Supplementary Materials for "From Fear to Love: Dissecting Political Trust in China"

June 5, 2024

Contents

A Appendix

A.1 Sources of Corruption Data

A.2 On the comparability of the treatment and outcome variables across different surveys

Due to repeated modifications of questionnaires across survey rounds, none of the major public opinion surveys in contemporary China consistently incorporates questions critical for our study. It is therefore necessary to combine various surveys to fulfill our need for both longitudinal and cross-sectional observations. We utilize a compilation of the surveys to ensure both sufficient time for trend observation and appropriate intervals: China Barometer Survey (CBS) from the years 2002, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2019; Chinese Social Survey (CSS) dated 2006, 2017, 2019, 2021; and Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) of 2010. In particular, we rely on questions on

Table A.1 Trend of Corruption Investigation Cases in China (2004-2022).

year	cases
2004	162,032
2006	123,489
2008	128,516
2010	139,621
2012	155,144
2013	172,532
2014	226,000
2015	330,000
2016	423,000
2017	527,000
2018	638,000
2019	619,000
2020	618,000
2021	631,000
2022	592,000

Note: The source of the data is listed in Table A.2

the "nature of the workunit," coupled with CCP membership information, to identify "regime insiders," and questions on "trust in the central government" to measure levels of political trust. The practice of combining surveys naturally raises the question of survey comparability, but the surveys we employ present the key questions we rely on to construct our main variables in a remarkably consistent manner, thus justifying our approach.

Table A.3 catalogues the queries pertinent to the "character of the work unit" alongside their responses from all participating surveys. As depicted in the table, both the questions and the responses are demonstrated in a strikingly consistent manner. While minor deviations might exist in the exact phrasing and the number or sequence of the responses, we attenuate these discrepancies by implementing a unifying protocol for classifying responses, elucidated in Appendix A.3. The lone exceptions are CBS2008 and CBS2011, which eschew the direct questioning of the work unit, necessitating the integration of CSS2006 and CGSS2010 to safeguard the reliability of our pre-treatment trend surveillance. Nonetheless, we successfully extrapolated "work unit" data from CBS2008 and CBS2011 indirectly by decrypting their occupational data, a process expounded in Appendix A.3.

Table A.2 Survey measures used to operationalize independent variables

Year	Headlines and Source
2004	The work report of Wu Guanzheng presented at the fifth plenary session of the CCDI
2005	The work report of Wu Guanzheng presented at the sixth plenary session of the CCDI
2006	Wu Guanzheng's work report presented at the seventh plenary session of the CCDI
2008	Focusing on improving the system of punishing and preventing corruption
2009	Guoqiang presented at the fifth plenary session of the 17th CCDI
2010	Adhere to reform and innovation, vigorously implement work, and strive to achieve new results in building a clean and honest government and fighting against corruption
2011	Work report of the CCDI to the 18th National Congress of the CCP
2012	The Supervision Department of the CCDI announced the investigation and handling of cases in 2012
2013	The CCDI announced the work situation of building a clean and honest government and fighting against corruption in 2013
2014	The work report of Wang Qishan presented at the fifth plenary session of the 18th CCDI
2015	Report on the Work of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th CCDI
2016	Report on the Work of the Seventh Plenary Session of the 18th CCDI
2017	CCDI informs national supervision and investigation cases in 2017
2018	CCDI informs national supervision and investigation cases in 2018
2019	Adhering to and improving the supervision system of the Party and the state provides strong guarantees for the comprehensive construction of a prosperous society
2020	CCDI informs national supervision and investigation cases in 2020
2021	CCDI informs national supervision and investigation cases in 2021
2022	CCDI informs national supervision and investigation cases in 2022

Table A.3 Wordings of the "nature of workunit" questions and answers in different surveys

Survey	Question wordings
CBS2002	
	101. What kind of workunit do you work in?
	0. Party and government organs
	1. State affiliated institutions
	2. State-owned enterprises
	3. Collective enterprises
	4. Private companies
	5. Three types foreign-funded enterprises
	6. Self-employed business
	8. Others (please specify)
	7. [Do not read] Not applicable
	9. [Don't read] Don't answer
CBS2014	
	SE3. What is the nature of your current/pre-retirement workunit?
	1. Party and government organs
	2. State-owned enterprises
	3. State-controlled joint venture, cooperative or joint-stock enterprises
	4. Foreign-controlled joint venture, cooperative or joint-stock enterprises
	5. Foreign-owned enterprises
	6. State-affiliated institutions
	7. State-affiliated joint venture or joint-stock institutions
	8. Self-employed business
	9. Collective enterprises (including township enterprises)
	10. Private companies
	11. Other (specify)
	98. [Don't read] I don't know
	99. [Do not read] Do not answer
CBS2019	
	SE5. What is the nature of your current/pre-retirement workunit?
	1. Party and government organs
	2. State-owned enterprises
	3. State-controlled joint venture, cooperative or joint-stock enterprises
	4. Foreign-controlled joint venture, cooperative or joint-stock enterprises
	5. Foreign-owned enterprises
	6. State-affiliated institutions
	7. State-affiliated joint venture or joint-stock institutions
	8. Self-employed business
	9. Collective enterprises (including township enterprises)
	10. Private companies

Survey	Question wordings
	11. Other (specify) 98. [Don't read] I don't know 99. [Do not read] Do not answer
CGSS2010	
	A59j. The type of workunit or company you are currently working for is: 1. Party and government organs 2. Enterprises 3. State-affiliated enterprises 4. Social organizations 5. No workunit/self-employed/self-managing (joint venture) 6. Military 7. Others (specify) A59k. The nature of ownership of the workunit or company you are currently working for is: 1. State-owned or state-controlled 2. Collective owned or collective-controlled 3. Private owned/private managed/private-controlled 4. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan funded or controlled 5. Foreign-owned or foreign-controlled 6. Others (please specify)
CSS2006	
	B4a. The type of workunit/company you work for is: 1. Party and government organs 2. State-owned enterprises 3. State-affiliated institutions 4. Collective enterprises/institutions 5. Non-state (private) enterprises/institutions 6. Three types foreign-funded enterprises/institutions 7. Self-managing business 8. Rural family business 9. Rural collective economy 10. Social groups and community self-governing organizations 11. Others (please specify) 12. No workunit 13. Not sure
CSS2017	
	B4a. The workunit/company where you do this non-agricultural job is: 1. Party and government organs, people's organizations, and the military 2. State-owned enterprises and state-controlled enterprises 3. State-affiliated/collective institutions 4. Collective enterprises

Survey	Question wordings
	5. Private companies 6. Three types foreign-funded enterprises/institutions 7. Self-employed business 8. Collective-owned institutions (collective non-enterprise workunits) 9. Self-governing organizations such as village committees and neighborhood committees 10. Others (Specify) 11. No workunit 98. Not Sure
CSS2019	
	B4a. The workunit/company where you do this non-agricultural job is: 1. Party and government organs, people's organizations, and the military 2. State-owned enterprises and state-controlled enterprises 3. State-affiliated/collective institutions 4. Collective enterprises 5. Private companies 6. Three types foreign-funded enterprises/institutions 7. Self-employed business 8. Collective-owned institutions (collective non-enterprise workunits) 9. Self-governing organizations such as village committees and neighborhood committees 10. Social groups and self-governing organizations 11. Others (please specify) 12. No workunit 98. Not sure
CSS2021	
	B5a: The workunit/company where you do this non-agricultural job is: 1. Party and government organs, people's organizations, and the military 2. State-owned enterprises and state-controlled enterprises 3. State-affiliated/collective institutions 4. Collective enterprises 5. Private companies 6. Three types foreign-funded enterprises/institutions 7. Self-employed business 8. Collective-owned institutions (collective non-enterprise workunits) 9. Self-governing organizations such as village committees and neighborhood committees 10. Social groups and self-governing organizations 11. Others (please specify) 12. No workunit -1. Not sure

Table A.4 lists the questions on "trust in the central government" and their answers. Again, as seen from the table, both the questions and the answers are highly similar. Admittedly, some surveys offer 6 ordinal categories to choose from (CBS), some 5 (CGSS) and some 4 (CSS), which might affect the respondents' choices. But both outcome variables we constrict are dummies: the trust vs. distrust dummy and the highest trust vs. other response categories dummy, thus minimizing bias that might arise from different distances between response categories.

Wording of the "trust in the central government" question and answers in different surveys

Survey	Question wordings
CBS2002	
	73. If we use 1 to represent complete distrust, and 6 to represent complete trust, how do you trust the central government?
	1. Completely distrust
	2. Fairly distrust
	3. Somewhat distrust
	4. Somewhat trust
	5. Fairly trust
	6. Completely trust
	0. Hard to say
	8. Do not know
	9. No response
CBS2008	
	F30b. If we use 1 to represent complete distrust, and 6 to represent complete trust, how do you trust the central government?
	1. Completely distrust
	2. Fairly distrust
	3. Somewhat distrust
	4. Somewhat trust
	5. Fairly trust
	6. Completely trust
	7. Do not understand
	8. Do not know
	9. No response
CBS2011	
	C17b. How much trust do you have in the national government?
	1. Completely distrust
	2. Fairly distrust
	3. Somewhat distrust
	4. Somewhat trust
	5. Fairly trust
	6. Completely trust

Survey	Question wordings
	8. Do not know 9. No response
CBS2014	
	E1. How much do you trust the central government? 1. Completely distrust 2. Fairly distrust 3. Somewhat distrust 4. Somewhat trust 5. Fairly trust 6. Completely trust 7. Do not understand 8. Do not know 9. No response
CBS2019	
	E4. How much do you trust the central government? 1. Completely distrust 2. Fairly distrust 3. Somewhat distrust 4. Somewhat trust 5. Fairly trust 6. Completely trust 7. Do not understand 8. Do not know 9. No response
CGSS2010	
	D3. How much do you trust the central government? 1. Completely distrust 2. Fairly distrust 3. Between trust and distrust 4. Fairly trust 5. Completely trust
CSS2006	
	E5. In general, how much do you trust the central government? 1. Distrust very much 2. Fairly distrust 3. Fairly trust 4. Trust very much 5. Not sure
CSS2017	
	F1a2. Could you please tell us: do you trust the central government? (choose one) 1. Complete distrust 2. Fairly distrust 3. Fairly trust 4. Trust very much

Survey	Question wordings
	8. Hard to say
CSS2019	
	F1a. Could you please tell us: do you trust the central government? (choose one)
	1. Complete distrust
	2. Fairly distrust
	3. Fairly trust
	4. Trust very much
	8. Hard to say
CSS2021	
	F1a. Could you please tell us: do you trust the central government? (choose one)
	1. Complete distrust
	2. Fairly distrust
	3. Fairly trust
	4. Trust very much
	-1. Hard to say

Table A.5 Distribution of political trust by category

survey	% Missing (DK, NA)	% Distrust	% Somewhat Trust	% Fairly Trust	% Completely Trust	N
CBS2002	5.6	1.3	5.8	27.1	60.2	3183
CBS2008	7.1	0.9	4.1	22.9	65.0	5098
CBS2011	3.9	3.0	10.4	31.7	51.0	3473
CBS2014	9.2	4.2	15.0	36.1	35.5	4068
CBS2019	4.7	1.7	8.2	38.8	46.5	4941
CGSS2010	0.5	3.3	7.5	36.3	52.5	11783
CSS2006	2.5	2.7		37.1	57.7	7061
CSS2017	3.7	7.5		33.5	55.3	10143
CSS2019	2.0	4.6		29.9	63.5	10283
CSS2021	1.9	3.4		26.2	68.5	10136

Table A.6 Distribution of political trust between treated and control groups by survey years.

	Outcome (trust vs distrust)						Outcome (Completely trust vs Others)					
	Raw		1 vs 1 Matching		1 vs 3 Matching		Raw		1 vs 1 Matching		1 vs 3 Matching	
year	Control	Treated	Control	Treated	Control	Treated	Control	Treated	Control	Treated	Control	Treated
2002	98.71	98.22	98.87	98.22	98.76	98.22	65.27	58.80	57.03	58.80	63.92	58.80
2006	97.29	96.55	97.34	96.55	97.18	96.55	59.76	55.76	54.48	55.76	58.46	55.76
2008	99.21	98.45	97.78	98.45	98.82	98.45	71.87	66.08	62.97	66.08	69.84	66.08
2010	96.65	96.90	94.57	96.90	96.29	96.90	54.33	45.98	42.98	45.98	51.64	45.98
2011	96.92	96.77	97.05	96.77	97.00	96.77	55.34	52.67	53.51	52.67	55.57	52.67
2014	95.36	95.87	93.97	95.87	94.97	95.87	39.80	37.14	32.86	37.14	37.46	37.14
2017	91.82	94.23	91.97	94.23	91.64	94.23	58.20	54.45	49.87	54.45	55.11	54.45
2019	95.93	98.37	96.29	98.37	96.15	98.37	58.09	63.45	56.21	63.45	58.39	63.45
2021	95.90	98.80	96.70	98.80	96.18	98.80	68.36	75.33	67.07	75.33	67.93	75.33

A.3 On the coding rules for the "regime insiders"

Within the ambit of this investigation, we pinpoint our treatment assembly, the "regime insiders," via the amalgamation of Communist Party of China (CPC) membership and engagement in the state sector. While the identification of CPC membership is transparent, necessitating negligible clarification, discerning state-sector engagement presents more intricate challenges, as it is not a naturally dichotomous variable. Thus, the translation of associated variable data into a binary form is obligatory. Additionally, owing to slight disparities in the phrasing of the relevant question across surveys (refer to Appendix A.3), harmonization of surveys is imperative to ameliorate such inconsistencies. In an endeavor to curtail the peril of incompatible comparisons across disparate surveys, we promulgate a uniform protocol for encoding the state versus non-state sectors across these surveys. The tripartite information that we rely upon to delineate this distinction encompasses the status of employment, nature of the work unit, and occupation codes. We adopt the ensuing procedures for implementing this coding.

Initially, grounded in the employment status derived from questions such as "do you have a job" or "are you employed," we classify all respondents who are unemployed, retired, laid off, peasants, and housewives as 0 (non-state sector), reserving only the employed for further scrutiny. The singular exception constitutes "students." Despite students not officially being employed, we persist in labeling them as 1 (state sector) as private colleges are nearly non-existent, and private high schools are few in China. Presumably, the "students" in these surveys are either college students or senior high-school students, given that all survey respondents are over 18. Although students do not rely on the state for wages, they are dependent on state-owned schools for diplomas, job recommendations, financial aid, academic honors, and metaphorically, a promising future. Consequently, we categorize students within the state sector. Additionally, while there's a negligible likelihood of students partaking in corruption in a fiscal sense, the anti-corruption campaign, as explicated in the paper, possesses several dimensions, including an ideological aspect that targets ideological noncompliance among regime insiders. Therefore, students can yet be prospective targets of the campaign.

Secondly, hinged upon occupation codes that yield insights into whether a respondent is

engaged in physical labor, we code all physical laborers as 0, irrespective of the type of work unit reported. This arises from our intent to study the effect of political fear, for which we discern no theoretical or empirical rationale to believe that pure physical laborers, such as janitors in governmental edifices or university security personnel, are threatened by any facet of the anti-corruption campaign. Hence, we retain solely white-collar employees for additional screening. Every survey under our consideration contains a variant of an occupation query, phrased in manners such as "please tell me what your occupation is", "What is your job title and job description," "what's your main occupation currently," or other akin formats. However, the responses range from open-ended self-descriptions to national occupation codes. When the latter are employed (in most instances), we classify all occupations numbered above 500 as physical labor, with the lone exceptions being police and military personnel whose occupation codes range between 800-900. When open-ended responses are utilized (in a few instances), we manually sift out physical labor based on the self-descriptions offered by the respondents.

Thirdly, of the residual white-collar employees, we employ the pivotal "nature of work unit" query to discern state-sector employees. Despite minor differences in the wording of this question across surveys (refer to Appendix 1.3), responses tend to manifest a remarkably similar spectrum. For instance, in CBS 5 (2019), the question is phrased as "what is the nature of your current (or pre-retirement) work unit?" An ensemble of 13 categories comprises the potential responses: 1) the CCP and government; 2) state-owned enterprises; 3) state-dominant joint venture or shareholding enterprises; 4) foreign capital dominant enterprises; 5) foreign-owned enterprises; 6) government-affiliated institutions (in Chinese, shiye danwei); 7) government-affiliated institutions owned by joint venture or shareholding; 8) self-employed businessmen; 9) collective enterprises (including township- owned enterprises); 10) private enterprises; 11) others; 98) do not know; 99) no answer. We cluster all CCP/government organizations, state-owned/dominant or collective enterprises, and state-affiliated institutions (category 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9) as the state sector, and the remainder (category 4, 5, 8, 10, 11) as the non-state sector, designating category 98 and 99 as missing values.

Post this process, we ultimately arrive at a binary variable that differentiates the state sector

from the non-state sector. When a respondent is concurrently a CPC member and a state-sector employee, we code them as a "regime insider." The lone exceptions are CBS2008 and CBS2011, which refrain from directly inquiring about the nature of work units. Notwithstanding, we endeavored to extract as much of this information as feasible from the occupation query. This stems from the occupation queries in these two iterations being open-ended, permitting people to explicitly state their precise occupations, often revealing insights into the nature of their work units. Through this alternative approach, we manage to distinguish the state from the non-state sector in these two iterations. In an endeavor to curtail the peril of incompatible comparisons across disparate surveys, we promulgate a uniform protocol for encoding the state versus non-state sectors across these surveys. The tripartite information that we rely upon to delineate this distinction encompasses the status of employment, nature of the work unit, and occupation codes. We adopt the ensuing procedures for implementing this coding.

Table A.7 The distribution of treatment variable of regime insiders by various surveys.

Survey	control	treated
CBS2002	2501	632
CBS2008	4073	487
CBS2011	2416	725
CBS2014	3357	670
CBS2019	3684	1166
CGSS2010	9488	2252
CSS2006	5968	1033
CSS2017	8224	1895
CSS2019	5869	1808
CSS2021	7954	2110

A.4 Summary statistics of covariates

To save space from the main body of the paper, we put summary statistics of the covariates employed in our regression models in Figure A.1 here.

Figure A.1 Summary statistics of covariates. The tabular form is in Table A.8



Table A.8 Summary statistics of the covariates.

Variable	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Age	46.5	15.0	17	99
Female	0.53	0.50	0	1
Race:Han	0.90	0.30	0	1
Married	0.76	0.43	0	1
Rural Registry	0.66	0.48	0	1
Education	2.08	1.04	1	5

Note: The total number of observation is 78031. The CSS2006 dataset does not include the variable for race. Therefore, race is only utilized in estimating propensity scores regressions and is not used in DID regressions.

Table A.9 Average score of "perceived improvement of family finances in the last 5 years" for two groups with college education.

	ABS1	CSS2006	ABS2	ABS3	ABS4	ABS5	CSS2021
Regime insiders	4.02(69)	3.79(147)	/	/	3.85(73)	4.17(12)	3.79(245)
Regime outsiders	4.17(19)	3.65(125)	3.92(97)	3.69(199)	3.75(170)	4.14(7)	3.65(536)

Note: The responses have five categories, ranging from "improved a lot" (scored 1) to "declined a lot" (scored 5). We have reversed the coding to make higher numbers reflect more senses of improvement. Numbers with parentheses are sample sizes. We exclude data with less than 20 observations from analysis. We do not add more qualifications beyond education, such as gender and age, since they will further repress sample sizes.

A.5 Balance and Common Support Checks for Matching

Figure A.2 displays the absolute standardized differences in the means of covariates between the treated and control groups under two matching scenarios. The open circles and solid dots within the two panels correspond to the unmatched and matched results. The solid dots approximate more closely to the open circles in both panels, suggesting that following the matching process, the covariates between the treated and control groups are more evenly balanced, with the 1 vs. 1 matching exhibit a more balanced outcome.

Figure A.2 Plots of standardized differences in means of covariates between the treated and control groups under the raw and matched datasets



Note: Overall, the matched outcomes exhibit smaller differences in the means of covariates, signifying that the covariates are more evenly balanced under the two matching scenarios. The tabular form of this figure is in Table A.10

Figure A.3 provides a visual examination of the common support of the matched amples. Under both matching scenarios, it is discernible that the propensity scores of treated units, regardless of their values, have their matched counterparts in control units. This indicates the presence of common support and an overlap of the response surfaces between treated and control groups.

Table A.10 Balance Statistics of Data

	raw data			1 vs 1 Matching			1 vs 3 Matching		
	treat	control	std diff	treat	control	std diff	treat	control	std diff
Age	42.59	47.88	0.31	42.59	45.55	0.17	42.59	48.13	0.32
Female	0.40	0.56	0.33	0.40	0.39	0.02	0.40	0.46	0.13
Race: Han	0.92	0.91	0.03	0.92	0.93	−0.02	0.92	0.91	0.03
Married	0.67	0.78	0.24	0.67	0.72	0.11	0.67	0.78	0.24
Rural Registry	0.37	0.70	0.69	0.37	0.43	0.11	0.37	0.63	0.53
Education									
Elementary	0.08	0.43	1.23	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.08	0.28	0.70
Junior High	0.16	0.35	0.54	0.16	0.18	0.08	0.16	0.42	0.73
Senior High	0.33	0.17	0.35	0.33	0.51	0.38	0.33	0.23	0.22
College	0.40	0.05	0.71	0.40	0.22	0.37	0.40	0.07	0.67
Graduate	0.03	0.00	0.17	0.03	0.00	0.15	0.03	0.00	0.17

Note: The numbers in the "treat" and "control" columns represent the mean values of the respective variables within the treatment and control groups. The "std diff" indicates the difference in means between the treatment and control groups, divided by the standard deviation of the variables.

Figure A.3 Display of propensity score distributions between the treated and control groups



Note: Overlaps in each of the value bins are apparent in both panels, signifying the presence of common support. The tabular form of this figure is in Table A.11

Table A.11 Distributions of propensity scores between the treated and control groups.

p.score values		[0:0.1]	[0.1:0.2]	[0.2:0.3]	[0.3:0.4]	[0.4:0.5]	[0.5:0.6]	[0.6:0.7]	[0.7:0.8]	[0.8:0.9]	[0.9:1.0]
1 vs 1 Matching	treat	17107	4951	2446	1569	1374	1340	1267	1190	427	95
	control	16922	4852	2498	1565	1407	1434	1310	1176	479	89
1 vs 3 Matching	treat	8483	2485	1223	757	675	680	655	615	250	45
	control	25546	7318	3721	2377	2106	2094	1922	1751	656	139

Note: The propensity scores were discretized into 10 distinct bins, each with a bandwidth of 0.1.

A.6 Regression estimates of DID models

Table A.12 and Table A.13 present the regression estimates of the DID models under two separate outcome measurements. The treatment in Table A.12 differentiates regime insiders from outsiders using respondents' nature of work unit and their CCP membership status. In Table A.13, the treatment identifies respondents who are CCP members and hold at least a college degree.

Regardless of the distinct outcome and treatment measures, the main variable of interest-the interaction terms of treatment and time-remains statistically significant in both tables. This consistent finding lends robust support to our primary argument. However, due to the nonlinearity of the logistic regression estimates, we further elaborate the contextual interpretation of this main variable through various conditional plots in the following section.

Table A.12 Estimates from DID regression of two distinct outcomes, employing 'regime insider' as the treatment variable.

	outcome (trust vs distrust)						outcome (completely trust vs others)					
	Raw		1 vs 1 Matching		1 vs 3 Matching		Raw		1 vs 1 Matching		1 vs 3 Matching	
Variable	Coef	SE	Coef	95% CI	Coef	95% CI	Coef	SE	Coef	95% CI	Coef	95% CI
Intercept	2.23	(0.12)	2.69	[2.23: 3.27]	2.22	[1.93: 2.49]	-0.46	(0.05)	-0.71	[-0.89:-0.54]	-0.61	[-0.72:-0.50]
Treatment	-0.01	(0.10)	0.35	[0.15: 0.60]	0.16	[-0.04: 0.37]	-0.06	(0.03)	0.14	[0.06: 0.22]	0.02	[-0.05: 0.09]
Time	-0.85	(0.05)	-0.31	[-0.47:-0.10]	-0.63	[-0.74:-0.50]	-0.06	(0.02)	0.25	[0.18: 0.33]	0.07	[0.02: 0.12]
Treatment:Time	0.97	(0.12)	0.39	[0.09: 0.66]	0.76	[0.50: 0.99]	0.58	(0.04)	0.27	[0.16: 0.37]	0.46	[0.37: 0.54]
Age	0.03	(0.00)	0.02	[0.01: 0.02]	0.03	[0.02: 0.03]	0.02	(0.00)	0.02	[0.02: 0.02]	0.02	[0.02: 0.02]
Female	-0.23	(0.04)	-0.09	[-0.25: 0.04]	-0.23	[-0.32:-0.12]	-0.26	(0.02)	-0.32	[-0.39:-0.28]	-0.34	[-0.37:-0.29]
Married	-0.15	(0.05)	0.01	[-0.24: 0.11]	-0.02	[-0.16: 0.09]	-0.09	(0.02)	-0.04	[-0.10: 0.03]	-0.04	[-0.09: 0.01]
Rural Registry	0.36	(0.05)	0.38	[0.21: 0.52]	0.33	[0.23: 0.43]	0.29	(0.02)	0.31	[0.25: 0.37]	0.26	[0.22: 0.31]
Edu:Junior High	0.04	(0.06)	-0.22	[-0.79: 0.02]	-0.09	[-0.23: 0.08]	-0.15	(0.02)	-0.05	[-0.20: 0.05]	-0.13	[-0.20:-0.07]
Edu:Senior High	0.15	(0.07)	-0.21	[-0.73: 0.06]	0.04	[-0.13: 0.22]	-0.33	(0.03)	-0.25	[-0.40:-0.16]	-0.27	[-0.35:-0.21]
Edu:College	0.14	(0.09)	-0.37	[-0.90:-0.05]	0.01	[-0.19: 0.23]	-0.35	(0.04)	-0.26	[-0.42:-0.17]	-0.29	[-0.39:-0.21]
Edu:Graduate	-0.17	(0.23)	-0.69	[-1.35:-0.16]	-0.32	[-0.74: 0.22]	-0.48	(0.10)	-0.40	[-0.65:-0.20]	-0.43	[-0.64:-0.23]
# of Obs.	63498		24974		49948		63498		24974		49948	

Note: The treatment variable indicates respondents who are CCP members and belong to state-sector work units. The time variable is an indicator of the years after 2013 when the anticorruption efforts began. The coefficients presented are estimates obtained from logistic regressions. The numbers in parentheses denote the standard errors of the coefficient estimates. The intervals enclosed in brackets represent the 95% quantile intervals derived from the analysis of 24,000 bootstrap results.

Table A.13 Estimates from Difference-in-Differences (DID) regression of two distinct outcomes, employing alternative measure of the treatment variable.

	outcome (trust vs distrust)						outcome (completely trust vs others)					
	Raw		1 vs 1 Matching		1 vs 3 Matching		Raw		1 vs 1 Matching		1 vs 3 Matching	
Variable	Coef	SE	Coef	95% CI	Coef	95% CI	Coef	SE	Coef	95% CI	Coef	95% CI
Intercept	2.65	(0.08)	2.18	[1.58:2.83]	2.17	[1.78: 2.58]	-0.75	(0.03)	-0.93	[-1.18:-0.68]	-0.98	[-1.16:-0.80]
Treatment	-0.06	(0.18)	0.21	[-0.16:0.76]	0.25	[-0.06: 0.72]	-0.40	(0.06)	-0.14	[-0.34: 0.01]	-0.22	[-0.32:-0.03]
Time	-0.68	(0.05)	-0.40	[-0.69:0.06]	-0.32	[-0.49:-0.03]	-0.01	(0.02)	0.47	[0.26: 0.60]	0.44	[0.33: 0.54]
Treatment:Time	1.14	(0.25)	0.79	[0.11:1.37]	0.78	[0.15: 1.26]	0.94	(0.09)	0.51	[0.32: 0.78]	0.53	[0.35: 0.73]
Age	0.03	(0.00)	0.03	[0.02:0.04]	0.03	[0.02: 0.04]	0.02	(0.00)	0.02	[0.02: 0.03]	0.03	[0.02: 0.03]
Female	-0.27	(0.04)	0.14	[-0.31:0.32]	-0.05	[-0.27: 0.15]	-0.25	(0.02)	-0.44	[-0.53:-0.28]	-0.32	[-0.43:-0.25]
Married	-0.28	(0.05)	-0.32	[-0.75:0.11]	-0.34	[-0.57: 0.02]	-0.12	(0.02)	-0.05	[-0.20: 0.11]	-0.15	[-0.21: 0.03]
Rural Registry	0.24	(0.04)	0.46	[-0.15:0.75]	0.08	[-0.09: 0.51]	0.36	(0.02)	0.21	[0.03: 0.39]	0.19	[0.08: 0.35]
# of Obs.	63498		24974		49948		63498		24974		49948	

Note: The treatment variable identifies respondents who are members of CCP and hold at least a college degree The time variable is an indicator of the years after 2013 when the anticorruption efforts began. The coefficients presented are estimates obtained from logistic regressions. The numbers in parentheses denote the standard errors of the coefficient estimates. The intervals enclosed in brackets represent the 95% quantile intervals derived from the analysis of 24,000 bootstrap results.

A.7 Conditional plots of the DID estimates

Since estimates and their significance from logistic regression models are not directly interpretable, we illustrate the coefficients of our DID regression through assorted conditional plots in Figures A.4 and Figure A.5 below.

Figure A.4 provides a visual representation of the DID estimations by various treatment conditions before and after 2013 under fixed covariate settings (married females with college degrees and rural residency). The left panel portrays the time trend in the control group, indicating that, on average, after 2013, the probability of expressing trust in the central government was lower than before 2013. This suggests that, in the absence of treatment, individuals were less likely to express trust in the central government after 2013. The middle panel illustrates the difference between the treated and control groups before 2013, demonstrating that on average, those in the treatment group were more likely to express trust in the central government than those in the control group. This indicates that before 2013, individuals in the treatment group of above specification on average trusted the central government more than those in the control group. The right panel shows that the difference in the probability of expressing trust in the central government for the treatment group before and after 2013 is not significant.

Taken together, the positive effect of the interaction term of treatment and time arises from the fact that if the fear induced by elevated political control dampened people's trust in the central government after 2013, it did not have the same impact on regime insiders. Instead, as we argue in this paper, regime insiders turned fear into affinity and thus expressed trust in the central government, which in turn widened the gap that existed prior to 2013 between them and the regime outsiders.

Figure reffig:betas visually represents the magnitude of the effect among individuals with diverse personal traits. Briefly, this effect is more pronounced in individuals with higher education and those who do not hold rural residency. The effect does not seem to differ significantly between males and females, irrespective of their marital status. Furthermore, the strength of this effect appears to diminish with age. This visualization allows us to see how the influence of the treatment variable on trust in government varies across different segments of the

Figure A.4 Visual display of DID estimations collapsed by various treatment conditions



population, shedding light on the heterogeneous impacts of increased political control.

Figure A.5 The conditional difference of the estimated DID effect across covariates