What influences national ambition in clean transport policy? A statistical analysis of NDC climate mitigation targets and driving factors

Supplementary Information

Sturgess, D*., Ferguson, N. S., Dixon, J.

* *david.sturgess@strath.ac.uk*

Contents

Supplementary Information 1 – Presented regression models (Fig. 2) raw statistical outputs

S.I.1: Table 1 – Global regression models with Unconditional and Conditional ambition dependent variables

	Dependent variable:					
	ndc2_ambition_unconditional			ndc2_ambition_conditional		
	m1u	m2u	m3u	m1c	m2c	m3c
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	-0.009 (0.035)	0.017 (0.027)	0.026 (0.038)	-0.044 (0.039)	0.019 (0.029)	-0.026 (0.043)
gdp_pc_log_1	0.111*** (0.038)		0.052 (0.055)	0.153*** (0.042)		0.125** (0.062)
oil_rents_1	-0.103*** (0.028)		-0.060* (0.031)	-0.113*** (0.031)		-0.080** (0.035)
coal_rents_1	0.191*** (0.053)		0.159*** (0.052)	0.188*** (0.060)		0.165*** (0.058)
ng_rents_1	0.016 (0.057)		0.043 (0.057)	-0.004 (0.063)		0.024 (0.064)
ev_critical_minerals_1	-0.076** (0.037)		-0.072** (0.035)	-0.078* (0.041)		-0.075* (0.040)
nd_gain_vulnerability_1	0.099*** (0.037)		0.046 (0.040)	0.153*** (0.041)		0.116** (0.045)
nd_gain_readiness_1		-0.154*** (0.055)	-0.149** (0.064)		-0.139** (0.059)	-0.122* (0.072)
public_support_1		0.048* (0.027)			0.056* (0.030)	
electoral_democracy_1		0.068** (0.029)	0.061** (0.026)		0.070** (0.031)	0.061** (0.029)
control_corruption_1		0.134** (0.054)	0.109** (0.049)		0.112* (0.059)	0.067 (0.055)
Observations	163	115	156	163	115	156
R^2	0.190	0.198	0.272	0.200	0.159	0.251
Adjusted R^2	0.159	0.168	0.227	0.169	0.128	0.204
Residual Std. Error	0.062 (df = 156)	0.054 (df = 110)	0.059 (df = 146)	0.069 (df = 156)	0.058 (df = 110)	0.067 (df = 146)
F Statistic	6.100*** (df = 6; 156)	6.771*** (df = 4; 110)	6.067*** (df = 9; 146)	6.503*** (df = 6; 156)	5.193*** (df = 4; 110)	5.425*** (df = 9; 146)
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Supplementary information 2 – Details of parties with conditional NDC provisions

S.I.2: Table 1 – Countries that submitted conditional NDC provision, with unconditional and conditional 2100-warming assessments

ISO Alpha-3	Country names	Global 2100-warming for 'Unconditional NDC' assessment [in °C]	Global 2100-warming for 'Conditional NDC' assessment [in °C]
DZA	ALGERIA	5.1	4.7
BRB	BARBADOS	1.6	1.2
BIH	BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	3.1	2.8
KHM	CAMBODIA	5	4.1
CMR	CAMEROON	2	1.4
CAF	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	3.6	2.8
COG	CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE	2.2	1.2
DOM	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	1.8	1.2
ECU	ECUADOR	1.7	1.2
GNQ	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.3	1.4
SWZ	ESWATINI	2.1	1.8
FJI	FIJI, THE REPUBLIC OF	1.7	1.3
GEO	GEORGIA	2.7	2.1
GIN	GUINEA	1.3	1.2
GUY	GUYANA	5.1	2.4
IDN	INDONESIA	2.3	1.5
JOR	JORDAN	2	1.2
KAZ	KAZAKHSTAN	5.1	4.7
KGZ	KYRGYZSTAN	3	2.3
LBN	LEBANON	3.4	2.6
MDV	MALDIVES	4.9	1.2
MUS	MAURITIUS	2.3	1.2
MEX	MEXICO	2.7	2.1
MDA	MOLDOVA, REPUBLIC OF	5.1	1.6
MAR	MOROCCO	1.4	1.2
NAM	NAMIBIA	1.3	1.2
PAK	PAKISTAN	1.7	1.2
PRY	PARAGUAY	2.4	1.7
PER	PERU	1.9	1.3
PHL	PHILIPPINES	1.3	1.2
WSM	SAMOA	2.4	1.2
SLB	SOLOMON ISLANDS	5.1	1.2
ZAF	SOUTH AFRICA	5.1	3
TJK	TAJIKISTAN	3.4	2.5
THA	THAILAND	3.8	2.9
TUN	TUNISIA	2.7	1.8

Supplementary information 3 – Independent variables used for quantitative analysis

S.I.3: Table 1 – Independent variables key information and hypothesised relationship with ambition

Driver	Source	N	Description	Operation	Hypothesis (relationship with ambition)
GDP per capita (log)	(World Bank, 2024a)	165	Logarithm of GDP per capita (current US$, 2024).	Greater values = Greater economic growth	N/A (Control)
Oil rents	(World Bank, 2024b)	166	The difference between the value of crude oil production at regional prices and total costs of production, measured as a % of GDP.	Greater values = Greater oil rents	Negative
Coal rents	(World Bank, 2024c)	165	The difference between the value of both hard and soft coal production at world prices and their total costs of production, measured as a % of GDP.	Greater values = Greater coal rents	Negative
Natural gas rents	(World Bank, 2024d)	165	The difference between the value of natural gas production at regional prices and total costs of production, measured as a % of GDP.	Greater values = Greater natural gas rents	Negative
Electric-vehicle critical minerals	(USGS, 2024)	168	Share of global known reserves of key earth minerals critical to electric vehicle production as identified by (IEA, 2021) - Copper, Lithium, Nickel, Manganese, Cobalt, Graphite. Measured as a % of total reserves (across all minerals included).	Greater values = Greater share of global reserves	Positive
Vulnerability	(ND-GAIN, 2024)	167	Measure accounting for a country's exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity to the negative effects of climate change.	Greater values = Greater vulnerability to the negative effects of climate change.	Positive
Readiness	(ND-GAIN, 2024)	167	Measure of a country's ability to leverage investments and convert them to adaptive actions, accounting for economic, governance and social factors.	Greater values = Greater ability to leverage and convert investment into adaptive actions.	Positive
Public support	(Andre et al., 2024)	115	Share of people who say their "national government should do more to fight global warming", measured as % of population. Based on representative surveys of ~130,000 individuals spanning 125 countries.	Greater values = Greater share of the population who support heightened national action to tackle climate change	Positive
Electoral democracy	(V-Dem, 2024)	160	Measure of the of the extent to which elections occur freely and fairly, under comprehensive suffrage, and freedoms of association and expression are guaranteed. Measured on an index 0-1.	Greater values = More democratic	Positive
Control of corruption	(World Bank, 2024e)	167	Measures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption. Measured on an aggregate indicator ranging ~ -2.5-2.5	Greater values = Less corruption	Positive

S.I.3: Table 2 – Statistical summary of data used in this analysis

NB: 'statistic'_1 indicates max-min normalised independent variables used in regression models

Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
EDGAR_2019_transport_share_total_emissions	168	0.174	0.097	0.010	0.594
Global.2100.warming.for..Unconditional.NDC..assessment	168	2.724	1.490	1.200	5.100
Global.2100.warming.for..Conditional.NDC..assessment	168	2.510	1.460	1.200	5.100
ndc2_ambition_unconditional	168	0.084	0.067	0.003	0.392
ndc2_ambition_conditional	168	0.094	0.075	0.003	0.392
gdp_pc_log	165	3.757	0.614	2.336	5.052
gdp_pc_log_1	165	0.523	0.226	0.000	1.000
oil_rents	166	0.020	0.053	0.000	0.286
oil_rents_1	166	0.071	0.184	0.000	1.000
coal_rents	165	0.002	0.010	0.000	0.111
coal_rents_1	165	0.016	0.093	0.000	1.000
ng_rents	165	0.007	0.029	0.000	0.317
ng_rents_1	165	0.023	0.091	0.000	1.000
ev_critical_minerals	168	0.005	0.020	0.000	0.154
ev_critical_minerals_1	168	0.035	0.132	0.000	1.000
nd_gain_vulnerability	167	0.427	0.091	0.256	0.647
nd_gain_vulnerability_1	167	0.439	0.232	0.000	1.000
nd_gain_readiness	167	0.423	0.143	0.136	0.801
nd_gain_readiness_1	167	0.431	0.215	0.000	1.000
public_support	115	0.886	0.072	0.619	0.982
public_support_1	115	0.734	0.197	0.000	1.000
electoral_democracy	160	0.534	0.253	0.014	0.914
electoral_democracy_1	160	0.578	0.281	0.000	1.000
control_corruption	167	-0.113	0.981	-1.689	2.122
control_corruption_1	167	0.414	0.258	0.000	1.000

S.I.3: Figure 1 – Scatter-matrix, histogram, and Spearman rank correlation-matrix of all independent variables used in quantitative analysis



Supplementary information 4 – Bivariate relationships

S.I.4: Table 1 - Bivariate relationships between independent variables and *unconditional* ambition

	Dependent variable:								
	ndc2_ambition_unconditional								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Constant	0.092*** (0.005)	0.083*** (0.005)	0.086*** (0.005)	0.087*** (0.005)	0.081*** (0.011)	0.070*** (0.012)	0.065*** (0.021)	0.035*** (0.011)	0.058*** (0.010)
oil_rents_1	-0.095*** (0.028)								
coal_rents_1		0.166*** (0.055)							
ng_rents_1			-0.048 (0.058)						
ev_critical_minerals_1				-0.066* (0.039)					
nd_gain_vulnerability_1					0.008 (0.022)				
nd_gain_readiness_1						0.034 (0.024)			
public_support_1							0.024 (0.028)		
electoral_democracy_1								0.084*** (0.018)	
control_corruption_1									0.063*** (0.020)
Observations	166	165	165	168	167	167	115	160	167
R^2	0.068	0.052	0.004	0.017	0.001	0.012	0.007	0.126	0.058
Adjusted R^2	0.062	0.046	-0.002	0.011	-0.005	0.006	-0.002	0.120	0.052
Residual Std. Error	0.065 (df = 164)	0.066 (df = 163)	0.067 (df = 163)	0.067 (df = 166)	0.067 (df = 165)	0.067 (df = 165)	0.059 (df = 113)	0.063 (df = 158)	0.065 (df = 165)
F Statistic	11.999*** (df = 1; 164)	8.932*** (df = 1; 163)	0.681 (df = 1; 163)	2.869* (df = 1; 166)	0.138 (df = 1; 165)	1.923 (df = 1; 165)	0.756 (df = 1; 113)	22.746*** (df = 1; 158)	10.066*** (df = 1; 165)
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

S.I.4: Table 2 - Bivariate relationships between independent variables and *conditional* ambition

Conditional bivariate sensitivity test without gdppc (log) control variable

	Dependent variable:								
	ndc2_ambition_conditional								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Constant	0.102*** (0.006)	0.092*** (0.006)	0.096*** (0.006)	0.096*** (0.006)	0.082*** (0.013)	0.080*** (0.013)	0.062*** (0.022)	0.043*** (0.013)	0.068*** (0.011)
oil_rents_1	-0.106*** (0.031)								
coal_rents_1		0.152** (0.063)							
ng_rents_1			-0.068 (0.065)						
ev_critical_minerals_1				-0.073* (0.044)					
nd_gain_vulnerability_1					0.026 (0.025)				
nd_gain_readiness_1						0.031 (0.027)			
public_support_1							0.037 (0.030)		
electoral_democracy_1								0.085*** (0.020)	
control_corruption_1									0.061*** (0.022)
Observations	166	165	165	168	167	167	115	160	167
R^2	0.067	0.035	0.007	0.017	0.007	0.008	0.014	0.104	0.043
Adjusted R^2	0.061	0.029	0.001	0.011	0.001	0.002	0.005	0.098	0.037
Residual Std. Error	0.073 (df = 164)	0.075 (df = 163)	0.076 (df = 163)	0.075 (df = 166)	0.076 (df = 165)	0.076 (df = 165)	0.062 (df = 113)	0.071 (df = 158)	0.074 (df = 165)
F Statistic	11.709*** (df = 1; 164)	5.852** (df = 1; 163)	1.086 (df = 1; 163)	2.787* (df = 1; 166)	1.083 (df = 1; 165)	1.298 (df = 1; 165)	1.549 (df = 1; 113)	18.302*** (df = 1; 158)	7.416*** (df = 1; 165)
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Supplementary information 5 – Sensitivity tests of multiple regression models (both unconditional and conditional)

S.I.5: Table 1 – Sensitivity test for structural factors (Model 1) with unconditional ambition dependent variable

	Dependent variable:						
	ndc2_ambition_unconditional						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	-0.009 (0.035)	0.013 (0.039)	0.013 (0.035)	-0.018 (0.036)	0.088*** (0.011)	0.090*** (0.013)	0.092*** (0.011)
gdp_pc_log_1	0.111*** (0.038)	0.087** (0.042)	0.091** (0.038)	0.107*** (0.039)			
oil_rents_1	-0.103*** (0.028)		-0.102*** (0.027)		-0.099*** (0.029)		-0.098*** (0.027)
coal_rents_1	0.191*** (0.053)			0.192*** (0.055)	0.167*** (0.054)		
ng_rents_1	0.016 (0.057)				0.021 (0.058)		
ev_critical_minerals_1	-0.076** (0.037)		-0.068* (0.038)		-0.082** (0.038)		-0.073* (0.038)
fuel_exports_1		-0.057** (0.023)				-0.056** (0.023)	
nd_gain_vulnerability_1	0.099*** (0.037)	0.086* (0.044)	0.078** (0.038)	0.100*** (0.038)	0.010 (0.022)	0.012 (0.026)	0.005 (0.022)
Observations	163	146	165	164	163	146	165
R^2	0.190	0.070	0.121	0.097	0.145	0.042	0.090
Adjusted R^2	0.159	0.050	0.099	0.080	0.118	0.028	0.073
Residual Std. Error	0.062 (df = 156)	0.066 (df = 142)	0.064 (df = 160)	0.065 (df = 160)	0.064 (df = 157)	0.067 (df = 143)	0.065 (df = 161)
F Statistic	6.100*** (df = 6; 156)	3.541** (df = 3; 142)	5.519*** (df = 4; 160)	5.721*** (df = 3; 160)	5.320*** (df = 5; 157)	3.101** (df = 2; 143)	5.323*** (df = 3; 161)
Note:							*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The associative effect of our structural factors with unconditional ambition has the same direction across all models

We find GDP per capita (log), Oil & Coal rents and Electric vehicle critical minerals significant for all models for which they are included

Vulnerability is significant and positive when GDP per capita is controlled, but not significant when control is removed however positive association remains true

Additionally, we tested the effect of replacing the fossil fuel economic incentive of rents with that of fuel exports (World Bank, 2024), finding a significant negative association, this was not as strong nor significant as our fossil fuel rents findings which also reflected varying directional effects depending on fossil fuel type

S.I.5: Table 2 - Sensitivity test for structural factors (Model 1) with conditional ambition dependent variable

	Dependent variable:						
	ndc2_ambition_conditional						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	-0.044 (0.039)	-0.020 (0.044)	-0.022 (0.039)	-0.052 (0.040)	0.090*** (0.013)	0.093*** (0.014)	0.095*** (0.013)
gdp_pc_log_1	0.153*** (0.042)	0.126*** (0.046)	0.133*** (0.042)	0.148*** (0.044)			
oil_rents_1	-0.113*** (0.031)		-0.115*** (0.030)		-0.108*** (0.033)		-0.109*** (0.031)
coal_rents_1	0.188*** (0.060)			0.190*** (0.062)	0.154** (0.061)		
ng_rents_1	-0.004 (0.063)				0.003 (0.066)		
ev_critical_minerals_1	-0.078* (0.041)		-0.071* (0.042)		-0.086** (0.043)		-0.078* (0.043)
fuel_exports_1		-0.069*** (0.025)				-0.066** (0.026)	
nd_gain_vulnerability_1	0.153*** (0.041)	0.140*** (0.049)	0.130*** (0.042)	0.152*** (0.043)	0.030 (0.025)	0.031 (0.029)	0.024 (0.025)
Observations	163	146	165	164	163	146	165
R^2	0.200	0.100	0.146	0.109	0.132	0.053	0.093
Adjusted R^2	0.169	0.081	0.125	0.092	0.104	0.040	0.076
Residual Std. Error	0.069 (df = 156)	0.073 (df = 142)	0.071 (df = 160)	0.072 (df = 160)	0.072 (df = 157)	0.075 (df = 143)	0.073 (df = 161)
F Statistic	6.503*** (df = 6; 156)	5.278*** (df = 3; 142)	6.836*** (df = 4; 160)	6.518*** (df = 3; 160)	4.778*** (df = 5; 157)	4.026** (df = 2; 143)	5.519*** (df = 3; 161)
Note:							*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The associative effect of our structural factors with conditional ambition has the same direction across all models (bar natural gas rents however this is not significant and effect is approximately null)

We observe the same directional and significance effects in these conditional ambition models as the above unconditional models

S.I.5: Table 3 - Sensitivity test for socio-institutional factors (Model 2) with unconditional ambition dependent variable

	Dependent variable:						
	ndc2_ambition_unconditional						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	0.018 (0.027)	-0.051 (0.042)	0.031 (0.023)	0.049*** (0.013)	-0.036 (0.039)	0.049** (0.021)	-0.006 (0.027)
gdp_pc_log_1	0.024 (0.052)	-0.021 (0.053)	0.012 (0.075)	-0.039 (0.042)			
nd_gain_readiness_1	-0.177** (0.071)		-0.060 (0.067)	-0.022 (0.045)	-0.202*** (0.072)	-0.096 (0.061)	
public_support_1	0.047* (0.028)	0.068* (0.039)			0.076** (0.037)		0.049* (0.028)
PEW_public_support_1			0.031 (0.026)			0.033 (0.026)	
electoral_democracy_1	0.062** (0.031)		0.072** (0.033)	0.112*** (0.023)	0.030 (0.036)		0.076** (0.029)
cso_index_1		0.142*** (0.036)			0.105*** (0.037)		
control_corruption_1	0.139** (0.055)	0.056 (0.050)			0.195*** (0.072)	0.111* (0.058)	0.008 (0.031)
Observations	114	69	38	158	70	39	115
R^2	0.197	0.263	0.245	0.144	0.354	0.170	0.140
Adjusted R^2	0.160	0.217	0.153	0.127	0.303	0.098	0.116
Residual Std. Error	0.054 (df = 108)	0.056 (df = 64)	0.037 (df = 33)	0.063 (df = 154)	0.052 (df = 64)	0.039 (df = 35)	0.055 (df = 111)
F Statistic	5.314*** (df = 5; 108)	5.699*** (df = 4; 64)	2.672** (df = 4; 33)	8.615*** (df = 3; 154)	7.008*** (df = 5; 64)	2.383* (df = 3; 35)	6.005*** (df = 3; 111)
Note:							*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The associative effect of our socio-institutional factors with unconditional ambition has the same direction across all models (bar GDP per capita (log) however this is not significant)

Only Public support is significant across all model variations tested, whilst Electoral democracy and Control of Corruption are significant for the majority of models

We test alternative metric - Pew Research Centre's Global attitudes and trends survey data (PEW, 2015) - for our public support data taken for 2024 due to data availability constraints as it is retrospective of the 2022 NDC submission cut-off, however taken as indicative for this study to provide a far greater cross-sectional dataset). We find a positive association that matches that of our public support metric, however the PEW metric is not statistically significant (in contrast to our metric) however this could be largely attributed to the very limited sample size (only 38 observations).

As a follow up to Peterson et al., (2023) study of ambition enhancement we include their novel civil society organisation consultation index in our sensitivity test (whilst not included in our main findings) our results concur with their finding of a significant strong association with ambition.

S**.I.5: Table 4** - Sensitivity test for socio-institutional factors (Model 2) with conditional ambition dependent variable

	Dependent variable:						
	ndc2_ambition_conditional						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	0.020 (0.030)	-0.051 (0.045)	0.054* (0.030)	0.057*** (0.015)	-0.037 (0.043)	0.074** (0.027)	-0.001 (0.029)
gdp_pc_log_1	0.021 (0.056)	0.004 (0.057)	0.035 (0.098)	-0.030 (0.047)			
nd_gain_readiness_1	-0.162** (0.077)		-0.096 (0.088)	-0.035 (0.050)	-0.161** (0.080)	-0.109 (0.079)	
public_support_1	0.056* (0.030)	0.073* (0.042)			0.082** (0.041)		0.057* (0.030)
PEW_public_support_1			0.016 (0.034)			0.017 (0.033)	
electoral_democracy_1	0.064* (0.033)		0.069 (0.044)	0.114*** (0.026)	0.029 (0.040)		0.078** (0.031)
cso_index_1		0.152*** (0.038)			0.120*** (0.040)		
control_corruption_1	0.117* (0.060)	0.026 (0.054)			0.150* (0.079)	0.109 (0.076)	-0.003 (0.034)
Observations	114	69	38	158	70	39	115
R^2	0.159	0.240	0.139	0.119	0.300	0.077	0.116
Adjusted R^2	0.120	0.192	0.035	0.102	0.246	-0.002	0.093
Residual Std. Error	0.058 (df = 108)	0.060 (df = 64)	0.049 (df = 33)	0.071 (df = 154)	0.058 (df = 64)	0.050 (df = 35)	0.059 (df = 111)
F Statistic	4.085*** (df = 5; 108)	5.040*** (df = 4; 64)	1.334 (df = 4; 33)	6.920*** (df = 3; 154)	5.493*** (df = 5; 64)	0.974 (df = 3; 35)	4.874*** (df = 3; 111)
Note:							*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The associative effect of our socio-institutional factors with conditional ambition has the same direction across all models (bar GDP per capita (log) however this is not significant)

We observe the same directional and significance effects in these conditional ambition models as the above unconditional models

Supplementary Information 6 – Parties included in regression analysis model observations

S.I.6: Table 1 – (marked 'x' indicates inclusion, omissions result from lack of available data)

Country (n=168)	Model 1 (n=163)	Model 2 (n=115)	Model 3 (n=156)
ALGERIA	x	x	x
ARGENTINA	x	x	x
ARMENIA	x	x	x
AUSTRALIA	x	x	x
AUSTRIA	x	x	x
AZERBAIJAN	x		x
BAHAMAS	x		
BAHRAIN	x		x
BANGLADESH	x	x	x
BARBADOS	x		x
BELARUS	x		x
BELGIUM	x	x	x
BELIZE	x		
BENIN	x	x	x
BHUTAN	x		x
BOLIVIA, THE PLURINATIONAL STATE OF	x	x	x
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	x	x	x
BOTSWANA	x	x	x
BRAZIL	x	x	x
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM	x		
BULGARIA, THE REPUBLIC OF	x	x	x
BURKINA FASO	x	x	x
BURUNDI	x		x
CAMBODIA	x	x	x
CAMEROON	x	x	x
CANADA	x	x	x
CAPE VERDE	x		x
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	x		x
CHAD	x		x
CHILE	x	x	x
CHINA	x	x	x
COLOMBIA	x	x	x
COMOROS	x		x
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE	x		x
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE	x	x	x
COSTA RICA	x	x	x
COTE D'IVOIRE	x	x	x
CROATIA			
CUBA	x		x

CYPRUS	x	x	x
CZECH REPUBLIC	x	x	x
DENMARK	x	x	x
DJIBOUTI	x		x
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	x	x	x
ECUADOR	x	x	x
EGYPT	x	x	x
EL SALVADOR	x	x	x
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	x		x
ERITREA			
ESTONIA	x	x	x
ESWATINI	x		x
ETHIOPIA	x		x
European Union (27)			
FIJI, THE REPUBLIC OF	x		x
FINLAND	x	x	x
FRANCE	x	x	x
GABON	x	x	x
GAMBIA	x		x
GEORGIA	x	x	x
GERMANY	x	x	x
GHANA	x	x	x
GREECE	x	x	x
GUATEMALA	x	x	x
GUINEA	x	x	x
GUINEA-BISSAU	x		x
GUYANA	x		x
HAITI	x		x
HONDURAS	x	x	x
HUNGARY	x	x	x
ICELAND	x	x	x
INDIA	x	x	x
INDONESIA	x	x	x
IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF	x	x	x
IRAQ	x	x	x
IRELAND	x	x	x
ISRAEL	x	x	x
ITALY	x	x	x
JAMAICA	x	x	x
JAPAN	x	x	x
JORDAN	x	x	x
KAZAKHSTAN	x	x	x
KENYA	x	x	x
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF	x	x	x
KUWAIT	x		x
KYRGYZSTAN	x	x	x

LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC		x	
LATVIA	x	x	x
LEBANON	x	x	x
LESOTHO	x		x
LIBERIA	x		x
LIBYA	x		x
LITHUANIA	x	x	x
LUXEMBOURG	x		x
MADAGASCAR	x	x	x
MALAWI	x	x	x
MALAYSIA	x	x	x
MALDIVES	x		x
MALI	x	x	x
MALTA	x	x	x
MAURITANIA	x		x
MAURITIUS	x	x	x
MEXICO	x	x	x
MOLDOVA, REPUBLIC OF	x	x	x
MONGOLIA	x	x	x
MOROCCO	x	x	x
MOZAMBIQUE	x	x	x
NAMIBIA	x	x	x
NEPAL	x	x	x
NETHERLANDS, THE KINGDOM OF THE	x	x	x
NEW ZEALAND	x	x	x
NICARAGUA	x	x	x
NIGER	x		x
NIGERIA	x	x	x
NORTH MACEDONIA	x	x	x
NORWAY	x	x	x
OMAN	x		x
PAKISTAN	x	x	x
PANAMA	x	x	x
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	x		x
PARAGUAY	x	x	x
PERU	x	x	x
PHILIPPINES	x	x	x
POLAND	x	x	x
PORTUGAL	x	x	x
ROMANIA	x	x	x
RUSSIAN FEDERATION	x	x	x
RWANDA	x		x
SAINT LUCIA	x		
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	x		
SAMOA	x		
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	x		x

SAUDI ARABIA	x		x
SENEGAL	x	x	x
SIERRA LEONE		x	
SINGAPORE	x	x	x
SLOVAKIA			
SLOVENIA	x	x	x
SOLOMON ISLANDS	x		x
SOMALIA	x		x
SOUTH AFRICA	x	x	x
SPAIN	x	x	x
SRI LANKA	x	x	x
SUDAN, REPUBLIC OF THE	x		x
SURINAME	x		x
SWEDEN	x	x	x
SWITZERLAND	x	x	x
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	x		x
TAJIKISTAN	x	x	x
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF	x	x	x
THAILAND	x	x	x
TIMOR-LESTE	x		x
TOGO	x	x	x
TONGA	x		
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	x		x
TUNISIA	x	x	x
TURKEY	x	x	x
TURKMENISTAN	x		x
UGANDA	x	x	x
UKRAINE	x	x	x
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND	x	x	x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	x	x	x
URUGUAY	x	x	x
UZBEKISTAN	x	x	x
VANUATU	x		x
VENEZUELA, BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF		x	
VIET NAM	x	x	x
YEMEN	x		x
ZAMBIA	x	x	x

Supplementary Information 7 – Regression of GDP per capita against 2100-warming assessment

S**.I.7: Table 1** – 2100-warming assessment as ambition to enable relationship comparison with (Tørstad, 2020)

Note: 2100-warming assessment is not inverted, therefore positive association reflects a negative effect on 'ambition'.

	Dependent variable:	
	Global_2100_warming_for_Unconditional_NDC_assessment	Global_2100_warming_for_Conditional_NDC_assessment
	(1)	(2)
Constant	1.528^{***} (0.275)	1.210^{***} (0.266)
gdp_pc_log_1	2.279^{***} (0.484)	2.471^{***} (0.466)
Observations	165	165
R^2	0.120	0.147
Adjusted R^2	0.115	0.142
Residual Std. Error (df = 163)	1.399	1.349
F Statistic (df = 1; 163)	22.221^{***}	28.078^{***}
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01