86bdc4475a718d3844ea74caf).

Main OLS Results: Predictors of Perceived Origin of Fake News. We estimated OLS regressions with HC3 robust standard errors predicting the perceived origin of fake news from disinformation belief, political polarization attributed to fake news, perceived frequency of exposure to fake news, age, education, residence, gender, and two interaction terms (Table 1). The model explained a modest but significant proportion of variance in perceived origin, $R^2 = 0.067$, adjusted $R^2 = 0.056$, $F(9, 816) = 6.47$, $p < 0.001$. Residual autocorrelation was not detected (Durbin–Watson = 2.05, $p = 0.741$), and multicollinearity was minimal (VIFs = 1.02–1.87). Before we address our main research question, we present our findings for each predictor.

Holding all other predictors at their mean or reference values, stronger disinformation belief was associated with lower DV values, indicating a stronger tendency to attribute fake news to domestic rather than foreign sources ($B = -0.158$, $p < 0.001$). Put differently, respondents who more strongly believed that news media deliberately disseminate disinformation were more inclined to locate fake news in domestic distributors.

Table 1
OLS Regressions Predicting Perceived Origin of Fake News – Higher Disinformation belief is associated with more domestic origin attributions of fake news. Additionally, this association is amplified by more frequent perceived exposure to fake news.

Predictor	B	SE	t	p	95% CI
Intercept	2.624	.041	64.23	< 0.001	[2.543, 2.704]
Disinformation belief	-0.158	0.034	-4.65	< 0.001	[-0.224, -0.091]
Political polarization	-0.046	0.039	-1.17	0.243	[-0.123, 0.031]
Perceived exposure	-0.069	0.031	-2.19	0.029	[-0.131, -0.007]
Age	-0.002	0.002	-1.27	0.206	[-0.005, 0.001]
Education	-0.104	0.055	-1.89	0.059	[-0.212, 0.004]
Residence	0.004	0.064	0.07	0.948	[-0.121, 0.130]
Gender	0.018	0.050	0.37	0.714	[-0.080, 0.117]
Disinformation × Polarization	-0.006	0.033	-0.20	0.845	[-0.070, 0.057]
Disinformation × Perceived exposure	-0.098	0.032	-3.08	0.002	[-0.161, -0.036]

We analyzed fake news' political polarization's associations with the DV and found that it has no significant association with perceived origin ($B = -0.046$, $p = 0.243$), and neither was the interaction between disinformation belief and political polarization significant ($B = -0.006$, $p = 0.845$). Thus, the association between disinformation belief and origin judgments did not vary systematically across the levels of perceived political polarization.

In turn, perceived exposure to fake news was significantly associated with judgments about origin, as more perceived frequent exposure was linked to more domestic attributions ($B = -0.069$, $p = 0.029$). In other words, respondents who perceived more frequent encounters with fake news were more likely to locate those more in domestic than foreign sources. Regarding our main research question, we found that the interaction between disinformation belief and perceived exposure to fake news was statistically significant ($B = -0.098$, $p = 0.002$), implying that the domestic shift associated with disinformation belief becomes stronger as perceived exposure increases. Consistent with this interpretation, predicted values show that the slope linking disinformation belief to perceived origin is weakest under low exposure and steepest under high exposure, indicating that disinformation belief corresponds to markedly stronger domestic attributions among respondents who report frequent exposure to fake news (Fig. 1).

The Johnson-Neyman analysis further clarifies the boundary conditions of the Disinformation Belief-Fake News Exposure interaction. Specifically, the simple slope of disinformation belief predicting origin attributions was not statistically distinguishable from zero at lower levels of perceived exposure, but became significantly negative once exposure exceeded the Johnson-Neyman threshold (Fig. 2). Thus,

stronger disinformation belief was associated with more domestic origin attributions, primarily among respondents reporting moderate-to-high exposure to fake news.

Finally, none of the demographic controls showed statistically significant associations with perceived origin attribution in the OLS model.

Multiple-Imputation Sensitivity Analysis. Since DV non-response included a considerable number of "cannot decide" responses and additional missingness was present in predictors/controls (N = 180 in total), we conducted an MI sensitivity analysis (m = 20 imputations) to evaluate whether findings were sensitive to complete-case estimation. Across imputed datasets, we re-estimated the OLS model with mean-centered predictors and pooled coefficients using Rubin's rules.

Findings suggest that the results were mostly consistent with the previous OLS model introduced in Table 1: disinformation belief ($B = -0.162$, $p < 0.001$) and perceived exposure ($B = -0.064$, $p = 0.033$) remained significant predictors of more domestic attributions, and the disinformation-exposure interaction was also significant ($B = -0.089$, $p = 0.003$), whereas the disinformation-polarization interaction was still non-significant ($p = 0.964$). In the MI model, however, education was also statistically significant ($B = -0.119$, $p = 0.024$), suggesting that those respondents who obtain at least a college degree may be somewhat more likely to identify fake news coming from domestic sources when uncertainty due to missing data in the predictors is handled via imputation.

Overall, the results suggest (1) an association between media-related disinformation belief and domestic origin attributions, (2) an association between perceived higher fake news exposure and domestic origin attributions, and, most importantly, (3) the amplification of this association under higher perceived exposure.

Uncertainty about the Origin Attributions of Fake News. Since the "I cannot decide the origin of fake news" answer on the DV might be interpreted as not a classical missing value but rather a distinct category in contrast to those who chose between the "1–5" (e.g., the substantive) answer options, we ran a complementary logistic regression model. Specifically, we treated the "cannot decide" answers as parts of a distinct response category and estimated a multiple-imputation (m = 20) pooled logistic regression predicting the odds of selecting this answer option in the survey (DV = 1 in the logistic regression model) versus providing a substantive DV response (answers ranging from 1 [entirely domestic sources] to 5 [entirely foreign sources] = 0 in the logistic regression model). Against this backdrop, our complementary research question is the following:

What factors predict certainty versus uncertainty in domestic-foreign origin judgments of fake news?

The model included the same predictors and interactions as the main OLS specification. A pooled likelihood-ratio test indicated that the predictor set was jointly associated with "cannot decide" responses, $F(9, 721.58) = 3.53$, $p < 0.001$. Model fit was modest, with pseudo-R^2 values averaging

McFadden R^2 = 0.073 (adjusted = .043), Cox–Snell R^2 = 0.047, Nagelkerke R^2 = 0.097, and Tjur R^2 = 0.056 across imputations.

Three predictors showed statistically significant associations with the DV. First, media-disinformation belief was negatively associated with the "cannot decide" category (B = − 0.351, p = 0.044, OR = 0.70). From a reverse-angle perspective, this result suggests that respondents who more strongly believed that the news media deliberately disseminate disinformation were more likely to be able to attribute the origin of fake news. Second, higher perceived exposure to fake news also predicted lower odds of DV (B = − 0.502, p < 0.001, OR = 0.61), suggesting that more frequent perceived encounters with fake news correspond to a greater willingness/ability to attribute its origin to the domestic-foreign scale. Third, age was positively associated with the DV (B = 0.014, p = 0.035, OR = 1.01), implying a small increase in indecision coming with age. Expressed per decade, older age was associated with approximately 15% higher odds of indecision (OR ≈ 1.15). Political polarization, education, residence, gender, and both interaction terms were not significant.

Taken together, the uncertain respondents were less confident about the fake news information environment: compared to the other respondents, they reported lower perceived exposure and weaker disinformation belief, and were also older.

Discussion

Theoretical implications. We investigated how Hungarian citizens attribute origins to fake news, focusing on whether they perceive disinformation as "homegrown" or "foreign"-driven. Respondents who more strongly believed that the news media intentionally disseminate disinformation were significantly more likely to attribute fake news to domestic sources. Likewise, those who frequently felt exposed to fake news tended to attribute its origin to domestic sources. Crucially, our analysis revealed a synergistic association: high perceived exposure to fake news amplified the link between disinformation beliefs and domestic attributions. In other words, people who distrusted the media and believed they often encountered fake news were the most inclined to blame internal, domestic actors for spreading disinformation. An additional analysis showed that these factors also fostered greater certainty in judgments: such individuals were less likely to say they "cannot decide" who produces fake news, indicating more confident (but not necessarily more accurate) attributions.

These results make vital contributions to broader theoretical frameworks on media and disinformation. The significant role of perceived frequent exposure supports the idea that the more people feel bombarded by fake news, the more they internalize a reality where domestic actors are chiefly responsible. This extends cultivation theory into the digital disinformation era, suggesting that not only entertainment violence or stereotypes, but also perceptions of fake news, can cultivate specific worldviews about where threats come from[8]. Our findings thereby empirically reinforce the notion that heavy (perceived) exposure to misleading information can strengthen certain beliefs about the social

world—here, attributing blame for “fake news” to domestic sources—much as cultivation effects have long been shown to influence audiences’ social and political perceptions.

Beyond cultivation, the study contributes to media studies by highlighting the importance of fake news origin attribution, a relatively neglected dimension in the literature. Disinformation is often conceptualized as a “context-bound” phenomenon involving various actors, intentions, and tactics. Our evidence aligns with this view[35], showing that citizens do not automatically externalize blame for fake news to foreign agents; instead, their judgments reflect the specific context of their media environment. While much scholarly and policy attention has focused on foreign disinformation campaigns and interference—for instance, heightened awareness of Russian influence since the 2014 Crimea crisis[36]—our findings suggest that, at least in Hungary, the public often sees disinformation as emanating from within national borders, even if it might be copied from or supported by foreign agents. This insight complements existing studies of disinformation perceptions: it underscores that public concerns are not limited to hostile foreign actors, but also encompass domestic players and outlets. By demonstrating that stronger beliefs in deceptive domestic media correlate with “fake news” being attributed to domestic sources, our study confirms that disinformation, as a concept, blurs the line between external threats and the internal diminishing of the media, considered as the fourth estate[37].

Applied implications. Our findings are crucial for both scholars and policymakers: they imply that counter-disinformation initiatives cannot focus solely on foreign threat narratives but must also address the deep-seated domestic distrust fueling these attributions. Ultimately, understanding public attribution patterns in such settings can help diagnose the challenges of restoring trust in information: when people are misled from within, improving or rebuilding media credibility and bridging partisan information divides become as important as guarding against external propaganda.

The results also imply that debunking individual false claims is unlikely to be sufficient if citizens interpret the information environment through a lens of intentional domestic deception. A more useful response is to pair fact-checking with trust-repair “signals” that reduce the perception of deliberate manipulation: newsrooms can standardize visible correction routines (timestamped correction boxes, public correction logs), clearly separate news from opinion, and add “how we reported this” provenance notes for politically salient stories. Platforms and regulators can support this by enforcing clear labeling and disclosure.

Limitations

Despite offering novel insights, this study has several limitations that warrant acknowledgment. First, our analysis is based on a single-country case, which limits the generalizability of the findings beyond contexts with similar polarized media systems. Future research should examine whether these attribution dynamics hold in other countries, including less polarized environments or different media landscapes. Second, the study’s cross-sectional design precludes firm conclusions about causality or the direction of effects. Longitudinal or experimental designs would be valuable to determine, for

example, whether higher perceived exposure leads to domestic attributions or whether pre-existing attribution biases influence perceived exposure. Finally, we focused on perceived exposure and beliefs about media disinformation as predictors, but other factors (such as partisan identity or direct media consumption patterns) were beyond our scope. Addressing these limitations in subsequent research would deepen our understanding of how and why citizens assign blame for disinformation, both in Hungary and in comparative perspective.

Declarations

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Declaration of Conflict of Interest:

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data related to the analyzed variables can be released upon request.

that there is no conflict of interest.

Author Contribution

T.T. and E.P. wrote the main manuscript texts.Data curation and analysis were conducted by T.T.M.D. supervised the above processes.

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Figures




Figure 1

Marginal prediction plot – Interaction between Disinformation belief and Perceived Fake News Exposure Predicting Fake News' Origin Attributions. The predicted origin-attribution score decreases as disinformation belief increases, meaning stronger disinformation belief is associated with more domestic attributions of fake news. This negative association is weakest at low exposure and steepest at high exposure, indicating that perceived fake-news exposure amplifies the relationship. The grey band is the 95% CI around the predicted line.




Figure 2

Johnson–Neyman plot: The effect (simple slope) of disinformation belief (Disinfo_c) on origin attributions becomes reliably negative only beyond a specific perceived-exposure threshold. Below that threshold, the slope is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that the disinformation–attribution link is detectable primarily among respondents with higher perceived exposure. Because the moderator (perceived frequency of fake-news exposure) was mean-centered, the x-axis is displayed in units of Freq_c (i.e., perceived exposure minus its sample mean) rather than on the original 1–5 response scale. Accordingly, negative values indicate exposure levels below the sample mean and positive values indicate exposure levels above the mean. The y-axis shows the conditional simple slope of disinformation belief on perceived origin attributions at each level of perceived exposure. Given the coding of the dependent variable (lower values indicate more domestic attributions), a negative simple slope implies that stronger disinformation beliefs are associated with more domestic origin attributions, and this association emerges reliably only at moderate-to-high levels of perceived exposure.