

Supplementary Materials for Bribery across nations

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Materials and Methods

Design of the Bribery Game

As a behavioral measure of bribery, we use an adapted version of a bribery game based on previous designs (1, 2). This strategic game mimics a typical transaction between public officials and citizens. Participants made decisions in both roles. Starting in the role of the citizen, participants decided how to obtain a license to use natural resources (“When interacting with a public official from [nation], indicate what you decide as a citizen”; “Make the official payment” vs. “Make the unofficial payment”). In the role of the public official, participants decided whether to accept or reject the unofficial payment (“When interacting with a citizen from [nation], please indicate what you decide as a public official”; “Accept an unofficial payment” vs. “Reject an unofficial payment”).

Whereas the “unofficial payment” was mutually beneficial for the respective citizen-public official pair, it led to negative externalities. Namely, representing the societal costs of corruption, successful bribery transactions – a citizen offering and a matched public official accepting the unofficial payment – caused a reduction in donations to the non-profit climate-protection organization *atmosfair* (3). Such reductions in charity donations have been established to operationalize negative externalities in behavioral experiments (for example, 4).

The entire game tree and the payoffs associated with each choice are illustrated in Fig. 1 in the main article. Participants indicated their choices in the game for interaction partners from all participating nations, including their own. The order of the interaction partners was randomized anew for each participant. As they knew they would play with only one randomly chosen person, we treated each decision as a one-shot interaction. Such one-shot games are well suited to study how expectations shape behavior as they reduce strategic concerns such as reputation formation and prevent behavior-based belief-updating (5). We used four control questions to ensure that participants understood the logic of the task (see screenshots of the complete instructions in all languages on OSF:

https://osf.io/xc9qf/?view_only=b7b2d3e7f7854709aaf78dc41493efe6).

We employed the strategy method (6) for the decisions to offer and accept bribes. We implemented within-participants manipulations of (a) the interaction partner’s nation and (b) the role of the participant (citizen vs. public official). In the main study, participants thus made a total of 36 decisions in the bribery game (18 bribe offer decisions and 18 bribe acceptance decisions for each nation, including their own).

Nation-specific Expectations

To assess nation-specific expectations about the behavior of the interaction partner, in each round, after the bribery decision, we asked participants, “What percent of participants from [nation] in the role of the citizen/public official do you estimate will offer/accept the unofficial payment?”. Answers were given along ten categories, each indicating 10 percent ranges (i.e., 0-10%; 11-20%; 21-30%; 31-40%; 41-50%; 51-60%; 61-70%; 71-80%; 81-90%; 91-100%). If participants accurately guessed the percentage interval, they stood to gain a bonus of 35 Talers. We opted for an incentivized elicitation

of expectations, as it increases accuracy (7). Participants thus made 36 incentivized estimations about the nation-specific expectations (18 for expected bribe offers and 18 for expected bribe acceptances for each nation, including their own). For more details on the incentivization, see the section 'Incentivization.'

Social Norms

After the bribery game and eliciting nation-specific expectations, we assessed perceived injunctive and descriptive norms. Participants rated how acceptable and common they think bribery is in each of the participating nations (including their own) on scales ranging from 1 (= "not acceptable/common at all") to 7 (= "very acceptable/common").

Exit Questions

At the end of the study, we assessed (i) the perceived corruptness of making and (ii) accepting an unofficial payment in the game (1 = "not at all corrupt; 7 = "very corrupt"), (iii) how much participants supported the work of atmosfair (1 = "I don't support it at all"; 7 = "I support it very much"), (iv) political orientation (1 = "left"; 10 = "right"; no indication), the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status in which participants ranked their subjective social status on a ladder (1 = top; 9 = bottom), and (v) participants' highest obtained degree of education (1 = "completed primary school or lower"; 2 = "completed secondary school"; 3 = "vocational training"; 4 = "completed higher education (Bachelor or Master)"; 5 = "Doctoral, equivalent or higher").

Before reading the instructions and upon giving informed consent, participants were asked to indicate (vi) their age (open text field requiring numeric entry) and (vii) gender (male, female, other) to determine the quotas for each nation, ensuring representativeness for the respective nations in terms of age and gender.

Nation Selection and Matching

We included participants from 21 nations that were selected based on the respective nations' scores on Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index published in 2011 (8). The index constitutes a survey on cross-national bribery among 3,016 business executives from 30 nations. It was constructed from surveys asking business executives to indicate the likelihood that companies from nations they do business with engage in bribery, with scores ranging from 0 (= "always") to 10 (= "never"). The index did not include assessments of companies from the business executives' own nations but focused on bribery towards other nations. Out of the 28 nations included in the BPI, we sampled 21 nations, including the highest-ranked and lowest-ranked nations. From each of these nations, we collected representative samples according to age and gender for the adult population ≥ 18 years using age categories.

A Note on the Term "Nation"

We refer to all 21 regions as nations in the paper for ease of writing and understanding. We acknowledge that Hong Kong is not a nation but officially the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (HKSAR). We intentionally included Hong Kong and mainland China in our sample as it allows for comparing people's perceptions of two culturally similar nations/regions, according to cultural distance scores by Muthukrishna and colleagues (9) and with regards to stated moral preferences (see for moral-cultural similarity scores based on large survey data 10).

However, both were administratively different at the time of collecting the data ("one country, two systems"). China and Hong Kong also differed concerning common corruption indices. On the Bribe Payers Index, China ranked second to last (27th) with a score of 6.5, and Hong Kong ranked in the middle of the sample (15th) with a score of 7.6. Similar differences are observed for other corruption indices, such as the Corruption Perception Index (11). In 2020, the year the data was collected, China ranked 78th with a score of 42, whereas Hong Kong ranked 11th with a score of 77. Higher scores indicate lower perceptions of corruption in a given nation.

Sample

We determined the desired sample size and stopping rule a-priori. To reach a combination of representativeness within each nation and a large sample of nations, we committed to collecting a representative sample (in terms of age and gender) of $n = 300$ participants for each nation (see pre-registration pilot: <https://osf.io/fumzb> and main study: <https://osf.io/afcg9>) via the online panel provider Toluna (<https://de.toluna.com/#/>). Toluna was selected since it is one of the few companies with access to online samples in all the nations we were interested in. Toluna is mainly specialized in marketing research but has successfully collected data for academic research in the past (e.g., 12). The participants can be assumed to have little or no experience with experimental games, and their responses were of high quality.

Each national sample in our study was representative with regard to the age and gender composition of the adult population (≥ 18 years of age) for the respective nation (demographic information about the samples of each nation is displayed in Table S2). For participant recruitment, the panel provider used eight quotas (female: 18–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–65; male: 18–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–65) of different sizes to approximate representativeness concerning age and gender for the respective nations.

Invitations, including the link to the study, were sent out by the panel provider until all quotas were full. Participants could work on the study at any time by clicking on the link. Data were collected between the 21st of January 2021 and the 8th of February 2021, and the participation time was approximately 25 minutes.

Standard power analyses were difficult to conduct due to the lack of studies providing indications for effect-size measures to be expected. Furthermore, our funding for this research allowed for national subsamples of $n = 300$ participants. Thus, we report the results of a sensitivity analysis instead to make a statement about what effects we could reliably find with the sample size we aimed for. With the overall sample size of $N = 6,472$, even small effects of $f = .01$ (e.g., testing the influence of the within-subjects factor participant's nation on the willingness to offer and accept bribes H2(a-b)) could be detected with a power of $\beta = .99$.¹

The analysis was conducted using GPOWER (13), and we used a repeated measurement ANOVA as the closest available approximation for the cluster-corrected

¹ In our pre-registration, we mention a different a-priori sensitivity analysis for analyses at the national level ($N = 300$). The analysis revealed that with the available sample size, small effects of $f = .13$ could be detected at the national level with a power of $\beta = .99$. Since we did not perform any analyses within nations, following the advice of an anonymous reviewer, we now report a modified sensitivity analysis.

regression model that was applied. We pre-committed that data collection would only be stopped as soon as 300 participants from each nation finished the study. Effects in behavioral corruption research (17, 18), specifically resulting from studies using bribery games to study treatment effects on bribe offer and acceptance rates, are typical of small to medium sizes (see meta-analysis on bribery game 14). The same applies to research on the role of the interaction partners' national background in social interactions (12). Thus, our study is well-powered to detect the effects of relevance in the present area of research.

Participants expressed relatively moderate political views ($M = 5.95$; $SD = 2.29$, scale range: 1 – “left” to 10 – “right”), ranging from $M = 5.03$ in Turkey to $M = 7.28$ in the US. Overall, they estimated their social status to be moderate ($M = 5.15$, $SD = 1.88$, 1 = top; 9 = bottom), ranging from $M = 6.11$ in India to $M = 4.43$ in Russia. Participants were generally well educated, as 61% of the respondents had completed at least a Bachelor's degree.

Instructions

We pilot-tested the instructions with 10 participants. After completing the study, two of the authors, AD, and NK, conducted semi-structured interviews with the participants to assess the ease of comprehension of the instructions. Based on the responses, we adjusted the instructions to improve comprehension and ease of completing the study (the interview guide, the anonymized responses, and the implemented changes are available via <https://osf.io/hargd>).

A professional translation agency (<https://www.e-kern.com/>) translated the instructions. Native-speaking behavioral science experts then checked for comprehensibility. Based on their comments, the translation agency revised the text in some cases.

Ethics Statement

The University of Cologne's and the University of Amsterdam's ethical review boards approved the pilot study and the data collection of the main study. Participants provided informed consent before completing any measures.

Incentivization

Participants learned that they earned a fixed payment and a bonus payment determined by matching them with one randomly chosen participant from a randomly chosen nation with randomly chosen roles within this pair after the termination of the experiment. The total payment (fixed and bonus payment) was made by the panel provider approximately one week after participation. The fixed payment was implemented in the form of so-called “Toluna points,” which participants can exchange for various vouchers (e.g., Amazon). The bonus payment was paid in participants' national currency and ranged from 0 to an equivalent of €2.25.

Specifically, one of the measures, either the bribery decisions or the nation-specific expectations, was randomly selected as the basis for the bonus payment, which participants earned in addition to a flat fee from the panel provider. The decisions in the bribery game, as well as the elicitation of nation-specific expectations, were incentivized in line with Toluna regulations. In the bribery game, participants stood to gain between

20 and 45 Talers (see Fig. 1 in the main paper). For the nation-specific expectations, participants could earn 35 Talers if they correctly guessed the 10%-bracket of the actual bribe offer/acceptance. We used Taler as the experimental currency to ensure the same calculation efforts for all participants. We converted the study's currency of Taler into national currency using the ratio of 1 Taler = €0.05. We uniformly used the conversion rates from the 13th of January 2021 (09:00-10:00 CET). We follow previous multinational research in opting for a uniform size of bonus payments to increase comparability across nations (15).

As we outline in the main manuscript, using fixed versus purchasing power-corrected incentives is a common trade-off for multinational research using economic games. One argument against using fixed nominal exchange rates across all nations is that due to the differences in purchasing power, stake sizes differ across nations. Consequently, people might act differently when stake sizes are small vs. large. However, research on reciprocity games and collaborative, ethical decision-making tasks suggests that relative stake sizes do not strongly influence such behavior. Namely, experiments testing the effects of stake sizes on reciprocity reveal negligible differences between low and high stakes (16). Meta-analyses on collaborative forms of cheating – an equally interdependent behavior like bribery – lead to similar conclusions. Namely, larger stake sizes do not increase cheating for tasks where multiple people simultaneously decide whether to break ethical rules (17). Hence, the available empirical evidence suggests that different stake sizes across nations do not strongly influence the obtained results.

Still, we conducted several analyses to account for potential differences in wealth and corresponding differences in incentives. First, we convert the absolute payoffs into purchasing power-corrected payoffs using the international Big Mac Index (see <https://www.economist.com/big-mac-index>). It calculates how many Big Macs can be purchased in a given nation with a given amount of money. Due to its standardized production and worldwide popularity, the Big Mac has been used in comparative research because it is a suitable comparison benchmark (18). Table S1 provides an overview of the incentives in each nation when adjusting for purchasing power using the Big Mac Index. In the section ‘Controlling for Differences in Purchasing Power across Nations,’ we report analyses in which we control for purchasing power disparities with Big Mac Index corrected values of one unit of the experimental currency (i.e., Taler). Moreover, throughout the Supplementary Analyses, we report analyses that control for the differences in general economic wealth across nations, i.e., the difference between the two nations’ GDP of a given matched pair of participants. All conclusions from the analyses reported in the main manuscript remain the same when controlling for these measures.

Incentives for engaging in bribery converted to Big Mac Index		
	For the citizen (15 Taler = €0.75)	For the public official (10 Taler = €0.50)
Argentina	0.336	0.224
Australia	0.179	0.119
Brazil	0.183	0.122
China	0.248	0.165
France	0.176	0.117
Great Britain	0.185	0.123
Hong Kong	0.286	0.190
India	0.334	0.223
Italy	0.176	0.117
Japan	0.281	0.187
Canada	0.153	0.102
Netherlands	0.176	0.117
Russia	0.277	0.185
Singapore	0.181	0.120
South Africa	0.399	0.266
South Korea	0.227	0.152
Turkey	0.720	0.480
USA	0.138	0.092

Table S1 | Overview table depicting the purchasing power adjusted bribery incentives for every nation. We transformed the financial incentives of 15 Talers for the citizens (=€0.75) and 10 Talers for the public officials (€=0.50) when a bribe is offered and accepted (versus obtaining the license via the official payment). As an index for differences in purchasing power, we used the Economist Big Mac Index for the year 2021 in which the study was conducted. The data used for the transformation is available via <https://www.economist.com/big-mac-index>.

Deviations from the Pre-registration

Sample Size

In the pre-registration, we reported that we aimed to recruit $n = 300$ per nation. In some cases, our national subsamples were larger because multiple participants started the study simultaneously (see Table S2 for the final sample sizes). In one case (USA), we were not successful in recruiting the targeted sample size due to a low participation rate and because we had to exclude participants who self-reported a different country of residence than the nation they entered the study from (we committed to this plan before analyzing the data, see pre-registration: <https://osf.io/9kwpd>). In the pre-registration, we further report the results of a-priori sensitivity analysis for nation-specific analyses. Since we ultimately did not conduct such analyses, we now report a sensitivity analysis for the overall sample (see section ‘Sample’ above).

Design

The pre-registration states that “the order of the within-subjects factors will be randomized,” a statement that is to some degree ambiguous. The order of interaction partners was randomized, but participants first made 18 choices as citizens, followed by 18 choices as public officials.

Analysis Plan

The pre-registered analyses are reported in the SI (see section ‘Pre-registered Analyses’) as specified in the pre-registration document. We report simpler and more comprehensible analyses, such as correlations in the main article (based on comments by anonymous reviewers). Conclusions remain the same for the simplified and more complex analyses, such as regression analyses with cluster-corrected standard errors.

Pilot Study

In a pilot study, we included three nations (i.e., Germany, Spain, and Mexico) that differed strongly concerning the estimates about how frequently bribery occurs in international transactions according to the Bribe Payer's Index by Transparency International (see sample means in Table S13).

We used a 3 (own nation: Germany, Spain, Mexico) x 3 (interaction partner's nation: Germany, Spain, Mexico) x 2 (role: citizen vs. public official) mixed design with own nation as a between-subjects factor and interaction partner's nation and role as within-subject factors. The order of the first within-subjects factor was randomized. Results of the pilot study are reported in the SI (see section 'Results Pilot Study'). The results confirm our pre-registered hypotheses and are qualitatively similar to those reported in the main manuscript: nation-specific expectations about bribery are shared within and across nations and correlate positively with foreign bribery reputation.

Supplementary Analyses and Results

Information about the Sampled Nations in Main Study

The nations included in the main study are listed in Table S2. The table contains information about the sample size, the demographic composition (age and gender) of the samples, and the language used in each nation.

Nation	<i>N</i>	Survey language	<i>M</i> _{age} (SD)	% Female
Argentina	356	Spanish	37.46 (12.93)	52.25
Australia	305	English	40.90 (13.25)	49.51
Brazil	314	Portuguese	38.44 (12.47)	50.00
Canada	301	English	42.65 (13.68)	50.17
China	311	Chinese	38.46 (11.80)	44.37
France	303	French	41.76 (13.42)	50.17
Great Britain	301	English	41.51 (13.54)	49.50
Hong Kong	311	Chinese	42.07 (12.07)	54.98
India	316	Hindi	36.65 (12.81)	47.67
Italy	346	Italian	43.11 (12.41)	52.89
Japan	311	Japanese	42.26 (12.42)	48.87
Netherlands	304	Dutch	41.85 (13.69)	50.00
Russia	302	Russian	41.33 (12.51)	52.32
Singapore	305	English	38.31 (11.88)	51.48
South Africa	304	English	36.19 (11.79)	50.33
South Korea	298	Korean	41.72 (12.07)	49.33
Turkey	309	Turkish	36.40 (11.78)	46.28
USA	285	English	41.28 (12.79)	50.88

Table S2 | Overview table depicting descriptive statistics for the sample characteristics. Nations, sample sizes, survey language, mean (and SD) age, and % female.




Fig. S1 | Successful bribery interactions across nations. The bars are ordered according to the nations' overall "successful" bribery levels based on all interactions. The proportion of successful bribery (depicted on the x-axis) was calculated by bribes offered to a nation x bribes accepted by that nation occurring in all 18 nations in the main study. Nation coding: RU = Russia; CN = China; AR = Argentina; IN = India; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa; HK = Hong Kong; IT = Italy; BR = Brazil; KR = South Korea; FR = France; US = United States of America; GB = Great Britain; SG = Singapore; CA = Canada; AU = Australia; JP = Japan; NL = Netherlands.

National-level Differences in Indices Measuring Corruption, Economic Performance, and Culture

The sampled nations differ according to widely used corruption perception indices and other economic, legal, and cultural factors (see Table S3). The table depicts the nations' scores on two corruption indices. First, Transparency International's Corruption Barometer (19) asked citizens about their experiences of paying bribes in the 12 months preceding the survey. The survey in the Asia Pacific region, the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East first asked citizens how often they had contact with six different government services (education, health, public office, sanitation/electric services, required help from police, interacted with police in other instances). If they had contact with the respective service, they were further asked how often they had to "pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favor" on a four-point scale, ranging from "never" to "often."

Participants could further answer that they "don't know" or "refuse to answer." The scores in Table S3 show the averages across all services. The survey in Europe and Central Asia adopted a very similar technique yet differed in that it asked citizens if their household had paid a bribe for any of eight (not six) public services (education, legal system, health, police, registry, and permit services, utilities, tax revenues, land services). Results for France, the Netherlands, and Great Britain are taken from the 2014 Eurobarometer survey. When scores for Great Britain were not available, we used scores for the UK. Scores in Table S3 represent the percentage of respondents who report having paid a bribe in the past 12 months.

Second, Transparency International Bribe Payer's Index (BPI) (8) is compiled based on a survey of 3,016 international business experts. The experts indicate their perceptions about the likelihood of companies from 28 of the world's leading economies to pay bribes abroad. Answers ranged from 0 (= "always") to 10 (= "never"). Table S3 displays average scores per nation. For ease of understanding, we transformed the original scores so that low scores indicate low bribing perceptions. The BPI score serves as a proxy for foreign bribery reputation as it is the only available index that assesses perceptions about bribe payments across nations.

Table S3 further entails one national-level economic index (GDP per capita) with GDP data from 2020 derived from the International Monetary Fund (20). Further, as a proxy for the legal anti-corruption status of each nation, we included whether the nation ratified, signed, and implemented the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions (21). It is widely considered the most important legal instrument against bribery across nations (22). We included two widely used indices as proxies for a nation's culture. First, we used the classification of cultures according to how tight (strong norms, low tolerance for deviant behavior) versus loose (weak social norms, high tolerance for deviant behavior) a nation's culture is (23). Second, we used Hofstede's cultural dimensions, which rate nations on the dimensions of (i) power distance, (ii) individualism, (iii) masculinity, (iv) uncertainty avoidance, (v) long-term orientation, and (vi) indulgence (for more details, see 24). We report more details on the regression analyses using these national-level indicators as predictors of parochial bribery and an overview table of parochial and cross-national bribery in additional analyses on the OSF (<https://osf.io/8hv4t>).

Nation	Transparency International's Corruption Barometer	Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (transformed)	GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$)	OECD Convention	Tightness	Hofstede dimensions
Argentina	16	1.5	19,271	yes	N/A	PD:49; ID:46; M:56; UA:86; LO:20; IG:62
Australia	1	0.3	48,103	yes	4.4	PD:38; ID:90; M:61; UA:51; LO:21; IG:71
Brazil	11	1.1	13,777	yes	3.5	PD:69; ID:38; M:49; UA:76; LO:44; IG:59
Canada	3	0.3	45,003	yes	N/A	PD:39; ID:80; M:52; UA:48; LO:36; IG:68
China	42	2.3	16,278	no	7.9	PD:80; ID:20; M:66; UA:30; LO:87; IG:24
France	2	0.8	43,003	yes	6.3	PD:68; ID:71; M:43; UA:86; LO:63; IG:48
Great Britain	0	0.5	41,899	yes	6.9	PD:35; ID:89; M:66; UA:35; LO:51; IG:69
Hong Kong	2	1.2	55,028	no	6.3	PD:68; ID:25; M:57; UA:29; LO:61; IG:17
India	54	1.3	5,945	no	11	PD:77; ID:48; M:56; UA:40; LO:51; IG:26
Italy	5	1.2	37,905	yes	6.8	PD:50; ID:76; M:70; UA:75; LO:61; IG:30
Japan	2	0.2	39,391	yes	8.6	PD:54; ID:46; M:95; UA:92; LO:88; IG:42
Netherlands	2	0	54,022	yes	3.3	PD:38; ID:80; M:14; UA:53; LO:67; IG:68

Russia	34	2.7	25,916	yes	N/A	PD:93; ID:39; M:36; UA:95; LO:81; IG:20
Singapore	0	0.5	90,447	no	10.4	PD:74; ID:20; M:48; UA:8; LO:72; IG:46
South Africa	7	1.2	11,269	no	N/A	PD:49; ID:65; M:63; UA:49; LO:34; IG:63
South Korea	61	0.9	41,903	yes	10	PD:60; ID:18; M:39; UA:85; LO:100; IG:29
Turkey	18	1.3	26,768	yes	9.2	PD:66; ID:37; M:45; UA:85; LO:46; IG:49
USA	7	0.7	59,651	yes	5.1	PD:40; ID:91; M:62; UA:46; LO:26; IG:68

Table S3 | Table showing descriptive statistics of corruption perception indicators, GDP, ratification status of the OECD foreign bribery convention status, cultural tightness index, and Hofstede's cultural dimensions for all participating nations. Transparency International's Corruption Barometer reflects the values of the latest available estimate of self-reported bribe frequency ranging from 0% to 100% of the respondents reporting to have paid a bribe in the preceding 12 months. Transparency International's Bribe Payers compiles expert ratings estimating the likelihood of bribery across nations being part of business transactions with the respective nation. For a better interpretation of the BPI, a nation's value was subtracted from 8.8 (the highest score). Hence zero is the minimum, and higher numbers indicate higher bribing. GDP per capita based on IMF data for 2020. OECD Convention depicts the status of ratification of the OECD Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions as of May 2018: yes = signed, ratified, and entered into force of implementing legislation; no = did not sign, ratify or implement the convention. Tightness indicates the classification of a nation's tightness-looseness score, assessing the clarity and number of social norms, the degree of tolerance for norm violations, and overall compliance with social norms in each nation, higher scores indicate tighter cultures; Hofstede's cultural dimensions which rate nations on the dimensions of PD = Power Distance; ID = Individualism; M = Masculinity; UA = Uncertainty Avoidance; LO = Long-term Orientation; IG = Indulgence. Scores range from 0 to 100, with high scores indicating high levels of the respective dimension.

Pre-registered Analyses

Here, we report the analyses that were pre-registered (see <https://osf.io/afcg9>).

H1: Intraclass correlations exist within and between nations.

H1a: Nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers and acceptance in various nations are shared within nations.

Confirming our pre-registered hypotheses, for each nation, we find positive significant intraclass correlations for nation-specific expectations about bribe offer and acceptance rates (see Table S4). This finding indicates that participants from a given nation share nation-specific expectations about the percentages of bribe offers and acceptance in a given nation.

Nation	ICC nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe offers [95% CI]	ICC nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe acceptance [95% CI]
Argentina	.14 [.083; .270]	.20 [.124; .364]
Australia	.05 [.026; .106]	.06 [.035; .133]
Brazil	.04 [.022; .090]	.06 [.034; .130]
Canada	.08 [.044; .163]	.10 [.056; .198]
China	.04 [.024; .097]	.05 [.029; .115]
France	.04 [.021; .088]	.05 [.028; .110]
Great Britain	.05 [.029; .115]	.08 [.044; .163]
Hong Kong	.05 [.026; .105]	.10 [.055; .194]
India	.04 [.020; .084]	.03 [.017; .072]
Italy	.08 [.046; .167]	.10 [.057; .201]
Japan	.12 [.072; .243]	.18 [.105; .325]
Netherlands	.06 [.033; .129]	.10 [.060; .200]
Russia	.13 [.078; .258]	.15 [.091; .290]
Singapore	.05 [.027; .106]	.07 [.039; .148]
South Africa	.10 [.059; .206]	.14 [.082; .269]
South Korea	.08 [.046; .168]	.12 [.069; .236]
Turkey	.09 [.053; .188]	.12 [.068; .231]
USA	.02 [.010; .050]	.02 [.012; .056]

Table S4 | Intraclass correlations (ICC) for nation-specific expectations concerning the percentage of bribe offers (first column) and acceptance (second column). ICC estimates and 95% confidence intervals were calculated based on an individual rating (rater = participant), consistency agreement, and a 2-way mixed-effects model.

H1b: Nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers and acceptance are shared across nations.

As reported in the main article, nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe acceptance are shared across nations (intraclass correlation of expectations with 18 “raters” and 18 “targets” = 0.68, $p < .001$). Also, nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers are shared across nations (ICC = 0.69, $p < .001$).

H1c: Nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe acceptance and bribe offers correlate positively with foreign bribery reputation (= scores on Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index).

In line with the pre-registered prediction, OLS regression analyses with cluster-corrected bootstrapped standard errors (200 repetitions) at the national level reveal a significant positive link between foreign bribery reputation and nation-specific expectations (Table S5; Columns 1 & 2).² All pre-registered models uncover this link, independent of whether we only control for the nation’s relative economic performance (GDP difference between interaction partners’ nations³, Models 1 & 2) or additionally control for participants’ demographics (age, gender, Models 3 & 4). This positive relationship between nation-specific expectations about bribery and foreign bribery reputation supports the validity of TI’s Bribe Payers Index (BPI). It also suggests that experts and laypeople have similar and relatively stable perceptions of foreign bribery reputation.

² In the pre-registration, we committed to clustering SEs at the individual level (to account for the repeated measurement design) and to account for level differences between nations by using nation dummies in our regression analyses. These analyses lead to the same conclusions in all cases.

³ Based on a reviewer’s comment during the revision process, we replaced the GDP difference with the difference concerning purchasing power of 1 Taler based on the Big Mac Index (<https://www.economist.com/big-mac-index>) in additional analyses. These analyses are reported below (see section ‘Differences in Purchasing Power across Nations’) and lead to the same conclusions.

	(1) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe offers	(2) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe acceptance	(3) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe offers	(4) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe acceptance
Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (interaction partner's nation)	0.328*** (8.29)	0.0373*** (8.08)	0.322*** (7.81)	0.0364*** (7.42)
GDP difference (between interaction partners' nations)	0.00000677*** (3.39)	0.000000796*** (3.52)	0.00000711*** (3.41)	0.000000850*** (3.54)
Participant age			-0.00910*** (-3.58)	-0.00152*** (-6.16)
Participant gender (female = 0; male = 1)			0.143** (2.69)	0.0101+ (1.83)
Constant	4.359*** (48.74)	0.380*** (38.72)	4.658*** (36.40)	0.436*** (30.85)
Observations	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476
Cluster/nations	18	18	18	18
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.023	0.021	0.029

Table S5 | Regression table depicting the effect of foreign bribery reputation and GDP difference on nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers and acceptance. The results stem from OLS regression analyses (with bootstrapped cluster-corrected standard errors at the national level) predicting nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers (Model 1) and acceptance (Model 2) by foreign bribery reputation, operationalized with Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (of the respective interaction partner's nation), the difference in GDP between both interaction partners' nations (Models 1 & 3: citizens'-public officials' nation; Models 2 & 4: public officials'-citizens' nation). Models 3 and 4 additionally control for participant age and gender. *t*-statistics in parentheses. + $p < .10$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

H2a-b: The probability of offering and accepting bribes increases with a) nation-specific expectations and (b) foreign bribery reputation of the interaction partner's nation.

Confirming our pre-registered hypotheses, logistic regression analyses with bootstrapped standard errors (200 repetitions) at the national level reveal that both, bribe offers and acceptance are significantly and positively related to participants' nation-specific expectations about bribery (Table S6, Models 1, 2, 5, & 6) and foreign bribery reputation (=BPI scores; Models 3, 4, 7, & 8). Per pre-registration, we control for economic disparities between interaction partners' nations (GDP difference) and demographics (age, gender). The results are robust to including these national-level economic and individual-level demographic characteristics. These findings suggest that nation-specific expectations about bribery shape people's willingness to engage in bribery.

	(1) Bribe offer	(2) Bribe acceptance	(3) Bribe offer	(4) Bribe acceptance	(5) Bribe offer	(6) Bribe acceptance	(7) Bribe offer	(8) Bribe acceptance
Nation-specific expectations about acceptance (Models 1 & 5) / offers (Models 2 & 6)	1.736*** (15.82)	0.171*** (20.93)			1.714*** (15.72)	0.169*** (20.57)		
Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (interaction partners' nation)			0.305*** (9.45)	0.188*** (4.76)			0.301*** (8.96)	0.182*** (4.65)
GDP difference (between interaction partners' nations)	0.00000667*** (5.65)	0.00000614*** (4.43)	0.00000544*** (4.42)	0.00000574** (3.22)	0.00000692*** (5.70)	0.00000650*** (4.82)	0.00000576*** (4.54)	0.00000616*** (3.55)
Participant age					-0.00666*** (-5.97)	-0.00969*** (-5.74)	-0.00846*** (-6.67)	-0.0106*** (-6.21)
Participant gender (female = 0; male = 1)					0.104** (3.14)	0.122*** (3.40)	0.118*** (3.68)	0.140*** (4.30)

Constant	-1.367*** (-18.27)	-1.065*** (-12.84)	-0.926*** (-15.11)	-0.444*** (-5.27)	-1.145*** (-16.06)	-0.730*** (-11.16)	-0.644*** (-10.22)	-0.0862 (-1.24)
Observations	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476
Cluster/nations	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Pseudo R^2	0.0454	0.0416	0.0163	0.0107	0.0470	0.0448	0.0189	0.0147

Table S6 | Regression table depicting the effect of nation-specific expectations and foreign bribery reputation on the binary decision to offer and accept bribes. Results stem from logistic regression analyses with bootstrapped cluster-corrected standard errors at the national level predicting bribe offers (Models 1, 3, 5 & 7) and acceptance (Models 2, 4, 6 & 8) by nation-specific expectations (Models 1, 2, 5, & 6) or foreign bribery reputation operationalized with Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (of the respective interaction partner's nation; Models 3, 4, 7, & 8). The models control for the difference in GDP between both interaction partners' nations (Models 1, 3, 5, & 7: citizens'-public officials' nations; Models 2, 4, 6, & 8: public officials'-citizens' nations). Models 5-8 additionally control for participants' age and gender. z-statistics in parentheses. ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Exploratory Analyses

Simulations on Successful Bribery Transactions

We ran simulations with 10,000 repetitions in which we randomly paired participants from all 18 nations and in both roles (citizen & public official). We recorded for each pair whether or not a bribe occurred, i.e., whether the citizen offered and the public official accepted a bribe. On the resulting indicator, we ran a logistic regression predicting a successful bribe (yes vs. no) with foreign bribery reputation. The results reveal that the probability of successful bribery increases with the partner's BPI, $b_{average} = .24$, $Z_{average} = 3.28$. In 70% of the cases, this result was significant. Hence, the foreign bribery reputation of a given nation increases the chances of successful bribery.

Bribe Offers Predicted by own vs. Interaction Partner's Nation

To analyze whether participants' own or their interaction partners' nation is more important (explains more variance) for bribe offers, we conducted two regression models with cluster-corrected standard errors at the national level predicting bribe offers by own (Model 1: Pseudo $R^2 = 0.0055$; $BIC = 129,663$) vs. interaction partner nation dummies (Model 2: Pseudo $R^2 = 0.0266$; $BIC = 127,101$). The analyses reveal that a regression model predicting bribe offer by own nation explains less variance and has lower informational value, suggesting that the interaction partners' nation plays a more significant role than the own nation in the emergence of bribe offers. It appears that for the decision to instigate bribery across nations, it matters more *whom one is matched with than where one is from*.

Bribe Acceptance and Foreign Bribery Reputation

The results in the main text mostly focus on bribe *offers*. Analyses of bribe *acceptance* further support that bribery across borders largely hinges on the interaction partner's national background. When deciding whether to accept a bribe from a given nation, people appear to consider the foreign bribery reputation of the respective citizen's nation. As depicted in Fig. S2, public officials accept bribes offered from citizens' nations with a high reputation for foreign bribery (yellow to dark red symbols) more often than those stemming from nations with a low foreign bribery reputation (green symbols). This pattern occurs with consistency across the nations in the main study. It arguably provides even more robust evidence that non-strategic aspects related to foreign bribery reputation matter because, in contrast to offering bribes, accepting bribes has no strategic component (i.e., accepting bribes always increases the public officials' payoffs).




Fig. S2 | Accepted bribes across nations, showing that bribe acceptance corresponds with foreign bribery reputation. Bribe acceptance rates for all combinations of citizens' and public officials' nations. The y-axis depicts the public officials' nations (i.e., deciding to accept or reject a potential bribe offer). The symbols represent the citizens' nations (i.e., deciding whether to offer a bribe). The citizens' nations are color-coded by their rank on Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index, which serves as a proxy for foreign bribery reputation. RU is the nation with the lowest rank (i.e., dark red; highest foreign bribery reputation), and NL is the nation with the highest rank (i.e., dark green; lowest foreign bribery reputation). Nation coding: RU = Russia; CN = China; AR = Argentina; IN = India; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa; HK = Hong Kong; IT = Italy; BR = Brazil; KR = South Korea; FR = France; US = United States of America; GB = Great Britain; SG = Singapore; CA = Canada; AU = Australia; JP = Japan; NL = Netherlands. Symbol explanation: diamonds depict Asian nations, circles depict European nations, and squares depict other nations.

Mediation Model

It is theoretically conceivable that nation-specific expectations about bribe acceptance mediate the link between foreign bribery reputation and offering bribes. Indeed, an exploratory multilevel mediation analysis with bribe offer as the dependent variable, foreign bribery reputation (=Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index of the public officials' nation) as the independent variable, and nation-specific expectations about acceptance of bribe offers as a mediator revealed a significant indirect effect of nation-specific expectations ($b = .02$, $SE = .0005$, 95% CI for b [.018; .020], $p < .001$, Fig. S3). Nation-specific expectations overall mediated 24% of the total effect. We adopted a structural equation modeling approach in STATA using the gsem command to estimate the mediation model and conducted bootstrapping analyses to assess the significance of the indirect effect (25). The model includes random intercepts at the national level.




Fig. S3 | Schematic mediation model of the link between foreign bribery reputation (= score on Bribe Payers Index) and bribe offer, mediated by nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe acceptance. The link between Transparency International's BPI on bribe offers (bottom part) is partially mediated by nation-specific expectations (upper part).

Miscalibration

The results presented in the main text reveal that nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe acceptance are often inaccurate (see Fig. S4). Put differently, nation-specific expectations are shared but miscalibrated (see formal definition of miscalibration in 'Glossary').

We conducted exploratory analyses to test whether miscalibration differs between (a) bribery across nations, (b) parochial interactions (bribery within the same nation), and (c) interactions with culturally similar groups. To operationalize cultural similarity, we use the most recent estimate of cultural distance proposed by Muthukrishna and colleagues (9, data source: , 26).

Table S7 presents four OLS regression analyses based on all nation combinations (324 observations in total) and predicting miscalibration by parochial bribery (yes vs. no; Models 1 and 2) and cultural distance (Models 3 and 4). Results of Models 1 and 2 reveal that miscalibration levels are lower for parochial interactions (i.e., interactions within the same nation) compared to all other interactions. Models 3 and 4 show that miscalibration decreases with increasing cultural similarity between interaction partners' nations. These results suggest that people have more accurate nation-specific expectations about bribe acceptance for their own nation and for nations that are culturally similar to theirs. These findings support the contact hypothesis – a classic social psychological theory according to which contact with out-groups reduces stereotypes (27, see recent meta-analysis 28). Here, we find first evidence that the more accustomed people are to their interaction partners, the more accurately they can estimate whether bribe offers will be accepted

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Miscalibration	Miscalibration	Miscalibration	Miscalibration
Parochial bribery (no = 0; yes = 1)	-0.0694*** (-3.92)	-0.0694*** (-3.96)		
Cultural distance			0.351*** (4.26)	0.319*** (3.90)
Citizens' nations (Models 1/3)				
Public officials' nations (Models 2/4)				
US	.0301969+ (1.81)	-.0370694* (-2.24)	.0375241* (2.24)	-.0304019+ (-1.83)
Netherlands	0.00197 (0.12)	-0.00894 (-0.54)	-0.00217 (-0.13)	-0.0127 (-0.77)
France	-0.000816 (-0.05)	-0.0290+ (-1.75)	-0.00740 (-0.44)	-0.0350* (-2.11)
Brazil	-0.0419* (-2.51)	0.0383* (2.31)	-0.0423* (-2.54)	0.0380* (2.29)
Italy	0.0335* (2.00)	-0.00661 (-0.40)	0.0374* (2.24)	-0.00310 (-0.19)
Russia	0.0645*** (3.86)	0.0629*** (3.80)	0.0644*** (3.87)	0.0629*** (3.80)
Turkey	0.0120 (0.71)	0.000396 (0.02)	0.000705 (0.04)	-0.00984 (-0.59)
South Korea	-0.00745 (-0.45)	-0.00555 (-0.34)	-0.00238 (-0.14)	-0.000936 (-0.06)
China	-0.000594 (-0.04)	-0.0267 (-1.61)	-0.0149 (-0.88)	-0.0397* (-2.35)
Japan	-0.0263 (-1.57)	-0.00948 (-0.57)	-0.0363* (-2.16)	-0.0185 (-1.11)

Argentina	0.0258 (1.54)	0.0398* (2.41)	0.0332* (1.98)	0.0466** (2.80)
Hong Kong	0.0210 (1.26)	-0.0193 (-1.17)	0.0207 (1.24)	-0.0196 (-1.19)
India	-0.0462** (-2.76)	0.0383* (2.31)	-0.0458** (-2.75)	0.0387* (2.33)
South Africa	-0.00408 (-0.24)	0.0395* (2.38)	-0.00681 (-0.41)	0.0370* (2.23)
Singapore	0.0132 (0.79)	-0.0514** (-3.10)	0.0237 (1.41)	-0.0419* (-2.50)
Great Britain	-0.0374* (-2.24)	-0.0128 (-0.77)	-0.0372* (-2.23)	-0.0126 (-0.76)
Australia	-0.00882 (-0.53)	-0.00904 (-0.55)	-0.00409 (-0.25)	-0.00474 (-0.29)
Canada	-0.0285+ (-1.71)	-0.00331 (-0.20)	-0.0184 (-1.09)	0.00595 (0.36)
Constant	0.114*** (27.29)	0.114*** (27.59)	0.0738*** (7.83)	0.0770*** (8.22)
Observations/nation combinations	324	324	324	324
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.144	0.134	0.143

Table S7 | Table depicting the effect of parochial bribery and cultural distance on the degree of miscalibration between expected and actual acceptance rates. Miscalibration is operationalized as the absolute difference between nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe acceptance and actual acceptance rates in the bribery game. The models control for interaction partners' (citizens': Models 1 & 3; public officials': Models 2 & 4) nations dummies (effect coded). Miscalibration is predicted by parochial bribery (yes vs. no; Models 1 & 2) or by cultural distance using the index proposed by Muthukrishna and colleagues (9) in Models 3 & 4. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$, **** $p < .001$.




Fig. S4 | Cleveland dot plot depicting miscalibration between expected and actual bribe acceptance for parochial bribery (= bribery within the same nation). Orange dots depict nation-specific expectations about bribe acceptance, and red dots depict actual bribe acceptance rates for parochial bribery. The y-axis depicts the citizens' nations. The lines connecting the dots represent the difference between expected and actual acceptance rates (i.e., the degree of miscalibration).

Perceived Social Norms in One's Own and Interaction Partner's Nation.

We assessed perceived social norms using the commonly proposed distinction between descriptive and injunctive norms (29). We asked participants to rate on a 7-point scale how acceptable (injunctive norms) and common (descriptive norms) they think bribery is in each of the participating nations (including their own). We included both types of social norms because insights from recent literature reviews indicate that both impact the decision to engage in bribery (30, 31).

Our findings indicate that social norms perceptions about bribery in the participants' *own nations* had little effect on their willingness to offer and accept bribes (see Fig. S5). However, social norms perceptions regarding the *respective interaction partner's nation* had a strong effect on bribe offers and acceptance rates.




Fig. S5. Dot-and-whisker plot depicting the effect of social norms on bribe offer and acceptance for one's own and interaction partner's nation. The blue dots represent the semi-standardized regression coefficients and their confidence intervals for perceived descriptive and injunctive norms in a logistic regression analysis predicting the decision to offer (left pane) and accept (right pane) bribes. Cluster-corrected standard errors at the national level are used. The upper part depicts estimates for the participant's own nation, whereas the lower part depicts the estimate for the respective interaction partner's nation.

Table S8 reports the corresponding logistic regression analyses. Model 1 predicts bribe offer based on perceived descriptive and injunctive norms of bribery in one's own and the interaction partner's nation. Model 2 uses the same predictors to predict the non-strategic decision to accept bribes. Model 3 includes the nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe acceptance as an additional control variable to the predictors of bribe offers.

A main pattern of results emerges: social norm perceptions for one's own nation have no significant influence on the decision to offer or accept bribes. However, social norm perceptions about bribery in the interaction partner's nation strongly influence both decisions. This pattern is robust to controlling for nation-specific expectations about bribe acceptance (Model 3). People are more willing to offer and accept bribes when matched with interaction partners from nations where such bribery is perceived as an acceptable (injunctive norm) and common (descriptive norm) course of action. Hence, perceived norms play a crucial role in bribery across nations.

	(1) Bribe offer	(2) Bribe acceptance	(3) Bribe offer
Own nation			
Descriptive norm	-0.0162 (-0.90)	-0.0147 (-0.83)	-0.0182 (-1.09)
Injunctive norm	-0.00786 (-0.54)	0.0229* (1.41)	-0.00457 (-0.33)
Interaction partner's nation			
Descriptive norm	0.193*** (9.86)	0.190*** (10.26)	0.146*** (8.94)
Injunctive norm	0.139*** (13.13)	0.165*** (11.33)	0.115*** (12.05)
Nation-specific expectations about bribe acceptance			1.253*** (14.03)
Constant	-1.811*** (-19.30)	-1.636*** (-13.53)	-2.079*** (-21.54)
Observations	100,476	100,476	100,476
Cluster/nations	18	18	18
Pseudo R^2	0.0503	0.0612	0.0657

Table S8 | Regression table depicting the effect of perceived injunctive and descriptive norms on bribe offer and acceptance. Results stem from regression analyses with bootstrapped cluster-corrected standard errors at the national level predicting bribe offers (Models 1 and 3) and acceptance (Model 2) by descriptive and injunctive norms. Model 3 additionally controls for nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe acceptance.

*** $p < .001$. t statistics are reported in parentheses.

Differences Across the Economic Development of Nations

Here, we take a closer look at how the economic development of a nation impacts bribery across nations. Thus far, we have controlled for differences in GDP between participants' own and their interaction partners' nations. Here, we report extra analyses using the GDP of one's interaction partner's nation as a predictor of bribe offer (Table S9, Model 1) and acceptance (Model 2). We include nation-specific expectations (Models 1 and 2) or foreign bribery reputation (BPI score of interaction partner's nation; Models 3 and 4). The results suggest that citizens offer more bribes to public officials from poorer (vs. richer) nations, even when controlling for foreign bribery reputation, nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe acceptance, age, and gender.

Similarly, public officials accept more bribes from poorer (vs. richer) nations when controlling for foreign bribery reputation, nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers, age, and gender. In real-life settings, this could increase losses due to bribery in poor compared to rich nations, as bribery typically causes damage to the public official's nation in which it occurs. For example, bribes paid by the German company Siemens abroad most strongly affected the public officials' nations (32). However, since this analysis draws on $N = 18$ (corresponding to one value for each nation), the results must be interpreted cautiously to avoid premature inferences.

	(1) Bribe offer	(2) Bribe acceptance	(3) Bribe offer	(4) Bribe acceptance
Nation-specific expectations (about bribe acceptance, Model 1; about bribe offers, Model 2)	1.713*** (16.09)	2.345*** (20.81)		
GDP (interaction partner's nation)	-0.0000120*** (-12.27)	-0.00000744*** (-10.05)	-0.00000995*** (-9.72)	-0.00000779*** (-11.32)
Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (interaction partner's nation)			0.233*** (8.55)	0.154*** (7.20)
Participant age			-0.00767*** (-6.19)	-0.00967*** (-5.67)
Participant gender (female = 0; male = 1)			0.114*** (3.63)	0.135*** (4.13)
Constant	-0.913*** (-12.38)	-0.972** (-11.21)	-0.235*** (-4.60)	0.199*** (3.99)
Observations	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476
Cluster/nations	18	18	18	18
Pseudo R^2	0.0488	0.0712	0.0196	0.0131

Table S9 | Analyses predicting bribery with economic performance, foreign bribery reputation, and demographics. Logistic regression with bootstrapped cluster-corrected standard errors at the national level predicting bribe offer (Model 1) and acceptance (Model 2) by nation-specific

expectations about the percentage of bribe acceptance (Model 1) or nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers (Model 2), foreign bribery reputation (TI Bribe Payers Index score of interaction partner's nation; Models 3 and 4) and the GDP of the respective interaction partners' nations, hence in Models 1 & 3 of public officials' nations and in Models 2 & 4 of citizens' nations. Models 2 and 4 additionally control for participants' age and gender. z-statistics in parentheses. *** $p < .001$.

Differences in Purchasing Power across Nations

To control for differences in purchasing power across nations, we first converted one unit of experimental currency (= 1 Taler) into purchasing power-corrected values using the international Big Mac Index (for an overview, see Table S1). In additional analyses, we control for purchasing power disparities with these Big Mac Index-corrected values of 1 Taler. Table S10 reports regression analyses on nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers and acceptance that include the difference in the Big Mac Index scores between both interaction partners' nations. The main results reported in the main text are robust to controlling for purchasing power in this way. Namely, we still observe a positive link between foreign bribery reputation and nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers and acceptance, also in models that additionally control for age and gender.

	(1) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe offers	(2) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe acceptance	(3) Nation- specific expectations about percentage of bribe offers	(4) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe acceptance
Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (interaction partner's nation)	0.443*** (15.06)	0.0507*** (13.40)	0.444*** (15.07)	0.0507*** (13.40)
Big Mac Index difference (between interaction partners' nations)	-0.634 (-1.00)	-0.0157 (-0.20)	-0.647 (-1.07)	-0.0169 (-0.19)
Participant age			-0.00810*** (-3.51)	-0.00140*** (-6.42)
Participant gender (female = 0; male = 1)			0.138** (2.63)	0.00943+ (1.75)
Constant	4.241*** (46.30)	0.366*** (38.94)	4.497*** (47.42)	0.417*** (45.56)
Observations	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476
Cluster/nations	18	18	18	18
Adjusted R^2	0.013	0.017	0.016	0.022

Table S10 | Regression tables depicting the effect of foreign bribery reputation, Big Mac Index difference on expectations about the percentage of bribe offers and acceptance. The results stem from OLS regression analyses (with bootstrapped cluster-corrected standard errors at the national level) predicting nation-specific expectations about bribe offers (Model 1) and acceptance (Model 2) by foreign bribery reputation (= Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index score for the respective interaction partners' nation) and the difference between the interaction partner's nations Big Mac Index (=how many Big Macs can be purchased for 1 Taler in each nation). The Big Mac Difference score for Models 1 & 3 is calculated by citizens' - public officials' nations and Models 2 & 4 for public officials' - citizens' nations. Models 3 and 4 additionally control for participant age and gender. t -statistics in parentheses. + $p < .1$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

We also test whether the observed effects for bribe offer and acceptance are robust to controlling for purchasing power corrections. Table S11 shows that the results reported in the main text remain qualitatively the same when controlling for differences in Big Mac Index scores between the interaction partners' nations. Namely, nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe acceptance and offers still significantly positively predict bribe offers and acceptance. Also, the positive link between foreign bribery reputation and bribe offer and acceptance remains significant and positive when controlling for the Big Mac Index difference. Both of these findings also hold when additionally controlling for age and gender.

	(1) Bribe offer	(2) Bribe acceptance	(3) Bribe offer	(4) Bribe acceptance	(5) Bribe offer	(6) Bribe acceptance	(7) Bribe offer	(8) Bribe acceptance
Nation-specific expectations about bribe acceptance (Models 1 & 5) / bribe offers (Models 2 & 6)	1.808*** (15.96)	0.177*** (21.29)			1.792*** (15.95)	0.175*** (20.93)		
Big Mac Index difference (between interaction partners' nations)	-0.0956 (-0.15)	-0.141 (-0.21)	-0.674 (-1.29)	-0.611 (-0.85)	-0.105 (-0.19)	-0.154 (-0.22)	-0.690 (-1.46)	-0.630 (-0.80)
Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (interaction partner's nation)			0.395*** (12.84)	0.284*** (11.66)			0.396*** (12.79)	0.286*** (11.51)
Participant age					-0.00548*** (-5.15)	-0.00864*** (-5.16)	-0.00763*** (-6.18)	-0.00964*** (-5.69)
Participant gender (female = 0; male = 1)					0.0976** (3.01)	0.115** (3.21)	0.113*** (3.64)	0.135*** (4.14)

Constant	-1.394*** (-18.99)	-1.094*** (-12.40)	-1.014*** (-19.22)	-0.541*** (-6.93)	-1.218*** (-18.59)	-0.799*** (-12.40)	-0.768*** (-17.29)	-0.224*** (-4.39)
Observations	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476
Cluster/nations	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Pseudo R^2	0.0395	0.0364	0.0129	0.0067	0.0407	0.0390	0.0151	0.0102

Table S11 | Regression table depicting the effect of nation-specific expectations and foreign bribery reputation on the binary decision to offer and accept bribes. Results stem from logistic regression analyses with bootstrapped cluster-corrected standard errors at the national level predicting bribe offer (Models 1 and 3) and acceptance (Models 2 and 4) by nation-specific expectations (Models 1 and 2) or foreign bribery reputation (=Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index of interaction partners' nations; Models 3 and 4). The models control for the Big Mac Difference (Models 1, 3, 5, & 7: citizens'-public officials' nations; Models 2, 4, 6, & 8: public officials'-citizens' nations). Models 5-8 additionally control for participants' age and gender. z-statistics in parentheses. ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Support for Work of Climate Change NGO that was Negatively Affected by Bribery

We asked participants how much they supported the work of atmosfair, the climate protection NGO that incurred the cost of bribery, as each successful bribery transaction in the actual matching after the experiment reduced a donation to this NGO. Overall, we find positive support for their work with a grand mean of 5.43 (on a 7-point scale from 1 = “I don’t support it at all” to 7 = “I support it very much”).

Significant differences across nations exist (see Table S12). For instance, compared to the grand mean, participants from Brazil indicated higher support for the work of the NGO. In contrast, participants from Italy supported the work of the NGO less than average. Due to these differences between nations, we conducted additional robustness tests for the main results, controlling for the support of the work of atmosfair in regression analyses (see Table S13). The results reveal that the willingness to offer bribes decreases with the support of the NGO’s work, suggesting sensitivity towards the victim of the bribery transaction. Importantly, all main results are robust when controlling for the support of the NGO’s work. Results also remain stable when controlling for differences between interactions partners’ GDP levels (Table S13) or relative differences in purchasing power (Big Mac Index differences, see Table S14).

Support for the work of atmosfair	
Netherlands	-0.476*** (-5.94)
US	0.131 (1.59)
France	-0.146 (-1.82)
Brazil	0.541*** (6.86)
Italy	-0.259** (-3.44)
Russia	0.199* (2.48)
Turkey	0.408*** (5.14)
South Korea	-0.329*** (-4.07)
China	0.252*** (3.18)
Japan	-0.845*** (-10.66)
Argentina	0.725*** (9.74)
Hong Kong	-0.292*** (-3.68)
India	0.250** (3.18)
South Africa	0.350*** (4.37)
Singapore	0.0520 (0.65)

Great Britain	-0.00468 (-0.06)
Australia	-0.217** (-2.71)
Canada	-0.340*** (-4.23)
Constant	5.430*** (281.77)
Observations	5582
Adjusted R^2	0.066

Table S12 | Support for the work by atmosfair across all nations in the main study. Significance testing compared to the grand mean (=constant), coefficients indicate differences from the grand mean, t -statistics in parentheses, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

	(1) Bribe offer	(2) Bribe acceptance	(3) Bribe offer	(4) Bribe acceptance
Nation-specific expectations about bribe acceptance (Model 1) / bribe offers (Model 2)	1.757*** (16.05)	2.358*** (20.85)		
GDP difference (between interaction partners' nations)	0.00000635*** (5.47)	0.00000521*** (4.04)	0.00000512*** (4.24)	0.00000562*** (3.11)
Support for atmosfair's work	-0.0660*** (-7.06)	-0.0369* (-2.40)	-0.0553*** (-6.41)	-0.0208 (-1.36)
TI Bribe Payers Index (interaction partner's nation)			0.311*** (9.97)	0.190*** (4.76)
Constant	-1.019*** (-12.40)	-1.055*** (-9.57)	-0.632*** (-8.23)	-0.333*** (-2.84)
Observations	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476
Cluster/nations	18	18	18	18
Pseudo R^2	0.0470	0.0719	0.0175	0.0108

Table S13 | Analyses predicting bribery with participants' approval of the NGO's work against climate change. Logistic regression analyses with bootstrapped cluster-corrected standard errors at the national level predicting bribe offer (Model 1) and acceptance (Model 2) by nation-specific expectations (Models 1 & 2) or foreign bribery reputation (Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index of the respective interaction partner's nation; Models 3 & 4). The models control for the difference in GDP between both interaction partners' nations (Models 1 & 3: citizens'-public officials' nations; Models 2 & 4: public officials'-citizens' nations) and the valuation of the NGO atmosfair. z-statistics in parentheses. * $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$.

	(1) Bribe offer	(2) Bribe acceptance	(3) Bribe offer	(4) Bribe acceptance
Nation-specific expectations about bribe acceptance (Model 1) / bribe offers (Model 2)	1.828*** (16.15)	2.417*** (20.53)		
Big Mac Index Difference (between interaction partners' nations)	-0.126 (-0.17)	-0.319 (-0.51)	-0.699 (-1.19)	-0.623 (-0.89)
Support for atmosfair's work	-0.0768*** (-8.57)	-0.0463** (-2.88)	-0.0642*** (-6.92)	-0.0310+ (-1.90)
Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (interaction partner's nation)			0.396*** (12.90)	0.285*** (11.68)
Constant	-0.987*** (-12.07)	-1.029*** (-9.22)	-0.667*** (-8.65)	-0.373** (-3.08)
Observations	100,476	100,476	100,476	100,476
Cluster/nations	18	18	18	18
Pseudo R^2	0.0417	0.0683	0.0145	0.0071

Table S14 | Regression analyses predicting bribery with nation-specific economic performance and participants' approval of the NGO's work against climate change. Logistic regression analyses with bootstrapped cluster-corrected standard errors at the national level predicting bribe offer (Model 1) and acceptance (Model 2) by nation-specific expectations (Models 1 and 2) or foreign bribery reputation, operationalized with Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (interaction partners' nation; Models 3 & 4). The models control for the Big Mac difference between both interaction partners' nations (Models 1 & 3: citizens'-public officials' nations; Models 2 & 4: public officials'-citizens' nations as well as for the valuation of the NGO atmosfair. z-statistics in parentheses. + $p < .01$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Time Trends of Bribe Offers and Bribe Acceptance

In the pre-registration of our main study, we stated that we would assess whether order effects prevail in the responses across the 18 nations covered in the strategy method (= 18 interaction partners) in individually randomized order. Namely, we pre-registered an analysis comparing the behavior for the first three nations presented with the behavior for the last three nations by using a dummy variable (order: 0 = first three nations; 1 = last three nations). We tested whether bribe offer and acceptance differ between those first and last three nations, which would indicate order effects. Predicting bribe offer/bribe acceptance in regression analyses (with bootstrapped cluster-corrected standard errors at the national level) with this dummy variable of order did not reveal any significant time trends for bribe offer ($b = 0.04$, $z = 0.13$, $p = .900$) or bribe acceptance ($b = -0.014$, $z = -0.69$, $p = .491$).

Results Pilot Study

We conducted a pre-registered pilot study with three nations (Germany, Mexico, and Spain, see for more information Table S15).

Nation	<i>N</i>	Survey language	<i>M</i> _{age} (SD)	% Female
Germany	298	German	42.85 (13.25)	49.66
Mexico	290	Spanish	37.06 (12.54)	48.97
Spain	302	Spanish	41.82 (11.70)	50.00

Table S15 | Overview table showing the descriptive statistics for the sample characteristics for the pilot study using three nations. Nations, sample sizes, survey language, mean and standard deviation of age, percentage of female participants.

Pre-registered Analyses

In the pre-registration of the pilot study (<https://osf.io/fumzb>), we specified three hypotheses.

H1a: Nation-specific expectations about bribery are shared within nations.

Confirming our pre-registered hypothesis, we find that intraclass correlations (ICC) for nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers and acceptance are significant within each nation (see Table S16).

Nation	ICC offer [95% CI]	ICC acceptance [95% CI]
Germany	.110 [.030; .833]	.082 [.021; .786]
Spain	.122 [.034; .849]	.129 [.036; .856]
Mexico	.031 [.637; .998]	.105 [.028; .826]

Table S16 | Table showing the intraclass correlations (ICC) for nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers and acceptance across nations. ICC estimates and their 95% confidence intervals were calculated based on an individual rating (rater = participant), consistency-agreement, and 2-way mixed-effects model.

H1b: Nation-specific expectations about bribery are shared across nations.

Confirming the pre-registered hypothesis, nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers in our task are shared across nations (intraclass correlation of expectations with 3 “raters” and 3 “targets” = .84, $p < .001$). Also, nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe acceptance are shared across nations (intraclass correlation of expectations = .978, $p < .001$).

H1c: Nation-specific expectations correlate positively with foreign bribery reputation.

In line with the pre-registered hypothesis, we find a positive link between foreign bribery reputation and nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers (Table S17, Model 1) and bribe acceptance (Model 2) when controlling for the GDP difference between interaction partners’ nations. This positive link remains robust when conducting the pre-registered analysis of introducing participants’ age and gender (Models 3 & 4).

	(1) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe offers	(2) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe acceptance	(3) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe offers	(4) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe acceptance
Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (interaction partner's nation)	1.155** (2.83)	0.279*** (6.49)	1.155** (2.83)	0.279*** (6.49)
GDP difference (between interactions partners' nations)	-0.0000113 (-0.62)	-0.00000665*** (-3.48)	-0.0000113 (-0.62)	-0.00000665*** (-3.48)
Participant age			-0.00725 (-1.39)	-0.00171** (-3.20)
Participant gender (female = 0; male = 1)			0.236+ (1.80)	0.0212 (1.54)
Constant	3.690*** (26.79)	0.269*** (18.24)	3.884*** (14.69)	0.332*** (11.91)
Observations	2,670	2,670	2,670	2,670
Cluster/ participants	890	890	890	890
Adjusted R ²	0.057	0.101	0.059	0.108

Table S17 | Regression table showing the effects of foreign bribery reputation, GDP difference, age, and gender on nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers and acceptance. OLS regression analyses predicting expectations about the percentage of bribe offers (Model 1) and acceptance (Model 2) by foreign bribery reputation (= Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index of respective interaction partner's nation), the difference in GDP between both interaction partners' nations (Model 1 & 3: citizens'-public officials' nations; Models 2 & 4: public officials'-citizens' nations), and citizens' nation dummies (omitted). Models 3 and 4 additionally control for participant age and gender. *t*-statistics in parentheses. +*p* < .1, ***p* < .01, ****p* < .001.

H2a-b: The probability of offering and accepting bribes increases with a) nation-specific expectations about bribery and (b) foreign bribery reputation of the interaction partner's nation.

The pre-registered analyses confirm the hypothesized links between nation-specific expectations concerning the percentage of bribe acceptance and bribe offers (Model 1, Table S18). We furthermore find support for the hypothesized link between nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers and actual bribe acceptance (Model 2). When controlling for the GDP difference between interaction partners' nations (as specified in the pre-registration), the analyses do not reveal the predicted positive links between the foreign bribery reputation (=BPI score) and bribe offer (Model 3) and bribe acceptance (Model 4). Upon further inspection, we observe considerable overlap between GDP and BPI. To avoid multicollinearity concerns, we also add two non-pre-registered models that do not control for the GDP difference. These analyses show positive links between foreign bribery reputation and bribe offers (Model 5) and bribe acceptance (Model 6).

	(1) Bribe offer	(2) Bribe acceptance	(3) Bribe offer	(4) Bribe acceptance	(5) Bribe offer	(6) Bribe acceptance
Nation-specific expectations about bribe acceptance (Model 1) / bribe offers (Model 2)	1.694*** (9.02)	0.132*** (6.93)				
GDP difference (between interaction partners' nations)	0.0000250*** (8.25)	0.0000288*** (10.72)	0.0000535+ (1.93)	0.0000490* (2.15)		
Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (interaction partner's nation)			-0.447 (-0.73)	-0.354 (-0.70)	0.737*** (11.72)	0.736*** (12.86)
Constant	-2.049*** (-16.61)	-1.734*** (-13.61)	-1.411*** (-10.49)	-1.150*** (-9.23)	-1.565*** (-14.88)	-1.297*** (-12.55)
Observations	2,670	2,670	2,670	2,670	2,670	2,670
Cluster/participants	890	890	890	890	890	890
Pseudo R^2	0.0720	0.0593	0.0419	0.0421	0.0410	0.0414

Table S18 | Regression table showing the effects of nation-specific expectations, GDP difference, and foreign bribery reputation on bribe offer and acceptance. Results stem from logistic regression analyses predicting bribe offer (Model 1) and acceptance (Model 2) by nation-specific expectations (Models 1 & 2) or foreign bribery reputation (= Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index score for respective interaction partner's nation; Models 3 and 4) and the difference in GDP between the interaction partners' nations (Model 1 & 3: citizens'-public officials' nations; Models 2 & 4: public officials'-citizens' nations), and own nation dummies (omitted). z-statistics in parentheses. + $p < .1$, * $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$.

Exploratory Analysis (Pilot Study)

Differences in Purchasing Power across Nations

To control for differences in purchasing power across nations, we first converted one unit of experimental currency (= 1 Taler) into purchasing power-corrected values using the international Big Mac Index. In additional analyses, we controlled for purchasing power disparities with these Big Mac Index-corrected values of 1 Taler instead of the GDP difference between nations (see Tables S19 & S20).

	(1) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe offers	(2) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe acceptance	(3) Nation-specific expectations about percentage of bribe offers	(4) National level expectation about percentage of bribe acceptance
Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (interaction partner's nation)	0.836*** (6.53)	0.0912*** (6.97)	0.836*** (6.52)	0.0912*** (6.97)
Big Mac difference (between interaction partners' nations)	-8.618 (-0.62)	-5.057*** (-3.48)	-8.618 (-0.62)	-5.057*** (-3.48)
Participant age			-0.00725 (-1.39)	-0.00171** (-3.20)
Participant gender (female = 0; male = 1)			0.236+ (1.80)	0.0212 (1.54)
Constant	3.754*** (27.05)	0.307*** (21.18)	3.948*** (14.96)	0.370*** (13.59)
Observations	2670	2670	2670	2670
Cluster/participa nts	890	890	890	890
Adjusted R ²	0.057	0.101	0.059	0.108

Table S19| Regression table showing the effects of foreign bribery reputation, Big Mac difference, age, and gender on nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers and acceptance. OLS regression analyses predicting expectations about the percentage of bribe offers (Model 1) and acceptance (Model 2) by foreign bribery reputation (= Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index of respective interaction partner's nation), the Big Mac difference between both interaction partners' nations (Model 1 & 3: citizens'-public officials' nations; Models 2 &

4: public officials'-citizens' nations), and citizens' nation dummies (omitted). Models 3 and 4 additionally control for participant age and gender. *t*-statistics in parentheses. +*p* < .1, ***p* < .01, ****p* < .001.

	(1) Bribe offer	(2) Bribe acceptance	(3) Bribe offer	(4) Bribe acceptance	(5) Bribe offer	(6) Bribe acceptance
Nation-specific expectations about bribe acceptance (Model 1) / bribe offers (Model 2)	1.739*** (9.33)	0.136*** (7.22)				
Big Mac difference (between interaction partners' nations)	-56.60*** (-7.02)	-68.40*** (-9.89)	40.66+ (1.93)	37.23* (2.15)		
Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (interaction partner's nation)			1.060*** (5.92)	1.026*** (6.79)	0.737*** (11.72)	0.736*** (12.86)
Constant	-1.835*** (-15.71)	-1.503*** (-12.32)	-1.712*** (-13.18)	-1.426*** (-11.82)	-1.565*** (-14.88)	-1.297*** (-12.55)
Observations	2670	2670	2670	2670	2670	2670
Cluster/participants	890	890	890	890	890	890
Pseudo R^2	0.0660	0.0523	0.0419	0.0421	0.0410	0.0414

Table S20 | Regression table shows the effects of nation-specific expectations, Big Mac difference, and foreign bribery reputation on bribe offer and acceptance. Results stem from logistic regression analyses predicting bribe offer (Model 1) and acceptance (Model 2) by nation-specific expectations (Models 1 & 2) or foreign bribery reputation (= Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index score for respective interaction partner's nation; Models 3 and 4), the Big Mac difference between the interaction partners' nations (Model 1 & 3: citizens'-public officials' nations; Models 2 & 4: public officials'-citizens' nations), and own nation dummies (omitted). z-statistics in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$.

Glossary

In this glossary, we provide definitions of the terms used throughout the paper and SI.

Bribery decisions

Bribe offer (from nation A to nation B):

BO_{AB} = whether, in a given instance, a citizen from nation A offered a bribe to a public official from nation B.

Parochial bribe offer (in nation A):

BO_{AA} = whether, in a given instance, a citizen from nation A offered a bribe to a public official from nation A.

Bribe acceptance (from nation A to nation B):

BA_{AB} = whether, in a given instance, a public official from nation A accepted a bribe from a citizen from nation B.

Parochial bribe acceptance (in nation A):

BA_{AA} = whether, in a given instance, a public official from nation A accepted a bribe from a citizen from nation A.

Bribery rates

Bribe offer rates (from nation A to nation B):

BOR_{AB} = the number of all citizens in nation A who offer a bribe to a public official in nation B divided by the number of all citizens in nation A.

Parochial bribe offer rates (in nation A):

BOR_{AA} = the number of all citizens in nation A who offer a bribe to a public official in nation A divided by the number of all citizens in nation A.

Bribe acceptance rates (from nation B to nation A):

BAR_{AB} = the number of all public officials in nation A who accept a bribe from a citizen in nation B divided by the number of all public officials in nation A.

Parochial bribe acceptance rates (in nation A):

BAR_{AA} = the number of all public officials in nation A who accept a bribe from a citizen in nation A divided by the number of all public officials in nation A.

Successful bribery

Successful bribery (from nation A to nation B):

SB_{AB} = the proportion of offers from citizens from nation A to public officials from nation B multiplied by the proportion of bribe acceptance from public officials from nation B of bribe offers from citizens from nation A.

Parochial successful bribery (in nation A):

SB_{AA} = the proportion of bribe offers by citizens from nation A to public officials from nation A multiplied by the proportion of bribe acceptance from public officials from nation A of bribe offers from citizens from nation A.

Nation-specific expectations

Nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe acceptance (from nation A about nation B):

NEA_{AB} = the average expected bribe acceptance rate estimated by citizens from nation A about public officials from nation B.

Nation-specific expectations about the percentage of bribe offers (from nation A about nation B):

NEO_{AB} = the average expected bribe offer rate estimated by public officials from nation A about citizens from nation B.

Miscalibration

We define miscalibration as:

$$\sqrt{(e_x - a_x)^2}$$

where e_x denotes the nation-specific expectations for bribe acceptance and a_x denotes the actual acceptance rate in nation x , respectively.

Social norms perceptions

Perceived descriptive norms (from nation A about nation B):

PDN_{AB} = ratings by respondents from nation A on how common they think bribery is in nation B on scales ranging from 1 (= "not common at all") to 7 (= "very common").

Perceived injunctive norms (from nation A about nation B):

PIN_{AB} = ratings by respondents from nation A on how acceptable they think bribery is in nation B on scales ranging from 1 (= "not acceptable at all") to 7 (= "very acceptable").

Original Instructions (English)

Welcome to this study, which is being conducted by the University of Amsterdam in collaboration with DecisionLab Cologne!

Participation in this study will take approximately 25 minutes. You will begin the study with an amount of money that we provide, and you get to keep the amount that you have left after making decisions during the experiment.

Information on participation and data protection

Please read the following thoroughly.

Participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not want to participate in the study or if you want to end your participation, you can do so at any time by closing the browser window. You cannot participate in this study if you are under the age of 18.

All data will be scientifically analyzed. The scientific data are pseudonymized, i.e. they do not allow any conclusion about your identity. Access to the pseudonymized scientific data is available to us and to our scientific cooperation partners from other universities. The pseudonymization ensures that your identity will not be revealed during scientific analysis or scientific publications.

The data will be used exclusively for research purposes and stored only for the analysis. It is not possible to draw conclusions about individual participants.

Your experimental payoff will be credited to your Toluna account a few days after your participation.

Your experimental payoff will be credited to your Toluna account a few days after your participation.

For this study we are working together with an external service provider, the QuestBack-System on Unipark, who operates the electronic platform for the survey. We have agreed on an order processing with this service provider, which obliges him to treat personal data confidentially and to process them only for the purpose of our study.

For questions or comments, please contact:

contact@toluna.com

You can only participate in this study if you agree to participate and to the data processing described above.

You can contact the data protection officer responsible for this study under

The State Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information of North Rhine-Westphalia, P.O. Box 20 04 44, 40102 Düsseldorf (tel.: 0211/38424-0, e-mail: poststelle@ldi.nrw.de)

☐ Yes, I agree to participate in this study and to the processing of my data as described above.

☐ No, I do not agree to participate in this study and to the processing of my data as described above.

CONTINUE

What is your age in years?

CONTINUE

Please indicate your gender.

- ☐ male
- ☒ female
- ☐ diverse

CONTINUE

Welcome and thank you for participating.

The study has two parts:

In Part 1 you will take part in decision-making tasks. This first part is incentivized (i.e., you can earn a bonus payment based on your decisions).

Decisions in Part 1 will be explained in more detail below and comprehension questions will assess whether you understand the logic of the tasks. You can only start with Part 1 once you have answered these comprehension questions correctly.

It is therefore important for you to pay close attention to the instructions.

In Part 2 you have to answer a short questionnaire about yourself.

CONTINUE

In Part 1, you will participate in several decision making tasks.

You and all other participants can earn "Talers" as a bonus payment.

These Talers will be converted into Dollars at the end of the study with a conversion rate of 1:5.


That means, for every Taler you earn 5 cents.

Hence, the choices you make in the following tasks have financial consequences for you and others.

The details of the decision making tasks and the exact financial consequences for each choice are described in detail on the next pages.

CONTINUE

Here you can see an overview of the task which will be explained to you in more detail on the next pages.




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In this task, there are two roles:


1. the citizen.
2. the public official.

The main goal for the citizen is to obtain a license to use natural resources. The citizen can obtain that license in two ways, which will be outlined in more detail on the next pages.



CONTINUE


Participants in the role of the citizen will be randomly matched with a participant in the role of the public official.
That means that you will be matched with another participant.
We will refer to the person with whom you are matched as **Person B**.
You and Person B make all choices **without knowing what the other one decided**.
You will not interact with Person B after this task, nor will you discover Person B's identity.



CONTINUE


You and all other participants will make choices for both roles in the task.

That means that you and all other participants indicate what you would decide as a citizen and as a public official.



CONTINUE

The citizen starts with an endowment of 35 Talers and wants to get a **license to use natural resources**.
The license is worth 20 Talers, and it is allocated by the **public official**.




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The citizen can obtain the license to use natural resources in two ways:

1. By making an official payment.

OR

2. By making an **unofficial payment** to the public official.




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The citizen can obtain the license to use natural resources in two ways:

1. By making an **official payment**.

OR

2. By making an **unofficial payment** to the public official.




CONTINUE

The **public official** receives a **fixed salary of 20 Talers** to give the license.

If an unofficial payment is made, the public official can respond in two ways:

1. By **rejecting the unofficial payment**.
2. By **accepting the unofficial payment**.




CONTINUE

The **public official** receives a **fixed salary of 20 Talers** to give the license.

If an unofficial payment is made, the public official can respond in two ways:

1. By **rejecting an unofficial payment**.
2. By **accepting an unofficial payment**.



CONTINUE

The choices you make affect:

a) Your **own financial payoffs**.

b) **Person B's payoffs**.

c) A **donation to a charity**.

Namely, every time a citizen makes an unofficial payment

AND

the matched public official **accepts this unofficial payment**,

15 Talers will be **deducted** from a donation of **6000 Talers** to **atmosfair**.

All possible consequences for the citizen's and public official's choices are outlined in detail on the next pages.



Atmosfair GmbH was founded 2004 as part of a research project. Atmosfair is a non-profit climate-protection organization that develops and executes climate protection projects **around the globe** by developing renewable energy technology.

An example of their work is the photovoltaic power supply for a refugee camp.

Compared to the conventional power production with fossil fuels, a photovoltaic system saves a total of 1100 tons of CO2 each year, over 10 years.


At the end of the study, we'll provide you with a link to the organization's website.

Furthermore, you'll get access to a website on which you can see if and how much we donate to that charity.

CONTINUE

If the citizen decides to make the **official payment**,

- the citizen receives **40 Talers** (= 35 Talers endowment - 15 Talers official payment + 20 Talers value of the license),
- the public official **receives 20 Talers** (= fixed salary),
- and the donation to atmosfair is **reduced by 0 Talers**.




CONTINUE

If the **citizen** decides to make the **unofficial payment**,
AND

the public official **rejects** the **unofficial payment**,

the citizen **loses the unofficial payment** and has to **make the official payment**, hence:


- the citizen **receives 30 Talers** (= 35 Talers endowment - 10 Talers unofficial payment - 15 Talers official payment + 20 Talers value of the license),
- the public official **receives 20 Talers** (= fixed salary),
- and the donation to atmosfair is **reduced by 0 Talers**.



If the **citizen** decides to **make the unofficial payment**,
AND

the public official **accepts** the **unofficial payment**,


- the citizen **receives 45 Talers** (= 35 Talers endowment - 10 Talers unofficial payment + 20 Talers value of the license),
- the public official **receives 30 Talers** (= 20 Talers fix salary + 10 Talers unofficial payment),
- an the donation to atmosfair is **reduced by 15 Talers**.



CONTINUE

To make sure that you understood the logic of the decision making tasks please answer the following questions:


1. What is the consequence for the donation to atmosfair when a **citizen makes an unofficial payment** and the public official **accepts the unofficial payment**?



- ☐ The donation to atmosfair is reduced by 5 Talers.
- ☐ The donation to atmosfair is reduced by 15 Talers.
- ☐ The donation to atmosfair is reduced by 0 Talers.
- ☐ The donation to atmosfair is reduced by 10 Talers.

INSTRUCTIONS


2. If a citizen **makes an unofficial payment** and the public official **accepts the unofficial payment**, what are the payoffs for the citizen and the public official?



- ☐ The citizen earns 45 Talers and the public official earns 45 Talers.
- ☐ The citizen earns 40 Talers and the public official earns 20 Talers.
- ☐ The citizen earns 45 Talers and the public official earns 30 Talers.
- ☐ The citizen earns 35 Talers and the public official earns 20 Talers.

INSTRUCTIONS


3. If a citizen **makes an official payment** what are the payoffs for the citizen and the public official?



- ☐ The citizen earns 35 Talers and the public official earns 20 Talers.
- ☐ The citizen earns 45 Talers and the public official earns 30 Talers.
- ☐ The citizen earns 45 Talers and the public official earns 45 Talers.
- ☐ The citizen earns 40 Talers and the public official earns 20 Talers.

INSTRUCTIONS

4. You will make a decision as a citizen and as a public official in this task.



-
- ☐ That statement is correct.
- ☐ That statement is false.

INSTRUCTIONS

You will interact in the decision making tasks that have just been described to you with 18 different other participants (Persons B).

In each round you will interact with a different Person B, meaning that you will never interact with the same person twice.

The Persons B's are participants from the following 18 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, The Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.

For all countries, the participant samples are representative of the population of the respective countries in terms of age and gender.



You will also be asked to make an estimate for the behavior of all Persons B.

Your task is then to indicate what percentage of participants from a given country engage in a particular behavior.


CONTINUE

On the next pages, you will make a total of 72 decisions that have financial consequences.
Out of these 72 decisions, one will be randomly chosen and paid out.
That means that it is best for you to make decisions as if they all were paid out individually.



In the task, you are asked to estimate what percentage of participants from a given country engage in a particular behavior. In this task, you receive 35 Talers if your estimation is correct and this round is randomly selected for payout.

CONTINUE

On the next pages you are interacting in the role of the citizen.
Please read your response options carefully since they will vary.



You are now interacting with a person B from Japan.



When interacting with a **public official from Japan**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.
- ☐ Make the official payment.

What percent of participants from Japan in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- ☐ 0-10%
- ☐ 11-20%
- ☐ 21-30%
- ☐ 31-40%
- ☐ 41-50%
- ☐ 51-60%
- ☐ 61-70%
- ☐ 71-80%
- ☐ 81-90%
- ☐ 91-100%

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from The Netherlands.



When interacting with a **public official from The Netherlands**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.
- ☐ Make the official payment.

What percent of participants from The Netherlands in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- ☐ 0-10%
- ☐ 11-20%
- ☐ 21-30%
- ☐ 31-40%
- ☐ 41-50%
- ☐ 51-60%
- ☐ 61-70%
- ☐ 71-80%
- ☐ 81-90%
- ☐ 91-100%

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Russia.



When interacting with a **public official from Russia**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.



- ☐ Make the official payment.
- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from Russia in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from India.



When interacting with a **public official from India**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the official payment.
- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from India in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Hong Kong.



When interacting with a **public official from Hong Kong**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.
- ☐ Make the official payment.

What percent of participants from Hong Kong in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Brazil.



When interacting with a **public official from Brazil**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.
- ☐ Make the official payment.

What percent of participants from Brazil in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- ☐ 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100%

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Italy.



When interacting with a **public official from Italy**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.
- ☐ Make the official payment.

What percent of participants from Italy in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from The United Kingdom.



When interacting with a **public official from The United Kingdom**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the official payment.
- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from The United Kingdom in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Turkey.



When interacting with a **public official from Turkey**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the official payment.
- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from Turkey in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Singapore.



When interacting with a **public official from Singapore**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.



- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.
- ☐ Make the official payment.

What percent of participants from Singapore in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from the USA.



When interacting with a **public official from the USA**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.
- ☐ Make the official payment.

What percent of participants from the USA in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from France.



When interacting with a **public official from France**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.
- ☐ Make the official payment.

What percent of participants from France in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from China.



When interacting with a **public official from China**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the official payment.
- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from China in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100%

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Argentina.



When interacting with a **public official from Argentina**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.
- ☐ Make the official payment.

What percent of participants from Argentina in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from South Africa.



When interacting with a **public official from South Africa**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the official payment.
- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from South Africa in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Australia.



When interacting with a **public official from Australia**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.



- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.
- ☐ Make the official payment.

What percent of participants from Australia in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from South Korea.



When interacting with a **public official from South Korea**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the official payment.
- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from South Korea in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100%

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Canada.



When interacting with a **public official from Canada**, indicate what **you** decide as a **citizen**.


- ☐ Make the unofficial payment.
- ☐ Make the official payment.

What percent of participants from Canada in the role of the citizen do you estimate offer the unofficial payment?

- ☐ 0-10%
- ☐ 11-20%
- ☐ 21-30%
- ☐ 31-40%
- ☐ 41-50%
- ☐ 51-60%
- ☐ 61-70%
- ☐ 71-80%
- ☐ 81-90%
- ☐ 91-100%


CONTINUE

On the next pages you are interacting in the role of the public official.
Please read your response options carefully since they will vary.



CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Italy.



When interacting with a **citizen from Italy**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from Italy in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- ☐ 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100%

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Brazil.



When interacting with a **citizen from Brazil**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from Brazil in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- ☐ 0-10%
- ☐ 11-20%
- ☐ 21-30%
- ☐ 31-40%
- ☐ 41-50%
- ☐ 51-60%
- ☐ 61-70%
- ☐ 71-80%
- ☐ 81-90%
- ☐ 91-100%

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Hong Kong.



When interacting with a **citizen from Hong Kong**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from Hong Kong in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- ☐ 0-10%
- ☐ 11-20%
- ☐ 21-30%
- ☐ 31-40%
- ☐ 41-50%
- ☐ 51-60%
- ☐ 61-70%
- ☐ 71-80%
- ☐ 81-90%
- ☐ 91-100%

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from India.



When interacting with a **citizen from India**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.



- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from India in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Russia.



When interacting with a **citizen from Russia**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.



- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from Russia in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- ☐ 0-10%
- ☐ 11-20%
- ☐ 21-30%
- ☐ 31-40%
- ☐ 41-50%
- ☐ 51-60%
- ☐ 61-70%
- ☐ 71-80%
- ☐ 81-90%
- ☐ 91-100%

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Japan.



When interacting with a **citizen from Japan**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from Japan in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- ☐ 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100%

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from The Netherlands.



When interacting with a **citizen from The Netherlands**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from The Netherlands in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from The United Kingdom.



When interacting with a **citizen from The United Kingdom**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from The United Kingdom in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from South Africa.



When interacting with a **citizen from South Africa**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from South Africa in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Turkey.



When interacting with a **citizen from Turkey**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from Turkey in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Australia.



When interacting with a **citizen from Australia**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from Australia in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- ☐ 0-10%
- ☐ 11-20%
- ☐ 21-30%
- ☐ 31-40%
- ☐ 41-50%
- ☐ 51-60%
- ☐ 61-70%
- ☐ 71-80%
- ☐ 81-90%
- ☐ 91-100%

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Argentina.



When interacting with a **citizen from Argentina**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from Argentina in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from the USA.



When interacting with a **citizen from the USA**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from the USA in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from France.



When interacting with a **citizen from France**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from France in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from China.



When interacting with a **citizen from China**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from China in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Canada.



When interacting with a **citizen from Canada**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.


- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from Canada in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- ☐ 0-10%
- ☐ 11-20%
- ☐ 21-30%
- ☐ 31-40%
- ☐ 41-50%
- ☐ 51-60%
- ☐ 61-70%
- ☐ 71-80%
- ☐ 81-90%
- ☐ 91-100%

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from Singapore.



When interacting with a **citizen from Singapore**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.



- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from Singapore in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

- 0-10% ☐ 11-20% ☐ 21-30% ☐ 31-40% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 51-60% ☐ 61-70% ☐ 71-80% ☐ 81-90% ☐ 91-100% ☐

CONTINUE

You are now interacting with a person B from South Korea.



When interacting with a **citizen from South Korea**, please indicate what **you** decide as a **public official**.

- ☐ Reject an unofficial payment.
- ☐ Accept an unofficial payment.

What percent of participants from South Korea in the role of the public officials do you estimate accept the unofficial payment?

0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100%

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

CONTINUE

Part 1 of the study is now over.

In Part 2, please answer the final questions.

In the interaction just described, how corrupt do you think it is to make an unofficial payment?

1 = not corrupt at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 = very corrupt
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

In the interaction just described, how corrupt do you think it is to accept an unofficial payment?

1 = not corrupt at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 = very corrupt
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

What do you think: How common is bribery in Argentina?



1 = not common
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very common
☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in Argentina?



1 = not acceptable
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very
acceptable
☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in Australia?



1 = not common
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very common
☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in Australia?



1 = not acceptable
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very
acceptable
☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in Brazil?



1 = not common
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very common
☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in Brazil?



1 = not acceptable
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very
acceptable
☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in Canada?



1 = not common
at all

☐

2

☐

3

☐

4

☐

5

☐

6

☐

7 = very common

☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in Canada?



1 = not acceptable
at all

☐

2

☐

3

☐

4

☐

5

☐

6

☐

7 = very
acceptable

☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in China?



1 = not common at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 = very common
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐


What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in China?



1 = not acceptable at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 = very acceptable
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in France?



1 = not common
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very common
☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in France?



1 = not acceptable
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very
acceptable
☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in Hong Kong?



1 = not common
at all

☐

2

☐

3

☐

4

☐

5

☐

6

☐

7 = very common

☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in Hong Kong?



1 = not acceptable
at all

☐

2

☐

3

☐

4

☐

5

☐

6

☐

7 = very
acceptable

☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in India?



1 = not common at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 = very common
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in India?



1 = not acceptable at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 = very acceptable
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in Italy?



1 = not common
at all

☐

2

☐

3

☐

4

☐

5

☐

6

☐

7 = very common

☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in Italy?



1 = not acceptable
at all

☐

2

☐

3

☐

4

☐

5

☐

6

☐

7 = very
acceptable

☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in Japan?



1 = not common
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very common
☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in Japan?



1 = not acceptable
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very
acceptable
☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in The Netherlands?



1 = not common at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 = very common
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in The Netherlands?



1 = not acceptable at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 = very acceptable
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in Russia?



1 = not common
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very common
☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in Russia?



1 = not acceptable
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very
acceptable
☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in South Africa?



1 = not common
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very common
☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in South Africa?



1 = not acceptable
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very
acceptable
☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in Singapore?



1 = not common
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very common
☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in Singapore?



1 = not acceptable
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very
acceptable
☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in South Korea?



1 = not common
at all

☐

2

☐

3

☐

4

☐

5

☐

6

☐

7 = very common

☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in South Korea?



1 = not acceptable
at all

☐

2

☐

3

☐

4

☐

5

☐

6

☐

7 = very
acceptable

☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in Turkey?



1 = not common
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very common
☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in Turkey?



1 = not acceptable
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very
acceptable
☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in The United Kingdom?



1 = not common
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very common
☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in The United Kingdom?



1 = not acceptable
at all
☐

2
☐

3
☐

4
☐

5
☐

6
☐

7 = very
acceptable
☐

CONTINUE

What do you think: How common is bribery in the USA?



1 = not common at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 = very common
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

What do you think: How acceptable is bribery in the USA?



1 = not acceptable at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 = very acceptable
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

CONTINUE

Please indicate the extent to which you support the work of atmosfair – a non-profit climate protection organisation that works on expanding and developing renewable energy technologies worldwide. (1= I don't support it at all to 7= I support it very much)

1 I don't support it at all ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	6 ☐	7 I support it very much ☐
---	----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------	--

CONTINUE

In a few sentences, please describe what went through your head when you decided whether to make, accept or reject an official or unofficial payment in this task. (Please write a minimum of 100 characters).

CONTINUE

In political matters, people often refer to "left" and "right". Where do you place yourself on this scale ranging from 1=left to 10=right?

1 left	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 right	no indication
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

CONTINUE

Think of this ladder as representing where people stand in the USA. At the top of the ladder are the people who are the best off – those who have the most money, the most education, and the most respected jobs. At the bottom are the people who are the worst off – those who have the least money, least education, the least respected jobs, or no job. The higher up you are on this ladder, the closer you are to the people at the very top; the lower you are, the closer you are to the people at the very bottom.

Where would you place yourself on this ladder?

Please click on the rung where you think you stand at this time in your life relative to other people in the USA.



CONTINUE

Please indicate from the following list which educational degree best describes your highest obtained educational degree:

- ☐ Complete Primary School or lower
- ☒ Complete Secondary School
- ☐ Vocational Training
- ☒ Complete Higher Education (Bachelor or Master)
- ☐ Doctoral, equivalent or higher

CONTINUE

Thank you very much for your participation!

Your bonus will be calculated after the end of this study and credited to your Toluna account.

For questions concerning this study, please contact:

Dr. Nils Köbis, n.c.kobis@uva.nl

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