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Pragmatic Interpretivism: How Interpretation Enables the Movement of Knowledge Across Science, Policy, and Practice

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Pragmatic Interpretivism: How Interpretation Enables the Movement of Knowledge Across Science, Policy, and Practice

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Abstract

How can a finding be warranted within its originating inquiry while leaving open whether it should inform judgment in another context? This scholarship shows that interpretive mediation is epistemically necessary for warranted institutional judgment across different contexts. By developing Pragmatic Interpretivism through a theory-informed integrative conceptual analysis, this paper draws on pragmatist accounts of inquiry and illustrative scholarship on knowledge movement across science, policy, and practice. The analysis identifies contextual reconstruction, trust formation, legitimacy negotiation, and institutional intelligibility as interpretive functions whose epistemic significance depends on their contribution to assessing reasons for judgment. The core argument is that interpretive mediation connects a claim's meaning, assumptions, evidential scope, and limitations to the question confronting its recipients: a necessity that concerns warranted reliance across contexts, rather than information transmission, institutional acceptance, or a separately observable interpretive activity. Interpretation may be embedded in professional expertise, procedures, and shared conventions; it can support, qualify, or reject a proposed use of knowledge. Interpretive mediation is connected to bounded epistemic completion; that is, inquiry includes a defined practical purpose, completion requires an adequately supported answer, and an assessable account of how its findings bear on the intended contextual judgment. Such completion remains revisable and does not require universal agreement or successful implementation, unless implementation evidence is necessary to answer the inquiry's question. The contribution is a conceptual account distinguishing scientific warrant, contextual reliance, and practical outcomes, while explaining how interpretation enables purpose-defined inquiry to reach a defensible close. The account offers philosophical clarification rather than empirical proof or epistemic finality.

Keywords: Pragmatic Interpretivism; interpretive mediation; epistemic warrant; institutional judgment; bounded epistemic completion; science–policy–practice interfaces.

1.0 Introduction

The global scholarship community, through scientific knowledge, is expected to inform public policy, institutional governance, and professional practice alongside advancing disciplinary understanding. These expectations nevertheless point toward the relationships between research and social action, including how evidence contributes to decision-making, organizational learning, and the resolution of practical problems (Cash et al., 2003; Nutley et al., 2007; Oliver & Boaz, 2019). However, this paper goes beyond the credibility of those scientific findings to examine how they establish and inform particular institutional judgment. Research findings emerge through rigorous methods; however, they may still face circumstances where their relevance, applicability, or implications remain uncertain for institutional consumers.

Scholarships that address barriers to connecting evidence-based claims with policy and practice have raised distinct questions about whether a scientific claim is adequately supported, whether reliance on it is justified in a receiving context, and whether action informed by it achieves an intended outcome (Andermann et al., 2016). Answering these questions may not necessarily answer the others.

Several studies examine science–policy interfaces, research utilization, knowledge translation, knowledge mobilization, and boundary organizations, including the co-production of scientific knowledge, allowing examination of their relationships (van den Hove, 2007; Best & Holmes, 2010; Holmes et al., 2017). Approaching knowledge use this way brings together researchers, policymakers, practitioners, and institutions whose responsibilities and purposes may differ, and provides the setting for the present inquiry into the judgments through which scientific findings become reasons for contextual reliance.

Their epistemic significance becomes clearer when we examine the relationship between interpretation and judgment in evidence-based decision-making (Engebretsen et al., 2015). It explains why causal claims require additional warrant to be used in a target setting (RoI & Cartwright, 2012). Knowledge transfer involves contextual modification, epistemic purposes, and justification (Herfeld & Lisciandra, 2019). Because of these premises, it is important to challenge the treatment of translation and interpretation as secondary to scientific production and to examine their role in producing meaning (Engebretsen, Sandset, & Ødemark, 2017).

For this purpose, this paper builds on these accounts. It examines the distinction between establishing a result and warranting contextual reliance, with a strong emphasis on the completion of scientific inquiry.

This paper asks why warranted reliance on scientific knowledge across contexts requires interpretive mediation. It then asks when such mediation forms part of completing the inquiry.

The first question examines the relationship between the grounds of a scientific claim and the question it addresses. The second asks whether that relationship belongs to the purpose of this scholarship.

The conceptual relationship between the grounds of scientific knowledge claims and the question confronting its recipient gave rise to Pragmatic Interpretivism: an interpretive mediation that concerns judgments about a claim's meaning, assumptions, evidential scope, and limitations, and how these bear on the receiving question. Where contextual differences materially affect the proposed reliance, warranted judgment requires reasons addressing their significance. Interpretive mediation may be in professional expertise, procedures, and shared conventions. Although this may not constitute a separately observable stage following knowledge

production, nor does it supply missing evidence or guarantee successful action. Interpretive mediation may nevertheless support, qualify, or reject a proposed use.

This paper distinguishes between completing a source inquiry and completing an inquiry into contextual reliance. A scholarship may adequately answer its research question, but it may leave a later question about an unresolved application at the institutional level. The later question on unresolved application at the institutional level does not retrospectively make the source inquiry incomplete unless it exposes a defect in the original answer. Where an inquiry expressly includes a defined contextual question, however, producing scientifically warranted findings without establishing their bearing on that question leaves part of its purpose unfulfilled. Interpretive mediation helps complete the task in this latter circumstance because contextual assessment belongs to the epistemic task undertaken.

From a pragmatist perspective toward inquiry as addressing a problematic situation, the paper develops this relationship through the concept of bounded epistemic completion (Dewey, 1938). Completion concerns an adequately supported answer within a defensible scope, with grounds and limitations available for judgment; that is, it remains open to revision and does not require universal agreement or successful implementation unless evidence of implementation is necessary to answer the inquiry's question. A justified decision against present reliance may complete an inquiry asking whether current evidence supports that reliance, while leaving a separate question about practical effectiveness unresolved.

This paper aims to contribute to the synthesis and extension connecting interpretive mediation, contextual warrant, and purpose-defined inquiry completion by identifying the consequences of treating scientific warrant, warranted contextual reliance, and practical effectiveness as distinct accomplishments. By examining this

distinction, this work provides a basis for evaluating and weighing scientific knowledge where evidence adequate for one task is mistakenly treated as settling another. The selected studies illustrate contexts in which these judgments arise; the necessity claim is defended through conceptual argument rather than inferred solely from recurring empirical patterns.

This paper comprises six sections, including the conclusion. Section 2 presents the theory-informed integrative conceptual approach and uses selected studies as the methodology. Section 3 examines the interpretive functions across those studies and develops the argument for warranted contextual reliance. Section 4 presents the relationship between interpretive mediation and bounded epistemic completion. Section 5 discusses the limitations and implications for institutional judgment and science–policy–practice relationships.

2.0 Methodology

This study engages a conceptual analysis approach informed by qualitative inquiry and engagement with relevant philosophical and empirical scholarship. This chosen methodological approach follows from the nature of the research problem. The aim of this paper is not to test empirical hypotheses or generate theory through primary data collection. Rather, it examines an epistemological question concerning the production of scientific knowledge and the processes through which scientific knowledge acquires meaning and practical consequence beyond its primary context of production.

The lens of this study is to investigate whether interpretation and interpretive mediation constitute necessary conditions for the completion of scientific research, and when knowledge is expected to inform institutional judgment, policy deliberation, and professional practice.

The research issue addressed in this paper is therefore conceptual and philosophical rather than primarily empirical. Existing scholarship has extensively examined knowledge translation, research utilization, evidence-informed decision-making, boundary organizations, and mechanisms for connecting scientific knowledge with social action. These perspectives have generated important knowledge of communication, governance, coordination, and implementation processes. However, they provide comparatively less attention to the epistemological conditions that enable scientifically produced knowledge to become meaningful within institutional environments distinguished by different objectives, responsibilities, and modes of reasoning (Dixon, 2025; Borst, Wehrens, & Bal, 2022; Capano & Malandrino, 2022).

The conceptual analysis method is appropriate for this inquiry because the purpose of this research is to examine and clarify relationships among epistemological concepts rather than measure observable variables. Conceptual frameworks deliver a structured way to examine relationships among concepts using systematic interpretation and synthesis (Jabareen, 2009). Anchoring on this conceptual approach, Pragmatic Interpretivism serves as the epistemological framework for examining the relationships among inquiry, interpretation, interpretive mediation, institutional intelligibility, and pragmatic consequence. The analysis is guided by the central proposition of Pragmatic Interpretivism: scientific research does not achieve its intended practical significance solely through the production of valid knowledge. Rather, knowledge becomes capable of informing judgment and action through interpretive mediation, whereby its meaning is preserved, negotiated, and reconstructed within the contexts in which it is expected to have consequences.

The role of theory in this study is not to generate categories from empirical observation but to provide an analytical orientation for the critical examination of

existing scholarship. This approach aligns with qualitative research traditions that regard theory as a means of structuring interpretation and guiding inquiry (Collins & Stockton, 2018).

Empirical literature is incorporated not as primary empirical data and not as the basis for statistical generalization, but as analytically relevant cases through which the conceptual coherence and epistemological relevance of Pragmatic Interpretivism may be examined (Borim-de-Souza, Travis, Munck, & Galleli, 2020; Carter & Little, 2007; Hangel & ChoGlueck, 2023). The chosen empirical studies were purposively selected as analytical cases because they examine contexts and situations in which scientific knowledge encounters processes of interpretation, translation, institutional evaluation, trust formation, or practical application (Bodenstein & Kemmerling, 2026; Carrier, 2013; Evans, & Scarbrough, 2014).

These cases provide contexts for examining the central proposition of this paper: that scientific validity, while necessary, does not fully account for how knowledge becomes institutionally meaningful. Instead, the transition from knowledge production to practical consequence requires interpretive processes through which findings acquire contextual intelligibility.

The engagement with empirical literature follows an integrative approach in which diverse forms of scholarship contribute to conceptual insight rather than being aggregated as evidence for empirical substantiation (Whittemore & Knafl, 2005). The purpose is therefore not to conduct a comprehensive review of all research concerning science, policy, and practice relationships, but to examine selected scholarly contexts that expose the epistemological problem examined by this study.

The analytical process consists of three interconnected activities.

First, the study reconstructs the central propositions of Pragmatic Interpretivism. This involves clarifying the conceptual relationships among inquiry, interpretation, interpretive mediation, institutional intelligibility, pragmatic consequence, and epistemic completion. This reconstruction establishes the philosophical foundation against which relevant scholarship is examined.

Second, selected empirical literature is analyzed in relation to these propositions. The analysis considers whether scientific validity alone adequately accounts for the transition from knowledge production to institutional consequence, or whether contextual interpretation, meaning-making, and trust-related processes are necessary for scientific knowledge to become practically consequential.

Third, the insights derived from these analytical cases are integrated back into the epistemological framework. The purpose is not to empirically prove Pragmatic Interpretivism but to examine its conceptual coherence and epistemological relevance as an account of how scientific knowledge acquires institutional meaning.

This methodological approach regards empirical scholarship as a means of philosophical examination rather than as an independent object of empirical synthesis. The selected studies contribute by revealing recurring conditions and interpretive processes through which scientific knowledge acquires institutional meaning across several settings (Hor et al., 2023; Zhao et al., 2024). Their importance lies not in providing definitive confirmation of the framework, but in enabling a critical assessment of whether interpretive mediation offers a rational explanation for the movement of knowledge from research production to practical consequence.

The scope of this methodology does not aim to provide statistical generalization, exhaustive coverage of the existing literature, or empirical testing of Pragmatic

Interpretivism. Rather, it provides a conceptually in-depth examination of an epistemological proposition through engagement with philosophical arguments and relevant empirical scholarship. Future studies might further investigate this framework through comparative qualitative studies, case analyses, or mixed-method approaches across specific institutional contexts.

3.0 Philosophical Arguments and Empirical Scholarship

The preceding sections established the central epistemological problem addressed by this study: although scientific inquiry may produce valid and justified knowledge within its originating context, the movement of such knowledge into other contexts of judgment and practice is neither automatic nor solely dependent on communication or dissemination (Bowen & Graham, 2013). Section 2 established conceptual analysis as the methodological approach for examining this problem, where empirical scholarship is engaged not as a basis for empirical validation, but as analytically relevant cases through which the epistemological conditions of knowledge movement may be examined. By undertaking a comparative analysis of identified empirical scholarships concerning knowledge transitions from science to policy, and practice, together with the interfaces between them, knowledge translation, evidence utilization, and process that spans across these boundaries, this study aims not to understand the effectiveness of individual, or to interrogate the causal relationship among knowledge, institutions, and action. Rather, this scholarship examines occurring and re-occurring conditions through which scientific research acquires meaning, their legitimacy, and practical consequences beyond the original context of their knowledge production.

The analysis is guided by the central proposition of Pragmatic Interpretivism: interpretation is not merely a communicative activity that follows knowledge production;

rather, interpretive mediation constitutes an epistemically significant process through which knowledge acquires contextual intelligibility beyond its original conditions of production. Through interpretation, scientific knowledge becomes connected to the assumptions, purposes, and practical requirements of the contexts in which it is expected to inform action.

The empirical scholarship examined in this section is therefore analyzed comparatively through several conceptual dimensions: (1) the conditions under which knowledge is produced, (2) the transition of knowledge across contextual boundaries, (3) the interpretive processes involved in reconstructing meaning, (4) the emergence of contextual intelligibility, and (5) the relationship between interpreted knowledge and practical consequence. Through this analysis, the section examines whether interpretive mediation represents a recurring epistemological condition underlying the movement of knowledge across science, policy, and practices.

3.1 Empirical Cases of Knowledge Movement

This study examines the selected scholarship through the conceptual lens of Pragmatic Interpretivism. Research on knowledge exchange and actionable knowledge documents processes that connect research with decisions and practice (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010; Dobbins et al., 2009; Jagannathan et al., 2023). This paper distinguishes the findings and arguments reported in those works from its own interpretation of their epistemic significance.

The empirical scholarship examined in this subsection is not treated as empirical substantiation of Pragmatic Interpretivism. Rather, these studies are engaged as analytical cases of knowledge movement through which the epistemological conditions underlying the transition from scientific validity to contextual intelligibility can be examined. The selection of these cases follows a

purposive analytical rationale. The selection combines empirical studies with a review, an overview of knowledge translation, and a methodological discussion of translation, each relevant to examining the relationship between knowledge and its receiving context (Hauswald, 2021; Massimi, 2023). Together, these cases allow examination of the central research question:

Why does warranted reliance on scientific knowledge across differing contexts require interpretive mediation?

The analysis proceeds through three question-dimensions relevant to Pragmatic Interpretivism:

1. *Knowledge production, credibility, and trust.*

   How is knowledge established as credible within its originating epistemic context?

2. *Knowledge movement and Interpretive mediation.*

   What processes enable knowledge to be understood, reconstructed, and evaluated when it enters another context?

3. *Institutional intelligibility and practical consequence.*

   How does knowledge become meaningful enough to inform judgment, decision-making, and action?


The discussion begins with work on technical performance, trust, and claim evaluation, followed by studies of practice-based translation and institutional collaboration. Conceptual and methodological scholarship then provides additional resources for examining the proposed account. This organization supports comparison rather than empirical substantiation of Pragmatic Interpretivism.

3.1.1 Knowledge: validity, legitimacy, and trust.

According to Oisakede et al. (2026), the obstacles associated with implementing immuno-AI models in clinical practice center on validation, interpretability, and underlying regulatory and infrastructural preparedness. Drawing from their review, this paper emphasizes and clarifies the distinction between reported algorithmic performance and the justification for clinical adoption. Scientific or technical validity, or performance established under defined conditions, may show that a knowledge-producing system performs according to accepted criteria; however, such validity does not automatically determine whether knowledge users will consider that output meaningful, reliable, appropriate within their decision-making environment, or justified in a clinical setting.

Through Pragmatic Interpretivism, the relationship between an algorithmic output and a clinical question is a form of interpretive mediation that may be assessed by examining the output's evidential scope and its bearing on professional judgment. This assessment complements, rather than substitutes for, further validation or regulatory assessment.

This is represented through this diagram's analytical reconstruction of the relationship among performance, interpretation, trust assessment, and possible use:




The arrows in the diagram above show relationships under examination, not empirically established causal pathways or necessary chronological stages. The interpretation, or contextual assessment, may lead to reliance, qualified reliance, or non-use.

Moving on, in another empirical positioning, Young et al. (2016) extend this analysis by examining how potential knowledge users evaluate new claims within the institutional or user's assessments. The analysis also considers when those contextual judgments contribute to warranted reliance. Acceptance is influenced not only by the characteristics of the knowledge claim itself but also by contextual factors involving legitimacy, credibility, power relationships, and competing interpretations.

This case is selected in this paper as among the core conceptual anchoring that has important value for Pragmatic Interpretivism because it reveals that knowledge movement is not simply a matter of transferring information from producers to users. Knowledge users actively interpret claims through their own institutional positions, experiences, expectations, and understandings of credibility.

The epistemological implication here is that acceptance of knowledge requires more than evidence availability. It requires a process through which knowledge becomes intelligible and meaningful within the interpretive frameworks of those expected to use it.

Therefore, this empirical case highlights another dimension of interpretive mediation:




The study of Young et al for this intended scholarly work supports the proposition that interpretation is not a secondary social process occurring after knowledge production. Rather, interpretation contributes directly to whether knowledge can enter institutional reasoning.

3.1.2 Knowledge: interpretation towards institutional translation and practical use.

Knowledge movement and its translation transcend a mere linear transfer process, but rather a reflexive meaning construction – a reflexive engagement through which meaning is developed between researchers and practitioners, according to the study by Hor et al. (2023). This scholarship shows that knowledge gains practical relevance through interaction with the contexts where it is expected to operate, and that research relevance to practical questions can be examined through situated engagement. Practitioners do not merely receive scientific knowledge; they interpret, negotiate, and reconstruct its meaning according to professional experience and situated practice.

This scholarship aligns with the perspectives of Pragmatic Interpretivism because it shows that interpretation functions as an epistemic process that enables knowledge movement and engagement with contextual mediation.

The movement of knowledge in this empirical case is understood through this pattern:




This proposition (philosophically) implies that the relevance of research to a practical question can be engaged situationally by examining the warranted reliance on research findings. Scientific knowledge does not simply move unchanged across contexts; rather, its practical significance emerges through interpretive engagement.

In a complementary empirical study, Evans & Scarbrough (2014) draw a clear distinction between boundary-spanning through designated activities and translation embedded in mundane work, connecting research with practice environments.

Evans and Scarbrough's scholarship contributes an organizational perspective on the relationship between researchers and practice, a setting for examining whether differing organizational contexts create the grounds and scientific knowledge's relevance for contextual assessment and judgment for organizational use. Consequently, movement of knowledge requires processes that enable and bridge between these communities to develop sufficient shared understanding while preserving the integrity of their respective knowledge systems.

From the perspective of Pragmatic Interpretivism, these are boundary processes representing institutional expressions of interpretive mediation. Knowledge movement through boundaries occurs not because different communities possess identical interpretations, but because mechanisms emerge through which differences can be negotiated and meaning can be reconstructed.

Knowledge movement spanning boundaries through this empirical case is understood in this sequence:



Evans and Scarbrough demonstrated that interpretation is not only an individual cognitive activity but also an institutional process through which knowledge becomes actionable across domains.

3.1.3 Expanding the epistemological positions in pragmatic interpretivism.

Following Bowen & Graham (2013) on engaged scholarship and research utilization, the paper adopts a linear transfer approach from research use to organizational user engagement. In this discussion, the paper treats this as an overview and conceptual analysis rather than a separate empirical case.

The work of Bowen and Graham grounds a conceptual support that moves beyond linear understandings of knowledge translation. This paper's arguments engage scholarship by emphasizing more relational approaches where knowledge producers and users participate in processes of exchange, interaction, and mutual understanding.

From a Pragmatic Interpretivism perspective, scholarship engages with findings and with users' questions about the epistemic sufficiency of this relationship, which is distinct from the evidence or success of an engagement.

Examining the relationship between knowledge validity and translation through textual examples (Zhao et al., 2024), and considering uncertainty, difference, and reflexive interpretation, this scholarship extends the discussion to assessing knowledge crossing institutional contexts through this paper's own conceptual inference.

This paper implicates Pragmatic Interpretivism by arguing that contextual interpretation must be properly assessed for its contribution to justified understanding. While interpretation clarifies a claim's relevance, it may also distort an empirical finding's intended meaning or go beyond its scope of evidence. From this perspective, a research study's epistemic value may be assessed as valuable.

3.1.4 Summary of the studies compared:

Scholarship	Epistemological Tension Revealed	Interpretive Mediation Observed	Contribution to Pragmatic Interpretivism
Oisakede et al. (2026)	Technical validity alone does not establish trust.	Knowledge accuracy does not automatically produce institutional acceptance	Interpretation enables validated knowledge to become trusted and actionable
Young et al. (2016)	Knowledge claims require users' evaluation	Users interpret claims through	Knowledge movement requires

		legitimacy, power, and context	interpretive evaluation
Hor et al. (2023)	Knowledge translation is practice-based	Knowledge requires contextual reconstruction	Interpretation enables transformation of research meaning into practice meaning
Evans & Scarbrough (2014)	Knowledge movement spans boundaries	Different epistemic communities require mediation	Institutional intelligibility emerges through interpretive processes
Bowen & Graham (2013)	Engaged scholarship	Linear transfer models are insufficient	Knowledge movement requires relational engagement
Zhao et al. (2024)	Validity and translation	Meaning cannot be mechanically transferred	Interpretation preserves epistemic coherence across contexts

The table above presents relationships among performance, evidential support, contextual assessment, and possible use. Philosophically, this scholarship highlights the distinction between having supported claims and having sufficient reliable grounds for a receiving question. Whether the challenge concerns artificial intelligence in clinical environments, contested knowledge claims, professional practice transformation, or institutional collaboration, movement requires interpretive processes through which knowledge becomes intelligible, legitimate, and practically meaningful.


Through these cases, they provide illustrations and conceptual resources for the comparative analysis. They suggest that interpretation is not merely a communicative activity applied after knowledge production. Rather, interpretive mediation represents an epistemological condition through which knowledge acquires the capacity to move across contexts of judgment and practice.

3.2 Comparative Analysis

The choice of empirical cases in this study's discussions provides grounds for examining judgement in knowledge movement through varying contexts involving more than the dissemination of scientifically validated information. Although the scholarship contributions were cited from multiple domains – immuno-AI, contested resource management, healthcare practice transformation, and collaborative translational research, their significance in this research is their revelation of a recurring epistemological pattern, that is, the scientific justification of knowledge production does not automatically result in practical or actionable usefulness. Rather, knowledge movement needs interpretive processes through which knowledge becomes intelligible, legitimate, and meaningful within the contexts where judgment and action happen.

The aim of comparative analysis in this study is not to establish causal relationships among knowledge, institutions, and practice. The purpose here is to examine the recurring epistemological conditions revealed across the selected empirical cases; to identify the interpretive processes that enable knowledge produced within one epistemic context to become capable of functioning within another.

The comparison identifies five connected elements in the movement of knowledge from research into institutional practice as recurring interpretive patterns identified through comparative conceptual analysis. These are:



These patterns provide the analytical foundation for distinguishing Pragmatic Interpretivism from conventional approaches to knowledge translation. Existing

scholarship illustrates that knowledge movement requires translation, engagement, boundary spanning, and exchange. Pragmatic Interpretivism advances this discussion by arguing that these processes are manifestations of a deeper epistemological condition.

3.2.1 Recurring Interpretive Functions Across the Analytical Cases:

Analytical Cases	Interpretive Functions	Epistemological Significance
Oisakede et al. (2026); Hor et al. (2023)	Contextual reconstruction	Assess how a finding's scope and assumptions bear on a receiving question.
Oisakede et al. (2026); Young et al. (2016)	Trust formation	Distinguish confidence or acceptance from the grounds for warranted reliance
Young et al. (2016); Evans & Scarbrough (2014)	Legitimacy negotiation	Examine whether different perspectives make relevant reasons and objections available for assessment
Hor et al. (2023); Evans & Scarbrough (2014)	Institutional intelligibility	Consider how findings and limitations can participate in collective assessment through appropriate expertise and procedures

The four interpretive categories in the table emerged from comparing the selected studies, although they are not a common taxonomy in the source authors' research.

The comparisons in the preceding table instead direct attention to judgments about how evidence bears on a receiving question. This illustrates interpretive activity without establishing that contextual reconstruction, trust formation, legitimacy negotiation, and institutional intelligibility are altogether necessary, sufficient, and sequential conditions for knowledge use.

The proposition from the emergent patterns is that warranted reliance must be supported by reasons that address contextual differences in findings across users

when those differences substantially and materially affect judgment in organizational users.

3.2.2 Interpretation as contextual reconstruction.

The studies by Oisakede et al. (2026) and Hor et al. (2023) illustrate interpretation as contextual reconstruction. Scientific knowledge is produced within specific epistemic environments using methodologies, assumptions, standards of evidence, and disciplinary commitments which determine how knowledge claims are generated and evaluated. However, when such knowledge moves beyond these environments, it encounters contexts with different practical demands and interpretive frameworks. The immuno-AI review by Oisakede et al. (2026) and the account of practice-based translation by Hor et al. (2023) provide two settings for examining contextual reconstruction. In this reconstruction, contextual assessment concerns how a finding's scope and relevance bear on a clinical or professional question. It need not change the finding’s content, and cannot replace additional evidence where such evidence is required.

The preceding scholarships suggest that contextual interpretation can clarify the relationship between evidence and its possible use. Its adequacy depends on preserving the claim's supported content while examining assumptions and limits relevant to the receiving question.

Pragmatic Interpretivism contributes to existing knowledge translation discussions by identifying contextual reconstruction as an epistemological necessity for warranted reliance; whether assessment is required in a particular use or case depends on the context.

3.2.3 Interpretation as trust formation.

Another emergent epistemological pattern in the scholarship of Young et al. (2016) and Oisakede et al. (2026) compares trust formation to examine the distinction between confidence in research findings and the grounds for warranted reliance on such knowledge.

The preceding empirical cases reveal that acceptance of knowledge does not lead to automatic support of validity; scientific knowledge may establish findings and claims justified to a certain epistemic community, but the users of that knowledge beyond that community may see the need to determine whether such knowledge is sufficient, reliable, relevant, and serves the purposes for their appropriate institutional judgment and use.

By illustrating contrasting settings for examining performance, confidence, and organizational users' evaluations, knowledge interpretation concerns whether evaluations provide sufficient and relevant grounds and limitations to support assessment of warranted reliance. Knowledge users evaluate research claims through broader considerations involving legitimacy, credibility, institutional position, and contextual relevance.

These empirical cases revealed two important epistemological distinctions:

1. The grounds for warranted reliance, judgment, and use within an assessed research scope are established through evidential support; and
2. Interpretation through contextual assessment examines those grounds for justifiable reliance for a receiving question (enabling formation of warranted trust).

Trust, therefore, is not merely a psychological or social reaction to knowledge. Within knowledge movement, trust represents an epistemic relationship formed when knowledge becomes understandable, and reliance on expertise or procedures is appropriately grounded and responsive to relevant limitations. Understanding a knowledge claim and feeling confident about it are insufficient grounds for warranted reliance. Pragmatic Interpretivism therefore extends knowledge translation perspectives by arguing that trust formation is not external to knowledge movement; rather, it is enabled through processes of interpretive judgment that connect knowledge claims with contextual judgment.

3.2.4 Interpretation as legitimacy negotiation

The studies by Evans and Scarbrough (2014) and Young et al. (2016) illustrate how different knowledge systems can negotiate enough shared meaning to support action.

These empirical cases reveal that knowledge movement often occurs across contexts where actors possess different forms of expertise, responsibilities, and criteria for evaluating knowledge. Consequently, acceptance cannot be achieved solely through presenting stronger evidence. Knowledge must also become legitimate within the interpretive frameworks of those who evaluate and apply it through relevant reasons, and objections must be adequately addressed.

According to Young et al. (2016), knowledge users assess claims through contexts shaped by power relationships, competing interpretations, and institutional conditions. Likewise, Evans and Scarbrough (2014) illustrate that movement across research and practice boundaries requires processes through which different epistemic communities develop shared understanding without eliminating their differences.

The emergent epistemological pattern from these scholarships reveals that interpretation performs a mediating function between different systems of knowledge evaluation. Different knowledge systems negotiate sufficient shared meaning for action. This argument's concept proposes exchanges between actors with differing assumptions and assessment standards that may be examined. These exchanges nevertheless do not need to replace one knowledge system with another or produce complete agreement, because their contribution to warranted reliance depends on what they reveal contextually about the grounds of the proposed judgment.

The perspective here is that interpretation enables legitimacy by keeping knowledge connected to its original epistemic grounding while making it meaningful in another context. Legitimacy negotiation is considered for its potential to examine claims and their proposed use.

3.2.5 Interpretation as institutional intelligibility

The recurring emergent pattern revealed between the scholarships of Evans and Scarbrough (2014) and Hor et al. (2023) points towards institutional intelligibility of the produced knowledge.

These empirical cases show that knowledge movement ultimately occurs within institutional environments where decisions must be made, responsibilities assigned, and actions justified. Therefore, knowledge must become intelligible not only to individual users but also to institutional systems of judgment.

According to Evans and Scarbrough (2014), scientific knowledge moves through boundary-spanning processes that connect research communities and practice organizations. Similarly, Hor et al. (2023) showed us that knowledge becomes meaningful through engagement with professional practice contexts. In Pragmatic Interpretivism, institutional intelligibility concerns whether relevant findings, reasons,

and limitations contribute to collective assessment and are supported by professional expertise and institutional procedures without requiring every participant to reproduce the source inquiry.

Institutional intelligibility does not require identical interpretation or agreement among all actors. Rather, it requires sufficient shared understanding that knowledge can participate in collective reasoning. It concerns whether grounds of a proposed judgment are accessible for assessment. This is among the distinction central to Pragmatic Interpretivism. Interpretation does not eliminate contextual differences. However, disagreements may expose an unresolved contextual issue. Intelligibility may support or contribute to warranted judgment without agreement or action. Therefore, from the works of Evans and Scarbrough (2014), and Hor et al. (2023), this study concludes, among others, that institutional action requires intelligibility, and not perfect interpretive equivalence.

3.3 An Epistemic Process Connecting Knowledge and Contexts

Using comparative analysis in the preceding section, this study identifies contextual reconstruction, trust formation, legitimacy negotiation, and institutional intelligibility as the four interpretive functions that reveal how knowledge becomes meaningful across contexts. However, the recurrence of those interpretive functions does not establish that interpretation is epistemically necessary. Reaching this conclusion requires philosophical arguments explaining how interpretation shapes the relationship between what is claimed as knowledge and the institutional judgments it is expected to inform.

Pragmatic Interpretivism clarifies the epistemic role of interpretation in connecting scientific warrant to contextual judgment. A claim may be justified under its original conditions while leaving open whether, how, or to what extent it supplies a

reason for judgment elsewhere. Interpretive mediation interrogates and examines that relation. Its epistemic significance concerns the grounds on which knowledge can be relied upon, the limits of that reliance, and how those limits are preserved as knowledge enters another context (Greco, 2020; Pynn, 2015).

Interpretation connects the meaning, assumptions, scope, and limitations of a claim with that question. It examines whether the circumstances under consideration fall within the claim's evidential reach, which assumptions remain applicable, and whether additional premises are required before judgment can be supported. Contextual reconstruction therefore involves making these relationships explicit while preserving the distinctions on which the original claim depends. Scientific claims acquire meaning through the questions, assumptions, methods, and evidential conditions under which they are produced. These conditions establish what a finding concerns and delimit what can reasonably be inferred from it. When a finding enters another context, the question confronting its users may differ from the question its producers investigated. Consequently, the availability of a scientifically justified claim does not settle its relevance to the receiving question.

For example, evidence that a system performs accurately under specified conditions does not, by itself, establish that its outputs should guide a particular institutional decision. That judgment also requires considering whether the decision concerns comparable conditions, whether relevant uncertainties remain, and what consequences follow from relying on the output (Bradley et al., 2014). Interpretation identifies the inferential relationship between the finding and its proposed use (Eells & Sober, 1986; Linnemann, 2012).

This relationship does not require identical meanings or purposes across contexts. It requires enough understanding of the original claim to determine what can

legitimately carry over into another setting. Interpretive mediation may therefore support reliance, qualify it, or establish that the available knowledge does not adequately address the receiving question.

3.3.1 Interpretation: A ground for warranted judgment

Interpretation is epistemic because it concerns whether a claim supplies an appropriate reason for judgment. Explaining a finding in accessible language may facilitate understanding, but understanding alone does not establish that the finding warrants a particular conclusion. Epistemically significant interpretation examines what the evidence supports, where that support applies, and which proposed inferences exceed it.

The interpretive functions identified in Section 3.2 acquire epistemic significance through this evaluative work. Contextual reconstruction examines the applicability of a claim's assumptions and evidential scope (Ludlow, 2005). Trust formation becomes epistemically significant when reliance is grounded in an assessment of competence, evidence, uncertainty, and applicability (Carter & Simion, 2020; Wen, 2026). Legitimacy negotiation has an epistemic dimension when participants examine why they recognize a claim as appropriate for consideration. Institutional intelligibility enables participants to understand, question, and assess those reasons and their limitations through collective judgment.

These institutional interpretive qualifications matter because trust, legitimacy, and intelligibility can also arise without adequate warrant. A claim may become widely accepted through familiarity, authority, or institutional preference while remaining poorly supported, misunderstood, or reasonably rejected. Institutional acceptance must therefore remain distinguishable from epistemic justification.

Interpretive mediation does not confer warrant merely by securing agreement (Boone, 2014). Its epistemic contribution lies in preserving and evaluating the relationship between evidence and judgment (Llanto, 2026; Pynn, 2015). Where contextual adaptation conceals uncertainty, removes qualifications, or extends conclusions beyond their evidential scope, interpretation can undermine that relationship. Pragmatic Interpretivism consequently requires interpretation to remain answerable to the knowledge claim's grounds, including grounds that limit or oppose its intended use.

3.3.2 The necessity of interpretive mediation-bounded completion

The interpretive mediation proposed in this scholarship concerns how scientific knowledge enters reasoned institutional judgment across contexts. It does not imply that every instance of information transmission requires a separate interpretive intervention. Information can circulate without becoming a reason for judgment. The relevant transition occurs when actors rely upon a finding to support, qualify, or reject a conclusion concerning a contextual question.

The argument proceeds from three connected considerations. First, a justified scientific claim has a determinate evidential scope: its warrant supports some conclusions under specified conditions rather than every possible application. Second, an institutional judgment concerns a question whose circumstances and purposes may differ from those of the originating inquiry. Third, warranted reliance requires an adequate account of the relationship between that claim and the receiving question. Interpretive mediation examines this relationship (Reed, 2008; Kim, 2026; Reijula & Sequeiros, 2023).

These considerations lay the groundwork for interpretive mediation, where original claims and the adequacy of reason for contextual judgment are established.

The necessity is therefore epistemic: it concerns what is required for warranted reliance across contextual differences. It does not establish that interpretation alone is sufficient for a sound decision, or that institutions always undertake it adequately.

Interpretation may already be embedded in professional expertise, procedures, standards, or shared conventions. A practitioner may recognize a finding's applicability without conducting a visibly separate exercise. An established procedure may incorporate earlier judgments about scope and relevance. In such circumstances, existing practices carry the interpretive relationship. Its embedded character does not remove its epistemic function; it makes that function less visible (Koufidis et al., 2022; Hermeneutics, 2016; Dresow & Love, 2025).

The relationship between interpretation and completion depends on the inquiry's purpose and scope. When an inquiry aims to inform institutional judgment or professional practice, producing justified findings may fulfill its knowledge-production objective while leaving its relationship to that practical question unresolved (Carter & Little, 2007; Bird, 2007; Anderson, 2025). Hence, epistemic completion can be understood as the condition in which an inquiry has adequately answered its defined question and made the grounds, scope, and limitations of that answer available for warranted reasoning toward its intended purpose. Interpretive mediation contributes to this condition by establishing how the findings bear upon the contextual judgment they are intended to inform. Such completion remains bounded. It concerns an inquiry's specified objective rather than the exhaustion of every possible question or application. It also remains revisable: new evidence, changed circumstances, or criticism of an interpretive assumption may require reopening the inquiry. Completion therefore does not imply epistemic finality. Nor does completion require universal acceptance or successful implementation. Actors may understand the findings and still

disagree about priorities, obligations, or available resources. An inquiry may also establish that the evidence is insufficient to support a proposed action. In either case, the interpretive mediation's contribution to warranted judgment must be distinguished from the subsequent institutional outcome.

Pragmatic Interpretivism thus connects interpretation with completion by fulfilling a bounded epistemic purpose. Scientific warrant establishes the grounds of a claim; interpretive mediation examines how those grounds bear upon a contextual question. Where inquiry is intended to inform that question, this relationship forms part of what must be adequately resolved for its purpose to be fulfilled. At the same time, its conclusions remain open to reconsideration.

4.0 The Epistemic Completion of Inquiry

The preceding section argued that interpretive mediation is epistemically necessary when scientific knowledge enters warranted institutional judgment across differing contexts. This section develops the relationship between that mediation and the completion of inquiry. The question concerns "how an inquiry can fulfill its defined epistemic purpose while its findings remain open to criticism and revision?" Pragmatic Interpretivism proposes bounded epistemic completion to account for this relationship (Llanto, 2026). Completion concerns the adequate fulfillment of a specified inquiry, rather than the final settlement of knowledge about its subject matter. Where the inquiry's purpose includes informing a contextual question, completion requires an adequately supported account of how its findings bear upon that question. This proposal distinguishes the epistemic achievement of inquiry from the subsequent acceptance or implementation of its findings.

4.1 Inquiry: Purpose and Scope

A general assertion that an inquiry is complete necessitates a clear account of the inquiry's intended objectives. The research question, evidential requirements, and scope collectively define the criteria for assessing fulfillment (DiMarco & Khalifa, 2022; Greco, 2021). Without these boundaries, completion becomes ambiguous, as producing a finding, concluding a research project, and resolving the underlying epistemic problem may be mistakenly treated as equivalent outcomes.

Coming from Dewey's philosophical account through the transformation of an indeterminate situation, inquiry guides the selection and evaluation of relevant material in a research problem formulation. This reflects the relationship between inquiry and its problem, which is central to understanding how institutional operations are carried out (Dewey, 1938). This account draws on Dewey's theory of inquiry and treats institutional intelligibility as one part of the broader transformation of a problematic situation. It focuses on the epistemic processes informing judgment across contexts. These processes may contribute to a wider inquiry that also involves experimental, organizational, and practical activities.

The relevant purpose must therefore be specified: An inquiry investigating a phenomenon may adequately answer its research question without addressing a later institutional application. If another institution subsequently asks whether those findings apply to its circumstances, that question may initiate a further inquiry. The original inquiry does not become retrospectively incomplete merely because its findings acquire additional possible uses.

On the contrary, where an inquiry expressly aims to inform a defined institutional question, producing findings without examining their bearing on that question leaves part of its purpose unresolved. The distinction depends on the

inquiry's justified scope, rather than on a universal requirement that all research produce institutional action. Purpose nevertheless cannot justify an arbitrary declaration of completion. A preferred outcome, deadline, or institutional demand does not establish epistemic adequacy. An inquiry's scope must remain answerable to the problem it addresses, and revisions to that scope require explanation. Narrowing the question to accommodate an inconvenient finding changes the inquiry rather than demonstrating its fulfillment.

4.2 The Conditions of Bounded Epistemic Completion

Pragmatic Interpretivism proposes connected conditions for bounded epistemic completion. This paper offers these conditions as a conceptual account.

First, the inquiry must provide a well-supported answer to its defined question. The relevant evidence and reasoning must justify the answer at the level required by that question. Producing observations or assembling information is insufficient when the inquiry also requires explaining how they relate. Understanding is the constitutive arm of inquiry because it grasps connections among information rather than merely possessing discrete items of knowledge (Buckareff, 2023). An inquiry answer's grounds, scope, and limitations must be sufficiently explicit for assessment. Completion cannot reasonably be claimed where unresolved assumptions or concealed uncertainties materially affect the conclusion. This does not require eliminating every uncertainty. It requires distinguishing uncertainties compatible with the supported answer from those that prevent the question from being adequately resolved.

Second, where the inquiry includes a contextual purpose, the relationship between its findings and the intended judgment must be adequately established. Interpretive mediation examines applicability, additional premises, and the limits of

warranted reliance. Its task is to explain which contextual conclusions the findings support and which they do not.

These conditions distinguish knowledge production from fulfilling an inquiry intended to inform contextual judgment. Scientifically credible findings may satisfy the first condition while leaving the second unresolved. Equally, an institution may find a recommendation intelligible while its evidential support remains inadequate. Completion requires considering the relevant conditions together.

Accordingly, bounded epistemic completion is the condition in which an inquiry has adequately resolved its defined epistemic question, made the grounds and limitations of that resolution assessable, and, where its purpose requires it, established how the findings bear upon the intended contextual judgment (Holliday, 2014). This definition does not provide a universal numerical threshold. Adequacy depends on the question, evidence, and inferential demands involved. It must be defended through reasons that others can examine, rather than inferred from an author's or institution's declaration that the work is finished.

4.3 Completion, Acceptance, and Implementation

Bounded completion remains compatible with revisability because resolving a specified question does not exhaust every possible inquiry into its subject matter. Dewey explicitly distinguishes the settlement achieved by a particular inquiry from immunity to further investigation; conclusions may become resources for subsequent inquiry while remaining subject to revision (Dewey, 1938; Casler, 2020).

The present account carries this distinction into contextual judgment: a conclusion may be adequately warranted under specified conditions, while later evidence changes its support. Alternatively, the evidence may remain intact while changes in the receiving context undermine an earlier assessment of applicability.

Reconsideration can therefore concern either the finding or the interpretive relationship through which it informed judgment. Changed populations, operating conditions, institutional questions, or background assumptions may require renewed inquiry without showing that the earlier conclusion was originally unwarranted. A distinction is also necessary between later change and an earlier defect. Where new circumstances arise, reopening the inquiry may reflect the limits properly acknowledged at completion. Where a material uncertainty was already present but overlooked, criticism may instead show that the previous completion claim was premature.

Consequently, fallibilism does not make completion meaningless. It makes completion conditional upon the adequacy of available grounds and the stated boundaries of the inquiry. Continued openness to criticism coexists with a defensible judgment that a particular epistemic task has been fulfilled (Rescher, 1998; Harper, 2010). Epistemic completion, institutional acceptance, and successful implementation are distinguishable achievements. An institution may accept a conclusion through authority or preference without adequate justification. It may also understand a warranted conclusion but decline to act because of competing obligations, resource constraints, or disagreements about priorities.

Successful action likewise does not independently establish the adequacy of the inquiry informing it. An outcome may depend on favorable circumstances or factors outside the inquiry's account. Conversely, unsuccessful implementation does not necessarily undermine the findings when the failure concerns how an adequately supported judgment was enacted (Alston, 1998; Kock, 2004). Therefore, assess completion against the epistemic purpose specified in the inquiry. If that purpose includes investigating whether an intervention works in practice, implementation

evidence may be necessary to answer the question (Brownson et al., 2022; Means & Harris, 2013). The present distinction does not exempt such an inquiry from its evidential requirements.

An inquiry may also establish that the available evidence does not warrant a proposed action. Whether this constitutes completion depends on the question. It can adequately resolve a bounded assessment of whether present evidence supports reliance. It does not automatically complete a different inquiry aimed at establishing the intervention's effectiveness. In that case, insufficient evidence may justify suspension or further investigation while leaving the original question unresolved. Pragmatic Interpretivism thus treats bounded completion as an epistemic achievement whose claim must remain proportionate to the inquiry's purpose. Interpretive mediation contributes by establishing how findings can participate in warranted contextual reasoning, including reasoning that qualifies or rejects their proposed use. This relationship allows inquiry to reach a defensible close without demanding universal agreement, guaranteed institutional success, or final knowledge.

5.0 Implications for Institutional Judgment and Science-Policy-Practice Relationships

From the preceding discussion, this paper proposes the connected positions in which interpretive mediation is epistemically necessary for warranted reliance on scientific knowledge across differing contexts. When an inquiry includes a defined contextual purpose, showing how its findings bear on that purpose contributes to bounded epistemic completion. This section examines the implications of these propositions for institutional judgment and science–policy–practice relationships; implications concern how institutions assess, interpret, and justify their reliance on knowledge. They follow from the conceptual argument developed in this paper and remain open to further philosophical and empirical examination.

5.1 Evidence, Judgment, Trust, and Institutional Intelligibility

Trust formation leans toward legitimacy negotiation, and institutional intelligibility recurs as a consequence of interpretive functions, as earlier discussed in Section 3 of this scholarship. Knowledge significance for institutional judgment depends on distinguishing conditions of acceptance from grounds for justified reliance (Long & Sitkin, 2025; Suchman, 1995; Licht & Brülde, 2021; Fjørtoft, 2023). As shown in earlier sections of this paper, credibility, salience, and legitimacy in systems are essential to linking knowledge with action. These qualities between knowledge and institutional actions: credibility concerns scientific adequacy, salience concerns relevance to decision-makers' needs, and legitimacy concerns perceptions of fairness and respect for differing values and interests, interact, yielding trade-offs that incline towards favorable institutional judgment and legitimacy (Cash et al., 2003; Sarkki et al., 2015; Cash & Belloy, 2020).

Pragmatic Interpretivism draws an epistemic implication from these distinctions. Knowledge may be relevant to an institutional concern and produced through a legitimate process, yet still provide insufficient support for a particular judgment. Conversely, strong evidential support may coexist with distrust of the process or disagreement about the proposed action. These possibilities require separate examination rather than treatment as a single acceptance problem (Blome-Tillman, 2016; Llanto, 2026). Trust lets institutions rely on expertise they cannot reproduce themselves (Carter & Simion, 2020). Nevertheless, its epistemic role depends on whether that reliance is appropriately grounded and remains responsive to relevant limitations. Increasing trust without examining those grounds could strengthen confidence without strengthening justification. Legitimacy negotiation can also create opportunities for participants to assess claims and challenge their proposed

application. Agreement reached through such participation does not, by itself, establish evidential adequacy. A legitimate deliberative process and a warranted conclusion are related achievements, but their grounds remain distinct (Peter, 2007; Peter, 2012).

Institutional intelligibility contributes by making the relationship between findings and judgment sufficiently clear for assessment. (Carela & Kidd, 2021) It does not require every participant to possess identical expertise or endorse the same conclusion. It requires that relevant reasons, assumptions, and limitations can enter collective reasoning. Within this account, disagreement may expose an unsupported inference or an unresolved difference about purpose. Its epistemic value depends on what it reveals about the grounds of judgment (Carela & Kidd, 2021; Melchior, 2024).

5.2 Interpretive Mediation Across Science, Policy, and Practice

Pragmatic Interpretivism complements scholarship on knowledge translation, mobilization, and boundary spanning by examining the epistemic work these activities accomplish. Its contribution concerns how contextual engagement establishes, preserves, or challenges the grounds for relying upon knowledge. The boundary-spanning approaches involving designated roles and discrete activities should be distinguished from approaches embedded more continuously in everyday work because knowledge translation can occur through different organizational arrangements. From this perspective, these arrangements provide different settings in which interpretive mediation may occur. The epistemic question concerns whether participants adequately examine the relationship between findings, contextual assumptions, and proposed judgments (Evans & Scarbrough, 2014). These same considerations also apply between knowledge scholars and practitioners because practice-based knowledge translation is situated to support transformative learning

through reflexive dialogue and care. Tensions also arise from differing perspectives and power relationships (Hor et al., 2023).

For Pragmatic Interpretivism, such engagement can help assess applicability by making practical circumstances and assumptions available for examination. Practitioner participation does not automatically warrant an application; it can help identify the conditions that an adequate assessment must address. Knowledge relationships across these settings are consequently reciprocal. Institutional questions may reveal limits in existing evidence, while practical experience may prompt revision of the research problem. Interpretive mediation can therefore lead to renewed knowledge production and informed reliance on existing findings (Scarino, 2014; Tracy & Robles, 2009; Canary & McPhee, 2009).

Bounded completion further distinguishes these relationships. Where contextual judgment forms part of an inquiry's defined purpose, assessing its epistemic fulfillment requires examining the connection between findings and that judgment. Where a new application introduces a different question, it may initiate a further inquiry. This prevents every subsequent use from becoming a retrospective requirement imposed upon the original research. Furthermore, this also preserves the distinction between informing a decision and settling it. Scientific knowledge can support judgments about likely consequences, applicability, and uncertainty while leaving unresolved questions about priorities, obligations, and acceptable trade-offs. Interpretation clarifies what the evidence contributes without giving it authority over every component of institutional choice.

5.3 Limitations and Future Research

This paper's arguments establish warranted institutional reliance across contexts. It does not establish that interpretive mediation guarantees agreement,

effective implementation, or desirable outcomes. Nor does it fully explain why institutions adopt or reject scientific findings. The selected studies illustrate how scientific findings can inform warranted institutional judgments. It does not establish the frequency, causal influence, or organizational effectiveness of interpretive mediation across all institutional settings. The normative claim that warranted reliance requires an adequate contextual relationship must remain distinguishable from empirical claims about how institutions actually reason.

A limitation in this paper concerns the boundary between interpretation and other epistemic activities. Interpretation may overlap with inference, evidence appraisal, professional judgment, and deliberation. The proposed contribution therefore depends on clarifying the work of connecting a claim's meaning and evidential scope with a receiving question. The value of this account depends on what it adds to existing explanations of how institutions assess and use scientific findings. Future research could examine how institutions establish applicability, preserve qualifications, and distinguish findings from contextual inferences. Comparative studies could investigate settings where similar findings support different judgments, including justified non-use and reliance that exceeds evidential support. Such studies should permit the account to be challenged as well as refined.

Bounded completion also requires further examination of who defines an inquiry's purpose and how claims of fulfillment are contested. Differences between researchers, practitioners, and institutional authorities may expose boundaries that are poorly specified or retrospectively altered. Investigating these differences would help assess whether completion is defensible through shared reasons or merely declared through institutional authority.

These limitations identify and establish the scope of Pragmatic Interpretivism's proposed contribution: an account of how scientific warrant becomes available for contextual judgment, and how establishing that relationship can support a bounded inquiry while preserving revisability.

6.0 Conclusion

This scholarship examined the role of interpretive mediation as an epistemologically necessary condition for moving scientific knowledge into institutional judgment and practice. Its argument locates that necessity in the relationship between a scientifically warranted claim and the contextual judgment it is expected to inform. A claim's justification within its originating conditions does not independently establish its applicability elsewhere. Warranted reliance across differing contexts requires examining how the claim's meaning, assumptions, evidential scope, and limitations bear upon the receiving question. Interpretive mediation performs this epistemic work by establishing which contextual inferences the findings support and which exceed their grounds.

The argument concerns what warrants institutional reliance on scientific findings. Interpretation may be embedded in expertise, procedures, or shared conventions instead of appearing as a separate activity. Its epistemic function remains assessing the relationship between evidence and contextual inference. That assessment may justify reliance, qualify a proposed application, or establish that the available findings do not adequately support it. Interpretation therefore does not guarantee acceptance or action, and agreement does not itself confer epistemic warrant.

This study's thesis connects interpretive mediation with bounded epistemic completion, where an inquiry's defined purpose includes informing a contextual

question. Within that scope, producing justified findings fulfills the inquiry's purpose only when their bearing upon the intended judgment has also been adequately established. Completion requires an adequately supported answer, assessable grounds and limitations, and the contextual relationship required by that purpose (Schaffer, 2007). A subsequent application addressing a different question may initiate further inquiry without rendering the original inquiry retrospectively incomplete.

Bounded completion remains compatible with revisability because an inquiry can fulfill a defined epistemic task under stated conditions and be reconsidered in light of new evidence, changed circumstances, or criticism. It also remains distinguishable from universal acceptance and successful implementation. An inquiry may attain its purpose by establishing that current evidence does not warrant a proposed action, provided that assessing that warrant is the question it undertakes to resolve (Colyvan, 2006; Dusi, 2023).

Pragmatic Interpretivism is a conceptual account connecting scientific warrant, contextual judgment, and the completion of purpose-bounded inquiry. The selected scholarship provides analytical illustrations for examining this account rather than empirical proof of its necessity or effectiveness. Further work must clarify its relationship to existing accounts of inference, interpretation, and knowledge use, and examine how institutions establish or contest applicability and completion. The paper thus proposes that knowledge's movement into warranted institutional reasoning depends on an adequately established interpretive relationship, through which inquiry can fulfill a defined contextual purpose while its conclusions remain open to revision.

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