2. BRI policy and theoretical analysis
2.1. Policy background and elements
Connectivity is the core objective of the BRI initiated by the People’s Republic of China in 2013. Labelled as “A Key Pillar of the Global Community Future” by the China State Council Information Office (SCIO, 2023), the BRI aims to facilitate policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and closer people-to-people bonds. The initiative is designed as a non-imposed tool which allows for voluntary cooperation of members based on shared interests and values, as well as a flexible tool which can include new mutual interests over time.
Although the initial conception of BRI was to enhance connectivity between East Asia and Europe, by 2023 it had expanded to include Africa and Latin America with overall inclusion of over 150 countries globally and 30 international organizations participating through joining or signing cooperation agreements with the BRI (China SCIO, 2023). By then, the African continent had the highest proportion about 35% of BRI membership including 44 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, and the African Union (AU) had entered into related cooperative agreements with China (Africa-China Center for Policy and Advisory, 2023). To date, almost all African countries are members of the BRI (China Green Finance and Development Centre, 2025). Further, the China SCIO (2023) noted that the BRI participating countries have also expanded practical cooperation through major platforms such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).
One of the areas of growing focus for the BRI is green energy technology enhancement. The promotion of the Green Silk Road by China led to the release of Green Investment Principles (GIP) for the BRI in 2018 and consequently the formation of the BRI International Green Development Coalition in 2019 aimed at engaging in dialogue, exchanges, joint research, capacity building and other activities (Xiao & Yifei, 2023). For instance, Fig. 2 illustrates the consistent rise in China’s PV exports from 2007 to 2016 whereby in 2015 the exports to BRI countries started to exceed the values to the EU and US combined.
Primarily, the BRI is based on five priorities of cooperation also known as the “five-pronged” or “wǔ tōng” approach composed of policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and closer people-to-people ties (Chin, 2023). Whilst adopting the China SCIO (2023) definitions of the five priority areas, it should also be noted that the BRI operates through ‘soft’ approaches involving intangible rules, relationships and standards harmonization; as well as ‘hard’ or tangible approaches such as physical infrastructure and systems.
a.Policy coordination: Alignment of development strategies, technological and economic policies and administration rules and standards.
b.People-to-people ties: Promotion of friendly cooperation, cultural exchanges, tourism, education, think tank and the media, mutual learning among civilization and cultural integration and innovation.
c.Financial integration or coordination: Facilitation of multiple forms of financial cooperation, models, channels, diversification and mechanisms for investment and financing.
d.Unimpeded trade or trade connectivity: Promotion of trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, resolution of investment and trade barriers and improvement of business environment within the region and in all related countries.
e.Infrastructure (facilities) connectivity: Establishment of an infrastructure network over land, marine, air and cyberspace along the BRI corridors, routes, multiple countries and ports.
Apart from BRI’s five priorities, the SCIO (2023) records new areas within the BRI’s “All Round” Connectivity. The new fields target the achievement of a healthy, green, innovative, digital Silk Road. Based on the available data, however, this research utilizes indicators representing the original five priority areas only.
2.2. Theoretical analysis and hypotheses
As noted by Feng (2019) as cited in Hu et al., 2023) there is a synergy of sustainable development goals between China and countries along the BRI. China’s search for new PV products markets emanated from production overcapacity in the PV industry and consequent trade barriers initiated in 2011 by the EU and USA against China’s rising global market competition (Zhu et al., 2023). The rest of the BRI countries, especially those in SSA, attempt to access affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy.
Zhu et al. (2023) employed a spatial analysis of 2009 to 2016 trade statistics using linear probability models and logit model to show that BRI markets provide an alternative market for Chinese PV enterprises. Specifically, the results indicated that BRI facilitated 4751 million more PV products conveyed from China to BRI markets from 2013 to 2016 as illustrated in Fig. 2. The research by Zhu et al. (2023), therefore, validated BRI market’s potential to cushion area Chinese PV enterprises against the EU and USA trade sanctions and that the shift to BRI market would “advance laggard countries to realize green growth” p.25779. This is consistent with the core-periphery theory which argues that movement within and between the advanced (core) and developing (periphery) levels of economy is regulated by market forces (Hryniewicz, 2014).
However, Zhu et al.’s (2023) research was more interested in China moving away its focus from the EU and USA solar PV market than in the mechanisms of the BRI to secure alternative markets, like Africa. The perspective of the research in mainly on the supply-side and is restricted to Chinese PV firms as units of analysis. This research not only uses the countries as units of analysis, but also attempts to look at the BRI connectivity elements, an approach similar to Hu et. al.’s (2023) study which focused on non-African BRI members instead. Hu et. al. (2023) highlighted the important role of the BRI “five-pronged” approach in promoting PV trade, and recommended further research in these mechanisms. Regarding the BRI connectivity index, a common challenge faced by researchers is the unavailability or inaccessibility of data which covers the sampled BRI members with respect to the indicators included in the “BRI Five Connectivity” index developed by the Peking University (Chen, J., Liu & Liu, 2020; Hu et al., 2023; Sabola, 2024). This research adopts and improves the measurement methodology used by previous researchers by introducing relevant indicators for which data is easily accessible.
In general, the BRI has led to an increase in bilateral trade between China and SSA supported by the findings of Wang et al. (2024) and Negash et al. (2024), but there is need to find out about the BRI’s specific influence on PV exports with respect to SSA countries. Kluiver (2024) pointed out that Africa has potential gain from China’s shifts of BRI towards smaller, greener and less risky projects. Similarly, Geng’s (2021) review of the BRI and its global energy implications highlighted BRI’s contribution to renewable energy development in host countries, especially in terms of solar and wind energy.
To achieve the second specific research objective, Hypotheses 2 and 3 can be broken down into five hypotheses representing the BRI’s “five-pronged” approach.
2.2.1. Policy coordination
Using social network analysis, Hu et al. (2023) found out that policy coordination or communication promotes PV trade within the BRI framework by facilitating political communication channels among member countries. The soft approach exhibited a positive influence on PV trade from 2016 to 2020; thereafter declining in influence in 2021 and 2022 due to pandemic-induced disruptions to trade.
2.2.2. People-to-people ties
Unlike the case with financial connectivity, Hu et al’s (2023) study showed that people-to-people communication has a significant effect on BRI’s influence on China-SSA PV exports. Bridging the language and cultural gaps helps to reduce transaction costs and facilitate smooth progress in PV trade. Moreover, technological advancements contribute to reduction in language barriers.
Nevertheless, Hu et al (2023) found out that the influence of people-to-people connection exhibited declining significance of PV trade from 2001 to 2022; becoming non-significant in 2021 and 2022.
2.2.3. Financial coordination
Wang et al. (2024) used trade gravity model to analyze the BRI and China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) in SSA. The results showed that the BRI has positive effect on both FDI and trade. Sabola (2024) consolidated BRI’s positive effect on FDI for southern African countries using a Propensity Score Matching-Difference in Difference (PSM-DiD) approach. However, based on the ‘Financial Market Theory’, Hu et al. (2023) revealed that the effect of financial integration on BRI PV trade is inconsequential- likely lacking significant impact on PV trade in the presence of other strong factors.
Whilst Yasmeen et al. (2022) argued that FDI inflows can be a source of solar technology promotion, Voica et al. (2021) clarified that the impact of FDI on trade depends on the type of investment, absorptive capacity of the FDI recipient and economic development of the partner countries. Given the limited data on categorized FDI from China to SSA countries, this research uses the lump sum FDI stock recorded by the China Africa Research Initiative (CARI)- an approach utilized by other researchers like Hu et al. (2023) and Sabola (2024).
2.2.4. Trade connectivity
Using spatial analysis to find out the impact of the BRI on Chinese PV firms’ export expansion, Zhu et al. (2023) concluded that the firms prefer to explore BRI markets due to reduced trade restrictions. The expectation of trade connectivity having a positive mediating influence on PV exports is consistent with the findings of Hu et. al (2023).
2.2.5. Infrastructure connectivity
Hu et al. (2023) also explained that infrastructure expands PV trade among BRI countries by reducing distance-related challenges. Although Huang (2016) noted that energy infrastructure investments became pivotal in the early stages of BRI investments, Hu et al. (2023) argued that attention should be paid to aviation and shipping infrastructure in order to facilitate PV trade. Examples of facilities would, therefore, include modernized and expanded sea ports, air ports and roads aimed at trade and transit facilitation. This type of connectivity is important for both landlocked and coastal countries in the SSA region.
Having reached 10 years of implementation in 2023, the BRI has received a number of assessments as elaborated by the policy background and theoretical analysis. Over time, PV trade between China and other BRI members has evidently increased with a collective mediating influence from “five-pronged” approach, except for financial coordination whose effect may be inconsequential. The missing specific study on BRI’s influence on the exportation of PV products from China to SSA is an essential contribution to this research area.