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From Climate Diplomacy to Climate Finance: Assessing Bangladesh's Diplomatic Effectiveness and International Financing Outcomes, 2015-2025

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Research Article

Keywords: climate diplomacy, climate finance, Bangladesh, coalition leadership, process tracing, international climate governance

Posted Date: November 17th, 2026

DOI: https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11701378/v1

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Additional Declarations: No competing interests reported.

Abstract

This paper studies whether Bangladesh's climate diplomacy translated into discernible international climate-financing outcomes between 2015 and 2025. It develops a documentary traceability framework distinguishing diplomatic activity, agenda articulation, collective negotiating outcomes, institutional financing outcomes and Bangladesh-specific financial outcomes supported by process tracing. The analysis covers Bangladesh's 2020–2022 Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF)/Vulnerable Twenty (V20) leadership and the Dhaka-Glasgow Declaration, the COP27 Loss and Damage Fund decision, and the COP29 New Collective Quantified Goal. Evidence most strongly supports Bangladesh-linked coalition leadership and agenda articulation during its CVF/V20 presidency. COP27 and COP29 produced consequential shared outcomes, but Bangladesh's individual causal contribution is not isolated. Financial records identify selected approvals: USD 26.83 million in grants across seven selected GEF-related projects and USD 14.995 million across two identified Adaptation Fund projects. Bangladesh's interim BTR1 reports USD 9,908.6 million in climate finance received during 2015–2024. Yet a cross-check of eight financing rows across seven standalone GCF projects finds USD 418.300 million in BTR1 amounts matching approximately USD 418.301 million in approved financing, while provider-recorded dated disbursements through 2024 total USD 70.208 million. Nine AIMS profiles were screened but cannot support national aggregation. The analysis shows that agenda-setting is evidenced more clearly than Bangladesh-specific financial causation.

I. Introduction

Climate change diplomacy is not limited to negotiating treaty language or attending annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs). It also involves coalition-building, agenda-setting, issue framing, institutional entrepreneurship and efforts to shape the rules through which finance is mobilised and distributed. For climate-vulnerable states, these activities are particularly important because their influence in multilateral negotiations often depends less on material power than on coalition coordination, legitimacy, strategic framing and the ability to make vulnerability politically salient.

Bangladesh is an important case for studying the relationship between diplomatic cooperation and climate finance. The country has long presented climate change as a major development and security challenge and has participated actively in multilateral climate negotiations. Its leadership of the CVF and V20 during 2020–2022 gave it a key platform for coordinating the positions of climate-vulnerable countries. The Dhaka-Glasgow Declaration, adopted in November 2021, articulated collective priorities concerning adaptation, access to finance and support for climate-resilient development. Bangladesh also participated in UNFCCC negotiations that produced the COP27 loss-and-damage funding arrangements and the COP29 NCQG.

These developments raise an important empirical question: Did Bangladesh's diplomacy translate into discernible financial outcomes for the country, or did it primarily contribute to collective agenda-setting and institutional change? The distinction matters. A global fund established after a period of diplomatic

advocacy does not, by itself, show that one country caused the decision. Likewise, a project approved for Bangladesh after a diplomatic initiative cannot be attributed to that initiative without evidence of the decision process linking them. Vulnerability-based eligibility, domestic project preparation, accredited-entity pipelines, donor preferences and fund allocation rules may independently explain the observed financing portfolio.

The research question is: To what extent, and through what diplomatic and institutional mechanisms, has Bangladesh's climate-diplomatic engagement translated into clearly identifiable international climate-financing outcomes between 2015 and 2025?

The paper makes three contributions. First, it offers a longitudinal framework linking diplomatic activity to increasingly demanding categories of outcomes. Second, it applies conservative process-tracing standards to distinguish Bangladesh's own role from collective coalition and UNFCCC outcomes. Third, it reconstructs selected country-specific climate-finance records, separating approvals, commitments, transfers and disbursements, as well as dedicated climate funds from the wider OECD CRDF dataset. The paper does not claim to be the first study of Bangladesh's climate diplomacy; its contribution rests on tracing diplomacy-to-finance claims and clearly addressing the limits of attribution.

II. Related Work and Theoretical Framework

II.a Climate diplomacy and influence by less powerful states

Research on climate negotiations shows that material power is not the only source of influence. Smaller and more vulnerable states may shape negotiations through coalition formation, strategic agenda-setting, moral authority, procedural entrepreneurship and the construction of persuasive collective positions. Betzold's analysis of the Alliance of Small Island States illustrates how a coalition is able to amplify the negotiating influence of states whose individual material capabilities are limited. Genovese's work on weak states similarly directs attention to the strategies through which less powerful countries seek influence in global climate negotiations. Gray and Cointet's longitudinal analysis of least-developed countries draws attention to the importance of multilateral positioning and the changing structure of participation. (Allan & Bhandary, 2024), (Betzold, 2010), (Genovese, 2020), (Gray & Cointet, 2023). Bangladesh-focused negotiation scholarship stresses the performative and political practices through which climate positions are advanced, while broader climate-diplomacy literature clarifies the role of diplomatic framing and engagement. (Khanom, 2022), (Light, 2016)

This literature suggests that Bangladesh's CVF/V20 leadership should be evaluated as a potential source of agenda influence. However, coalition leadership must not be equated with unilateral authorship. A chair can convene, broker, frame and raise issues, but collective declarations and COP decisions are negotiated outcomes involving multiple states and institutional actors. The analytical task is therefore to identify the specific role supported by documentary evidence. (Ali et al., 2025), (Khanom, 2023), (Ornob & Khanom, 2026).

II.b Climate-finance allocation and institutional mediation

Climate-finance allocation is affected by more than diplomatic advocacy. Studies identify vulnerability, governance quality, donor interests, bureaucratic politics and institutional design as relevant determinants of allocation. Weiler, Klöck and Dornan examine competing explanations for adaptation-aid allocation, including vulnerability and governance. Peterson and Skovgaard show how bureaucratic politics can affect climate-finance decisions. Bhandary's work on institutional design and national climate funds illustrates the role of domestic institutions in translating international finance into national systems and project pipelines. (Bhandary, 2022), (Bhandary, 2024), (Omala, 2023), (Peterson & Skovgaard, 2019), (Robinson et al., 2023), (Weiler et al., 2018). Bangladesh-specific empirical studies also examine how climate finance relates to local risk appraisal and adaptation outcomes, offering a downstream implementation perspective instead of direct evidence of diplomatic causation. (Hussain & Ahmad, 2019), (Hussain & Ahmad, 2020)

This evidence suggests that a country's diplomatic involvement may be only one factor in the longer chain connecting international advocacy to finance. Domestic coordinating institutions, proposal preparation, accreditation, safeguards, implementation capacity and fund-specific eligibility rules may mediate or constrain the relationship. In Bangladesh, the International Climate Finance Cell within the Economic Relations Division is relevant to understanding the national coordination and proposal-development environment. The paper therefore treats domestic institutional capacity as both a potential enabling mechanism and an alternative explanation

II.c Accounting problems in international climate finance

The measurement of climate finance is contested. Weikmans and Roberts identify persistent accounting problems involving definitions, reporting conventions, additionality and the distinction between commitments and disbursements. These issues are key to this study. An approved project amount is not the same as a cash transfer; a cumulative transfer snapshot is not an annual flow; co-financing is not equivalent to a fund's grant; and agency fees should not be added to recipient project grants. Multi-country project totals cannot be assigned wholly to Bangladesh without a documented country allocation. (Bhandary, 2022), (Bhandary, 2024), (Weikmans & Roberts, 2019).

The study consequently maintains two distinct financial evidence layers. Dedicated climate funds—principally the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF)/Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), Adaptation Fund and relevant Climate Investment Funds—are studied through project-level records. OECD Climate-Related Development Finance is treated as a supplementary recipient-perspective dataset and is not added to dedicated-fund totals because coverage and accounting scopes may overlap.

II.d From diplomatic influence to finance: a conditional transmission model

The literature points to three analytically distinct stages. The first is diplomatic capacity: the ability to convene, broker, frame issues and build coalitions despite limited material power. The second is structural conversion: whether those activities are reflected in negotiating texts, decisions, funding windows or governance arrangements. The third is distributive conversion: whether institutional arrangements result in identifiable country-specific approvals and, later, transfers or disbursements. Treating these stages separately avoids conflating visibility in negotiations with control over allocation.

This distinction brings together work on coalition influence and agenda-setting with research on the institutional and bureaucratic determinants of climate-finance allocation. Coalition leadership may amplify voice, but negotiated outcomes are jointly produced. Institutional rules, accreditation, project readiness, national endorsement, safeguards and donor or agency preferences then shape which countries and projects receive finance. Diplomatic influence is therefore best understood as one possible upstream condition in a longer causal sequence, not as a sufficient explanation for financial allocation.

The proposed transmission model is: (1) diplomatic inputs, such as national statements, coalition chairing and negotiating proposals; (2) intermediate outputs, such as agenda recognition, declaration language and negotiating-text changes; (3) institutional outcomes, such as new funding arrangements or revised access rules; and (4) distributive outcomes, such as Bangladesh-specific project approvals and verified transfers. At each link, the analysis asks whether documentary evidence establishes the connection or whether the observed relationship is only temporal or thematic.

Three rival pathways are considered. First, domestic institutional capacity may independently explain project access through national coordination, project preparation and accredited entities. Second, fund-level allocation rules and donor preferences may explain approvals without a direct diplomatic effect. Third, coalition partners, negotiating blocs and COP presidencies may be responsible for shared outcomes that coincide with Bangladesh's advocacy. The empirical strategy therefore treats these factors as competing or mediating explanations and requires documentary process evidence before assigning national diplomatic attribution.

The framework produces three expectations. E1: where Bangladesh exercises sustained coalition leadership, the clearest observable diplomatic effect should be agenda articulation and coalition coordination. E2: institutional outcomes may follow collective advocacy, but individual national attribution will remain difficult unless negotiation records identify Bangladesh's specific contribution. E3: country-specific finance will be attributable to diplomacy only where project or fund records connect the diplomatic initiative to a subsequent decision pathway; otherwise, approvals should be reported as financial access outcomes, not diplomatic effects.

Figure 1 presents the conditional transmission model introduced above. Its arrows indicate an analytical sequence to be tested, not an assumption that diplomatic activity caused later institutional or financial outcomes.

II.e Analytical framework and operational definition

This study conceptualizes diplomatic effectiveness as a multi-stage process rather than a single observable outcome. Documented diplomatic activity may create opportunities for agenda articulation; agenda articulation may contribute to collective negotiating or institutional outcomes; and those outcomes may, under additional domestic and international conditions, facilitate country-specific financing. Each transition is contingent. The framework therefore separates the presence of diplomatic activity from evidence of influence and from evidence of financial benefit.

D0 - Diplomatic activity or advocacy is documented, but no identifiable agenda or institutional outcome is established.

D1 - Agenda recognition or articulation is documented, including the adoption of a collective priority, declaration or negotiating demand.

D2 - A collective negotiating outcome is achieved, but Bangladesh's individual causal contribution is not isolated.

D3 - An institutional financing arrangement or mechanism is established, but no Bangladesh-specific financial allocation is traced to the diplomatic episode.

D4 - A Bangladesh-specific financing outcome is linked to the diplomatic initiative through documentary process tracing of the relevant decision pathway.

These categories are evidence thresholds, not a league table of diplomatic importance. D4 requires evidence of temporal precedence, a plausible transmission mechanism, identifiable actors, a decision pathway and documentary corroboration. The study does not infer D4 from chronology, thematic alignment, coalition membership or project approval alone. Where an outcome is collective, it is attributed to the coalition or UNFCCC process rather than Bangladesh alone.

III. Methodology

III.a Research strategy and temporal scope

The study uses a qualitative-dominant mixed-methods design based entirely on secondary sources. Diplomatic evidence is examined for 2015–2025. Financial evidence is examined for 2015–2024, the ten-year period for which the current research architecture seeks comparable annual records. The

principal units of analysis are (i) diplomatic episodes, (ii) formal negotiating or institutional outcomes, and (iii) Bangladesh-specific project or transaction records. No interviews or fieldwork are used.

III.b Documentary sources and episode selection

Diplomatic evidence is drawn from official CVF/V20 declarations and communiqués, Bangladesh national statements, UNFCCC decisions and outcome announcements, and institutional records. Three episodes receive in-depth analysis: (1) Bangladesh's CVF/V20 presidency and the Dhaka-Glasgow Declaration during 2020–2022; (2) the COP27 decision establishing new funding arrangements and a fund for responding to loss and damage; and (3) the COP29 agreement on the NCQG. These episodes were selected because they are prominent in Bangladesh's climate-diplomatic profile and have identifiable institutional or negotiating outcomes. (Climate Vulnerable Forum, 2021; Climate Vulnerable Forum & Vulnerable Twenty Group, n.d.; Climate Vulnerable Forum & Vulnerable Twenty Group, 2022; Government of Bangladesh, 2024; Hasina, 2022; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2022a; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2024).Financial evidence is drawn from GEF, Adaptation Fund and GCF project records, Bangladesh's interim BTR1, ERD's Aid Information Management System (AIMS), and the OECD CRDF recipient-perspective directory. The inventory contains seven selected GEF/LDCF/CBIT approvals, two identified Adaptation Fund approvals, an eight-row/seven-project GCF cross-check against BTR1 Annex II, and nine AIMS profiles screened for climate relevance. These sources do not constitute a complete national census. OECD recipient-perspective files were identified but not imported. Results are therefore limited to qualified selected-project observations and the BTR1-reported aggregate; no harmonized annual national total is calculated (Adaptation Fund, n.d.-a, n.d.-b; Department of Environment, 2025; Global Environment Facility, n.d.-a, n.d.-b, n.d.-c, n.d.-d, n.d.-e, n.d.-f, n.d.-g; Green Climate Fund, 2026a, 2026b, 2026c, 2026d, 2026e, 2026f, 2026g; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2026, n.d.).

III.c Process tracing and attribution tests

For each diplomatic episode, the analysis asks: What initiative or position did Bangladesh advance? Through which coalition or institutional channel? What formal outcome followed? Is Bangladesh's role documented independently, or only asserted in a national or coalition retrospective? Is there evidence that the outcome changed a financing decision relevant to Bangladesh? Are alternative explanations plausible? A D4 attribution is withheld unless the documentary record identifies a credible causal mechanism from diplomatic intervention to a Bangladesh-specific financing decision.

III.d Financial measurement and reconciliation rules

The financial database distinguishes approval, commitment, transfer, disbursement and expenditure. It also keeps grants, loans, guarantees, equity, co-financing, in-kind contributions, project-preparation grants and agency fees separate. Amounts are retained in their reported currency and price basis until

the source schema is verified. Current cumulative portfolio snapshots are not backcast into annual flows. Unallocated multi-country project finance is excluded from Bangladesh-specific aggregates. Missing values remain missing and are never coded as zero. OECD CRDF is analyzed separately from dedicated-fund project totals.

III.e Limitations and reproducibility

Financial coverage is still incomplete. The OECD CRDF recipient-perspective workbooks for 2015–2024 are listed officially, but binary retrieval failed in this environment; no OECD observations or annual Bangladesh series are reported. The GCF cross-check covers only seven standalone projects in BTR1 Annex II, not the full country portfolio. Nine AIMS profiles were screened, but cumulative totals, incomplete transaction dates, regional allocations and apparent accounting discrepancies prevent annual aggregation. The GEF and Adaptation Fund inventories are selected records, not complete portfolio censuses. The study therefore reports no complete national annual total, regression estimate or causal effect size.

III.f Use of AI tools

AI-assisted tools, including ChatGPT (OpenAI), Gemini, Claude were used to support source discovery and organization, preliminary structuring of extracted information, analytical drafting and language editing, and preparation of research audit workbooks. These tools were not treated as primary sources of evidence. All substantive claims, source records, extracted data, calculations, interpretations and final text must be independently verified by the author, who retains full responsibility for the accuracy and integrity of the manuscript.

IV. Results

IV.a Bangladesh's CVF/V20 leadership and agenda articulation

The strongest country-linked evidence of Bangladesh's climate-diplomatic effectiveness concerns its leadership of the CVF and V20 from 2020 to 2022. Official coalition records identify Bangladesh's presidency during this period, with the handover taking place in May 2022. This role gave Bangladesh an institutional platform to coordinate the positions of climate-vulnerable countries and advance their shared priorities in international climate discussions. (Climate Vulnerable Forum & Vulnerable Twenty Group, n.d.), (Climate Vulnerable Forum & Vulnerable Twenty Group, 2022).

The Dhaka-Glasgow Declaration, adopted on 2 November 2021, articulated collective demands concerning climate finance, adaptation, access to funding and support for climate-resilient development. It is the clearest documentary indicator in the present record of agenda articulation during Bangladesh's presidency. The appropriate interpretation is that Bangladesh exercised coalition leadership and helped convene and advance a collective agenda. The declaration does not establish that Bangladesh alone

authored all its demands or secured subsequent global finance commitments. (Climate Vulnerable Forum, 2021).

An outgoing-chair address in May 2022 reported that Bangladesh and the Marshall Islands helped seed the CVF-V20 Joint Multi-Donor Fund and described the Finance Summit's role in pressing for a delivery plan for the USD 100 billion climate-finance goal. This is relevant evidence of institutional entrepreneurship and the chair's own assessment of its contribution. However, because it is a self-reported retrospective, it should be corroborated with independent evidence of the fund's capitalization, governance, operationalization and disbursement before being treated as proof of a realized financial outcome. The episode is coded D1 for coalition agenda articulation; any stronger institutional or finance attribution requires further verification. (Hasina, 2022).

IV.b COP27 and the Loss and Damage Fund

At COP27 in 2022, parties agreed to establish new funding arrangements and a fund for responding to loss and damage in particularly vulnerable developing countries. This was a major institutional development in the international climate regime. For the present research question, however, the existence of the fund is not equivalent to a Bangladesh-specific financial outcome. The decision was a collective UNFCCC outcome, and the evidence assembled here does not establish that Bangladesh independently caused the decision or that a particular Bangladesh allocation resulted from its prior diplomatic intervention. (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2022a).

The COP27 episode is therefore coded D3 at the institutional level: it produced a financing institution relevant to the priorities of vulnerable countries. It is not coded D4 because the necessary country-specific allocation and documentary causal chain have not been established.

IV.c COP29 and the New Collective Quantified Goal

At COP29 in 2024, parties agreed to a new collective quantified goal that calls on developed countries to take the lead in mobilizing at least USD 300 billion per year for developing countries by 2035. The outcome also calls on all actors to scale up finance from public and private sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035. These are different formulations: the USD 1.3 trillion figure constitutes a broader all-actor scale-up ambition, not a grant obligation solely imposed on developed countries. (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2024).

Bangladesh's official high-level statement at COP29 stresses its 'three zeroes' vision. The statement available for this analysis does not substantiate all the detailed grant-share or quantitative demands sometimes attributed to Bangladesh in secondary commentary. The NCQG is therefore treated as a collective negotiating outcome, coded D2. The available evidence does not isolate Bangladesh's role in determining the final quantitative terms, nor does it identify a Bangladesh-specific financial allocation caused by the NCQG. (Government of Bangladesh, 2024). The UNFCCC record identifies the item as

Bangladesh's COP29 high-level national statement published on 15 November 2024; however, the PDF cover page anomalously prints "2–13 October 2024". The study uses the UNFCCC record metadata and the statement text, while retaining this internal date inconsistency as a source-quality caveat

IV.d Selected GEF/LDCF/CBIT project approvals

The selected GEF-related project inventory contains seven in-period records with known financial values. These comprise five investment-project grants totalling USD 25,614,335 and two enabling or transparency-related grants totalling USD 1,215,242. The selected grant subtotal is USD 26,829,577. Associated co-financing is reported separately at USD 166,147,000, and agency fees at USD 2,539,865. Neither co-financing nor agency fees is included in the grant subtotal. (Global Environment Facility, n.d.-c; Global Environment Facility, n.d.-e; Global Environment Facility, n.d.-f; Global Environment Facility, n.d.-a; Global Environment Facility, n.d.-g; Global Environment Facility, n.d.-b; Global Environment Facility, n.d.-d).

This figure is a selected-project subtotal, not a complete national GEF/LDCF/CBIT total. The inventory includes projects with approval dates between 2016 and 2022, but other candidate records remain unverified or outside the study period. The approvals demonstrate that Bangladesh has accessed dedicated climate-fund resources. They do not, by themselves, demonstrate that the approvals resulted from the CVF/V20 presidency, COP27 or COP29 diplomacy. In the absence of a documented decision pathway, those financial records are not coded D4.

IV.e Selected Adaptation Fund approvals

The identified Adaptation Fund inventory includes two Bangladesh project approvals within 2015–2024: an offshore small-islands and riverine-charland project approved in March 2019 for USD 9,995,369, and a coastal safe-drinking-water project approved in October 2024 for USD 5,000,000. Their combined identified approval value is USD 14,995,369. This is a selected approval subtotal, not a complete historical Adaptation Fund portfolio or an annual disbursement series. (Adaptation Fund, n.d.-b), (Adaptation Fund, n.d.-a).

The Adaptation Fund's later cumulative transfer snapshots and board-report transfer figures are not interchangeable with annual disbursements. They are retained as separate dated observations and are not backcast into the approval years. As with the GEF records, project approval demonstrates access to finance but does not establish that a particular diplomatic initiative caused the approval.

IV.f GCF and OECD evidence status

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) Open Data Library provides country-level, funded-activity and capacity-building information through a dynamically updated platform. The provider-side cross-check in this study covers seven standalone Bangladesh projects identified in Annex II of Bangladesh's First Biennial

Transparency Report (BTR1) for 2015–2024: FP004, FP069, SAP026, SAP008, FP070, FP150 and FP206. FP150 appears under two financing instruments, resulting in eight financing rows. Across these records, GCF-approved financing amounts to approximately USD 418.301 million, whereas dated provider disbursements recorded through 31 December 2024 total approximately USD 70.208 million. These figures describe a selected project subset; they should not be interpreted as the GCF's complete Bangladesh portfolio or as a national climate-finance total. (Green Climate Fund, n.d.-a, n.d.-b, n.d.-c; Department of Environment, 2025; Green Climate Fund, 2026a, 2026b, 2026c, 2026d, 2026e, 2026f, 2026g).

The OECD Creditor Reporting System climate-related development finance (CRDF) recipient-perspective directory provides annual workbooks covering 2015–2024 and a consolidated workbook covering 2000–2024. Neither source format was imported into the present analysis. Consequently, no OECD-derived annual Bangladesh climate-finance total or disbursement series is reported. The documented extraction protocol specifies filtering recipient records for Bangladesh and observation years 2015–2024; retaining source filenames, retrieval dates and SHA-256 checksums; preserving original amount, currency and price-basis fields; and deriving climate-related commitments only from a verified climate-share field. Any conversion from thousand USD to USD would be documented explicitly. Bilateral and multilateral channels would remain separate where the source permits. Missing observations would not be interpreted as zero, and the resulting series would not be added to dedicated-fund approval totals. OECD documentation distinguishes recipient-perspective records of bilateral and multilateral flows from provider-perspective accounting, thereby requiring care to avoid double counting. The 2026 schema documentation describes commitment amounts in thousands USD, current- and constant-price variants, and a climate-share field; these are documented schema characteristics, not collected data for this study. (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2026, n.d.).

IV.g Integrated diplomacy-to-finance assessment

Taken together, the evidence supports a differentiated assessment. Bangladesh’s CVF/V20 presidency and the Dhaka-Glasgow Declaration provide the strongest evidence of coalition leadership and agenda articulation (D1). The outgoing-chair address reports Bangladesh and the Marshall Islands seeded the CVF-V20 Joint Multi-Donor Fund and pressed for a delivery plan for the USD100bn goal; this is a retrospective self-assessment, not independent proof of causation. COP27 produced a collective institutional financing outcome (D3), while COP29 produced a collective negotiating outcome (D2). Neither record isolates Bangladesh’s individual causal contribution.

The evidence indicates that Bangladesh’s diplomacy is most clearly observable in coalition leadership and agenda articulation. The COP29 national statement adds normative framing but no quantified finance demand. Selected Bangladesh-specific project approvals are documented, yet no documentary pathway links these approvals to the diplomatic episodes examined. A D4 outcome is therefore not established.The analysis distinguishes approval cohorts, measured by approval date and approved amount, from annual flows, measured only by dated source transactions. OECD CRDF is a commitment

dataset, not a disbursement series. Missing observations are not coded as zero; regional amounts without a Bangladesh allocation, co-financing and agency fees remain separate.

The inventory contains seven selected GEF/LDCF/CBIT approvals, two identified Adaptation Fund approvals, an eight-row cross-check of seven GCF projects in BTR1 Annex II, and nine AIMS profiles. OECD CRDF has not been imported. These sources differ in coverage, accounting stage and reporting period and are not additive. BTR1 remains an official reported aggregate, not a fully reconciled cash-disbursement series.

IV.h Financial coverage and indicator construction

Table 1 summarizes the current quantitative boundary. It is deliberately not presented as a combined total because doing so would conflate different funds, accounting stages and coverage periods.

Table 1
Financial evidence coverage and validation status

Evidence stream	Current observed records	Reported result	Publication treatment
GEF/LDCF/CBIT	7 selected project approvals	USD 26.830m grant approvals	Selected subtotal only; co-financing and agency fees separate.
Adaptation Fund	2 identified approvals	USD 14.995m approved grants	Selected approval subtotal; not annual disbursements.
GCF	7 candidate dated project amounts	USD 70.208m diagnostic arithmetic only	Excluded from headline results pending transaction reconciliation.
OECD CRDF	0 imported recipient rows	No annual total calculated	Awaiting 2015–2024 source workbooks.
National annual total	Incomplete coverage	Not calculable	No combined total or annual trend claim.

IV.i Process-tracing assessment and attribution

The process-tracing results distinguish three types of evidence: evidence that Bangladesh acted, evidence that a collective or institutional outcome followed, and evidence that the first contributed to the second through an identifiable mechanism. The first two are documented more clearly than the third. Bangladesh's CVF/V20 presidency and the Dhaka-Glasgow Declaration support a D1 finding because official records establish the chair role and the declaration's collective agenda-setting content. They do not establish that Bangladesh alone authored the declaration or that its demands caused specific COP26 financing terms.

The COP27 Loss and Damage episode meets the D3 threshold at the institutional level: Decision 2/CP.27 establishes new funding arrangements, a fund for responding to loss and damage, and a Transitional Committee. This is a collective outcome of a negotiation history involving multiple coalitions and states; the decision does not isolate a Bangladesh intervention as a necessary or sufficient cause. The COP29 NCQG similarly meets D2 as a collective negotiating outcome. The official Bangladesh high-level national statement dated 15 November 2024 documents a normative “three zeroes” vision zero net carbon emissions, zero wealth concentration and zero unemployment and discusses zero waste, renewable energy, social business and youth entrepreneurship. The inspected two-page statement does not mention the USD 300 billion annual goal, the USD 1.3 trillion scale-up call, a quantified grant-share demand, or a Bangladesh-specific Loss and Damage allocation request. It therefore supports limited D1 agenda articulation, not a claim that Bangladesh advanced those specific finance demands or shaped the final NCQG. The project inventory also does not identify a Bangladesh-specific allocation traceable to the COP27 decision during the financial observation period.

The project-level financial evidence must be interpreted separately from diplomatic attribution. Seven selected GEF-related approvals and two identified Adaptation Fund approvals demonstrate that Bangladesh accessed dedicated climate-finance channels. However, project approval is mediated by national institutions, accredited entities, project preparation, fund eligibility, agency priorities and donor decisions. The current project records do not contain the documentary bridge needed to attribute those approvals to the diplomatic episodes examined here. The study therefore assigns no D4 outcome at this stage.

A conservative attribution rule is preferable to an expansive claim of diplomatic success. The evidence supports Bangladesh’s role in coalition leadership and collective agenda articulation, and it confirms selected country-specific project approvals. It does not yet show that Bangladesh’s diplomacy generated those approvals or secured the major multilateral negotiating outcomes. This distinction is central to the paper’s contribution: diplomatic influence, institutional change and national financial receipts are analytically related but empirically non-equivalent.

Table 2
Comparative assessment of the principal diplomatic episodes

Episode	Documented activity / outcome	Evidence-supported interpretation	Code	Attribution boundary
CVF/V20 presidency and Dhaka-Glasgow Declaration (2020–2022)	Bangladesh chaired the coalition; declaration adopted 2 November 2021 and articulated collective finance/adaptation priorities.	Strongest evidence of Bangladesh-linked coalition leadership and agenda articulation.	D1	Declaration is collective; chairmanship does not prove sole authorship or downstream financing causation.
COP27 Loss and Damage Fund (2022)	UNFCCC parties agreed new funding arrangements and a fund for loss and damage.	Major collective institutional financing outcome.	D3	No Bangladesh-specific allocation or causal pathway linked to Bangladesh diplomacy is established.
COP29 NCQG (2024)	Parties agreed at least USD 300bn/year by 2035 and a broader all-actor scale-up call to USD 1.3tn/year.	Collective negotiating outcome aligned with developing-country finance priorities.	D2	USD 1.3tn is not a developed-country grant obligation; Bangladesh's individual influence on final terms is not isolated.

Table 3
Selected Bangladesh-specific dedicated-fund approval evidence

Fund / portfolio	Selected records	Reported amount	What the amount represents	Coverage limitation
GEF/LDCF/CBIT	7 selected projects	USD 26,829,577	Grant approvals only; investment grants USD 25,614,335 and enabling/transparency grants USD 1,215,242.	Partial project selection, not complete national portfolio.
Adaptation Fund	2 in-period projects	USD 14,995,369	Approved grant amounts: USD 9,995,369 (2019) and USD 5,000,000 (2024).	Selected approval subtotal; not annual transfers or full historical portfolio.
GCF	Candidate observations, not reconciled	Not reported as validated total	Diagnostic candidate subtotal USD 70,208,123 excluded from headline results.	Transaction type, date and multi-country allocation validation incomplete.

IV.j Financial comparability and limits of aggregation

The available provider records are not a single additive measure. GEF records are selected grant approvals; Adaptation Fund records are selected project approvals; GCF records are a limited cross-check of BTR1 rows; and OECD CRDF has not been imported. Their coverage and accounting stages differ.

The study calculates no combined national total or harmonized annual trend. Annual flows require dated transactions; approval cohorts use approval dates. Co-financing, fees and unallocated regional amounts remain separate. The CVF-V20 Joint Multi-Donor Fund is not counted as Bangladesh finance received without verified Bangladesh allocations and transfers.

IV.k Descriptive presentation of the available financial evidence

Figure 2 compares the two selected approval subtotals that currently have sufficiently identified project-level grant values: USD 26.830 million across seven selected GEF/LDCF/CBIT records and USD 14.995 million across two identified Adaptation Fund approvals. The comparison is descriptive only. It does not imply equal portfolio coverage, comparable annual flows, or a complete national total.

Figure 3 summarizes the current coverage boundary. Selected GEF and Adaptation Fund project amounts are identified, but neither stream provides a complete comparable annual series in the present inventory. GCF candidate amounts remain unreconciled; OECD CRDF records have not been imported; and the CVF-V20 Joint Multi-Donor Fund has no independently verified Bangladesh allocation or transfer series. A missing or unvalidated series is classified as not established, not as zero.

An additional national reporting source materially expands the empirical baseline, but its accounting stage requires qualification. Bangladesh's interim First Biennial Transparency Report (BTR1), submitted on 31 December 2025, reports USD 9,908.6 million in climate finance received across 154 programs during 2015–2024. It classifies USD 2,727.0 million as adaptation, USD 2,172.5 million as mitigation, and USD 5,009.1 million as cross-cutting (Department of Environment, 2025). The amount is retained as a BTR1-reported national aggregate, not treated as a verified cash-disbursement total. A cross-check of Annex II against GCF project records finds cases where the amount labelled "received" equals the full GCF-approved financing amount even though the provider's dated disbursement record is materially lower at the end of 2024 (Green Climate Fund, 2026a; Green Climate Fund, 2026b; Green Climate Fund, 2026c).

Table 4 summarizes the BTR1 national aggregate and selected fund-specific figures. These provider amounts are not additive to the national total and should not be combined with the separate project-level GEF and Adaptation Fund approval subtotals. The national aggregate is reported as received by BTR1, but the Annex II cross-check below indicates that some rows may represent approved or committed amounts rather than disbursements actually received.

Table 4
Nationally reported climate finance received and selected provider figures in Bangladesh's interim BTR1.

BTR1 category / provider	Reported amount (USD million)	Coverage / note
National total	9,908.6	154 programmes; 2015–2024; government-reported received finance
Adaptation	2,727.0	58 programmes
Mitigation	2,172.5	44 programmes
Cross-cutting	5,009.1	52 programmes
Green Climate Fund	470.4	Grants; 18 projects and activities
Global Environment Facility	32.0 grants; 221.0 co-financing	Nine national initiatives; co-financing separate
Adaptation Fund	13.4	Three projects
Climate Investment Funds	92.9	Seven projects under CTF, PPCR and SREP

IV.I Cross-validation of BTR1-reported finance against provider transactions

The audit covers seven standalone Bangladesh GCF projects listed in BTR1 Annex II for 2015–2024: FP004, FP069, SAP026, SAP008, FP070, FP150 and FP206. FP150 has separate loan and grant rows, giving eight financing rows. BTR1 reports USD418.300m across these rows; corresponding GCF-approved financing totals USD418.301m. Provider timelines record USD70.208123m in dated disbursements through 31 December 2024. This is a selected-project discrepancy, not a national financing gap. In five projects, the BTR1 amount matches approved financing while dated disbursements are lower; in two, the values coincide. The Annex II 'amount received' field therefore cannot be assumed to represent consistently defined cash disbursement without project-level reconciliation.

Table 5

Cross-check of selected BTR1 Annex II entries against GCF project timelines. Amounts are USD million; disbursement cut-offs are based on provider-recorded dated events.

GCF project	BTR1 Annex II amount	Provider-approved GCF financing	Provider disbursements by end-2024	Interpretation
FP004	40.000	40.000 grant	5.886	BTR1 amount equals approved grant; provider timeline records lower cumulative disbursement by end-2024.
FP069	24.980	24.980 grant	23.411128	BTR1 amount equals approved grant; provider timeline records lower cumulative disbursement by end-2024.
SAP026	24.960	24.957990 grant	4.348540	BTR1 rounded amount matches approved grant; dated provider disbursement through 2024 is lower.
SAP008	9.680	9.681340 grant	9.681340	Approved financing and dated disbursement total coincide in provider timeline inspected.
FP070	20.000	20.000 grant	20.000	Approved financing and dated disbursement total coincide in provider timeline inspected.
FP150 (loan)	250.000	250.000 concessional loan	0.672825	BTR1 amount equals approved loan component; only dated event identified through 2024 is USD0.672825m.
FP150 (grant)	6.480	6.480 grant	Not identified*	No grant disbursement event identified in timeline through 2024; not proof of zero cash transfer.
FP206	42.200	42.201200 grant	6.208290	BTR1 rounded amount matches approved grant; dated provider disbursement through 2024 is lower.

Note. Amounts are USD million; disbursement cut-offs use provider-recorded dated events. For FP150's grant component, no dated disbursement event was identified through 31 December 2024; this is not proof of zero cash transfer. Total dated provider disbursements across the eight financing rows equal USD 70.208123 million.

UNFCCC's BTR submission register records Bangladesh's BTR1 submission on 31 December 2025. As of the register's 9 November 2026 update, no Bangladesh technical expert review report (TERR) is listed. The report is explicitly labelled interim; its climate-finance aggregate should therefore be treated as an official national submission requiring further assessment, not as a technically reviewed, independently reconciled transaction dataset (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2026).

The selected two-project Adaptation Fund approval subtotal (USD 14.995 million) exceeds the BTR1 provider-reported USD 13.4 million across three projects. The available records do not reconcile their coverage, cut-off or inclusion basis; the figures are therefore reported separately and are not treated as comparable or additive. An additional cross-check concerns implementation status. BTR1 records FP004 and FP069 as “Completed” in Annex II, whereas the GCF project pages retrieved for this audit list both projects as “Under implementation”; FP004 has a current estimated completion date of 31 March 2028 and FP069 a completion date of 30 June 2026. The difference may reflect distinct reporting definitions or reporting cut-off dates, but the documents inspected do not explain it. These status fields are therefore not harmonized and are not used as evidence of project completion or financial receipt (Green Climate Fund, 2026a), (Green Climate Fund, 2026b).

AIMS project-level evidence is partly accessible through nine ERD profiles. The AIMS manual describes project-level commitment, disbursement and expenditure reporting, while ERD’s FABA wing has foreign-aid budget and accounts functions (Economic Relations Division, 2016, 2026b): IBFCR (1658), Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation (1843), Weather and Climate Services (1986), community-based adaptation (4563), Sundarbans mangrove adaptation (1685), SREPGen (19), Catalyzing Clean Energy (1153), Khulna Water Supply (1027), and a Bangladesh-India coastal resilience project (1472). ID 1027 is excluded because its climate-specific share is unknown. ID 1472 remains unresolved: its title identifies a Bangladesh-India programme, while AIMS lists Bagerhat, Khulna and a 1 July 2015 disbursement after the stated 1 March 2015 project end; country allocation and the post-completion payment require reconciliation. For ID 1685, the displayed commitment (15 January 2015) and disbursement (1 April 2015) precede the stated 1 May 2015 project start. Most profiles provide cumulative or incomplete transaction details. IBFCR reports USD 1.231m committed and USD 1.904m disbursed, a USD 0.674m discrepancy. Other records cross the study boundary or contain date/allocation issues. AIMS is used for project discovery and administrative cross-checking, not national aggregation (Economic Relations Division, n.d.-a, n.d.-b, n.d.-c, n.d.-d, n.d.-e, n.d.-f, n.d.-g, n.d.-h, n.d.-i, n.d.-j).

A complementary administrative source is ERD’s Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh 2024-25 report, including Table 3.8, which reports foreign-aid commitments and disbursements classified by purpose and type for 1971/72-2024/25. The report confirms that official aid-flow accounting distinguishes commitments from disbursements and separates grants from loans. It is not climate-tagged and uses fiscal-year periods, however, so it cannot independently validate the BTR1 climate-finance aggregate or be merged with the calendar-year climate-finance series (Economic Relations Division, 2026a).

V. Discussion and Implications

V.a Diplomatic influence is more visible in agenda-setting than in financial attribution

The findings are consistent with scholarship that identifies coalition formation and agenda-setting as ways less powerful states can exercise influence in multilateral negotiations. Bangladesh’s CVF/V20

presidency offered an institutional platform for collective voice and agenda coordination. The Dhaka-Glasgow Declaration is evidence that priorities were articulated in a formal coalition document during this period. The outgoing-chair address further records the presidency's account of Bangladesh's role in seeding the CVF-V20 Joint Multi-Donor Fund with the Marshall Islands and its advocacy around a USD 100 billion delivery plan. Because this is a retrospective statement by the outgoing chair, it should be treated as evidence of the presidency's own account of its diplomatic activity rather than independent proof of causal influence. Bangladesh's COP29 national statement provides a different form of agenda articulation: a normative three-zero vision rather than a quantified climate-finance negotiating demand. These outcomes are consistent with E1, while not establishing that Bangladesh independently determined collective negotiating outcomes. (Betzold, 2010), (Genovese, 2020), (Gray & Cointet, 2023).

The distinction between agenda-setting and finance attribution is essential. Diplomatic influence can alter the language, visibility or institutional treatment of an issue without producing a traceable national allocation. Conversely, a country may receive project finance because it meets vulnerability criteria, has a prepared project pipeline or is eligible under a fund's rules, even if the relevant approval was not caused by a particular diplomatic intervention. The paper's D0-D4 framework prevents these different pathways from being collapsed.

V.b Institutional outcomes are not equivalent to country-specific gains

The COP27 Loss and Damage Fund illustrates the difference between an institutional outcome and a national financial outcome. Establishing a fund can be a major success for vulnerable countries collectively, but the benefits to an individual country depend on capitalization, access rules, allocation criteria, project preparation and actual disbursement. A D3 classification recognizes the institutional achievement while withholding a D4 claim until a Bangladesh-specific pathway is documented.

The NCQG illustrates the distinction between negotiated goals and actual finance delivered. The COP29 outcome includes a goal of at least USD 300 billion annually by 2035 and a separate call for all actors to scale up finance from public and private sources to USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035. These are forward-looking collective goals, not amounts already received by Bangladesh. The Bangladesh national statement inspected for this study does not mention either figure; the figures must therefore be attributed to the collective COP29 outcome, not to Bangladesh's national intervention. Monitoring implementation will require transaction-level data and attention to the quality and instrument composition of finance.

V.c Domestic institutions and project pipelines mediate access

The selected GEF and Adaptation Fund approvals show that Bangladesh has accessed multiple international climate-finance channels, but this access is institutionally mediated. Project concepts must

be developed, endorsed, submitted through eligible entities, satisfy fund-specific criteria and pass appraisal and approval procedures. These steps create plausible pathways through which diplomatic priorities could be translated into projects, but they also provide rival explanations for approval outcomes. Without concept notes, endorsement records, appraisal documents and decision correspondence linking a project to a diplomatic initiative, the more defensible interpretation is that the projects demonstrate financial access and national implementation capacity, not a direct diplomatic dividend.

Future process tracing should investigate whether Bangladesh's diplomatic agenda was translated into national project concepts, whether these concepts were given priority by national coordinating bodies, whether accredited entities developed proposals in response to diplomatic commitments, and whether fund decision documents explicitly refer to the diplomatic initiative. Without such evidence, attributing a project approval to diplomacy would overstate the findings.

V.d Implications for evaluating climate diplomacy

The study suggests that evaluations of climate diplomacy should not rely on a single aggregate indicator such as total finance received. A more defensible evaluation distinguishes activity, agenda recognition, collective negotiating outcomes, institutional change and country-specific economic results. This strategy permits researchers to recognize diplomatic attainments without confusing them with financial receipts. It also makes uncertainty visible and gives future researchers a reproducible basis for updating the evidence.

V.e Limitations

The principal limitation is incomplete financial data coverage. OECD CRDF annual workbooks have not been imported or header-validated; the current documented schema supports a prospective commitment series, not an assumed disbursement series. The GCF candidate transaction records require reconciliation, and the GEF project inventory is not exhaustive. The Adaptation Fund figures are selected approvals rather than a complete annual series. Diplomatic evidence is also uneven. The COP29 Bangladesh national statement has now been inspected in full, but it is a short high-level statement and supports a normative three-zero framing rather than detailed climate-finance demands. The outgoing-chair account of the Joint Multi-Donor Fund and Glasgow delivery-plan advocacy is still a self-reported retrospective account and requires independent corroboration for stronger causal claims.

The study also uses a single-country design. It can identify mechanisms and evidence gaps in Bangladesh's case, but it cannot establish that the same patterns apply to all climate-vulnerable countries. A future comparative study could examine whether coalition chairs secure different types of agenda or institutional outcomes from non-chair members, while controlling for vulnerability, project readiness and donor preferences.

V.f Conclusion

This paper asked whether Bangladesh's climate diplomacy between 2015 and 2025 translated into discernible financing outcomes. The strongest evidence concerns coalition leadership and agenda articulation during Bangladesh's 2020–2022 CVF/V20 presidency, particularly the Dhaka-Glasgow Declaration. The outgoing-chair address records the presidency's account of its role in the CVF-V20 Joint Multi-Donor Fund and finance advocacy, but does not independently establish causal influence. COP27 established a loss-and-damage funding arrangement, and COP29 adopted a new collective quantified finance goal. Bangladesh's COP29 statement articulated a three-zero vision, not quantified finance demands or demonstrated influence over the NCQG.

The financial evidence confirms selected Bangladesh-specific approvals in the GEF/LDCF/CBIT and Adaptation Fund portfolios. The selected GEF-related grant subtotal is USD 26.83 million across seven records, and the identified Adaptation Fund approval subtotal is USD 14.995 million across two projects. These amounts are not complete national totals and cannot be attributed to the diplomatic episodes without documentary process tracing. GCF candidate amounts remain unreconciled, while OECD CRDF files have not been imported; therefore, neither source contributes a validated annual Bangladesh series to the present results.

The paper's central conclusion is that Bangladesh's diplomatic effectiveness is more strongly evidenced in coalition agenda-setting than in directly attributable country-specific finance. This is not evidence that diplomacy exerted no financial effect. It is a statement about what the presently verified record can establish. A stronger causal assessment requires complete transaction-level financial data and documentary evidence connecting diplomatic initiatives to specific national project decisions. By distinguishing agenda influence from financial attribution, the study offers a transparent approach to evaluating climate diplomacy and international climate finance.

Declarations

Author Contribution

M.A.H.A. conceived and designed the study, developed the research framework and methodology, collected and analyzed the documentary evidence, conducted the investigation, prepared the tables and figures, and wrote the original manuscript. M.A.H.A. reviewed and approved the final version of the manuscript and takes full responsibility for its content.

Data availability.

The project-selection register, diplomatic episode coding, selected project-level financial observations, source register and audit flags are provided in Online Resource 1. Online Resource 2 contains the available transaction-level extracts from GCF project schedules and ERD AIMS profiles, together with

calculation rules, source locators and unresolved-record flags. These supplementary materials support reproducibility but do not constitute a complete national transaction-level climate-finance dataset. Original third-party datasets and institutional records remain accessible through their respective repositories, subject to applicable access conditions.

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Figures




Figure 1

Conditional diplomacy-to-finance transmission model and attribution boundary




Figure 2

Selected Bangladesh-specific dedicated-fund approval evidence (USD million)


Coverage and validation status of financial evidence

	Selected project / approval evidence	Comparable annual series available	Bangladesh-specific flows validated
GEF/LDCF/CBIT	Selected only	Not established	Selected approvals
Adaptation Fund	Selected only	Not established	Selected approvals
GCF	Seven projects cross-checked	Not established	Partial dated flows
AIMS	Nine profiles screened	Not established	Partial / unresolved
OECD CRDF	Not imported	Not established	Not established
CVF-V20 Joint Multi-Donor Fund	Initiative documented	Not established	Not established

Selected records and partial cross-checks are not complete national totals. Missing or unvalidated values are not coded as zero.

Figure 3

Financial evidence coverage and validation status



BTR1-reported 'received' aggregate; provider cross-checks indicate some entries may reflect approvals, not cash disbursements.

Figure 4

Bangladesh's BTR1-reported climate-finance composition, 2015-2024 (USD million).
Source: Department of Environment (2025)