

Effective cooperation leading to support of reforestation via a ‘climate public goods game’ in the Chinese collectivistic society

Supplementary information

Supplementary Results

Group	PGG Treatment	Contr Round1	CR2	CR3	CR4	CR5	CR6	CR7	CR8	CR9	CR10	AvContr PerId	Thresh Reached	AvContrPerId ReachedOr Nonreached
1	Direct Pay	10	20	35	46	59	70	78	89	99	107	1.78	no	1.87
2	Direct Pay	16	29	43	56	64	72	82	93	104	117	1.95	no	
3	Direct Pay	12	25	37	46	60	72	82	93	102	120	2.00	yes	
4	Direct Pay	16	31	48	63	75	89	99	114	130	146	2.43	yes	
5	Direct Pay	16	27	38	52	64	76	89	101	115	127	2.12	yes	
6	Direct Pay	14	34	49	61	76	88	103	117	126	135	2.25	yes	
7	Direct Pay	12	26	37	55	69	79	92	102	109	121	2.02	yes	
8	Direct Pay	17	33	46	57	66	76	88	99	112	124	2.07	yes	
1	Delayed Pay	12	28	42	54	61	73	78	91	107	119	1.98	no	1.53
2	Delayed Pay	6	13	18	24	30	36	42	48	55	60	1.00	no	
3	Delayed Pay	15	29	43	58	72	81	93	107	113	118	1.97	no	
4	Delayed Pay	7	17	24	32	40	46	52	60	64	69	1.15	no	
5	Delayed Pay	14	33	45	56	70	84	96	108	118	125	2.08	yes	
6	Delayed Pay	18	33	43	55	66	79	88	105	118	132	2.20	yes	
7	Delayed Pay	11	24	34	42	56	69	83	96	113	122	2.03	yes	
8	Delayed Pay	15	27	39	48	62	76	85	100	110	123	2.05	yes	
1	Environment	15	29	41	49	59	70	81	94	110	119	1.98	no	1.77
2	Environment	10	23	33	37	50	62	72	78	84	90	1.50	no	
3	Environment	9	20	32	43	56	65	79	87	97	106	1.77	no	
4	Environment	17	27	39	51	67	84	99	113	130	144	2.40	yes	
5	Environment	18	33	44	60	77	89	107	117	127	136	2.27	yes	
6	Environment	17	35	54	70	85	102	119	131	140	145	2.42	yes	
7	Environment	12	28	37	50	62	74	87	98	112	121	2.02	yes	
8	Environment	10	23	38	53	68	80	95	105	114	127	2.12	yes	

Table ISI Descriptive results of the 3 treatments per group (in each row). Column 3 reports the combined contributions of the 6 players in round 1. This number is averaged per player at the end of the 10th round and reported in the third last column. If the combined contribution of the last round was above the threshold of 120 points, the threshold was reached and indicated as such in the second last column. The last column shows the average contribution per individual, combining the groups whether they did not reach or did reach the threshold.




Figure SI A comparison of our results and whether the goal of the PGG's was obtained (reaching the minimum threshold) versus the results of the original experiment first performed in Germany (Jacquet et al., 2013). For graphical purposes, the groups that did not manage to reach the threshold are indicated with negative y values.




Figure 2SI Histogram with distribution line of final payoffs in different treatments. 120 is the threshold cut-off point for the games to be 'won'.

Figure 3SI A majority of collectivist participants took part in this experiment. The Individualism/Collectivism 15-items questionnaire also tested for vertical and horizontal orientation preferences.




Figure 4SI *Proportion of individuals and their collectivism orientation. Across the three treatments, we scrutinized the participants in relation to their conformity to individualism or collectivism principles. In all treatments, we had a slight majority of collectivists, more so in T1 and T2 in which 54.3% and 55.5% were abiding by collectivist values, whereas in T3 50.65% of participants were found to be collectivist.*

Instructions:

Treatment 1

Welcome to this 'climate change' experiment in which you can earn money!

At the start of the experiment, 85 RMB will be credited to your account. This is comprised of a 40 RMB operating fund and a 45 RMB endowment. During the experiment you can freely use your operating fund, however the endowment will remain untouched.

In the course of the game you can decide whether and how much of your 40 RMB operating fund you want to invest. Any amount of the operating fund that you have not invested will be paid to you immediately after the experiment.

All decisions you make are anonymous because the other participants don't know who they are interacting with.

For a successful experiment you will not be able to communicate to the other participants.

In the course of this experiment you will be involved in **10 climate rounds**.

In each of these rounds you can invest money in an attempt to avoid dangerous climate change. One of the consequences of dangerous climate change will be serious economic loss. In this experiment this is simulated through possible loss of your endowment. By doing so you can also earn some money. In fact, what you do not use of your operating fund will be paid to you.

Although there are many students around you, you will interact with only six. In each round of the game the six participants will be asked simultaneously: ***How much do you want to invest in climate protection?*** (possible answers: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 RMB)

When every player has made his decision, these answers combined together are displayed in all 6 computers simultaneously.

Afterwards all contributions will be credited to an account for climate change.

Funded by the money that you may have paid into climate protection, we will print several posters to be displayed in appropriate locations of several YUFE departments and restaurants. They will give information about the appropriate methods we can follow at university for climate protection without much effort.

E.g.: Energy can be saved by turning the lights off and turning off PCs when not in use.

Paper should be saved at all times. Eat food on the trays and avoid the papers cups.

University employees should use public transport instead of private cars. The increased use of renewable energy sources contributes to greenhouse gas abatement.

We will be able to put up more posters of larger size the more money we collect.

Click NEXT

Example of climate round: Four players have decided to invest into climate protection. Two of them paid 2 RMB and the other two of them paid 4 RMB.

Students	Wang	Li	Zhang	Liu	Chen	Yang
Decision	Invest 2 RMB	Invest 0	Invest 0	Invest 4 RMB	Invest 2 RMB	Invest 4 RMB
Change in participant's account	-2	0	0	-4	-2	-4

At this round, a total 12 RMB were paid for climate protection and thus credited to the climate account.

Click NEXT

You can play many different strategies. For example, as a final outcome your 5 co-players and you could contribute at least 120 RMB during the 10 rounds (2 RMB each 6 participant x 10 rounds = 120 RMB). In the event that your group reaches this target you are going to receive your endowment of 45 RMB in cash here.

What you have not invested of your operating fund you are going to definitely receive in cash directly after the game. By playing this strategy you would earn a total of 65 RMB, about 20 RMB in cash directly after the game and 45 RMB tomorrow.

Another strategy could be to contribute nothing of your operating fund in the course of 10 rounds. In this case, you would obtain the whole 40 RMB of your operating fund in cash directly after the game. If your group has not invested at least 120 RMB after 10 rounds you lose your endowment with a probability of 90%. However, there remains a 10% probability that you will receive your endowment tomorrow. You will get this information directly after the game. By choosing this strategy you would earn a total of 40 RMB, paid today after the game.

Of course you could also play any strategy between this two examples.

If your group reaches the target, we will pay off your endowment by bank money transfer as soon as possible in two or three days' time, instead of directly after the trial today. This is to assure that the results can be compared to those of other groups which will obtain their endowment on the 28th of January.

Click NEXT

The end of the game

At the end of the game (after exactly 10 rounds) the computer compares the climate account with the threshold amount. The threshold amount has to be reached to avoid dangerous climate change. It is reached if every player pays on average 2 RMB per round for climate protection. In this case (6 students x 2 RMB =) 12 RMB per round would be paid into the climate account.

If this amount has been reached for the climate account, every player will obtain his endowment of 45 RMB in cash on the next day. Any remaining part of the operating fund, which has not been invested will be paid anonymously and in cash directly after the game. If the threshold amount for the climate account is not reached dangerous climate change occurs with a probability of **90 % (9 out of 10 cases)** followed by serious economic losses. This is the probability of losing your endowment of 45 RMB. Nevertheless any remaining uninvested money from the operating fund will be paid to you in cash and anonymously. There is a probability of **10% (1 out of 10 cases)** that you would keep your endowment of 45 RMB. After the game the computer decides randomly with this probability.

Any remaining uninvested money from the operating fund will be paid anonymously and in cash directly after the game.

Click NEXT

Operating fund, 40 RMB:

You can pay this during the game into a climate account. What you do not invest, you will definitely be paid in cash at the end of the game (independently whether the group paid at least 120 RMB into the climate account).

Endowment, 45 RMB:

You will be paid this amount in cash and anonymously if the group has paid at least 120 RMB into the climate account. If the group has not contributed 120 RMB you will lose your endowment with a probability of 90% (9 out of 10 cases).

Click NEXT

Summary

Total capital = operating fund + endowment

You will be involved in 10 climate rounds

In each round you can invest 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 RMB into climate protection!

After reading please confirm by clicking NEXT

The experiment will now start.

Click NEXT

Treatment 2

Welcome to this 'climate change' experiment in which you can earn money!

At the start of the experiment, 85 RMB will be credited to your account. This is comprised of a 40 RMB operating fund and a 45 RMB endowment. During the experiment you can freely use your operating fund, however the endowment will remain untouched. In the course of the game you can decide whether and how much of your 40 RMB operating fund you want to invest. Any amount that you have not invested will be paid to you immediately after the experiment.

All decisions you make are anonymous because the other participants don't know who they are interacting with.
For a successful experiment you will not be able to communicate to the other participants.

In the course of this experiment you will be involved in **10 climate rounds**.
In each of these rounds you can invest money in an attempt to avoid dangerous climate change. One of the consequences of dangerous climate change will be serious economic loss. In this experiment this is simulated through possible loss of your endowment. By doing so you can also earn some money. In fact, what you do not use of your operating fund will be paid to you.

Although there are many students around you, you will interact with only six. In each round of the game the six participants will be asked simultaneously: **How much do you want to invest in climate protection?** (possible answers: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 RMB)
When every player has made his decision, these answers combined together are displayed in all 6 computers simultaneously.
Afterwards all contributions will be credited to an account for climate change.
Funded by the money that you may have paid into climate protection, we will print several posters to be displayed in appropriate locations of several YUFE departments and restaurants. They will give specific information about the appropriate methods we can follow at university for climate protection without much effort.
E.g.: Energy can be saved by turning the lights off and turning off PCs when not in use. Paper should be saved at all times. Eat food on the trays and avoid the papers cups. University employees should use public transport instead of private cars. The increased use of renewable energy sources contributes to greenhouse gas abatement.

We will be able to put up more posters of larger size the more money we collect. If this promotion is successful, it will be replicated in a fellow German university at the beginning of their next term.
Click NEXT

Example of climate round: Four players have decided to invest into climate protection. Two of them paid 2 RMB and the other two of them paid 4 RMB.

Students	Wang	Li	Zhang	Liu	Chen	Yang
Decision	Invest 2 RMB	Invest 0	Invest 0	Invest 4 RMB	Invest 2 RMB	Invest 4 RMB
Change in participant's account	-2	0	0	-4	-2	-4

At this round, a total 12 RMB were paid for climate protection and thus credited to the climate account.

Click NEXT

You can play many different strategies. For example, as a final outcome your 5 co-players and you could contribute at least 120 RMB during the 10 rounds (2 RMB each 6 participant x 10 rounds = 120 RMB). In the event that your group reaches this target you are going to receive your endowment of 45 RMB by bank money transfer in two months' time from now.

What you have not invested of your operating fund you are going to definitely receive in cash directly after the game. By playing this strategy you would earn a total of 65 RMB, about 20 RMB in cash directly after the game and 45 RMB in two months' time from now. Another strategy could be to contribute nothing of your operating fund in the course of 10 rounds. In this case, you would obtain the whole 40 RMB of your operating fund in cash directly after the game. If your group has not invested at least 120 RMB after 10 rounds you lose your endowment with a probability of 90%. However, there remains a 10% probability that you will receive your endowment in two months' time from now. You will get this information directly after the game. By choosing this strategy you would earn a total of 40 RMB, paid today after the game.

Of course you could also play any strategy between this two examples.

If your group reaches the target, we will pay off your endowment by bank money transfer in two months' time from now. This is to assure that the results can be compared to those of other groups which will obtain their endowment in two months' time from now.

Click NEXT

The end of the game

At the end of the game (after exactly 10 rounds) the computer compares the climate account with the threshold amount. The threshold amount has to be reached to avoid dangerous climate change. It is reached if every player pays on average 2 RMB per round for climate protection. In this case (6 students x 2 RMB =) 12 RMB per round would be paid into the climate account.

If this amount has been reached for the climate account, every player will obtain his endowment of 45 RMB in two months' time from now. Any remaining part of the operating fund, which has not been invested will be paid anonymously and in cash directly after the game. If the threshold amount for the climate account is not reached dangerous climate change occurs with a probability of **90 % (9 out of 10 cases)** followed by serious economic losses. This is the probability of losing your endowment of 45 RMB.

Nevertheless any remaining uninvested money from the operating fund will be paid to you in cash and anonymously.

There is a probability of **10% (1 out of 10 cases)** that you would keep your endowment of 45 RMB. After the game the computer decides randomly with this probability.

Any remaining uninvested money from the operating fund will be paid anonymously and in cash directly after the game.

Click NEXT

Operating fund, 40 RMB:

You can pay this during the game into a climate account. What you do not invest, you will definitely be paid in cash at the end of the game (independently whether the group paid at least 120 RMB into the climate account).

Endowment, 45 RMB:

You will be paid this amount in cash and anonymously if the group has paid at least 120 RMB into the climate account. If the group has not contributed 120 RMB you will lose your endowment with a probability of 90% (9 out of 10 cases).

Click NEXT

Summary

Total capital = operating fund + endowment

You will be involved in 10 climate rounds

In each round you can invest 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 RMB into climate protection!

After reading please confirm by clicking NEXT

The experiment will now start.

Click NEXT

Treatment 3

Welcome to this 'climate change' experiment in which you can earn money!

At the start of the experiment, 85 RMB will be credited to your account. This is comprised of a 40 RMB operating fund and a 45 RMB endowment. During the experiment you can freely use your operating fund, however the endowment will remain untouched. In the course of the game you can decide whether and how much of your 40 RMB operating fund you want to invest. Any amount that you have not invested will be paid to you immediately after the experiment.

All decisions you make are anonymous because the other participants don't know who they are interacting with.
For a successful experiment you will not be able to communicate to the other participants.

In the course of this experiment you will be involved in **10 climate rounds**.
In each of these rounds you can invest money in an attempt to avoid dangerous climate change. One of the consequences of dangerous climate change will be serious economic loss. In this experiment this is simulated through possible loss of your endowment. By doing so you can also earn some money. In fact, what you do not use of your operating fund will be paid to you.

Although there are many students around you, you will interact with only six. In each round of the game the six participants will be asked simultaneously: **How much do you want to invest in climate protection?** (possible answers: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 RMB)
When every player has made his decision, these answers combined together are displayed in all 6 computers simultaneously.
Afterwards all contributions will be credited to an account for climate change.
Funded by the money that you may have paid into climate protection, we will print several posters to be displayed in appropriate locations of several YUFE departments and restaurants. They will give specific information about the appropriate methods we can follow at university for climate protection without much effort.
E.g.: Energy can be saved by turning the lights off and turning off PCs when not in use. Paper should be saved at all times. Eat food on the trays and avoid the papers cups. University employees should use public transport instead of private cars. The increased use of renewable energy sources contributes to greenhouse gas abatement.

We will be able to put up more posters of larger size the more money we collect. If this promotion is successful, it will be replicated in a fellow German university at the beginning of their next term.
Click NEXT

Example of climate round: Four players have decided to invest into climate protection. Two of them paid 2 RMB and the other two of them paid 4 RMB.

Students	Wang	Li	Zhang	Liu	Chen	Yang
Decision	Invest 2 RMB	Invest 0	Invest 0	Invest 4 RMB	Invest 2 RMB	Invest 4 RMB
Change in participant's account	-2	0	0	-4	-2	-4

At this round, a total 12 RMB were paid for climate protection and thus credited to the climate account.

Click NEXT

You can play many different strategies. For example, as a final outcome your 5 co-players and you could contribute at least 120 RMB during the 10 rounds (2 RMB each 6 participant x 10 rounds = 120 RMB). In the event that your group reaches this target we will invest 45 RMB in planting trees, traditional plants and depolluting the soil for the next generation in the framework of a reforestation project.

What you have not invested of your operating fund you are going to definitely receive in cash directly after the game. By playing this strategy would earn about 20 RMB in cash directly after the game and 45 RMB endowment of the next generation would be invested into reforestation of trees. The evidence for the deposit of this investment will be visible on the posters, our publications.

Another strategy could be to contribute nothing of your operating fund in the course of 10 rounds. In this case, you would obtain the whole 40 RMB of your operating fund in cash directly after the game. If your group has not invested at least 120 RMB after 10 rounds you lose your endowment with a probability of 90%. However, there remains a 10% probability that trees will be planted nevertheless. You will get this information directly after the game. By choosing this strategy you would earn a total of 40 RMB, paid today after the game.

Of course you could also play any strategy between this two examples.

If your group reaches the target, we will pay off your endowment by bank money transfer as soon as possible in two or three days' time, instead of directly after the trial today. This is to assure that the results can be compared to those of other groups which will obtain their endowment on the 28th of January.

Click NEXT

The end of the game

At the end of the game (after exactly 10 rounds) the computer compares the climate account with the threshold amount. The threshold amount has to be reached to avoid dangerous climate change. It is reached if every player pays on average 2 RMB per round for climate protection. In this case (6 students x 2 RMB =) 12 RMB per round would be paid into the climate account.

If this amount has been reached for the climate account, we will invest 45 RMB into the reforestation of trees for the next generation. Any remaining part of the operating fund, which has not been invested will be paid anonymously and in cash directly after the game. If the threshold amount for the climate account is not reached dangerous climate change occurs with a probability of **90 % (9 out of 10 cases)** followed by serious economic losses. This is the probability of losing the endowment of the next generation. Nevertheless any remaining uninvested money from the operating fund will be paid to you in cash and anonymously.

There is a probability of **10% (1 out of 10 cases)** that trees will be planted for the next generation also if the target is not reached. After the game the computer decides randomly with this probability.

Any remaining uninvested money from the operating fund will be paid anonymously and in cash directly after the game.

Click NEXT

Operating fund, 40 RMB:

You can pay this during the game into a climate account. What you do not invest, you will definitely be paid in cash at the end of the game (independently whether the group paid at least 120 RMB into the climate account).

Endowment, 45 RMB:

You will be paid this amount in cash and anonymously if the group has paid at least 120 RMB into the climate account. If the group has not contributed 120 RMB you will lose your endowment with a probability of 90% (9 out of 10 cases).

Click NEXT

Summary

Total capital = operating fund + endowment

You will be involved in 10 climate rounds

In each round you can invest 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 RMB into climate protection!

After reading please confirm by clicking NEXT

The experiment will now start.

Click NEXT

实验 1

欢迎来到这个你可以挣钱的‘气候变化’试验！

在实验开始时，85 元将被记入您的帐户。这 85 元由 40 元运营基金和 45 元捐款组成。试验中你可以自由地使用你的运营基金，而捐款部分将保持不变。在任务过程中你可以决定 40 元的运营基金是否用来投资，还有你想用来投资的金额。你没有用于投资的金额会在试验后立即支付给你。

所有你做的决定都是匿名的，因为其他参与者不知道他们正在和谁交流。为了成功的试验你将不能和其他参与者联系。

试验过程中你会参与到 **10 轮气候**。
在每一轮中你可以把钱尝试投资于防止危险的气候。危险的气候变化带来的后果之一将是严重的经济损失。在此实验中通过你的捐款的可能损失来模拟。你也可以这样做来挣钱。事实上，你没有使用的运营基金将会被支付给你。

虽然有很多学生在你身边，但你只需要和 6 个人交流。每一轮任务，6 名参与者都会被同时问到：**你想投资多少钱于气候保护？**（可能的答案：0，1，2，3 或 4 元）
当每一个参与者做出了他的决定，这些答案合在一起会在 6 台电脑中同时显示出来。
之后，所有的捐款会被记在一个气候变化的账户下。
你可能已付入气候保护的基金，我们会打印出一些海报展示在财经大学一些系和餐厅的合适位置。他们将不费力气就给出在大学里对于气候保护我们能跟进的合适途径的信息。
例如：通过关掉不用的灯和电脑，将能节约能源。
纸应该随时被节约，使用托盘进餐并避免纸杯。
大学职工应该使用公共交通代替私家车。可再生能源的使用增加可为温室气体减排做贡献。

我们将能张贴更多，更大尺寸的海报, 我们收集到的钱越多。
阅后请点击 **NEXT** 确认。

一轮气候举例：四个参与者已经决定了投资环境保护，他们中的两名付了 2 元，另外两名付了 4 元。

学生	王	李	张	刘	陈	杨
决定	投资 2 元	投资 0	投资 0	投资 4 元	投资 2 元	投资 4 元
参与者账户内变化	-2	0	0	-4	-2	-4

这一轮中，总共 12 元被用于气候保护，并因此被计入气候账户中。

阅后请点击 **NEXT** 确认。

你可以使用很多不同的策略参与互动。

例如，作为最后的成果，5个和你一起的参与者还有你，可以在10轮中贡献120元。（2元每名参与者 x 10轮=120元）在项目中，你的团队达到这个目标，你将以现金形式当场收到45元的捐款。

你没有用于投资的运营基金一定会直接以现金形式在任务后收到，以这种策略参与互动，你可以总共挣到65元，20元现金直接于任务后（支付），45元在明天。

另一种策略让你的运营基金在10轮中都用不到。假若这样，你会在任务后直接以现金形式获得所有40元的运营基金。如果你的组10轮后没有投资至少120元你有90%的可能性损失掉你的捐款。尽管如此，仍然有10%的可能性你会在明天收到你的捐款。你会在任务后直接得到信息。通过选择这个策略你可以挣到总共40元，在今天任务后支付。当然，在这两个例子里你可以运用任何策略。

如果你的组达到了目标，我们会尽快在两三天时间内付清你的捐款，替代在当天试验后（支付的方式）。这种方式用来确保结果可以去和那些其他的在7月28日得到他们捐款的组进行比较。当年预算只够下一组，下一组我们已经通过掷骰子决定了-你是幸运的并且明天就可以收到你的捐款。尽管如此，你和其他组一样将必须来参加第二次。

阅后请点击 **NEXT** 确认。

实验结束

任务的最后（确切的10轮以后）电脑会比较气候账户和初始账户。初始账户必须达到一定（金额）避免危险的气候变化。它是能达到的，如果每个参与者平均每轮为气候保护付出了2元。在这种情况下（6名学生 x 2元=12元）每轮将会被付进气候账户。如果气候账户的初始账户达到了一定金额。每个参与者会在次日获得他的45元现金捐款。如果这个金额能达到，任何人都应该获得他45元捐款任何运营基金的保留部分，没有用于投资的部分将会匿名地在任务后以现金被支付。

如果气候账户的初始账户没有达到（防止）危险气候变化（所需的金额），有**90%的可能性（10例里有9例）**伴随着严重的经济损失。这是损失掉你45元捐款的可能性。不过任何保留的，没有投资的来自运营基金的钱将马上。

有10%的可能性（**10例里有1例**）你可以留下你的45元。任务之后，电脑通过这个可能性随机决定。

任何保留的，没有投资的来自运营基金的钱将马上直接。

阅后请点击 **NEXT** 确认。

运营基金，40元

你可以在任务中把基金支付进气候账户。你没有投资的部分，一定会在任务最后以现金支付给你（和是否小组付出至少120元进气候账户）。

捐款，45元

你会被以同等数额的现金匿名支付，如果小组付出了至少120元进气候账户。如果小组没有贡献120元你有**90%（10种情况里有9种）**的可能会损失你的捐款。

小结

总资产=运营基金+捐款

你会参与到10轮气候

每一轮你可以投资 0,1,2,3 或 4 元于气候保护!
阅后请点击 NEXT 确认。

实验现在开始
阅后请点击 NEXT 确认。

实验 2

欢迎来到这个你可以挣钱的‘气候变化’试验！

在实验开始时，85 元将被记入您的帐户。这 85 元由 40 元运营基金和 45 元捐款组成。试验中你可以自由地使用你的运营基金，而捐赠部分将保持不变。在任务过程中你可以决定 40 元的运营基金是否用来投资，还有你想用来投资的金额。你没有用于投资的金额会在试验后立即支付给你。

所有你做的决定都是匿名的，因为其他参与者不知道他们正在和谁交流。为了成功的试验你将不能和其他参与者联系。

试验过程中你会参与到 10 轮气候。
在每一轮中你可以把钱尝试投资于防止危险的气候。危险的气候变化带来的后果之一将是严重的经济损失。在此实验中通过你的捐款可能损失来模拟。你也可以这样做来挣钱。事实上，你没有使用的运营基金将会被支付给你。

虽然有很多学生在你身边，但你只需要和 6 个人交流。每一轮任务，6 名参与者都会被同时问到：你想投资多少钱于气候保护？（可能的答案：0，1，2，3 或 4 元）
当每一个参与者做出了他的决定，这些答案合在一起会在 6 台电脑中同时显示出来。
之后，所有的捐款会被记在一个气候变化的账户下。
你可能已支付进气候保护的基金，我们会打印出一些海报展示在财经大学一些系和餐厅的合适位置。他们将不费力地给出对于气候保护我们能在大学里跟进的合适途径的信息。
例如：通过关掉不用的灯和电脑，将能节约能源。
纸应该随时被节约，使用托盘进餐并避免纸杯。
大学职工应该使用公共交通代替私家车。可再生能源的使用增加可为温室气体减排做贡献。

我们将能张贴更多，更大尺寸的海报, 我们收集到的钱越多。
阅后请点击 NEXT 确认。

一轮气候举例：四个参与者已经决定了投资环境保护，他们中的两名付了 2 元，另外两名付了 4 元。

学生	王	李	张	刘	陈	杨
决定	投资 2 元	投资 0	投资 0	投资 4 元	投资 2 元	投资 4 元
参与者账户内变化	-2	0	0	-4	-2	-4

这一轮中，总共 12 元被用于气候保护，并因此被计入气候账户中。

你可以使用很多不同的策略参与互动。

例如，作为最后的成果，5个和你一起的参与者还有你，可以在10轮中贡献120元。（2元每名参与者 x 10轮=120元）在项目中，你的团队达到这个目标，你将以银行转账汇款的方式在从现在算起的两个月内收到你的45元的捐款。你没有用于投资的运营基金一定会直接以现金形式在任务后收到，以这种策略参与互动，你可以总共挣到65元，20元现金直接于任务后（支付），45元在从现在算起的两个月内。

另一种策略让你的运营基金在10轮中都用不到。假若这样，你会在任务后直接以现金形式获得所有40元的运营基金。如果你的组10轮后没有投资至少120元你有90%的可能性损失掉你的捐款。尽管如此，仍然有10%的可能性你会在从现在算起的两个月内收到你的捐款。你会在任务后直接得到信息。通过选择这个策略你可以挣到总共40元，在今天任务后支付。当然，在这两个例子里你可以运用任何策略。

如果你的组达到了目标，我们会尽快在从现在算起的两个月时间内付清你的捐款，替代在当天试验后（支付的方式）。这种方式用来确保结果可以和那些其他的获得他们捐款的组比较，在从现在算起的两个月时间内。

阅后请点击 **NEXT** 确认。

实验结束

任务的最后（确切的10轮以后）电脑会比较气候账户和初始账户。初始账户必须达到一定（金额）避免危险的气候变化。它是能达到的，如果每个参与者平均每轮为气候保护付出了2元。在这种情况下（6名学生 x 2元=12元）每轮将会被付进气候账户。如果气候账户的初始账户达到了一定金额。每个参与者会在从现在算起的两个月内获得他的45元现金捐款。任何运营基金的保留部分，没有用于投资的部分将会匿名地在任务后以现金被支付。

如果起气候账户的初始账户没有达到（防止）危险气候变化（所需的金额），有**90%的可能性（10例里有9例）**伴随着严重的经济损失。这是损失掉你45元捐款的可能性。不过任何保留的，没有投资的来自运营基金的钱将马上。有**10%的可能性（10例里有1例）**你可以留下你的45元捐款。任务之后，电脑通过这个可能性随机决定。

任何保留的，没有投资的来自运营基金的钱将马上直接以现金形式在任务后被匿名付给你。

阅后请点击 **NEXT** 确认。

运营基金，40元

你可以在任务把基金支付进气候账户。你没有投资的部分，一定会在任务最后以现金支付给你（和是否小组付出至少120元进气候账户）。

捐款，45元

你会被以同等数额的现金匿名支付，如果小组付出了至少120元进气候账户。如果小组没有贡献120元你有**90%（10种情况里有9种）**的可能会损失你的捐款。

小结

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实验现在开始

阅后请点击 **NEXT** 确认。

实验 3

欢迎来到这个你可以挣钱的‘气候变化’试验！

在实验开始时，85 元将被记入您的帐户。这 85 元由 40 元运营基金和 45 元捐款组成。试验中你可以自由地使用你的运营基金，而捐款部分将保持不变。在任务过程中你可以决定 40 元的运营基金是否用来投资，还有你想用来投资的金额。你没有用于投资的金额会在试验后立即支付给你。

所有你做的决定都是匿名的，因为其他参与者不知道他们正在和谁交流。为了成功的试验你将不能和其他参与者联系。

试验过程中你会参与到 **10 轮气候**。

在每一轮中你可以把钱尝试投资于防止危险的气候。危险的气候变化带来的后果之一将是严重的经济损失。在此实验中通过你的捐款可能损失来模拟。你也可以这样做来挣钱。事实上，你没有使用的运营基金将会被支付给你。

虽然有很多学生在你身边，但你只需要和 6 个人交流。每一轮任务，6 名参与者都会被同时问到：**你想投资多少钱于气候保护？**（可能的答案：0，1，2，3 或 4 元）

当每一个参与者做出了他的决定，这些答案合在一起会在 6 台电脑中同时显示出来。

之后，所有的捐款会被记在一个气候变化的账户下。

你可能已支付进气候保护的基金，我们会打印出一些海报展示在财经大学一些系和餐厅的合适位置。他们将不费力地给出在大学里对于气候保护我们能跟进的合适途径的信息。

例如：通过关掉不用的灯和电脑，将能节约能源。

纸应该随时被节约，使用托盘进餐并避免纸杯。

大学职工应该使用公共交通代替私家车。可再生能源的使用增加可为温室气体减排做贡献。

我们将能张贴更多，更大尺寸的海报，我们收集到的钱越多。

阅后请点击 **NEXT** 确认。

一轮气候举例：四个参与者已经决定了投资环境保护，他们中的两名付了 2 元，另外两名付了 4 元。

学生	王	李	张	刘	陈	杨
决定	投资 2 元	投资 0	投资 0	投资 4 元	投资 2 元	投资 4 元
参与者账户内变化	-2	0	0	-4	-2	-4

这一轮中，总共 12 元被用于气候保护，并因此被计入气候账户中。

阅后请点击 **NEXT** 确认。

你可以使用很多不同的策略参与互动。

例如，作为最后的成果，5个和你一起的参与者还有你，可以在10轮中贡献120元。（2元每名参与者 $\times$ 10轮=120元）在项目中，你的团队达到这个目标，我们将投资45元人民币于为了下一代种树，在一个再造林项目框架下。

你没有用于投资的运营基金一定会直接以现金形式在任务后收到，以这种策略参与互动，你可以总共挣到20元现金直接于任务后（支付），45元捐款为了下一代将被投资进橡树造林。投资存款证据将在出版物上看得到。

另一种策略让你的运营基金在10轮中都用不到。假若这样，你会在任务后直接以现金形式获得所有40元的运营基金。如果你的组10轮后没有投资至少120元你有90%的可能性损失掉你的捐款。尽管如此，仍然有10%的可能性还是会被种植。你会在任务后直接得到信息。通过选择这个策略你可以挣到总共40元，在今天任务后支付。当然，在这两个例子里你可以运用任何策略。

如果你的组达到了目标，我们会尽快在从现在算起的两个月时间内付清你的捐款，替代在当天试验后（支付的方式）。这种方式用来确保结果可以和那些其他的在7月28日获得他们捐款的组比较。

阅后请点击NEXT确认。

实验结束

任务的最后（确切的10轮以后）电脑会比较气候账户和初始账户。初始账户必须达到一定（金额）避免危险的气候变化。它是能达到的，如果每个参与者平均每轮为气候保护付出了2元。在这种情况下（6名学生 $\times$ 2元=12元）每轮将会被付进气候账户。如果气候账户的初始账户达到了一定金额。我们会投资45元进再生，为了下一代。没有用于投资的部分将会匿名地在任务后以现金被支付。

如果起气候账户的初始账户没有达到（防止）危险气候变化（所需的金额），有90%的可能性（10例里有9例）伴随着严重的经济损失。这是损失掉下一代捐款的可能性。不过任何保留的，没有投资的来自运营基金的钱将马上。

有10%的可能性（10例里有1例）会为下一代而种植，即使目标没达到。任务后电脑根据可能性随机决定。

任何保留的，没有投资的来自运营基金的钱将马上直接。

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阅后请点击NEXT确认。

小结

总资产=运营基金+捐款

你会参与到 **10** 轮气候
每一轮你可以投资 **0,1,2,3** 或 **4** 元于气候保护！
阅后请点击 **NEXT** 确认。

实验现在开始
阅后请点击 **NEXT** 确认。

Individualism-Collectivism Scale (Triandis, 1995)

Please answer the following questions. For each question choose the answer which best represents your opinion. There is no right or wrong answer!

1. You and your friends decided spontaneously to go out to dinner at a restaurant. What do you think is the best way to handle the bill?
 - a. Split it equally, without regard to who ordered what (HC)
 - b. Split it according to how much each person earns (VI)
 - c. The group leader pays the bill or decides how to split it (VC)
 - d. Compute each person's charge according to what that person ordered (HI)
2. You are buying a piece of art for your office. Which one factor is the most important in deciding whether to buy it?
 - a. It is a good investment (VI)
 - b. Your coworkers will like it (HC)
 - c. You just like it (HI)
 - d. Your supervisor will approve of it (VC)
3. Suppose you had to use one word to describe yourself. Which one would you use?
 - a. Unique (HI)
 - b. Competitive (VI)
 - c. Cooperative (HC)
 - d. Dutiful (VC)
4. Happiness is attained by
 - a. Gaining a lot of status in the community (VC)
 - b. Linking with a lot of friendly people (HC)
 - c. Keeping one's privacy (HI)
 - d. Winning in competitions (VI)
5. You are planning to take a major trip that is likely to inconvenience a lot of people at your work, during your absence. With whom will you discuss it, before deciding whether or not to take it?
 - a. No one (HI)
 - b. My parents (VC)
 - c. My spouse or close friend (HC)
 - d. Experts about the place I plan to travel to so I can decide if I want to go (VI)
6. Which one of these four books appears to you to be the most interesting?
 - a. How to make friends (HC)
 - b. How to succeed in business (VI)
 - c. How to enjoy yourself inexpensively (HI)
 - d. How to make sure you are meeting your obligations (VC)
7. Which is the most important factor in an employee's promotion, assuming that all other factors such as tenure and performance are equal? Employee is or has
 - a. Loyal to the cooperation (HC)
 - b. Obedient to the instructions from management (VC)
 - c. Able to think for him- or herself (HI)
 - d. Contributed to the corporation much in the past (VI)
8. When you buy clothing for a major social event, you would be most satisfied if
 - a. You like it (HI)
 - b. Your parents like it (VC)
 - c. Your friends like it (HC)
 - d. It is so elegant it will dazzle everyone (VI)
9. In your opinion, in an ideal society national budgets will be determined so that

- a. All people have adequate incomes to meet basic needs (HC)
 - b. Some people will be rewarded for making brilliant contributions (VI)
 - c. There will be maximal stability, law, and order (VC)
 - d. People can feel unique and self-actualized (HI)
10. When people ask me about myself, I
- a. Talk about my ancestors and their traditions (VC)
 - b. Talk about my friends, and what we like to do (HC)
 - c. Talk about my accomplishments (VI)
 - d. Talk about what makes me unique (HI)
11. Suppose your fiancé and your parents do not get along very well. What would you do?
- a. Nothing (HI)
 - b. Tell my fiancé(e) that I need my parents' financial support and he or she should learn to handle the politics (VI)
 - c. Tell my fiancé(e) that he or she should make a greater effort to 'fit in with the family' (HC)
 - d. Remind my fiancé(e) that my parents and family are very important to me and he or she should submit to their wishes (VC)
12. Teams of five people entered a science project contest. Your team won first place and a prize of \$100. You and another person did 95% of the work in this project. How should the money be distributed?
- a. Split it equally, without regard to who did what (HC)
 - b. The other person and I get 95% of the money and the rest goes to the group (VI)
 - c. The group leader decides how to split the money (VC)
 - d. Divide the money the way that gives me the most satisfaction (HI)
13. Imagine you are selecting a band for fund-raising event given by your organization. Which are the most important factors in making your decision?
- a. I really like the band (HI)
 - b. My friends approve the band (VC)
 - c. The administration of my organization approves of the band (VC)
 - d. The band will draw a large crowd (VI)
14. You need to choose one more class for the next semester. Which one will you select?
- a. The one that will help me get ahead of everyone else (VI)
 - b. The one my parents said to take (VC)
 - c. The one my friends plan to take (HC)
 - d. The one that seems most interesting to me (HI)
15. You are at a pizza restaurant with a group of friends. How should you decide what kind of pizza to order?
- a. The leader of the group orders for everyone (VC)
 - b. I order what I like (HI)
 - c. We select the pizza that most people prefer (HC)
 - d. We order the extravagant pizza available (VI)
16. Which candidate will you vote for in the election for president of the student government?
- a. The one your friends are voting for (HC)
 - b. The one I like best (HI)
 - c. The one who will reward me personally (VI)
 - d. The one who is a member of an organization important to me. The status of the organization will improve if that candidate is elected (VC)

个人主义-集体主义比例 (adapted from Triandis, 1995)

请回答以下问题。对于每个问题，选择最能代表你意见的答案。没有正确或错误的答案之分!

1. 你和你的朋友自发决定在一个餐厅外出吃饭。你觉得最好的处理账单的方式是
 - a. 平等地分开付，不考虑谁点了什么 (HC)
 - b. 分开付，根据每个人的收入多少 (VI)
 - c. 组长付账或者组长决定如何分开付 (VC)
 - d. 根据每个人点的东西计算每个人的费用 (HI)
2. 你在为你的办公室购买一件艺术品。哪个是最重要的因素决定你是否购买它?
 - a. 这是一个好投资 (VI)
 - b. 你的同事会喜欢它 (HC)
 - c. 你只是喜欢 (HI)
 - d. 你的主管会批准 (VC)
3. 假定你要使用一个词来形容自己。你会用哪一个?
 - a. 独一无二的 (HI)
 - b. 有竞争力的 (VI)
 - c. 合作的 (HC)
 - d. 尽忠职守的 (VC)
4. 实现幸福靠
 - a. 社会地位 (VC)
 - b. 和友善的人们连接在一起 (HC)
 - c. 保护他人隐私 (HI)
 - d. 比赛获胜 (VI)
5. 你将计划参加一个重要旅行,可能给工作伙伴带来很多不便之处，你的工作,你不在的时候，决定前你会和谁讨论去不去参加
 - a. 没有一个人 (HI)
 - b. 我的父母 (VC)
 - c. 我的配偶或亲密朋友 (HC)
 - d. 我计划旅行的地方专家,所以我可以决定我是否要去 (VI)
6. 这四本书中哪本你看上去最有意思?
 - a. 如何交朋友 (HC)
 - b. 如何在商业上成功 (VI)
 - c. 如何以平价享受 (HI)
 - d. 如何确保你履行义务 (VC)
7. 哪一个员工晋升最重要的因素，假定所有其他因素，如终身雇佣制和绩效是平等的？雇员是或者有
 - a. 对合作忠心 (HC)
 - b. 服从管理指令 (VC)
 - c. 能够想到他人 (HI)
 - d. 过去对公司贡献很大 (VI)
8. 当你为一个重大的社交活动购买服装,你将最满意如果
 - a. 你喜欢他/她 (HI)
 - b. 你的父母喜欢它 (VC)
 - c. 你的朋友喜欢它 (HC)

- d. 它是如此优雅,将眩目每个人(六)
9. 在你看来,在一个理想的社会国家的预算将会确定来用于
- 所有的人都有足够的收入来满足基本需要 (HC)
 - 有些人会得到杰出贡献奖励 (VI)
 - 将有最大程度的稳定、法律和秩序 (VC)
 - 人们会觉得独一无二和有自我实现感 (HI)
10. 当人们问我关于我自己,我
- 谈一谈我的祖先和他们的传统 (VC)
 - 谈一谈我的朋友和们想做的 (HC)
 - 谈一谈我的成就 (VI)
 - 谈一谈是什么使我独一无二 (HI)
11. 假设你的未婚夫(妻) 和你的父母相处得不好。 你会怎么做?
- 什么也不做 (HI)
 - 告诉我未婚夫(妻),我需要父母的财政支持,他或她应该学习如何处理政治 (VI)
 - 告诉我未婚夫(妻),他或她应做出更大努力,以便“与家庭”合适 (HC)
 - 提醒我未婚夫(妻),我的父母和家庭是非常重要的,我和他或她应服从他们的愿望(VC)
12. 五人团队进入了一个科学项目比赛。 你的团队赢得了第一位,有一个 100 元的奖项。 你和另一个人做了 95%的工作, 这一项目。 钱应如何进行分配?
- 平等分开付, 不去想谁做了多少 (HC)
 - 另一个人和我得了 95%的钱, 其余的钱进入团队 (VI)
 - 该组组长决定了如何分钱 (VC)
 - 分钱的的方式让我很满意 (HI)
13. 想象一下,你在选择一个乐队用来做基金会的筹款活动, 什么是你做决定最重要的因素
- 我真的很喜欢这个乐队 (HI)
 - 我的朋友们批准带乐队 (VC)
 - 我的管理组织已批准带 (VC)
 - 乐队将吸引很多人 (VI)
14. 你需要为下学期选课, 你会选哪门?
- 会帮助我走在每个人前面的 (VI)
 - 父母会参与选的 (VC)
 - 我的朋友计划去的 (HC)
 - 对我最有趣的 (HI)
15. 你与一群朋友在一家比萨饼店。 你如何决定点什么类型的披萨
- 组长为大家点 (VC)
 - 我点自己喜欢的 (HI)
 - 我们大部分人更喜欢的披萨 (HC)
 - 我们点很奢华的披萨 (VI)
16. 你会为哪位学生政府总统候选人投票?
- 你朋友投票的人 (HC)
 - 我最喜欢的 (HI)
 - 将个人奖励我的人 (VI)
 - 对我重要的某个组织成员。如果候选人被选中, 该组织的地位将会提高 (VC)