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YEZhanghuang1Emailchuckverna@sina.com
LinleiZHONG2Emailz_linlei@163.com
GuoBin3Emailbgjtgb5786@163.com
ZhaoJian4Emailzhaojian3712@163.com
1Guangzhou Maritime CollegeGuangzhouChina
2Deyang installation technician CollegeDeyangChina
3Baotou Iron and Steel(Group) Co., LtdBaotouChina
4IBarun Mining Branch Co. of Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Union Co., LtdBaotouChina
YE Zhanghuang1 ZHONG Linlei2 Guo Bin3 Zhao Jian4
(1 Guangzhou Maritime College, Guangzhou, China, chuckverna@sina.com; 2 Deyang installation technician College, Deyang, China, z_linlei@163.com; 3 Baotou Iron and Steel(Group) Co., Ltd., Baotou, China, bgjtgb5786@163.com; 4 IBarun Mining Branch Co. of Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Union Co., Ltd., Baotou, China, zhaojian3712@163.com)
Abstract
REEs trade patterns and network are of great strategic importance for world-wide cooperation and industrial security. Based on the trade data of the global REEs from year 2000 to 2022, the paper analyzes its trade pattern evolution in terms of trade value, trade network and network influence. It further examines the correlation between REEs trade and economic development, and analyze Chinese trade network from the viewpoint of trade partners and trade concentration. The paper reveals that China, Japan, US, and Germany have consistently ranked as the top 4 in the trade values over the last two decades, while Australia is gradually becoming an increasingly important partner. China, Germany, US and France have always maintained high node degrees. Notably, Netherlands has exhibited a marked rise in node degree. 126 economic entities fall into four groups. Some recommendations have been put forward to better serve the global trade.
Keywords:
REEs
trade pattern
complex network
network visualization
0 Introduction
REEs-a group of 17 metals including the lanthanides, as well as the element of scandium and yttrium-are widely regarded as the “vitamins of modern industry”. Due to their unique physical properties[1], they are key raw materials for advanced manufacturing, such as medical equipment, national defense, and new energy vehicles[2–3].
Currently, the academic community has conducted extensive research on REEs pricing mechanism[4–7], policy evaluation [8–11], and industrial transformation[12–15]. However, with global trade uncertainties and worldwide adjustments in REEs policies, many scholars have shifted their focus to REEs international trade. Using REEs resource products as research subjects, they have carried out studies on REEs trade flows [16–20], and trade security strategies[21–35].
With the intensified geopolitical competition, Western nations are actively rebuilding their REEs industries and restructuring supply chains [36]. This shift may lead to a global REEs "decoupling" scenario, posing substantial challenges to Chinese REEs sector. To safeguard global industry security and maintain Chinese strategic advantages, the paper analyzes the REEs global trade pattern in terms of trade value, network structure, and network influence; and examines the correlation between trade features and economic development; and investigates Chinese trade network through its trading partners and trade concentration, based on global REEs trade data from the year of 2002 to 2022.
2 Global REEs Trade Pattern Analysis
2.1 Trade Value
The REEs trade values are calculated in US dollars in the paper. Global REEs import and export values followed a generally similar trend from the year of 2002 to 2022. In 2022, global REE imports reached USD 30.05 billion, while exports totaled USD 58.70 billion (Fig. 1). The decade from 2002 to 2012 was marked by a continuous annual increase in global trade values, followed by a period of sustained contraction between 2012 and 2020, with a minor rebound observed in 2018.
(Source: Reference [44])
Due to the diverse economic structures and resource endowments of global trading partners, their demand and supply for REEs vary greatly. To better understand trade dynamics, we analyze the top 10 economic entities in terms of REEs trade value from 2002 to 2022.
From the import side, China, Japan, the United States, and Germany consistently ranked as the top four economic entities from 2002 to 2022 (Table 2). They also rank among the highest in the global GDP list. In addition, South Korea, Hong Kong CHN, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand in Asia, France and Italy in Europe, as well as Mexico in the Americas, also play key roles in global REEs import markets.
Table 2
Global top 10 economic entities with the highest REEs import values from 2002 to 2022
2002 | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 | 2018 | 2020 | 2022 |
|---|
CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN |
JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | AUS |
USA | USA | USA | USA | DEU | DEU | DEU | DEU | DEU | DEU | JPN |
DEU | DEU | DEU | DEU | USA | USA | USA | USA | AUS | USA | DEU |
KOR | FRA | FRA | THA | KOR | PHL | MYS | MYS | USA | AUS | USA |
FRA | KOR | THA | FRA | FRA | FRA | PHL | AUS | MYS | VNM | PHL |
GBR | HKG | KOR | MAR | THA | MYS | VNM | KOR | KOR | THA | VNM |
MEX | ESP | GBR | HKG | MYS | HKG | KOR | VNM | PHL | KOR | MYS |
MYS | THA | ESP | NLD | PHL | KOR | HKG | PHL | VNM | MYS | THA |
HKG | ITA | ITA | KOR | HKG | NLD | FRA | FRA | FRA | PHL | KOR |
(Source: Reference [44])
On the exports side, China, Japan, Germany, and the United States consistently ranked the world’s leading exporters from 2002 to 2022. However, Australian REEs exports has been rising steadily, making it the largest global exporter in 2022 (Table 3).
Table 3
Top 10 economies with the highest global REEs export value from 2002 to 2022
2002 | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 | 2018 | 2020 | 2022 |
|---|
JPN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN |
CHN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | AUS |
USA | DEU | DEU | DEU | USA | USA | DEU | DEU | AUS | DEU | JPN |
DEU | USA | USA | USA | DEU | DEU | USA | USA | DEU | USA | DEU |
MYS | ESP | HKG | HKG | HKG | HKG | HKG | MYS | USA | AUS | USA |
FRA | GBR | GBR | FRA | KOR | PHL | MYS | NLD | MYS | VNM | VNM |
KOR | FRA | FRA | NLD | NLD | MYS | PHL | HKG | VNM | MYS | PHL |
HKG | HKG | KOR | KOR | FRA | FRA | RUS | KOR | PHL | THA | KOR |
GBR | UKR | ESP | ESP | PHL | NLD | NLD | VNM | KOR | KOR | THA |
NLD | NLD | NLD | THA | MYS | KOR | KOR | AUS | NLD | PHL | MYS |
| (Source: Reference [44]) |
Since 2018, with the escalating trade tensions between China and the United States, China has tightened regulatory controls over REEs exports, imposing restrictions on several key products【39】. This has deeply affected global supply chains. In this context, Mt. Weld REEs deposit in Australia has secured long-term export agreements as an alternative supplier【40】. Although Hong Kong(CHN), Spain, Austria, Norway, and the Netherlands lack significant REEs resources, their roles as transit trade centers, contribute to market diversification.【41】
In a word, China play an important role in both imports and exports. Policy dynamics in China have substantial impacts over the global markets. Meanwhile, Australia’s export rise and the steady demand-supply from the the United States, Japan and Germany have jointly shaped the global REEs trade pattern.
2.2 Trade network
To further understand the features of global REEs trade network, this study analyzes the following aspects: network size, network density, and network clustering coefficient.
Expansion in Network Size
The network size is defined by nodes and edges. The former refers to economic entities engaged in trade, while the latter refers to bilateral trade relationships, with more nodes and edges indicating broader global trade participation.
A
From 2002 to 2022, the REEs trade network expanded significantly. The average annual node number in the import network reached 137, while the export network 197, indicating more export players than import.. More than 80% of the global economic entities have participated in REEs trade, indicating that REEs resources have always been valued by different countries (Figs.
2). The edge number has increased steadily for both imports and exports in the same period (Figs. 3).
(Source: Reference [44])
Figure 3 Edge number of global REEs trade from 2002–2022
(Source: Reference [44])
Decline in Network Density
The network density is measured by the proportion between actual edges and the theoretical maximum ones, with larger values reflecting the tighter trade connectivity【42】.
The network density of the global REEs trade declined. From 2002 to 2022, import network density steadily declined from 0.051 to 0.041. Export network density dropped sharply from 0.042 in 2002 to 0.021 in 2004, then gradually increased, peaking at 0.042 in 2008, and fluctuated around 0.036 afterward(Fig. 4) .Overall, the connection tightness decreased slightly. However, the import network remains closer connection than the export network.
(Source: Reference [44])
(3)Rising in Network Clustering Coefficient
The clustering coefficient is calculated by the average of local clusters across all nodes. The higher value it is, the stronger consolidation degree of REEs trade it is【43】.
The clustering coefficient has shown a general upward trend in the period.. The import network clustering coefficients went up from 0.56 in the year 2002 to 0.67 in the year of 2022, with notable dips in 2006, 2012 and 2020. It hit the bottom of 0.27 in 2012 and rose to the peak of 0.67 in 2022. The export network clustering coefficients went up from 0.57 in the year 2002 to 0.75 in the year of 2022, with notable dips in 2010. The lowest was 0.36 in 2010, while the highest is 0.75 in 2022 (Fig. 5). This suggests that REEs trade partners have formed tighter clusters.
(Source: Reference [44])
2.3 Network Influence
The node degree represents the connection number between a given node and others in the REEs trade. i.e. the partner number for an economic entity within the trade network. In the trade network, China, Germany, the United States, and France have consistently in the node degree top list. Notably, the Netherlands experienced a significant increase in its node degree, ranking the third in 2022(Table 4). This indicates that China, France, the Netherlands, the United States, and Germany have established relatively stable trade connections with plenty of, partners. The REEs policies of these countries exert substantial influences and drive dynamic evolution of the global trade network.
Table 4
Top 10 REEs trade partners with the highest node degree in the network from 2002 to 2022
2002 | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 | 2018 | 2020 | 2022 |
|---|
DEU | USA | USA | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN | CHN |
USA | CHN | CHN | DEU | DEU | DEU | DEU | DEU | DEU | USA | FRA |
FRA | DEU | DEU | USA | USA | USA | USA | USA | USA | NLD | NLD |
GBR | GBR | GBR | FRA | FRA | KOR | FRA | NLD | NLD | DEU | USA |
CHN | FRA | FRA | GBR | GBR | NLD | NLD | FRA | FRA | FRA | DEU |
JPN | ITA | JPN | JPN | JPN | FRA | JPN | KOR | KOR | KOR | KOR |
ITA | JPN | ITA | ITA | KOR | MEX | CHE | JPN | JPN | IND | TUR |
KOR | KOR | KOR | KOR | ITA | IND | AUT | TUR | IND | JPN | JPN |
MEX | BEL | BEL | BEL | MEX | FRA | KOR | ITA | ITA | TUR | ITA |
BEL | CHE | MEX | CHE | CHE | CHE | RUS | THA | THA | ITA | IND |
| (Source: Reference [44]) |
A visualization has been conducted according to the 2022 REEs trade values and node degree rankings, 126 global trade partners falls into four groups (Fig. 6).
Group I comprises the top 25% trade partners in both trade values and node degree rankings. The 26 members in this group are characterized by a great number of trade partners and high trade values. Representative countries include China (ranked 1st in both trade value and node degree), the United States (4th in trade value, 4th in node degree), and France (8th in trade value, 2nd in node degree). Partners in this group have big influence on the REEs trade network.
Group II includes partners with a high trade value ranking (top 50%) but a lower node degree ranking (bottom 50%). The 21 members in this group have considerable trade values but a few trade partners. Good examples are Egypt (ranked 40th in trade value, 92nd in node degree) and Iran (46th in trade value, 72nd in node degree).
Group III consists of partners with a low trade value ranking (bottom 50%) but a high node degree ranking (top 50%). The 26 partners in this group have low trade values but a larger number of trade partners. Representative economies include New Zealand (67th in trade value, 51st in node degree) and Nigeria (68th in trade value, 52nd in node degree).
Group IV consists of partners ranked in the bottom 50% for both trade values and node degrees. The 53 members in this group have low trade values and limited trade partners. Examples include Laos (115th in node degree, 125th in trade value) and Dominica (155th in node degree, 136th in trade value).
(Source: Reference [44])
2.4 Correlation Analysis
To display the relationship between REEs trade and economic development, Table 5 reveals a significant positive correlation between trade values and network node degrees.. Furthermore, the four trade indicators show a significant positive correlation with GDP (Gross Domestic Product), FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), and GNI (Gross National Income per capital)[44]. Conversely, the indicators exhibit a negative correlation with RMRRG (Ratio between mineral resource rent and GDP)[45]. This means that partners with more developed REEs trade networks and higher trade values tend to have a lower reliance on mineral resources.
Table 5
Relevant analysis results of the REEs trade network in G20 countries (regions)
Project | Import node degree | Export node degree | Import value | Export value | RMRRG | GDP | FDI | GNI |
|---|
Import node degree | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
Export node degree | 0.7866*** | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
Import value | 0.2964*** | 0.3470*** | 1 | - | - | - | - | - |
Export value | 0.2677*** | 0.3472*** | 0.6304*** | 1 | - | - | - | - |
RMRRG | −0.3376*** | −0.1379* | −0.2291*** | −0.0238 | 1 | - | - | - |
GDP | 0.5634*** | 0.5868*** | 0.6387*** | 0.4587*** | −0.1865*** | 1 | - | - |
FDI | 0.4291*** | 0.4582*** | 0.3807*** | 0.3354*** | −0.1894*** | 0.7184*** | 1 | - |
GNI | 0.5118*** | 0.5540*** | 0.5019*** | 0.3981*** | −0.1843** | 0.9999*** | 0.7423*** | 1 |
| (Source: Reference [44]、 [45]) |
| (Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% level) |
3. Analysis on Chinese REEs Trade Network
3.1 Trade Partners
(1)Import Trade Partners
China imports REEs from a wide range of countries across Asia, Oceania, America, and Europe (Table 6). From 2002 to 2014, Japan was the largest supplier of REEs to China in terms of trade value, whereas from 2016 to 2022, Australia took the lead. Additionally, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia have held significant positions in Chinese REEs import market.
Table 6
China’s top 10 import partners in terms of REEs values
2002 | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 | 2018 | 2020 | 2022 |
|---|
JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | AUS | AUS | AUS | AUS |
KOR | KOR | THA | USA | PHL | PHL | AUS | JPN | JPN | VNM | USA |
MYS | DEU | AUS | THA | THA | AUS | MYS | MYS | USA | USA | MMR |
USA | USA | USA | PHL | AUS | MYS | PHL | CHL | MYS | JPN | BRA |
AUS | ITA | PHL | AUS | DEU | KOR | DEU | PHL | CAN | BRA | MYS |
ITA | HKG | KOR | KOR | MYS | DEU | KOR | KOR | MMR | MYS | JPN |
HKG | AUS | DEU | IND | USA | USA | THA | DEU | PHL | VNM | VNM |
PHL | ESP | ESP | MYS | KOR | THA | USA | VNM | VNM | PHL | ZWE |
MMR | FRA | IND | DEU | CHL | IRN | CHL | USA | DEU | DEU | NGR |
DEU | PHL | ITA | IRN | MMR | CHL | VNM | IRN | KOR | KOR | CHN |
FRA | IND | HKG | HKG | FRA | VNM | IRN | THA | RUS | ARE | RUS |
| (Source: Reference [44]) |
Changes in Chinese REEs import trade values (Fig. 7) reveals an upward trend from Australia, Myanmar, and Brazil from 2002 to 2022. Conversely, imports from Japan and South Korea have declined. The changes may be influenced by international market prices, economic structures, and geopolitical relationship, but it is not an irreversible change[46–47]. Despite the import declines from traditional partners between 2014 and 2022, China’s total import value continued to rise, reaching $10.7432 billion USD in 2022. This suggests a diversification of Chinese REEs import sources.
(Source: Reference [44])
In China’s REEs export markets (Table 7), Japan has consistently maintained No. 1 position from 2002 to 2022, followed by the United States, Hong Kong CHN, Germany, and South Korea as major traditional destinations. Emerging export markets have included India, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand in recent years.
Table 7
China’s top 10 export partners in terms of REEs values
2002 | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 | 2018 | 2020 | 2022 |
|---|
JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN | JPN |
HKG | HKG | HKG | USA | USA | HKG | USA | USA | USA | USA | DEU |
USA | USA | USA | HKG | HKG | USA | DEU | DEU | DEU | DEU | USA |
KOR | KOR | KOR | KOR | KOR | DEU | HKG | KOR | KOR | VNM | KOR |
DEU | ITA | NLD | NLD | DEU | KOR | KOR | HKG | VNM | KOR | VNM |
NLD | NLD | SGP | DEU | NLD | FRA | NLD | VNM | THA | THA | THA |
THA | FRA | DEU | ITA | ITA | NLD | THA | NLD | NLD | ITA | ITA |
ITA | DEU | FRA | SGP | FRA | THA | ITA | THA | ITA | NLD | IND |
SGP | SGP | ITA | FRA | SGP | ITA | VNM | ITA | HKG | IND | POL |
FRA | THA | IND | IND | THA | PHL | MYS | DNK | MYS | PHL | NLD |
MYS | GBR | GBR | THA | IND | CHE | IND | MYS | IND | HKG | PHL |
| (Source: Reference [44]) |
China’s REEs export value has shown a steady increase, with the export value reaching $6.6592 billion in 2022, nearly five times higher than that in 2002, Exports to Hong Kong CHN, Japan, Germany, South Korea, and the United States exhibit similar fluctuations, aligning with the overall trend of China's REEs export trade (Fig. 8)
(Source: Reference [44])
The ratios of REEs import and export trade values are greater than 1 for items of 253090 (REEs ores), 284690 (REEs oxides) and 320650 (REEs phosphors) from 2002 to 2022. Notably, the import value of 253090 was approximately 50 times higher than its export value in 2022. These indicate China’s substantial demand for REEs primary products and manufactured products. In contrast, for other REEs products, the ratios are less than 1. Notably, the import value of 280530 (REEs metals) was only 0.8 percent of its export value in 2022. These indicate that China exports a large number of REEs refined products to global markets.
Table 8
Value ratio of China's REEs import and export trade from 2002 to 2022
HS code | 2002 | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 | 2018 | 2020 | 2022 |
|---|
253090 | 1.272 | 1.522 | 2.225 | 0.796 | 1.186 | 1.588 | 1.654 | 2.483 | 10.208 | 7.407 | 50.827 |
280530 | 0.016 | 0.005 | 0.002 | 0.014 | 0.004 | 0.008 | 0.013 | 0.009 | 0.008 | 0.075 | 0.008 |
284610 | 0.047 | 0.294 | 0.176 | 0.100 | 0.033 | 0.076 | 0.128 | 0.068 | 0.180 | 0.565 | 0.286 |
284690 | 0.082 | 0.105 | 0.160 | 0.037 | 0.052 | 0.062 | 0.220 | 0.399 | 0.604 | 2.002 | 1.630 |
720299 | 0.216 | 0.156 | 0.304 | 0.118 | 0.065 | 0.040 | 0.051 | 0.086 | 0.111 | 0.448 | 0.220 |
850511 320650 | 0.422 4.794 | 0.536 2.378 | 0.594 1.602 | 0.421 1.512 | 0.502 1.943 | 0.423 1.596 | 0.334 1.288 | 0.241 2.658 | 0.185 2.642 | 0.134 2.938 | 0.060 2.268 |
| (Source: Reference [44]) |
3.2 Trade Concentration
Utilizing the concept of industrial concentration, a trade concentration index has been constructed[48]. i.e., the ratio between China’s REEs trade value with the top 4 (CR4) or top 8 (CR8) partners with the global REEs trade value.
Firstly, the Chinese import concentration shows a fluctuating upward trend (Fig. 9). Taking CR4 as an example, the import trade network exhibited low concentration in 2002(CR4 < 30%), followed by moderate concentration (30% < CR4 < 55%) from 2004 to 2006, high concentration (55% < CR4 < 70%) from 2008 to 2016, and extremely high concentration (CR4 > 70%) from 2018 to 2022. Overall, China's import concentration has shown a gradual increase.
Secondly, the Chinese export concentration demonstrates a declining trend(Fig. 9). For example,, the export trade network exhibited high concentration (50% < CR4 < 70%) from 2002 to 2016, which decreased to moderate concentration (30% < CR4 < 55%) from 2018 to 2022. This indicates an increasing diversification of China's export partners, particularly including emerging markets such as India, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
(Source: Reference [44])
4. Conclusions and Recommendations
4.1 Conclusions
(1) Economic entities with high trade values occupy central positions within the global REEs trade network. China, Japan, the United States, and Germany have been the leading countries in terms of REEs trade values from 2002 to 2022. Australia has increasingly emerged as a key global player in the global trade. The above partners have jointly shaped the global REEs trade pattern.
(2) Analysis on the global REEs trade network shows that the network size has been increasing, while its density has decreased from 2002 to 2022. The network’s clustering coefficient has generally increased in the same period. Data show that 80% of global economic entities have participated in in REEs trade, with more export players than import ones. The REEs import network is denser than the export network, and the trend toward consideration within the trade network is more pronounced.
(3) Analysis on global REEs trade node degrees reveals that, China, Germany, the United States, and France have maintained a large number of trade partners from 2002 to 2022. The Netherlands experienced a notable rise in node degree. Visualization based on REEs trade values and node degree rankings in the 2022, 126 global partners falls into into four groups. China, France, and the United States, along with 23 other partners, belong to Group I, have big influence on the REEs trade network.
(4) Correlation analysis shows that REEs trade is positively correlated with economic development (GDP, FDI, GNI), while negatively correlated with dependence degree on mineral resources (RMRRG).
(5) China’s REEs import values significantly exceeds its export values. China exhibits a substantial demand for REEs primary and manufactured products, while exporting a higher value of refined products.
(6) China's import concentration is increasing, while export concentration is declining. Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines and ASEAN are main import origin of China’s REEs. Japan, Hong Kong CHN, the United States, Germany, and South Korea are traditional export destinations for Chinese REEs, while emerging markets, such as India, the Philippines and Vietnam, have become increasingly important.
4.2 Recommendations
Based on the above findings, the following recommendations are proposed for global REEs industrial security.and sustainable develepment.
(1)Scientifically improve REEs regulatory level
By establishing an international REEs regulatory alliance, we can balance interests between production and consumption countries. The alliance will share blacklist database, and cancel trade licenses of non-compliant enterprises.
Classification guidance is a must thing to do: civilian and military use. Market transaction rules will be observed in such civilian sectors as electric vehicles or wind power. while military use must be subjected to strict end-use examination. It is a feasible method to avoid the REEs abuses.
As an important REEs production country, China should make great contributions to the global regulation in order to lessen the waste of the precious REEs resource.
(2)Dynamically stabilize REEs supply chain
Through global dynamic quotas, orderly mining of REEs resources will be ensured. A three-level ( enterprises, countries and transnational organizaitons) strategic reserve system will be established to guarantee stable supply during emergencies. Countries in Group I should take more responsibility to coordinate the REEs production capacity.
By implementing a digital identity system to specify REEs mining locations, processing methods, energy consumption, and transaction information, we can establish a blockchain-based certification for comprehensive traceability. This system will ensure the order of supply chain, and struggle against unfair and illegal activities.
As an indispensable country of global REEs trade flows, China could implement accurate oversight policies to stabilize the global REEs supply chain.
(3) Continuously promote REEs technological innovation
By establishing the Global REEs Innovation Coalition (GRIIC), we can share a global innovation fund, implement a common patent pool mechanism, enable cross-authorization among Sino-America-Europe laboratories, and jointly maintain a REEs clean extraction and substitute material database to achieve technological innovation and reduce transfer costs[49].
China could pioneer a REEs Industry Supercluster–developing zero-carbon smelting bases in Baotou and Ganzhou, establishing an advanced magnetic materials innovation belt in the Yangtze River Delta, and creating electrical machinery recycling hubs in the Pearl River Delta. An integrated regional closed-loop system would be formed to deliver better REEs products and technologies globally[50].
actively deepen REEs trade cooperation
By exploring REEs trade new market, our aims are to accelerate the trade cooperation between major REEs trade players and emerging parntners, and founding REEs trade complementary network.
China should establish joint REEs industrial parks with neighboring countries by making good use of the "REEs Cooperation mechanism along One Belt and One Road", and achieve production capacity coordination by exchanging separation technology for resource right[51]. Simultaneously, utilizing RCEP's duty-free framework to boost REEs trade within the region and the global integration.
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