

Supplementary Materials

Supplementary Figures




Supplementary Fig. 1 | Share of policies that reach predefined thresholds. N = 5,439, number of policies: $N_{\text{carbon tax}}$ = 40, $N_{\text{isolated policies}}$ = 22, $N_{\text{policy packages}}$ = 4,592. The underlying support estimates are based on the MRP approach. The figure shows the share of policies that are supported within each state (red dots for Republican states, blue dots for Democratic states; Democratic states are defined by Democratic vote share in 2024 presidential election > 50%) and nationally (black diamond) at two thresholds: 30% and 50%. For example, if only one of the 40 carbon tax proposals is supported by at least 50% of participants in a state, the dot in panel B would be located at 2.5%. There are four types of state labels: blue labels represent Democratic states with high support rates, red labels represent


Republican states with low support rates, white labels with a blue border represent Democratic states with low support rates, and white labels with a red border represent Republican states with high support rates. State abbreviations: AL (Alabama), AK (Alaska), AR (Arkansas), AZ (Arizona), CA (California), DC (District of Columbia), DE (Delaware), FL (Florida), IA (Iowa), ME (Maine), ND (North Dakota), NM (New Mexico), NY (New York), TX (Texas), UT (Utah), WY (Wyoming).




Supplementary Fig. 2 | Polarization in Climate Policy Support between Republicans and Democrats. *N* = 3,884. The figure only includes participants that were affiliated with the Republican or Democratic party. Density estimates of predicted support-rates (%; share of people supporting each policy) for all evaluated policy configurations, pooled across all seven conditions (carbon tax, and isolated policies and policy packages within the food, transportation, and household domains), using multilevel regression and poststratification-based (MRP) national estimates. (A) Density by self-reported party affiliation. Blue, Democrat; red, Republican. (B) Density for all Republicans and Democrats in the sample, pooled across party affiliation.




Supplementary Fig. 3 | Policy support and polarization as a function of policy attributes (carbon tax). $N_{support}$ = 5,463; $N_{polarization}$ = 3,899. Coefficients from mixed-effects models of carbon tax attributes on (left) policy support (logist mixed-effects model; random intercepts for respondent and state) and (right) partisan polarization, i.e., the Democrat − Republican difference in the attribute effect (log-odds; party × attribute interaction in a logit mixed-effects model with random intercepts for respondent and state, estimated on the Democrat and Republican subsample). Reference categories: \$15/tCO_2e (tax level), no annual increase (tax dynamic), deficit reduction (revenue use). Points show fixed-effect estimates; horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals.




Supplementary Fig. 4 | Policy support and polarization as a function of policy attributes (isolated policies). $N_{support}$ = 5,463; $N_{polarization}$ = 3,899. Coefficients from logit mixed-effects models of individual policy attributes on (left) support and (right) partisan polarization, for food (top), transportation (middle), and household (bottom) policies evaluated in isolation. Polarization estimates are Democrat − Republican differences in the attribute effects (log-odds; party × attribute interaction, see Supplementary Fig. 3). The reference category is climate food label (food), increase federal funding of green infrastructure projects by 50% (transport) and update energy labels (household). Points show fixed-effect estimates with 95% confidence intervals.




Supplementary Fig. 5 | Policy support and polarization as a function of policy attributes (policy packages). $N_{support}$ = 5,463; $N_{polarization}$ = 3,899. Coefficients from logit mixed-effects models of policy package attributes on (left) support and (right) partisan polarization, for food (top), transportation (middle), and household (bottom) packages. Polarization estimates are Democrat − Republican differences in the attribute effects (log-odds; party × attribute interaction, see Supplementary Fig. 3). Reference categories: "No tax", "No mandate"/"No reduction"/"No label" (domain-specific attributes, as applicable). Points show fixed-effect estimates with 95% confidence intervals.




Supplementary Fig. 6 | Effect sizes of policy attribute levels for individual and combined policies (for three domains). *N* = 5,463. The difference in effect sizes between individual and combined policies constitutes the packaging attenuation effect. The policy package effect measure is closer to 0 for most policy attributes, indicating the assumed attenuation of attribute effects when policies are evaluated in packages compared to in isolation. For isolated policies, we extracted the coefficients from the corresponding regressions without adjustments (reference categories: for food, climate food label; for transportation, increase federal funding for green infrastructure projects by 50%; for household, label on household appliances). For policy packages, the initial models had different reference categories (no policy for each policy). To make coefficients comparable between the two conditions, we subtracted the effect of the policy attribute which was the reference in the isolated condition from each policy attribute in the package condition (e.g., for the 75% mandate of vegetarian or vegan meals in public cafeterias, we subtracted the effect of the carbon food label in the policy package condition from the effect of the mandate). The bars represent 95% confidence intervals. *SE*s for the recoded package estimates were computed as the square root of the sum of the variances of the two coefficients minus twice their covariance.




Supplementary Fig. 7 | **Policy packaging effect by policy type.** *N* = 5,463. Bars show the packaging attenuation effect, the difference between a policy attribute's coefficient estimated in isolation versus within a package, pooled across attributes within each policy type (push, pull, carbon tax-specific revenue-recycling mechanisms) and shown separately by domain. Positive values indicate a smaller effect in packages, and negative values a larger effect, and differences were pooled with a random-effects model. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals from the random-effects pool and incorporate both the estimation uncertainty of each attribute-level difference and the between-attribute heterogeneity (τ^2) within each cell. The sampling variance of each attribute-level difference was taken as $SE^2_{\text{isolated}} + SE^2_{\text{package}}$. Isolated coefficients were extracted from the unadjusted domain regression models, and package coefficients were recoded to match the isolated-condition reference category, with *SE*s accounting for the covariance between parameters (see Note to Supplementary Fig. 6). Cells contain two to seven attributes, so intervals for the smallest cells (e.g., household pull policies, $n = 2$) are correspondingly wide. A random-effects meta-regression across all 30 attribute levels, with domain fixed effects, showed no difference in attenuation between push and pull policies (push − pull = 0.06, 95% CI [−0.11, 0.23], $p = .52$).




Supplementary Fig. 8 | Policy support and polarization of policy support across states (*SD*). $N_{support}$ = 5,439, $N_{polarization}$ = 3,884, number of policies: $N_{carbon\ tax}$ = 40, $N_{isolated\ policies}$ = 22, $N_{policy\ packages}$ = 4,592. Sample size is reduced as only participants that identified as either Republican or Democrat were included. Polarization is computed based on the average difference in support between Democrats and Republicans for every policy proposal. The underlying support estimates are based on the MRP approach. Grey states are not presented due to low sample size (fewer than 10 Democrat or Republican participants: Alaska, North Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming).




Supplementary Fig. 9 | State-level predictors of carbon tax support and polarization. $N_{support}$ = 5,463; $N_{polarization}$ = 3,899. Coefficients from logit mixed-effects regressions relating state-level contextual predictors to (left) policy support and (right) partisan polarization for carbon tax proposals. Support estimates are shown for Model 1 (focal state-level predictor and policy attributes) and Model 2 (additionally socio-demographic variables and the baseline set of state-level predictors or the corresponding swap-in set); Model 1.5 (focal predictor and socio-demographic variables) is reported in Supplementary Table 3. Polarization estimates are changes in the Democrat − Republican gap (log-odds per *SD* of the predictor; party × predictor interaction in a mixed-effects logit model with a random intercept for respondent and a random intercept and party slope for state) from Model 1 (focal predictor) and Model 2 (baseline or swap-in set). The baseline predictor set was established to avoid collinearity among correlated state characteristics. All continuous predictors are standardized, so coefficients are comparable in magnitude. Points show fixed-effect estimates and horizontal bars 95% confidence intervals. The vertical dashed line marks zero.


Support
Polarization (Democrats vs. Republicans)
Vegetarian restaurants
Farming jobs (per capita)
Apple price
Dairy price
Meat price
Implemented policies (food)
Democratic vote share
CO2 emissions (per capita)
GDP (2024)
Fossil fuel jobs (per capita)
Fossil fuel revenue (% GDP)
Electricity: fossil fuel share
Electricity price
Gasoline price
Extreme weather (billion-$ events)
Implemented policies (general)
Charging infrastructure (per capita)
Passenger trips (per capita)
Registered EVs (per capita)
Automotive jobs (per capita)
Public transport price
Implemented policies (transport)
Installed heat pumps (share)
Implemented policies (household)
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Food
Transport
Household
Coefficient (log odds)
Model
Model 1: State-level predictor + Policy attributes
Model 2: State-level predictor + Policy attributes + Baseline state-level predictors


Supplementary Fig. 10 | State-level predictors of isolated policy support and polarization. $N_{support}$ = 5,463; $N_{polarization}$ = 3,899. Coefficients from logit mixed-effects regressions relating state-level contextual predictors to (left) policy support and (right) partisan polarization for policies evaluated in isolation, shown separately for food (top), transportation (middle), and household (bottom) domains. Within each panel, predictors are grouped into general state-level characteristics (below the dotted line) and domain-specific predictors (above the dotted line). Support estimates are shown for Model 1 (focal state-level predictor and policy attributes) and Model 2 (additionally socio-demographic variables and the baseline set of state-level predictors or the corresponding swap-in set); Model 1.5 (focal predictor and socio-demographic variables) is reported in Supplementary Table 3. Polarization estimates are changes in the Democrat − Republican gap (log-odds per *SD* of the predictor; party × predictor interaction in a mixed-effects logit model with a random intercept for respondent and a random intercept and party slope for state) from Model 1 (focal predictor) and Model 2 (baseline or swap-in set). The baseline predictor set was established to avoid collinearity among correlated state characteristics. Continuous predictors are standardized. Points show fixed-effect estimates with 95% confidence intervals, and the vertical dashed line marks zero.



Supplementary Fig. 11 | Variability in regression coefficients of state-level predictor of carbon tax support. *N* = 5,463. Coefficients from logit mixed-effects regressions relating state-level contextual predictors to policy support for carbon tax proposals. Predictors with multiple estimates were part of the baseline predictor set which was established to avoid collinearity among correlated state characteristics. The shape of the dot indicates the specific model configuration (impl. policies: implemented policies; FF revenue: fossil fuel revenue; FF jobs: fossil fuel jobs; electricity FF: electricity from fossil fuels). All continuous predictors are standardized, so coefficients are comparable in magnitude. Points show fixed-effect estimates, and horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals. Blue dots indicate significant coefficients.



Supplementary Fig. 12 | Variability in regression coefficients of state-level predictor of isolated domain-specific policy support. *N* = 5,463. Coefficients from logit mixed-effects regressions relating state-level contextual predictors to policy support for isolated domain specific policy proposals. Predictors with multiple estimates were part of the baseline predictor set which was established to avoid collinearity among correlated state characteristics. The shape of the dot indicates the specific model configuration (impl. policies: implemented policies; FF revenue: fossil fuel revenue; FF jobs: fossil fuel jobs; electricity FF: electricity from fossil fuels). All continuous predictors are standardized, so coefficients are comparable in magnitude. Points show fixed-effect estimates, and horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals. The vertical dashed line marks zero. Blue dots indicate significant coefficients.



Supplementary Fig. 13 | Variability in regression coefficients of state-level predictor of domain-specific policy package support. *N* = 5,463. Coefficients from logit mixed-effects regressions relating state-level contextual predictors to policy support for domain specific policy package proposals. Predictors with multiple estimates were part of the baseline predictor set which was established to avoid collinearity among correlated state characteristics. The shape of the dot indicates the specific model configuration (impl. policies: implemented policies; FF revenue: fossil fuel revenue; FF jobs: fossil fuel jobs; electricity FF: electricity from fossil fuels). All continuous predictors are standardized, so coefficients are comparable in magnitude. Points show fixed-effect estimates, and horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals. The vertical dashed line marks zero. Blue dots indicate significant coefficients.

Transportation Policy Package Proposals

	Policy Package 1	**Policy Package 2**
Carbon Tax Level	$50 /tCO2e	$150 /tCO2e
Carbon Tax Dynamic	No increase	Yearly increase by 10% (capped at $300)
Carbon Tax Revenue	Deficit reduction	Public programs low-income households
Fleet Emission Standards	Step-wise reduction of allowed newly sold ICEVs to 0% by 2030	Step-wise reduction of allowed newly sold ICEVs to 0% by 2040
Public Transportation Subsidy	Reduce price by 15%	Reduce price by 45%
Federal Funding	Additional $1.5 billion funding for charging infrastructure expansion and $20 billion funding for public transportation per year	Additional $0.75 billion funding for charging infrastructure expansion and $10 billion funding for public transportation per year

Information about policies

If you had to choose between them, which of the two policy packages would you prefer?

○ Policy Package 1 ○ Policy Package 2

Would you approve of the policy packages?
Please rate each policy package separately now.

	No	Probably not	Undecided	Probably yes	Yes
Policy Package 1	○	○	○	○	○
Policy Package 2	○	○	○	○	○

Next

Supplementary Fig. 14 | Exemplary discrete choice experiment trial for transportation policy packages. Participants could click on the “Information about policies” box and see an explanation of all policies relevant for a specific task. The carbon tax DCE only included the three carbon tax attributes, and the domain-specific isolated policy DCEs included only one row, in which one domain-specific policy was presented in each column (e.g., Policy Package 1: “Fleet Emission Standards: Step-wise reduction of allowed newly sold ICEVs to 0% by 2050”; Policy Package 2: “Public Transportation Subsidy: Reduce price by 45%”).

Supplementary Tables

Supplementary Table 1

Socio-demographic sample composition

		Sample	General population
N		5,463	
Age			
	M (SD)	47.34 (15.95)	
	18–29	17.4%	22.1%
	30–39	19.8%	19.4%
	40–49	18.2%	17.6%
	50–59	18.1%	17.4%
	60–69	17.6%	17.0%
	70–74	7.0%	6.6%
	75+	1.9%	NA
Gender			
	Female	50.6%	50.5%
	Male	48.9%	49.5%
	Other	0.4%	NA
Gross household income			
	< $25,000	12.0%	14.1%
	$25,000–$49,999	17.3%	17.2%
	$50,000–$74,999	16.2%	15.7%
	$75,000–$99,999	12.6%	12.1%
	$100,000–$149,999	17.6%	17.0%
	> $149,999	24.3%	23.9%
Formal education			
	Less than a high school diploma	1.6%	8.9%
	High school graduate / GED	21.2%	42.7%
	Associate degree	12.7%	10.5%
	Bachelor's degree	33.5%	23.5%
	Trade school certification	3.6%	NA
	Master's degree or higher education	25.4%	14.4%
	Other (please specify)	1.9%	NA
Employment status			
	Working full time	53.8%	NA
	Working part time	10.9%	NA
	Temporarily laid off	0.8%	NA
	Unemployed	6.7%	NA
	Retired	19.3%	NA
	Homemaker	3.9%	NA
	Student	2.6%	NA
	Other (Please specify)	1.9%	NA
Party affiliation			
	Democratic Party	38.8%	27%
	Republican Party	32.5%	27%
	Independent/No party affiliation	26.7%	45%
	Other (please specify)	1.9%	NA
Political orientation			
	Extremely liberal	7.7%	NA
	Liberal	15.7%	NA
	Slightly Liberal	10.8%	NA
	Moderate or middle of the road	28.0%	NA

		Sample	General population
	Slightly conservative	10.5%	NA
	Conservative	16.1%	NA
	Extremely conservative	6.9%	NA
	Haven't thought much about it	4.4%	NA
State			
	Alabama	1.1%	1.5%
	Alaska	0.2%	0.6%
	Arizona	2.2%	2.1%
	Arkansas	0.7%	0.9%
	California	8.6%	11.8%
	Colorado	1.8%	1.7%
	Connecticut	1.2%	1.1%
	Delaware	0.4%	0.3%
	District of Columbia	0.4%	0.2%
	Florida	8.0%	6.4%
	Georgia	2.7%	3.2%
	Hawaii	0.3%	0.4%
	Idaho	0.3%	0.5%
	Illinois	4.4%	3.8%
	Indiana	1.8%	2.0%
	Iowa	1.0%	1.0%
	Kansas	0.9%	0.9%
	Kentucky	1.4%	1.3%
	Louisiana	1.1%	1.4%
	Maine	0.4%	0.4%
	Maryland	1.8%	1.8%
	Massachusetts	2.9%	2.1%
	Michigan	2.7%	3.0%
	Minnesota	1.4%	1.7%
	Mississippi	0.6%	0.9%
	Missouri	1.7%	1.8%
	Montana	0.3%	0.3%
	Nebraska	0.5%	0.6%
	Nevada	0.9%	0.9%
	New Hampshire	0.5%	0.4%
	New Jersey	3.6%	2.8%
	New Mexico	0.5%	0.6%
	New York	6.8%	6.0%
	North Carolina	4.1%	3.1%
	North Dakota	0.1%	0.2%
	Ohio	3.8%	3.5%
	Oklahoma	0.9%	1.2%
	Oregon	1.2%	1.3%
	Pennsylvania	5.2%	3.9%
	Rhode Island	0.3%	0.3%
	South Carolina	1.6%	1.5%
	South Dakota	0.3%	0.3%
	Tennessee	2.3%	2.1%
	Texas	9.1%	8.7%
	Utah	0.5%	1.0%
	Vermont	0.2%	0.2%
	Virginia	2.5%	2.6%
	Washington	2.0%	2.3%
	West Virginia	0.5%	0.5%
	Wisconsin	2.3%	1.8%
	Wyoming	0.2%	0.2%

Note. NAs indicate rows where no comparable general population data was available. General population data was informed by: latest US Census data (gender, age, income, formal education, state of residency), and Gallup data (party affiliation; https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx).

Supplementary Table 2

Packaging effect: correlations with the level of support and polarization

Domain	*n*	*r* [95% CI]	*r* with baseline	*r* with actual
Support				
Food	1,311	.49 [.45, .53]	.24 [.19, .29]	.66 [.63, .69]
Transport	1,967	.55 [.52, .58]	.23 [.18, .27]	.74 [.72, .76]
Household	983	.24 [.18, .30]	−.10 [−.16, −.04]	.51 [.46, .56]
Polarization				
Food	1,311	.32 [.28, .37]	−.14 [−.20, −.09]	.64 [.61, .67]
Transport	1,967	.54 [.51, .57]	.00 [−.04, .04]	.79 [.77, .81]
Household	983	.64 [.60, .68]	.08 [.02, .14]	.85 [.83, .86]

Note. Packaging effect = national MRP estimate of a package minus the mean of the national MRP estimates of its isolated components (support: $M = -6.3$ percentage points, $SD = 3.3$; polarization: $M = -1.8$, $SD = 4.5$; $n = 4{,}261$ packages). *r*: correlation of the packaging effect with the mean of actual and baseline estimates (reported in the main text). *r* with baseline / *r* with actual: correlation with the baseline (mean of the isolated parts) or with the actual package estimate. 95% CIs based on Fisher's z.

Supplementary Table 3

State-level predictors of policy support: Models 1, 1.5 and 2 for all predictors and DCEs

Predictor	Model 1		Model 1.5		Model 2	
	B [95% CI]	*p*	*B* [95% CI]	*p*	*B* [95% CI]	*p*
Carbon tax						
Implemented climate policies, general	**0.06 [0.00, 0.12]**	.044	0.03 [−0.02, 0.08]	.282	−0.01 [−0.10, 0.08]	.866
Billion-dollar disasters	0.02 [−0.05, 0.09]	.603	0.03 [−0.03, 0.08]	.318	0.04 [−0.03, 0.11]	.286
Gasoline price	0.04 [−0.03, 0.10]	.294	0.01 [−0.04, 0.06]	.692	−0.07 [−0.15, 0.01]	.109
Electricity price	**0.07 [0.01, 0.13]**	.022	0.04 [−0.01, 0.10]	.125	0.03 [−0.06, 0.12]	.510
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.05 [−0.01, 0.12]	.111	0.05 [−0.00, 0.10]	.069	**0.06 [0.00, 0.12]**	.048
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	0.01 [−0.06, 0.08]	.716	0.01 [−0.04, 0.07]	.659	−0.02 [−0.09, 0.05]	.545
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	−0.01 [−0.07, 0.05]	.804	−0.00 [−0.06, 0.05]	.859	−0.02 [−0.08, 0.04]	.508
GDP (2024)	**0.10 [0.04, 0.15]**	< .001	**0.07 [0.01, 0.12]**	.014	**0.08 [0.01, 0.15]**	.035
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	**−0.08 [−0.14, −0.02]**	.005	**−0.07 [−0.13, −0.02]**	.009	**−0.09 [−0.15, −0.02]**	.014
Democratic vote share (2024)	0.06 [−0.00, 0.12]	.065	0.02 [−0.03, 0.08]	.444	−0.03 [−0.12, 0.06]	.512
Isolated food policies						
General predictors						
Implemented climate policies, general	**0.14 [0.05, 0.23]**	.002	**0.12 [0.04, 0.20]**	.003	0.03 [−0.06, 0.12]	.548
Billion-dollar disasters	−0.03 [−0.14, 0.08]	.600	−0.02 [−0.12, 0.07]	.621	0.01 [−0.06, 0.08]	.768
Gasoline price	**0.17 [0.08, 0.26]**	< .001	**0.14 [0.06, 0.22]**	< .001	0.05 [−0.06, 0.17]	.369
Electricity price	**0.14 [0.05, 0.22]**	.003	**0.12 [0.04, 0.19]**	.004	0.06 [−0.03, 0.14]	.184
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.03 [−0.09, 0.15]	.616	0.01 [−0.10, 0.12]	.829	−0.00 [−0.07, 0.06]	.992
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	−0.04 [−0.14, 0.06]	.434	−0.05 [−0.14, 0.04]	.285	−0.04 [−0.11, 0.03]	.243
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	−0.05 [−0.13, 0.03]	.240	−0.06 [−0.13, 0.02]	.121	−0.05 [−0.11, 0.02]	.150
GDP (2024)	**0.19 [0.11, 0.27]**	< .001	**0.14 [0.06, 0.22]**	< .001	0.08 [−0.00, 0.15]	.063
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	**−0.14 [−0.21, −0.06]**	< .001	**−0.13 [−0.20, −0.06]**	< .001	**−0.10 [−0.18, −0.02]**	.011
Democratic vote share (2024)	**0.13 [0.05, 0.21]**	.001	**0.10 [0.02, 0.17]**	.011	0.00 [−0.10, 0.10]	.948
Domain-specific predictors						
Implemented food policies	0.08 [−0.02, 0.17]	.112	0.05 [−0.03, 0.14]	.241	0.00 [−0.06, 0.07]	.975
Meat price	**−0.15 [−0.23, −0.07]**	< .001	**−0.13 [−0.20, −0.06]**	< .001	**−0.09 [−0.15, −0.03]**	.004
Dairy price	0.04 [−0.04, 0.12]	.338	0.04 [−0.03, 0.12]	.287	−0.01 [−0.09, 0.07]	.785
Apple price	**−0.11 [−0.21, −0.02]**	.021	−0.08 [−0.17, 0.01]	.071	−0.05 [−0.12, 0.01]	.092
Farming jobs (per capita)	**0.13 [0.02, 0.24]**	.016	**0.12 [0.03, 0.21]**	.011	0.06 [−0.05, 0.16]	.297
Vegetarian restaurants	**0.21 [0.15, 0.27]**	< .001	**0.17 [0.11, 0.22]**	< .001	**0.11 [0.01, 0.21]**	.024
Isolated transportation policies						
General predictors						
Implemented climate policies, general	**0.20 [0.12, 0.28]**	< .001	**0.15 [0.08, 0.23]**	< .001	0.02 [−0.07, 0.12]	.630
Billion-dollar disasters	0.02 [−0.10, 0.14]	.770	0.03 [−0.07, 0.13]	.585	0.05 [−0.01, 0.11]	.100
Gasoline price	**0.14 [0.02, 0.26]**	.020	0.09 [−0.02, 0.19]	.097	−0.04 [−0.13, 0.06]	.451
Electricity price	**0.16 [0.06, 0.25]**	.001	**0.13 [0.05, 0.21]**	.002	0.06 [−0.01, 0.14]	.084
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.06 [−0.08, 0.21]	.389	0.05 [−0.07, 0.17]	.414	**0.06 [0.00, 0.12]**	.037

Predictor	Model 1		Model 1.5		Model 2	
	***B* [95% CI]**	***p***	***B* [95% CI]**	***p***	***B* [95% CI]**	***p***
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	−0.01 [−0.12, 0.10]	.805	−0.00 [−0.10, 0.09]	.949	0.05 [−0.01, 0.10]	.128
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	−0.03 [−0.11, 0.05]	.511	−0.02 [−0.09, 0.05]	.603	0.04 [−0.02, 0.10]	.196
GDP (2024)	**0.20 [0.09, 0.31]**	< .001	**0.15 [0.05, 0.24]**	.003	0.08 [−0.00, 0.16]	.055
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	**−0.10 [−0.17, −0.03]**	.007	**−0.08 [−0.15, −0.01]**	.019	0.02 [−0.06, 0.10]	.601
Democratic vote share (2024)	**0.18 [0.10, 0.26]**	< .001	**0.13 [0.06, 0.20]**	< .001	0.02 [−0.07, 0.10]	.684
Domain-specific predictors						
Implemented transportation policies	**0.18 [0.08, 0.27]**	< .001	**0.13 [0.05, 0.21]**	.002	−0.06 [−0.16, 0.05]	.290
Public transport fares	**0.15 [0.05, 0.24]**	.002	**0.12 [0.04, 0.20]**	.002	**0.09 [0.02, 0.15]**	.008
Automotive jobs (per capita)	**−0.16 [−0.24, −0.08]**	< .001	**−0.12 [−0.19, −0.05]**	.001	**−0.09 [−0.15, −0.04]**	.002
Registered EVs (per capita)	**0.20 [0.09, 0.32]**	< .001	**0.14 [0.04, 0.25]**	.008	−0.02 [−0.10, 0.05]	.512
Public transit trips (per capita)	**0.19 [0.10, 0.28]**	< .001	**0.12 [0.04, 0.21]**	.003	0.05 [−0.01, 0.11]	.108
EV chargers (per capita)	**0.19 [0.10, 0.27]**	< .001	**0.13 [0.05, 0.21]**	.001	0.01 [−0.09, 0.10]	.915
Isolated household policies						
General predictors						
Implemented climate policies, general	**0.16 [0.09, 0.24]**	< .001	**0.13 [0.06, 0.20]**	< .001	0.10 [−0.01, 0.22]	.066
Billion-dollar disasters	0.00 [−0.10, 0.10]	.989	0.02 [−0.07, 0.10]	.722	**0.09 [0.02, 0.17]**	.011
Gasoline price	**0.12 [0.03, 0.22]**	.013	**0.09 [0.00, 0.17]**	.046	−0.02 [−0.13, 0.08]	.629
Electricity price	**0.15 [0.07, 0.23]**	< .001	**0.13 [0.05, 0.20]**	.001	0.03 [−0.07, 0.14]	.527
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.05 [−0.06, 0.16]	.347	0.05 [−0.05, 0.14]	.353	**0.10 [0.04, 0.16]**	.001
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	−0.05 [−0.15, 0.04]	.290	−0.05 [−0.14, 0.03]	.219	0.06 [−0.02, 0.13]	.118
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	−0.05 [−0.12, 0.02]	.177	−0.06 [−0.13, 0.01]	.071	0.02 [−0.07, 0.11]	.689
GDP (2024)	**0.16 [0.09, 0.24]**	< .001	**0.12 [0.05, 0.20]**	< .001	**0.10 [0.04, 0.16]**	.001
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	**−0.13 [−0.19, −0.07]**	< .001	**−0.13 [−0.19, −0.07]**	< .001	−0.10 [−0.23, 0.02]	.102
Democratic vote share (2024)	**0.19 [0.12, 0.25]**	< .001	**0.15 [0.09, 0.22]**	< .001	**0.11 [0.00, 0.23]**	.045
Domain-specific predictors						
Implemented household policies	**0.12 [0.05, 0.19]**	.001	**0.09 [0.02, 0.16]**	.012	0.04 [−0.05, 0.14]	.371
Share of heat pumps	−0.01 [−0.12, 0.10]	.813	0.00 [−0.09, 0.10]	.931	0.06 [−0.03, 0.14]	.213
Food policy packages						
General predictors						
Implemented climate policies, general	**0.15 [0.10, 0.21]**	< .001	**0.11 [0.06, 0.17]**	< .001	0.04 [−0.04, 0.13]	.298
Billion-dollar disasters	−0.02 [−0.11, 0.07]	.613	−0.02 [−0.10, 0.05]	.597	0.01 [−0.05, 0.07]	.813
Gasoline price	**0.12 [0.04, 0.20]**	.002	**0.09 [0.04, 0.14]**	< .001	−0.02 [−0.12, 0.08]	.678
Electricity price	**0.12 [0.05, 0.19]**	< .001	**0.10 [0.05, 0.15]**	< .001	0.03 [−0.05, 0.11]	.452
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.02 [−0.08, 0.12]	.705	0.01 [−0.08, 0.09]	.875	−0.00 [−0.06, 0.05]	.906
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	0.00 [−0.09, 0.09]	.983	−0.01 [−0.08, 0.07]	.860	−0.01 [−0.07, 0.06]	.871
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	−0.02 [−0.09, 0.05]	.510	−0.03 [−0.09, 0.04]	.371	−0.02 [−0.08, 0.04]	.557
GDP (2024)	**0.14 [0.07, 0.21]**	< .001	**0.10 [0.04, 0.15]**	< .001	0.04 [−0.03, 0.12]	.237
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	**−0.11 [−0.17, −0.04]**	.001	**−0.11 [−0.17, −0.05]**	< .001	−0.05 [−0.12, 0.02]	.166
Democratic vote share (2024)	**0.11 [0.05, 0.18]**	< .001	**0.08 [0.02, 0.15]**	.016	0.03 [−0.06, 0.12]	.458
Domain-specific predictors						
Implemented food policies	**0.10 [0.02, 0.18]**	.011	**0.07 [0.00, 0.13]**	.039	0.03 [−0.03, 0.09]	.348
Meat price	**−0.17 [−0.23, −0.11]**	< .001	**−0.15 [−0.21, −0.10]**	< .001	**−0.13 [−0.19, −0.07]**	< .001
Dairy price	**0.07 [0.00, 0.14]**	.037	**0.07 [0.01, 0.13]**	.022	0.02 [−0.05, 0.09]	.647
Apple price	**−0.09 [−0.17, −0.01]**	.034	−0.06 [−0.12, 0.01]	.107	−0.02 [−0.08, 0.04]	.541
Farming jobs (per capita)	0.08 [−0.01, 0.18]	.086	**0.07 [0.00, 0.14]**	.035	−0.00 [−0.09, 0.09]	.995
Vegetarian restaurants	**0.16 [0.10, 0.21]**	< .001	**0.12 [0.06, 0.17]**	< .001	0.07 [−0.02, 0.16]	.138
Transportation policy packages						
General predictors						
Implemented climate policies, general	**0.16 [0.08, 0.23]**	< .001	**0.11 [0.05, 0.17]**	< .001	0.01 [−0.09, 0.11]	.844
Billion-dollar disasters	0.01 [−0.09, 0.11]	.893	0.02 [−0.07, 0.10]	.680	0.03 [−0.02, 0.09]	.243
Gasoline price	0.10 [−0.00, 0.20]	.051	0.05 [−0.03, 0.13]	.253	−0.03 [−0.11, 0.04]	.374
Electricity price	**0.11 [0.03, 0.20]**	.008	**0.08 [0.00, 0.15]**	.039	0.01 [−0.06, 0.09]	.694
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.04 [−0.07, 0.16]	.455	0.03 [−0.06, 0.13]	.460	0.04 [−0.02, 0.10]	.188
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	−0.00 [−0.10, 0.09]	.923	0.00 [−0.08, 0.08]	.952	0.02 [−0.04, 0.08]	.496
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	−0.02 [−0.09, 0.06]	.622	−0.01 [−0.08, 0.05]	.724	0.01 [−0.05, 0.08]	.711
GDP (2024)	**0.16 [0.07, 0.24]**	< .001	**0.11 [0.03, 0.18]**	.004	0.06 [−0.01, 0.13]	.074
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	**−0.11 [−0.18, −0.04]**	.001	**−0.09 [−0.15, −0.03]**	.004	−0.04 [−0.12, 0.04]	.316
Democratic vote share (2024)	**0.15 [0.08, 0.22]**	< .001	**0.09 [0.03, 0.15]**	.005	−0.02 [−0.11, 0.06]	.573
Domain-specific predictors						
Implemented transportation policies	**0.13 [0.05, 0.21]**	.001	**0.09 [0.01, 0.16]**	.020	−0.07 [−0.18, 0.03]	.157
Public transport fares	**0.13 [0.05, 0.20]**	.001	**0.09 [0.03, 0.16]**	.002	0.06 [−0.00, 0.13]	.051

Predictor	Model 1		Model 1.5		Model 2	
	B [95% CI]	*p*	*B* [95% CI]	*p*	*B* [95% CI]	*p*
Automotive jobs (per capita)	**−0.17 [−0.23, −0.10]**	< .001	**−0.13 [−0.18, −0.07]**	< .001	**−0.11 [−0.17, −0.05]**	< .001
Registered EVs (per capita)	**0.15 [0.06, 0.25]**	.002	**0.10 [0.01, 0.18]**	.028	−0.02 [−0.09, 0.06]	.671
Public transit trips (per capita)	**0.17 [0.10, 0.23]**	< .001	**0.10 [0.05, 0.16]**	< .001	0.04 [−0.02, 0.10]	.182
EV chargers (per capita)	**0.16 [0.08, 0.24]**	< .001	**0.10 [0.03, 0.17]**	.003	0.00 [−0.09, 0.10]	.935
Household policy packages						
General predictors						
Implemented climate policies, general	**0.10 [0.05, 0.15]**	< .001	**0.07 [0.02, 0.12]**	.003	0.08 [−0.00, 0.16]	.061
Billion-dollar disasters	0.04 [−0.03, 0.11]	.257	0.04 [−0.02, 0.10]	.196	**0.07 [0.01, 0.12]**	.020
Gasoline price	0.06 [−0.01, 0.12]	.083	0.03 [−0.01, 0.08]	.156	−0.02 [−0.09, 0.06]	.673
Electricity price	**0.10 [0.04, 0.15]**	< .001	**0.07 [0.02, 0.12]**	.003	0.07 [−0.01, 0.15]	.081
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.06 [−0.00, 0.13]	.068	0.05 [−0.01, 0.10]	.084	**0.07 [0.02, 0.13]**	.006
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	0.02 [−0.04, 0.09]	.465	0.02 [−0.03, 0.08]	.399	**0.07 [0.01, 0.12]**	.020
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	−0.00 [−0.06, 0.06]	.891	−0.00 [−0.06, 0.05]	.896	0.05 [−0.02, 0.11]	.173
GDP (2024)	**0.13 [0.08, 0.18]**	< .001	**0.10 [0.05, 0.14]**	< .001	**0.08 [0.03, 0.14]**	.002
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	**−0.07 [−0.13, −0.02]**	.007	**−0.07 [−0.12, −0.02]**	.009	−0.06 [−0.16, 0.03]	.192
Democratic vote share (2024)	**0.10 [0.04, 0.15]**	< .001	**0.06 [0.01, 0.11]**	.010	0.02 [−0.06, 0.11]	.583
Domain-specific predictors						
Implemented household policies	**0.09 [0.03, 0.14]**	.002	**0.06 [0.01, 0.11]**	.019	0.05 [−0.02, 0.12]	.148
Share of heat pumps	−0.03 [−0.10, 0.04]	.352	−0.02 [−0.07, 0.04]	.501	−0.01 [−0.07, 0.06]	.878

Note. Coefficients (log-odds per *SD* of the z-standardized state-level predictor) with Wald 95% confidence intervals from logit mixed models with random intercepts for participant and state. Model 1: policy attributes and the focal state-level predictor (N = 5,463). Model 1.5: additionally socio-demographic control variables (political orientation, age and income standardized within states; gender; education; place of residency; complete cases). Model 2: additionally the baseline set of state-level predictors of the domain. For predictors that are not part of the baseline set, the estimate comes from the swap-in model (see Methods and Supplementary Figs. 11 to 13). Estimates with $p < .05$ are printed in bold.

Supplementary Table 4

Random- and fixed-effect selection and intra-class correlations of the attribute models

Model	AIC	BIC	χ^2 (df)	*p*	ICC participant / state
Carbon tax					
(1|CASE)	38,022	38,106			
(1|CASE) + (1|state)	38,023	38,116	0.09 (1)	.77	.48 / .001
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: taxLevel †	38,029	38,147	0.26 (3)	.97	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: TaxProgress	38,021	38,122	4.44 (1)	.04	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: TaxRevenue †	38,028	38,154	3.84 (4)	.43	
FE: attributes (complete cases)	36,132	36,224			
FE: attributes + individual controls	35,387	35,545	761.41 (8)	< .001	
Isolated food policies					
(1|CASE)	26,303	26,367			
(1|CASE) + (1|state)	26,278	26,350	27.26 (1)	< .001	.49 / .007
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: foodPolicy †	26,290	26,410	0.42 (6)	> .99	
FE: attributes (complete cases)	24,995	25,067			
FE: attributes + individual controls	23,963	24,098	1,048.72 (8)	< .001	
Isolated transportation policies					
(1|CASE)	27,143	27,215			
(1|CASE) + (1|state)	27,099	27,179	45.57 (1)	< .001	.44 / .013
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: transportationPolicy †	27,107	27,243	6.51 (7)	.48	
FE: attributes (complete cases)	25,841	25,921			

Model	AIC	BIC	χ^2 (df)	*p*	ICC participant / state
FE: attributes + individual controls	24,701	24,844	1,155.87 (8)	< .001	
Isolated household policies					
(1|CASE)	27,478	27,542			
(1|CASE) + (1|state)	27,461	27,533	19.32 (1)	< .001	.44 / .007
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: householdPolicy †	27,473	27,593	0.01 (6)	> .99	
FE: attributes (complete cases)	26,191	26,262			
FE: attributes + individual controls	25,361	25,496	846.25 (8)	< .001	
Food policy packages					
(1|CASE)	37,326	37,477			
(1|CASE) + (1|state)	37,314	37,474	14.14 (1)	< .001	.47 / .005
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: taxLevel †	37,319	37,512	3.43 (4)	.49	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: TaxProgress †	37,318	37,494	0.00 (2)	> .99	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: TaxRevenue †	37,321	37,523	2.67 (5)	.75	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: foodMandate †	37,313	37,498	6.66 (3)	.08	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: foodSubsidy †	37,304	37,489	16.04 (3)	.001	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: foodLabel	37,313	37,481	3.36 (1)	.07	
FE: attributes (complete cases)	35,515	35,674			
FE: attributes + individual controls †	34,638	34,863	893.16 (8)	< .001	
Transportation policy packages					
(1|CASE)	38,065	38,224			
(1|CASE) + (1|state)	38,046	38,214	20.16 (1)	< .001	.48 / .006
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: taxLevel †	38,054	38,255	0.53 (4)	.97	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: TaxProgress	38,044	38,229	6.00 (2)	.05	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: TaxRevenue †	38,055	38,265	1.79 (5)	.88	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: EVMandate †	38,052	38,245	0.03 (3)	> .99	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: PTSubsidy †	38,050	38,243	2.31 (3)	.51	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: PFunding †	38,050	38,235	0.00 (2)	> .99	
FE: attributes (complete cases)	36,254	36,421			
FE: attributes + individual controls	35,242	35,476	1,027.66 (8)	< .001	
Household policy packages					
(1|CASE)	39,373	39,524			
(1|CASE) + (1|state)	39,370	39,530	4.33 (1)	.04	.42 / .002
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: taxLevel †	39,375	39,568	3.53 (4)	.47	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: TaxProgress †	39,372	39,549	1.74 (2)	.42	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: TaxRevenue †	39,378	39,579	2.51 (5)	.78	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: HPMandate †	39,374	39,559	2.31 (3)	.51	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: EnEffSubsidy †	39,370	39,555	6.00 (3)	.11	
(1|CASE) + (1|state) + state slopes: Label †	39,372	39,540	0.00 (1)	> .99	
FE: attributes (complete cases)	37,547	37,705			
FE: attributes + individual controls †	36,677	36,902	885.75 (8)	< .001	

Note. N = 5,463. Logit mixed-effects models of support on the policy attributes, fitted by maximum likelihood. Random-effect (RE) steps: random intercept for participants (CASE), plus random intercept for states, plus uncorrelated random slopes of the dummies of one attribute across states (each compared with the model with both random intercepts). Fixed-effect (FE) steps: attributes without and with individual-level controls (political orientation, age, gender, education, income, place of residency), on the complete cases for the controls. χ^2: likelihood-ratio test against the preceding model. † singular fit or convergence issues. ICC: latent-scale intra-class correlations of the retained model (residual variance $\pi^2/3$).

Supplementary Table 5

Pairwise comparisons of attribute levels within each attribute (support, absolute evaluation)

Level A	Level B	A − B	95% CI	*z*	*p*	*p* (Holm)
Carbon tax						
Tax level						
\$15/tCO_2e	\$50/tCO_2e	0.28	[0.19, 0.36]	6.65	< .001	< .001
\$15/tCO_2e	\$100/tCO_2e	0.51	[0.43, 0.59]	12.32	< .001	< .001
\$15/tCO_2e	\$150/tCO_2e	0.76	[0.67, 0.84]	18.06	< .001	< .001
\$50/tCO_2e	\$100/tCO_2e	0.23	[0.15, 0.32]	5.65	< .001	< .001
\$50/tCO_2e	\$150/tCO_2e	0.48	[0.40, 0.56]	11.50	< .001	< .001
\$100/tCO_2e	\$150/tCO_2e	0.24	[0.16, 0.33]	5.90	< .001	< .001
Tax trajectory						
Non-dynamic	Dynamic (+10% per year, capped at \$300)	0.91	[0.85, 0.97]	30.20	< .001	< .001
Revenue use						
Deficit reduction	Electricity bill rebates	−0.61	[−0.70, −0.52]	−13.18	< .001	< .001
Deficit reduction	Green spending	−0.53	[−0.62, −0.44]	−11.46	< .001	< .001
Deficit reduction	Low-income programs	−0.42	[−0.51, −0.33]	−9.09	< .001	< .001
Deficit reduction	Reduce labor/capital taxes	−0.06	[−0.15, 0.04]	−1.18	.24	.24
Electricity bill rebates	Green spending	0.08	[−0.01, 0.17]	1.76	.08	.16
Electricity bill rebates	Low-income programs	0.19	[0.10, 0.28]	4.13	< .001	< .001
Electricity bill rebates	Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.56	[0.47, 0.65]	11.93	< .001	< .001
Green spending	Low-income programs	0.11	[0.02, 0.20]	2.38	.02	.05
Green spending	Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.48	[0.39, 0.57]	10.23	< .001	< .001
Low-income programs	Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.37	[0.28, 0.46]	7.87	< .001	< .001
Isolated food policies						
Policy						
Carbon label	Plant-based subsidy (15%)	−0.17	[−0.30, −0.03]	−2.42	.02	.09
Carbon label	Plant-based subsidy (30%)	−0.31	[−0.45, −0.17]	−4.48	< .001	< .001
Carbon label	Plant-based subsidy (45%)	−0.25	[−0.39, −0.12]	−3.65	< .001	.002
Carbon label	Vegetarian mandate (25%)	−0.01	[−0.14, 0.13]	−0.12	.91	.91
Carbon label	Vegetarian mandate (50%)	0.74	[0.60, 0.88]	10.54	< .001	< .001
Carbon label	Vegetarian mandate (75%)	1.68	[1.53, 1.83]	22.35	< .001	< .001
Plant-based subsidy (15%)	Plant-based subsidy (30%)	−0.14	[−0.28, 0.00]	−2.03	.04	.17
Plant-based subsidy (15%)	Plant-based subsidy (45%)	−0.08	[−0.22, 0.05]	−1.22	.22	.67
Plant-based subsidy (15%)	Vegetarian mandate (25%)	0.16	[0.02, 0.30]	2.30	.02	.11
Plant-based subsidy (15%)	Vegetarian mandate (50%)	0.91	[0.77, 1.05]	12.76	< .001	< .001
Plant-based subsidy (15%)	Vegetarian mandate (75%)	1.85	[1.70, 2.00]	24.19	< .001	< .001
Plant-based subsidy (30%)	Plant-based subsidy (45%)	0.06	[−0.08, 0.19]	0.83	.41	.82
Plant-based subsidy (30%)	Vegetarian mandate (25%)	0.30	[0.17, 0.44]	4.35	< .001	< .001
Plant-based subsidy (30%)	Vegetarian mandate (50%)	1.05	[0.91, 1.19]	14.70	< .001	< .001
Plant-based subsidy (30%)	Vegetarian mandate (75%)	1.99	[1.84, 2.14]	25.97	< .001	< .001
Plant-based subsidy (45%)	Vegetarian mandate (25%)	0.24	[0.11, 0.38]	3.53	< .001	.003
Plant-based subsidy (45%)	Vegetarian mandate (50%)	1.00	[0.86, 1.14]	13.93	< .001	< .001
Plant-based subsidy (45%)	Vegetarian mandate (75%)	1.93	[1.78, 2.08]	25.23	< .001	< .001
Vegetarian mandate (25%)	Vegetarian mandate (50%)	0.75	[0.61, 0.89]	10.60	< .001	< .001
Vegetarian mandate (25%)	Vegetarian mandate (75%)	1.69	[1.54, 1.84]	22.33	< .001	< .001
Vegetarian mandate (50%)	Vegetarian mandate (75%)	0.94	[0.79, 1.08]	12.42	< .001	< .001
Isolated transport policies						
Policy						
Public transport subsidy (15%)	Public transport subsidy (30%)	−0.18	[−0.31, −0.04]	−2.55	.01	.04

Level A	Level B	A − B	95% CI	*z*	*p*	*p* (Holm)
Public transport subsidy (15%)	Public transport subsidy (45%)	−0.24	[−0.38, −0.10]	−3.39	< .001	.004
Public transport subsidy (15%)	Federal funding (+$0.75bn / +$10bn)	0.44	[0.31, 0.58]	6.36	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (15%)	Federal funding (+$1.5bn / +$20bn)	0.39	[0.25, 0.53]	5.56	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (15%)	ICEV phase-out by 2050	0.70	[0.57, 0.84]	10.00	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (15%)	ICEV phase-out by 2040	0.81	[0.67, 0.94]	11.44	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (15%)	ICEV phase-out by 2030	1.20	[1.06, 1.34]	16.58	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (30%)	Public transport subsidy (45%)	−0.06	[−0.20, 0.08]	−0.86	.39	.78
Public transport subsidy (30%)	Federal funding (+$0.75bn / +$10bn)	0.62	[0.48, 0.76]	8.88	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (30%)	Federal funding (+$1.5bn / +$20bn)	0.57	[0.43, 0.71]	8.03	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (30%)	ICEV phase-out by 2050	0.88	[0.74, 1.02]	12.42	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (30%)	ICEV phase-out by 2040	0.98	[0.84, 1.12]	13.84	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (30%)	ICEV phase-out by 2030	1.38	[1.23, 1.52]	18.89	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (45%)	Federal funding (+$0.75bn / +$10bn)	0.68	[0.54, 0.82]	9.65	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (45%)	Federal funding (+$1.5bn / +$20bn)	0.63	[0.49, 0.77]	8.85	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (45%)	ICEV phase-out by 2050	0.94	[0.80, 1.08]	13.17	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (45%)	ICEV phase-out by 2040	1.04	[0.90, 1.18]	14.60	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (45%)	ICEV phase-out by 2030	1.44	[1.29, 1.58]	19.61	< .001	< .001
Federal funding (+$0.75bn / +$10bn)	Federal funding (+$1.5bn / +$20bn)	−0.05	[−0.19, 0.09]	−0.73	.47	.78
Federal funding (+$0.75bn / +$10bn)	ICEV phase-out by 2050	0.26	[0.12, 0.40]	3.72	< .001	.001
Federal funding (+$0.75bn / +$10bn)	ICEV phase-out by 2040	0.36	[0.22, 0.50]	5.15	< .001	< .001
Federal funding (+$0.75bn / +$10bn)	ICEV phase-out by 2030	0.76	[0.61, 0.90]	10.50	< .001	< .001
Federal funding (+$1.5bn / +$20bn)	ICEV phase-out by 2050	0.31	[0.17, 0.45]	4.40	< .001	< .001
Federal funding (+$1.5bn / +$20bn)	ICEV phase-out by 2040	0.41	[0.27, 0.55]	5.83	< .001	< .001
Federal funding (+$1.5bn / +$20bn)	ICEV phase-out by 2030	0.81	[0.66, 0.95]	11.11	< .001	< .001
ICEV phase-out by 2050	ICEV phase-out by 2040	0.10	[−0.04, 0.24]	1.43	.15	.46
ICEV phase-out by 2050	ICEV phase-out by 2030	0.49	[0.35, 0.64]	6.84	< .001	< .001
ICEV phase-out by 2040	ICEV phase-out by 2030	0.39	[0.25, 0.53]	5.45	< .001	< .001
Isolated household policies						
Policy						
Appliance label update	Efficiency subsidy (cap 40%)	0.11	[−0.01, 0.24]	1.77	.08	.36
Appliance label update	Efficiency subsidy (cap 50%)	−0.01	[−0.14, 0.11]	−0.21	.83	> .99
Appliance label update	Efficiency subsidy (cap 60%)	0.00	[−0.13, 0.12]	−0.06	.95	> .99
Appliance label update	Fossil heating phase-out by 2050	0.46	[0.33, 0.59]	7.12	< .001	< .001
Appliance label update	Fossil heating phase-out by 2040	0.64	[0.51, 0.77]	9.87	< .001	< .001
Appliance label update	Fossil heating phase-out by 2030	0.85	[0.72, 0.97]	12.94	< .001	< .001
Efficiency subsidy (cap 40%)	Efficiency subsidy (cap 50%)	−0.13	[−0.26, 0.00]	−1.95	.05	.31
Efficiency subsidy (cap 40%)	Efficiency subsidy (cap 60%)	−0.12	[−0.25, 0.01]	−1.80	.07	.36
Efficiency subsidy (cap 40%)	Fossil heating phase-out by 2050	0.35	[0.22, 0.48]	5.28	< .001	< .001
Efficiency subsidy (cap 40%)	Fossil heating phase-out by 2040	0.53	[0.40, 0.66]	8.01	< .001	< .001
Efficiency subsidy (cap 40%)	Fossil heating phase-out by 2030	0.73	[0.60, 0.86]	11.05	< .001	< .001
Efficiency subsidy (cap 50%)	Efficiency subsidy (cap 60%)	0.01	[−0.12, 0.14]	0.15	.88	> .99
Efficiency subsidy (cap 50%)	Fossil heating phase-out by 2050	0.48	[0.35, 0.60]	7.20	< .001	< .001
Efficiency subsidy (cap 50%)	Fossil heating phase-out by 2040	0.66	[0.53, 0.79]	9.92	< .001	< .001
Efficiency subsidy (cap 50%)	Fossil heating phase-out by 2030	0.86	[0.73, 0.99]	12.88	< .001	< .001
Efficiency subsidy (cap 60%)	Fossil heating phase-out by 2050	0.46	[0.34, 0.59]	7.08	< .001	< .001
Efficiency subsidy (cap 60%)	Fossil heating phase-out by 2040	0.65	[0.52, 0.78]	9.79	< .001	< .001
Efficiency subsidy (cap 60%)	Fossil heating phase-out by 2030	0.85	[0.72, 0.98]	12.78	< .001	< .001
Fossil heating phase-out by 2050	Fossil heating phase-out by 2040	0.18	[0.05, 0.31]	2.76	.006	.04
Fossil heating phase-out by 2050	Fossil heating phase-out by 2030	0.38	[0.26, 0.51]	5.84	< .001	< .001
Fossil heating phase-out by 2040	Fossil heating phase-out by 2030	0.20	[0.07, 0.33]	3.09	.002	.02
Food policy packages						

Level A	Level B	A − B	95% CI	*z*	*p*	*p* (Holm)
Tax level						
No tax	$15/tCO$_2$e	0.31	[0.19, 0.42]	5.24	< .001	< .001
No tax	$50/tCO$_2$e	0.43	[0.32, 0.55]	7.50	< .001	< .001
No tax	$100/tCO$_2$e	0.50	[0.38, 0.61]	8.45	< .001	< .001
No tax	$150/tCO$_2$e	0.58	[0.47, 0.70]	10.14	< .001	< .001
$15/tCO$_2$e	$50/tCO$_2$e	0.13	[0.04, 0.22]	2.75	.006	.02
$15/tCO$_2$e	$100/tCO$_2$e	0.19	[0.10, 0.28]	4.07	< .001	< .001
$15/tCO$_2$e	$150/tCO$_2$e	0.28	[0.19, 0.37]	5.97	< .001	< .001
$50/tCO$_2$e	$100/tCO$_2$e	0.06	[−0.03, 0.15]	1.35	.18	.18
$50/tCO$_2$e	$150/tCO$_2$e	0.15	[0.06, 0.24]	3.28	.001	.004
$100/tCO$_2$e	$150/tCO$_2$e	0.09	[0.00, 0.18]	1.92	.06	.11
Tax trajectory						
Non-dynamic	Dynamic (+10% per year, capped at $300)	0.40	[0.33, 0.46]	12.49	< .001	< .001
Revenue use						
Deficit reduction	Electricity bill rebates	−0.21	[−0.31, −0.11]	−4.08	< .001	< .001
Deficit reduction	Green spending	−0.16	[−0.26, −0.05]	−2.99	.003	.01
Deficit reduction	Low-income programs	−0.28	[−0.38, −0.18]	−5.41	< .001	< .001
Deficit reduction	Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.02	[−0.08, 0.13]	0.45	.65	.65
Electricity bill rebates	Green spending	0.06	[−0.05, 0.16]	1.07	.28	.57
Electricity bill rebates	Low-income programs	−0.07	[−0.17, 0.03]	−1.35	.18	.53
Electricity bill rebates	Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.24	[0.13, 0.34]	4.53	< .001	< .001
Green spending	Low-income programs	−0.12	[−0.23, −0.02]	−2.41	.02	.06
Green spending	Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.18	[0.08, 0.28]	3.47	< .001	.003
Low-income programs	Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.30	[0.20, 0.41]	5.89	< .001	< .001
Vegetarian meal mandate						
No mandate	25% vegetarian meals	−0.15	[−0.23, −0.07]	−3.76	< .001	< .001
No mandate	50% vegetarian meals	0.15	[0.08, 0.23]	3.82	< .001	< .001
No mandate	75% vegetarian meals	0.70	[0.62, 0.78]	16.83	< .001	< .001
25% vegetarian meals	50% vegetarian meals	0.30	[0.23, 0.38]	7.58	< .001	< .001
25% vegetarian meals	75% vegetarian meals	0.85	[0.77, 0.93]	20.44	< .001	< .001
50% vegetarian meals	75% vegetarian meals	0.55	[0.46, 0.63]	13.06	< .001	< .001
Plant-based food subsidy						
No subsidy	15% price reduction	−0.19	[−0.27, −0.10]	−4.51	< .001	< .001
No subsidy	30% price reduction	−0.17	[−0.25, −0.09]	−4.16	< .001	< .001
No subsidy	45% price reduction	−0.29	[−0.37, −0.21]	−7.17	< .001	< .001
15% price reduction	30% price reduction	0.01	[−0.07, 0.09]	0.34	.73	.73
15% price reduction	45% price reduction	−0.11	[−0.19, −0.03]	−2.68	.007	.01
30% price reduction	45% price reduction	−0.12	[−0.20, −0.04]	−3.02	.003	.008
Carbon label						
No label	Carbon label	−0.24	[−0.30, −0.19]	−8.85	< .001	< .001
Transport policy packages						
Tax level						
No tax	$15/tCO$_2$e	0.00	[−0.11, 0.11]	−0.03	.97	.97
No tax	$50/tCO$_2$e	0.26	[0.15, 0.37]	4.54	< .001	< .001
No tax	$100/tCO$_2$e	0.40	[0.28, 0.51]	6.91	< .001	< .001
No tax	$150/tCO$_2$e	0.45	[0.34, 0.56]	7.78	< .001	< .001
$15/tCO$_2$e	$50/tCO$_2$e	0.26	[0.17, 0.35]	5.82	< .001	< .001
$15/tCO$_2$e	$100/tCO$_2$e	0.40	[0.31, 0.49]	8.72	< .001	< .001
$15/tCO$_2$e	$150/tCO$_2$e	0.45	[0.36, 0.54]	9.90	< .001	< .001
$50/tCO$_2$e	$100/tCO$_2$e	0.14	[0.05, 0.23]	2.97	.003	.009
$50/tCO$_2$e	$150/tCO$_2$e	0.19	[0.10, 0.28]	4.14	< .001	< .001
$100/tCO$_2$e	$150/tCO$_2$e	0.05	[−0.04, 0.14]	1.15	.25	.50
Tax trajectory						
Non-dynamic	Dynamic (+10% per year, capped at $300)	0.51	[0.44, 0.57]	16.09	< .001	< .001
Revenue use						
Deficit reduction	Electricity bill rebates	−0.24	[−0.34, −0.13]	−4.53	< .001	< .001
Deficit reduction	Green spending	−0.16	[−0.26, −0.06]	−3.11	.002	.02
Deficit reduction	Low-income programs	−0.10	[−0.20, 0.00]	−1.96	.05	.25
Deficit reduction	Reduce labor/capital taxes	−0.01	[−0.11, 0.09]	−0.19	.85	.85
Electricity bill rebates	Green spending	0.08	[−0.02, 0.18]	1.49	.14	.41

Level A	Level B	A − B	95% CI	*z*	*p*	*p* (Holm)
Electricity bill rebates	Low-income programs	0.13	[0.03, 0.24]	2.59	.010	.06
Electricity bill rebates	Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.23	[0.12, 0.33]	4.36	< .001	< .001
Green spending	Low-income programs	0.06	[−0.04, 0.16]	1.14	.26	.51
Green spending	Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.15	[0.05, 0.25]	2.94	.003	.02
Low-income programs	Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.09	[−0.01, 0.19]	1.78	.08	.30
ICEV phase-out mandate						
No mandate	Phase-out by 2050	−0.04	[−0.12, 0.04]	−1.01	.31	.65
No mandate	Phase-out by 2040	0.01	[−0.07, 0.09]	0.23	.82	.82
No mandate	Phase-out by 2030	0.09	[0.01, 0.17]	2.21	.03	.13
Phase-out by 2050	Phase-out by 2040	0.05	[−0.03, 0.13]	1.24	.22	.65
Phase-out by 2050	Phase-out by 2030	0.13	[0.05, 0.21]	3.24	.001	.007
Phase-out by 2040	Phase-out by 2030	0.08	[0.00, 0.16]	1.98	.05	.19
Public transport subsidy						
No subsidy	15% price reduction	−0.25	[−0.33, −0.17]	−6.13	< .001	< .001
No subsidy	30% price reduction	−0.33	[−0.41, −0.25]	−8.16	< .001	< .001
No subsidy	45% price reduction	−0.43	[−0.51, −0.35]	−10.47	< .001	< .001
15% price reduction	30% price reduction	−0.08	[−0.16, 0.00]	−2.06	.04	.04
15% price reduction	45% price reduction	−0.18	[−0.26, −0.10]	−4.39	< .001	< .001
30% price reduction	45% price reduction	−0.09	[−0.17, −0.02]	−2.33	.02	.04
Federal funding						
No additional funding	+$0.75bn charging / +$10bn public transport	−0.26	[−0.33, −0.20]	−7.58	< .001	< .001
No additional funding	+$1.5bn charging / +$20bn public transport	−0.36	[−0.42, −0.29]	−10.25	< .001	< .001
+$0.75bn charging / +$10bn public transport	+$1.5bn charging / +$20bn public transport	−0.09	[−0.16, −0.03]	−2.69	.007	.007
Household policy packages						
Tax level						
No tax	$15/tCO₂e	0.16	[0.05, 0.27]	2.85	.004	.02
No tax	$50/tCO₂e	0.38	[0.27, 0.49]	6.86	< .001	< .001
No tax	$100/tCO₂e	0.49	[0.38, 0.60]	8.60	< .001	< .001
No tax	$150/tCO₂e	0.51	[0.40, 0.62]	9.11	< .001	< .001
$15/tCO₂e	$50/tCO₂e	0.22	[0.14, 0.31]	5.06	< .001	< .001
$15/tCO₂e	$100/tCO₂e	0.33	[0.24, 0.41]	7.35	< .001	< .001
$15/tCO₂e	$150/tCO₂e	0.35	[0.26, 0.43]	7.80	< .001	< .001
$50/tCO₂e	$100/tCO₂e	0.10	[0.02, 0.19]	2.31	.02	.04
$50/tCO₂e	$150/tCO₂e	0.12	[0.03, 0.21]	2.75	.006	.02
$100/tCO₂e	$150/tCO₂e	0.02	[−0.07, 0.11]	0.42	.67	.67
Tax trajectory						
Non-dynamic	Dynamic (+10% per year, capped at $300)	0.42	[0.36, 0.48]	13.60	< .001	< .001
Revenue use						
Deficit reduction	Electricity bill rebates	−0.28	[−0.38, −0.18]	−5.66	< .001	< .001
Deficit reduction	Green spending	−0.24	[−0.34, −0.15]	−4.84	< .001	< .001
Deficit reduction	Low-income programs	−0.21	[−0.31, −0.11]	−4.21	< .001	< .001
Deficit reduction	Reduce labor/capital taxes	−0.13	[−0.23, −0.03]	−2.54	.01	.07
Electricity bill rebates	Green spending	0.04	[−0.06, 0.13]	0.77	.44	.88
Electricity bill rebates	Low-income programs	0.07	[−0.03, 0.17]	1.44	.15	.45
Electricity bill rebates	Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.15	[0.06, 0.25]	3.08	.002	.01
Green spending	Low-income programs	0.03	[−0.06, 0.13]	0.66	.51	.88
Green spending	Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.12	[0.02, 0.21]	2.30	.02	.11
Low-income programs	Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.08	[−0.02, 0.18]	1.66	.10	.39
Fossil heating phase-out mandate						
No mandate	Phase-out by 2050	−0.17	[−0.25, −0.09]	−4.34	< .001	< .001
No mandate	Phase-out by 2040	−0.21	[−0.29, −0.13]	−5.26	< .001	< .001
No mandate	Phase-out by 2030	−0.05	[−0.13, 0.02]	−1.38	.17	.34
Phase-out by 2050	Phase-out by 2040	−0.04	[−0.11, 0.04]	−0.95	.34	.34
Phase-out by 2050	Phase-out by 2030	0.12	[0.04, 0.19]	2.96	.003	.009
Phase-out by 2040	Phase-out by 2030	0.15	[0.08, 0.23]	3.90	< .001	< .001
Energy-efficiency subsidy						
No subsidy increase	Credit cap +10%	0.01	[−0.06, 0.09]	0.38	.70	.70
No subsidy increase	Credit cap +30%	−0.06	[−0.14, 0.02]	−1.50	.13	.40

Level A	Level B	A − B	95% CI	*z*	*p*	*p* (Holm)
No subsidy increase	Credit cap +50%	−0.11	[−0.19, −0.03]	−2.81	.005	.03
Credit cap +10%	Credit cap +30%	−0.07	[−0.15, 0.00]	−1.89	.06	.23
Credit cap +10%	Credit cap +50%	−0.13	[−0.20, −0.05]	−3.20	.001	.008
Credit cap +30%	Credit cap +50%	−0.05	[−0.13, 0.03]	−1.31	.19	.40
Appliance energy label						
No label update	Label update	−0.29	[−0.34, −0.23]	−10.69	< .001	< .001

Note. N = 5,463. Wald contrasts between all levels of an attribute from the logit mixed-effects models of the main text (log-odds; A − B > 0: level A is more supported than level B). *p* (Holm): Holm-adjusted within attribute. In the isolated DCEs, all policies are levels of one attribute.

Supplementary Table 6

Attenuation of attribute effects in policy packages by policy type and domain

Domain	Policy type	*k*	Pooled attenuation	*SE*	95% CI	τ²
Random-effects pooling by domain and policy type						
Food	Pull	3	0.27	0.06	[0.16, 0.38]	0.002
Food	Push	7	0.38	0.07	[0.23, 0.52]	0.034
Food	Revenue recycling	4	0.25	0.08	[0.09, 0.41]	0.022
Household	Pull	2	0.02	0.21	[−0.38, 0.43]	0.080
Household	Push	7	0.38	0.08	[0.23, 0.53]	0.037
Household	Revenue recycling	4	0.19	0.09	[0.01, 0.37]	0.028
Transport	Pull	4	0.37	0.15	[0.08, 0.66]	0.079
Transport	Push	7	0.20	0.07	[0.06, 0.33]	0.028
Transport	Revenue recycling	4	0.28	0.08	[0.13, 0.43]	0.020
Meta-regression: push − pull (domain fixed effects in the pooled model)						
Food	Push − pull	10	0.11	0.13	[−0.15, 0.36]	0.028; p = .41
Household	Push − pull	9	0.36	0.17	[0.02, 0.70]	0.041; p = .04
Transport	Push − pull	11	−0.17	0.13	[−0.44, 0.09]	0.040; p = .20
Pooled	Push − pull	30	0.06	0.09	[−0.11, 0.23]	0.040; p = .52

Note. N = 5,463. Attenuation = difference between the isolated and the (recoded) package coefficient of an attribute level. 37 of 42 attribute levels were attenuated; the mean absolute coefficient decreased from 0.49 (isolated) to 0.23 (packages). Upper panel: DerSimonian-Laird random-effects pooling; lower panel: random-effects meta-regression of attenuation on policy type (push vs. pull; revenue-recycling mechanisms excluded), separately by domain and pooled across domains with domain fixed effects; the last column gives τ² and the *p*-value. *k* = number of attribute levels.

Supplementary Table 7

Partisan gaps in the effects of policy attributes (Democrat − Republican)

Attribute level	Δ*B* (D − R)	95% CI	*p*	*p* (Holm)
Carbon tax				
Tax level: \$50/tCO_2e	−0.04	[−0.24, 0.16]	.69	> .99
Tax level: \$100/tCO_2e	0.18	[−0.02, 0.38]	.07	.35
Tax level: \$150/tCO_2e	0.11	[−0.09, 0.31]	.28	> .99
Tax trajectory: Yearly increase by 10% (cap \$300)	0.04	[−0.11, 0.18]	.63	> .99
Revenue use: Electricity bill rebates	0.32	[0.10, 0.55]	.004	.02
Revenue use: Green spending	1.12	[0.89, 1.34]	< .001	< .001
Revenue use: Low-income programs	0.98	[0.76, 1.21]	< .001	< .001
Revenue use: Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.10	[−0.12, 0.33]	.36	> .99
Isolated food policies				
Plant-based subsidy (15%)	0.33	[0.00, 0.65]	.047	.18
Vegetarian mandate (25%)	0.28	[−0.04, 0.59]	.09	.18
Plant-based subsidy (30%)	0.52	[0.20, 0.84]	.001	.007
Plant-based subsidy (45%)	0.66	[0.34, 0.98]	< .001	< .001
Vegetarian mandate (50%)	0.05	[−0.27, 0.38]	.75	.75
Vegetarian mandate (75%)	−0.35	[−0.69, −0.01]	.046	.18
Isolated transportation policies				

Attribute level	Δ*B* (D − R)	95% CI	*p*	*p* (Holm)
ICEV phase-out by 2030	−0.29	[−0.63, 0.06]	.10	.30
ICEV phase-out by 2040	−0.34	[−0.67, 0.00]	.051	.20
ICEV phase-out by 2050	−0.06	[−0.39, 0.28]	.75	.98
Federal funding (+$1.5bn / +$20bn)	0.12	[−0.22, 0.46]	.49	.98
Public transport subsidy (15%)	−0.73	[−1.07, −0.40]	< .001	< .001
Public transport subsidy (30%)	−0.37	[−0.70, −0.03]	.03	.15
Public transport subsidy (45%)	−0.45	[−0.78, −0.11]	.008	.051
Isolated household policies				
Efficiency subsidy (cap 40%)	0.59	[0.29, 0.90]	< .001	< .001
Efficiency subsidy (cap 50%)	0.51	[0.20, 0.82]	.001	.001
Efficiency subsidy (cap 60%)	0.54	[0.23, 0.85]	< .001	.001
Fossil heating phase-out by 2030	0.90	[0.59, 1.21]	< .001	< .001
Fossil heating phase-out by 2040	1.07	[0.76, 1.38]	< .001	< .001
Fossil heating phase-out by 2050	1.02	[0.71, 1.33]	< .001	< .001
Food policy packages				
Tax level: $15/t$CO_2$e	0.34	[0.07, 0.62]	.01	.16
Tax level: $50/t$CO_2$e	0.37	[0.10, 0.64]	.008	.09
Tax level: $100/t$CO_2$e	0.24	[−0.03, 0.52]	.08	.67
Tax level: $150/t$CO_2$e	0.32	[0.05, 0.59]	.02	.21
Tax trajectory: Yearly increase by 10% (cap $300)	−0.09	[−0.24, 0.06]	.22	> .99
Revenue use: Electricity bill rebates	0.20	[−0.04, 0.44]	.10	.72
Revenue use: Green spending	0.43	[0.18, 0.68]	< .001	.008
Revenue use: Low-income programs	0.39	[0.14, 0.63]	.002	.02
Revenue use: Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.12	[−0.13, 0.37]	.34	> .99
Vegetarian mandate: 25% vegetarian meals	0.35	[0.16, 0.54]	< .001	.004
Vegetarian mandate: 50% vegetarian meals	0.33	[0.14, 0.52]	< .001	.008
Vegetarian mandate: 75% vegetarian meals	0.00	[−0.19, 0.19]	> .99	> .99
Plant-based subsidy: 15% reduction	0.13	[−0.07, 0.32]	.20	> .99
Plant-based subsidy: 30% reduction	0.19	[0.00, 0.38]	.052	.47
Plant-based subsidy: 45% reduction	0.13	[−0.07, 0.32]	.20	> .99
Carbon label	0.06	[−0.07, 0.19]	.36	> .99
Transportation policy packages				
Tax level: $15/t$CO_2$e	0.18	[−0.09, 0.45]	.18	.74
Tax level: $50/t$CO_2$e	0.09	[−0.17, 0.36]	.50	> .99
Tax level: $100/t$CO_2$e	0.24	[−0.03, 0.51]	.08	.56
Tax level: $150/t$CO_2$e	0.13	[−0.14, 0.40]	.35	> .99
Tax trajectory: Yearly increase by 10% (cap $300)	0.17	[0.02, 0.32]	.02	.22
Revenue use: Electricity bill rebates	0.20	[−0.04, 0.45]	.10	.56
Revenue use: Green spending	0.30	[0.06, 0.54]	.01	.15
Revenue use: Low-income programs	0.22	[−0.02, 0.46]	.08	.56
Revenue use: Reduce labor/capital taxes	−0.04	[−0.28, 0.20]	.77	> .99
ICEV phase-out: by 2030	0.32	[0.13, 0.51]	< .001	.01
ICEV phase-out: by 2040	0.37	[0.18, 0.56]	< .001	.002
ICEV phase-out: by 2050	0.30	[0.11, 0.49]	.002	.02
Public transport subsidy: 15% price reduction	0.18	[−0.01, 0.37]	.07	.56
Public transport subsidy: 30% price reduction	0.28	[0.09, 0.47]	.004	.049
Public transport subsidy: 45% price reduction	0.20	[0.01, 0.39]	.04	.38
Federal funding: +$0.75bn charging / +$10bn public transport	0.44	[0.28, 0.60]	< .001	< .001
Federal funding: +$1.5bn charging / +$20bn public transport	0.56	[0.40, 0.72]	< .001	< .001
Household policy packages				
Tax level: $15/t$CO_2$e	0.44	[0.17, 0.70]	.001	.01
Tax level: $50/t$CO_2$e	0.58	[0.32, 0.85]	< .001	< .001
Tax level: $100/t$CO_2$e	0.31	[0.04, 0.57]	.02	.13
Tax level: $150/t$CO_2$e	0.54	[0.28, 0.80]	< .001	< .001
Tax trajectory: Yearly increase by 10% (cap $300)	−0.04	[−0.18, 0.10]	.60	> .99
Revenue use: Electricity bill rebates	0.10	[−0.14, 0.33]	.41	> .99
Revenue use: Green spending	0.31	[0.08, 0.55]	.010	.08
Revenue use: Low-income programs	0.33	[0.09, 0.56]	.007	.06
Revenue use: Reduce labor/capital taxes	0.04	[−0.20, 0.27]	.75	> .99
Fossil heating phase-out: by 2030	0.82	[0.64, 1.01]	< .001	< .001
Fossil heating phase-out: by 2040	0.75	[0.57, 0.93]	< .001	< .001

Attribute level	Δ*B* (D − R)	95% CI	*p*	*p* (Holm)
Fossil heating phase-out: by 2050	0.83	[0.65, 1.01]	< .001	< .001
Efficiency subsidy: credit cap +10%	0.20	[0.02, 0.38]	.03	.17
Efficiency subsidy: credit cap +30%	0.22	[0.04, 0.41]	.02	.12
Efficiency subsidy: credit cap +50%	0.29	[0.11, 0.48]	.002	.02
Appliance label: label update	0.01	[−0.12, 0.13]	.91	> .99

Note. N = 3,899 (participants identifying as Democrat or Republican). Logit mixed-effects models per DCE with the policy attributes, party affiliation and their interactions (random intercepts for participant and state). Δ*B*: party × attribute interaction (positive values: the attribute level widens the gap between Democrats and Republicans). *p* (Holm): Holm-adjusted within DCE. Reference levels: \$15/tCO_2e, no annual increase, deficit reduction (carbon tax); carbon label (isolated food), federal funding +\$0.75bn/+\$10bn (isolated transportation), appliance label update (isolated household); no tax and no policy (packages).

Supplementary Table 8

State-level predictors of partisan polarization (change in the Democrat − Republican gap)

Predictor	Model 1 Δ*B* [95% CI]	*p*	Model 2 Δ*B* [95% CI]	*p*	States
Carbon tax					
Implemented climate policies (general)	−0.08 [−0.22, 0.06]	.28	0.13 [−0.09, 0.35]	.24	50
Billion-dollar disasters	0.10 [−0.03, 0.24]	.14	0.14 [−0.03, 0.31]	.12	51
Gasoline price	−0.17 [−0.30, −0.04]	.01	−0.12 [−0.32, 0.09]	.26	51
Electricity price	−0.16 [−0.29, −0.03]	.02	−0.12 [−0.34, 0.11]	.31	51
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.00 [−0.15, 0.15]	.98	−0.01 [−0.15, 0.13]	.87	51
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	0.02 [−0.12, 0.16]	.78	0.04 [−0.13, 0.20]	.66	51
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	0.03 [−0.11, 0.17]	.68	0.03 [−0.11, 0.18]	.67	51
GDP (2024)	−0.18 [−0.32, −0.04]	.01	−0.08 [−0.26, 0.09]	.33	51
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	0.10 [−0.04, 0.23]	.17	0.08 [−0.08, 0.25]	.33	51
Democratic vote share (2024)	−0.05 [−0.20, 0.09]	.46	0.18 [−0.03, 0.40]	.10	51
Isolated food policies					
Implemented climate policies (general)	−0.04 [−0.18, 0.10]	.60	0.05 [−0.17, 0.28]	.66	50
Billion-dollar disasters	0.00 [−0.16, 0.17]	.96	0.06 [−0.10, 0.21]	.49	51
Gasoline price	−0.01 [−0.15, 0.12]	.84	0.09 [−0.18, 0.35]	.52	51
Electricity price	−0.07 [−0.21, 0.07]	.32	−0.11 [−0.32, 0.10]	.30	51
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.03 [−0.14, 0.21]	.72	0.06 [−0.09, 0.20]	.44	51
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	0.15 [−0.01, 0.31]	.07	0.18 [0.02, 0.34]	.02	51
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	0.14 [−0.01, 0.29]	.08	0.17 [0.01, 0.32]	.03	51
GDP (2024)	−0.07 [−0.21, 0.06]	.29	−0.04 [−0.24, 0.15]	.65	51
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	0.11 [−0.03, 0.25]	.11	0.16 [−0.03, 0.34]	.09	51
Democratic vote share (2024)	0.01 [−0.14, 0.17]	.87	0.13 [−0.10, 0.35]	.28	51
Implemented food policies	0.13 [−0.03, 0.29]	.10	0.17 [0.01, 0.33]	.04	50
Meat price	0.01 [−0.13, 0.15]	.91	−0.03 [−0.17, 0.12]	.73	50
Dairy price	0.01 [−0.14, 0.16]	.90	0.03 [−0.17, 0.22]	.79	50
Apple price	−0.01 [−0.17, 0.14]	.85	−0.01 [−0.16, 0.14]	.90	50
Farming jobs (per capita)	−0.06 [−0.19, 0.08]	.42	−0.05 [−0.28, 0.18]	.67	51
Vegetarian restaurants	−0.12 [−0.26, 0.02]	.09	−0.19 [−0.44, 0.06]	.13	51
Isolated transportation policies					
Implemented climate policies (general)	−0.06 [−0.19, 0.07]	.39	0.17 [−0.06, 0.41]	.15	50
Billion-dollar disasters	0.09 [−0.04, 0.23]	.17	0.11 [−0.03, 0.25]	.12	51
Gasoline price	−0.12 [−0.25, 0.01]	.07	−0.06 [−0.25, 0.12]	.50	51
Electricity price	−0.13 [−0.26, 0.00]	.04	−0.20 [−0.39, −0.02]	.03	51
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.02 [−0.12, 0.16]	.79	0.05 [−0.09, 0.19]	.47	51
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	0.04 [−0.09, 0.17]	.54	0.07 [−0.07, 0.21]	.34	51
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	0.04 [−0.08, 0.17]	.51	0.07 [−0.07, 0.21]	.31	51
GDP (2024)	−0.14 [−0.26, −0.01]	.03	−0.04 [−0.20, 0.12]	.64	51
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	0.08 [−0.05, 0.21]	.21	0.10 [−0.06, 0.26]	.22	51
Democratic vote share (2024)	−0.06 [−0.19, 0.08]	.39	0.17 [−0.04, 0.38]	.12	51
Implemented transportation policies	−0.11 [−0.24, 0.02]	.09	0.07 [−0.18, 0.33]	.57	50
Public transport fares	−0.04 [−0.17, 0.09]	.56	0.03 [−0.12, 0.18]	.70	47
Automotive jobs (per capita)	0.09 [−0.04, 0.22]	.16	0.11 [−0.03, 0.25]	.14	51
Registered EVs (per capita)	−0.16 [−0.29, −0.04]	.01	−0.08 [−0.26, 0.10]	.39	51

Predictor	Model 1 Δ*B* [95% CI]	*p*	Model 2 Δ*B* [95% CI]	*p*	States
Public transit trips (per capita)	−0.10 [−0.25, 0.04]	.16	−0.02 [−0.19, 0.14]	.78	51
EV chargers (per capita)	−0.19 [−0.32, −0.07]	.003	−0.21 [−0.45, 0.03]	.08	51
Isolated household policies					
Implemented climate policies (general)	−0.06 [−0.18, 0.07]	.40	−0.03 [−0.26, 0.19]	.77	50
Billion-dollar disasters	0.05 [−0.08, 0.18]	.44	0.06 [−0.08, 0.21]	.39	51
Gasoline price	−0.07 [−0.20, 0.06]	.28	−0.02 [−0.21, 0.17]	.85	51
Electricity price	−0.08 [−0.21, 0.05]	.22	−0.04 [−0.25, 0.16]	.68	51
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.07 [−0.06, 0.20]	.30	0.09 [−0.06, 0.23]	.23	51
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	0.12 [−0.02, 0.25]	.10	0.09 [−0.05, 0.24]	.21	51
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	0.10 [−0.03, 0.23]	.13	0.11 [−0.04, 0.27]	.14	51
GDP (2024)	−0.05 [−0.17, 0.08]	.46	0.00 [−0.15, 0.14]	.97	51
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	0.08 [−0.04, 0.21]	.21	0.16 [−0.05, 0.36]	.13	51
Democratic vote share (2024)	−0.02 [−0.15, 0.11]	.72	0.09 [−0.15, 0.34]	.45	51
Implemented household policies	−0.03 [−0.16, 0.10]	.62	−0.04 [−0.22, 0.14]	.69	50
Share of heat pumps	0.04 [−0.09, 0.17]	.58	0.08 [−0.10, 0.26]	.37	33
Food policy packages					
Implemented climate policies (general)	−0.07 [−0.20, 0.06]	.27	0.09 [−0.12, 0.30]	.41	50
Billion-dollar disasters	0.10 [−0.03, 0.23]	.14	0.09 [−0.05, 0.24]	.22	51
Gasoline price	−0.10 [−0.23, 0.02]	.11	−0.01 [−0.26, 0.25]	.96	51
Electricity price	−0.15 [−0.28, −0.02]	.03	−0.17 [−0.37, 0.02]	.08	51
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.02 [−0.11, 0.16]	.75	0.03 [−0.11, 0.17]	.65	51
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	0.11 [−0.02, 0.24]	.10	0.13 [−0.01, 0.28]	.08	51
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	0.10 [−0.03, 0.23]	.13	0.10 [−0.04, 0.25]	.15	51
GDP (2024)	−0.11 [−0.24, 0.02]	.10	0.00 [−0.19, 0.18]	.97	51
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	0.10 [−0.04, 0.23]	.15	0.10 [−0.07, 0.27]	.24	51
Democratic vote share (2024)	−0.05 [−0.19, 0.08]	.44	0.11 [−0.10, 0.32]	.31	51
Implemented food policies	0.06 [−0.08, 0.19]	.40	0.13 [−0.01, 0.28]	.08	50
Meat price	0.05 [−0.08, 0.18]	.44	0.02 [−0.12, 0.16]	.79	50
Dairy price	−0.02 [−0.16, 0.12]	.77	−0.02 [−0.20, 0.17]	.84	50
Apple price	0.06 [−0.07, 0.19]	.35	0.03 [−0.11, 0.17]	.71	50
Farming jobs (per capita)	−0.10 [−0.23, 0.03]	.14	−0.01 [−0.23, 0.21]	.93	51
Vegetarian restaurants	−0.15 [−0.29, −0.02]	.03	−0.07 [−0.30, 0.16]	.54	51
Transportation policy packages					
Implemented climate policies (general)	−0.09 [−0.22, 0.04]	.16	0.14 [−0.10, 0.39]	.26	50
Billion-dollar disasters	0.10 [−0.03, 0.24]	.13	0.09 [−0.05, 0.23]	.21	51
Gasoline price	−0.18 [−0.31, −0.05]	.006	−0.14 [−0.33, 0.05]	.14	51
Electricity price	−0.15 [−0.29, −0.02]	.02	−0.16 [−0.35, 0.03]	.10	51
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.03 [−0.10, 0.17]	.63	0.03 [−0.11, 0.17]	.66	51
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	0.09 [−0.04, 0.22]	.17	0.11 [−0.04, 0.25]	.15	51
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	0.08 [−0.05, 0.21]	.23	0.11 [−0.03, 0.26]	.13	51
GDP (2024)	−0.15 [−0.28, −0.02]	.02	−0.06 [−0.23, 0.10]	.46	51
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	0.08 [−0.05, 0.21]	.24	0.07 [−0.10, 0.23]	.44	51
Democratic vote share (2024)	−0.11 [−0.24, 0.03]	.12	0.08 [−0.13, 0.30]	.45	51
Implemented transportation policies	−0.15 [−0.28, −0.02]	.02	−0.01 [−0.27, 0.26]	.96	50
Public transport fares	−0.09 [−0.22, 0.04]	.19	−0.02 [−0.18, 0.14]	.77	47
Automotive jobs (per capita)	0.07 [−0.06, 0.21]	.27	0.06 [−0.09, 0.20]	.46	51
Registered EVs (per capita)	−0.18 [−0.31, −0.05]	.006	−0.11 [−0.30, 0.07]	.23	51
Public transit trips (per capita)	−0.12 [−0.26, 0.02]	.10	−0.04 [−0.21, 0.13]	.64	51
EV chargers (per capita)	−0.20 [−0.33, −0.07]	.002	−0.22 [−0.46, 0.03]	.08	51
Household policy packages					
Implemented climate policies (general)	−0.06 [−0.18, 0.05]	.28	−0.08 [−0.28, 0.13]	.47	50
Billion-dollar disasters	0.05 [−0.07, 0.17]	.42	0.06 [−0.07, 0.20]	.36	51
Gasoline price	−0.10 [−0.22, 0.01]	.09	−0.05 [−0.22, 0.12]	.56	51
Electricity price	−0.13 [−0.24, −0.01]	.03	−0.11 [−0.30, 0.07]	.24	51
Electricity from fossil fuels	0.01 [−0.12, 0.13]	.91	0.02 [−0.11, 0.15]	.74	51
Fossil-fuel revenue (share of GDP)	0.06 [−0.06, 0.18]	.36	0.03 [−0.11, 0.16]	.68	51
Fossil-fuel jobs (per capita)	0.02 [−0.10, 0.13]	.79	0.03 [−0.11, 0.16]	.69	51
GDP (2024)	−0.12 [−0.24, −0.01]	.03	−0.08 [−0.21, 0.06]	.26	51
CO_2 emissions (per capita)	0.04 [−0.07, 0.16]	.48	0.07 [−0.11, 0.26]	.43	51
Democratic vote share (2024)	−0.07 [−0.19, 0.05]	.24	−0.04 [−0.26, 0.18]	.71	51
Implemented household policies	−0.05 [−0.17, 0.07]	.44	−0.10 [−0.26, 0.06]	.23	50
Share of heat pumps	0.04 [−0.09, 0.17]	.53	0.02 [−0.14, 0.18]	.81	33

Note. N = 3,899. Interaction of party affiliation with the z-standardized state-level predictor in logit mixed-effects models with the policy attributes, party × attribute interactions, a random intercept for participant, and a random intercept and party slope for state. Estimates are changes in the Democrat − Republican gap (log-odds) per *SD* of the predictor (negative: smaller gap). Model 1: focal predictor only; Model 2: baseline or swap-in set of state-level predictors. 21 of 196 coefficients have $p < .05$.

Supplementary Table 9

Socio-demographic differences in the partisan gap

Term	Δ*B*	95% CI	*p*	*p* (Holm)
Carbon tax — joint test: $\chi^2(6) = 109.91$, $p < .001$; AIC 26,671 → 26,573				
Age (per *SD*)	0.31	[0.18, 0.43]	< .001	< .001
Male (ref. female)	0.34	[0.09, 0.59]	.007	.03
University degree	0.38	[0.10, 0.66]	.009	.03
Income (per *SD*)	0.02	[−0.12, 0.16]	.77	.77
Suburban (ref. rural)	−0.32	[−0.66, 0.01]	.06	.12
Urban (ref. rural)	−1.35	[−1.73, −0.97]	< .001	< .001
Isolated food policies — joint test: $\chi^2(6) = 82.63$, $p < .001$; AIC 18,013 → 17,942				
Age (per *SD*)	0.23	[0.09, 0.36]	< .001	.004
Male (ref. female)	−0.13	[−0.40, 0.13]	.32	.65
University degree	0.24	[−0.06, 0.54]	.11	.33
Income (per *SD*)	0.07	[−0.07, 0.22]	.33	.65
Suburban (ref. rural)	−0.55	[−0.91, −0.20]	.002	.009
Urban (ref. rural)	−1.48	[−1.88, −1.07]	< .001	< .001
Isolated transportation policies — joint test: $\chi^2(6) = 97.94$, $p < .001$; AIC 18,479 → 18,393				
Age (per *SD*)	0.25	[0.13, 0.37]	< .001	< .001
Male (ref. female)	0.22	[−0.02, 0.46]	.07	.16
University degree	0.41	[0.14, 0.68]	.003	.01
Income (per *SD*)	0.13	[−0.01, 0.26]	.07	.16
Suburban (ref. rural)	−0.32	[−0.64, 0.01]	.05	.16
Urban (ref. rural)	−1.22	[−1.59, −0.85]	< .001	< .001
Isolated household policies — joint test: $\chi^2(6) = 61.26$, $p < .001$; AIC 18,888 → 18,839				
Age (per *SD*)	0.23	[0.11, 0.36]	< .001	.001
Male (ref. female)	0.07	[−0.18, 0.32]	.58	.58
University degree	0.28	[0.00, 0.55]	.05	.16
Income (per *SD*)	0.09	[−0.05, 0.22]	.23	.46
Suburban (ref. rural)	−0.38	[−0.71, −0.05]	.03	.10
Urban (ref. rural)	−1.06	[−1.44, −0.67]	< .001	< .001
Food policy packages — joint test: $\chi^2(6) = 71.70$, $p < .001$; AIC 26,228 → 26,169				
Age (per *SD*)	0.14	[0.01, 0.26]	.03	.14
Male (ref. female)	0.06	[−0.19, 0.30]	.66	> .99
University degree	0.25	[−0.03, 0.53]	.08	.32
Income (per *SD*)	0.05	[−0.09, 0.18]	.52	> .99
Suburban (ref. rural)	−0.24	[−0.57, 0.09]	.16	.48
Urban (ref. rural)	−1.23	[−1.61, −0.85]	< .001	< .001
Transportation policy packages — joint test: $\chi^2(6) = 106.43$, $p < .001$; AIC 26,573 → 26,478				
Age (per *SD*)	0.27	[0.15, 0.40]	< .001	< .001
Male (ref. female)	0.08	[−0.16, 0.33]	.51	> .99
University degree	0.34	[0.07, 0.62]	.01	.06
Income (per *SD*)	0.04	[−0.10, 0.18]	.56	> .99
Suburban (ref. rural)	−0.31	[−0.64, 0.02]	.07	.20
Urban (ref. rural)	−1.37	[−1.74, −0.99]	< .001	< .001
Household policy packages — joint test: $\chi^2(6) = 91.63$, $p < .001$; AIC 27,646 → 27,566				
Age (per *SD*)	0.22	[0.11, 0.33]	< .001	< .001
Male (ref. female)	0.06	[−0.16, 0.28]	.62	.62
University degree	0.20	[−0.05, 0.45]	.12	.26
Income (per *SD*)	0.11	[−0.02, 0.23]	.09	.26
Suburban (ref. rural)	−0.31	[−0.61, −0.02]	.04	.15
Urban (ref. rural)	−1.17	[−1.50, −0.83]	< .001	< .001

Note. n = 3,877. Democrats and Republicans with complete socio-demographic data (binary gender). Logit mixed-effects models per DCE with the policy attributes and the interactions of party affiliation

with age, gender, education, income, and place of residency (random intercepts for participant and state). Δ*B*: change of the Democrat − Republican difference in support (log-odds) associated with the term (continuous variables per *SD*; factors relative to the reference category). *p* (Holm): Holm-adjusted within DCE. Joint test: likelihood-ratio test between models with and without all interactions.

Result robustness based on alternative outcome measurement

In the main text, policy support was operationalized as the separate evaluation of each policy proposal. As a robustness check, we repeated the analyses with the second outcome of the DCE, the relative preference between the two proposals shown in a trial. Because participants preferred exactly one of the two proposals, the relative outcome equals 1 for one and 0 for the other proposal of every trial. This has two consequences: first, its mean is 50% by construction in every sample, subsample, and DCE, so it carries no information on the absolute level of support. Second, variables that do not differ between the two proposals of a trial, such as characteristics of the participant or of the participant's state, cannot predict which proposal is preferred. The relative outcome identifies differences between policy proposals: the effects of policy attributes, the ordering of policy configurations, and differences in both between groups such as Democrats and Republicans.

We therefore replicated the analyses that rest on such differences, including the effects of policy attributes (Supplementary Figs. 15 and 16, Supplementary Table 10), the MRP estimates (Supplementary Fig. 17, Supplementary Table 11), partisan differences in attribute effects and in configuration-level support (Supplementary Figs. 18 and 19, Supplementary Table 12), and the attenuation of attribute effects in policy packages (Supplementary Fig. 20, Supplementary Table 13). We did not replicate analyses whose results depend on absolute levels of support or on variables that are constant within a trial.

Attribute effects were estimated with the same logit mixed-effects model as in the main text (row-level model: each proposal is one observation; random intercepts for participant and state). Because the two proposals of a trial are not independent, we additionally estimated a pair-level model (Bradley-Terry model: one observation per trial; choice of the first proposal regressed on the attribute differences between the two proposals, controlling for the position of the proposal). In the row-level models for the relative outcome, the

variances of the participant and state intercepts were estimated at or near zero, as expected because the mean of the relative outcome is 50% for every participant and, by design, for every state. National and party-specific MRP estimates for both outcomes were obtained with the same models, the same poststratification frame, and the same prediction procedure as in the main text.

Attribute effects

Supplementary Figs. 15 and 16 show the coefficients of all attribute levels for the absolute evaluation (main text), the row-level relative preference model, and the pair-level relative preference model. The two relative specifications gave nearly identical coefficients (r = .99 across the 76 coefficients). Coefficients for the relative outcome closely tracked those for the absolute evaluation (r = .86 across all 76 coefficients, Supplementary Fig. 17A; .91 ≤ r ≤ .99 within DCEs; Supplementary Table 11). Signs agreed for 91% (69 of 76) of the coefficients. Of the 61 coefficients that were significant for the absolute evaluation, 56 were significant with the same sign in the pair-level relative model, four were not significant, and one was significant with the opposite sign. Six further coefficients were significant only for the relative outcome.

The specific findings reported in the main text were reproduced (Supplementary Table 10). Push policies were less preferred than pull policies: stronger mandates and higher tax levels decreased, and subsidies, funding, and labels increased the probability that a proposal was preferred (Supplementary Figs. 15 and 16). In policy packages, the least coercive mandate level was preferred over no mandate in the food domain (pair-level B = 0.10, 95% CI [0.04, 0.15], p < .001) and the household domain (B = 0.14, 95% CI [0.08, 0.19], p < .001). Sensitivity to subsidy levels was limited for both outcomes: the 15% and 30% subsidies for plant-based food had similar effects (absolute: 0.19 and 0.17; row-level: 0.20 and 0.16; pair-level: 0.12 and 0.11). Among the revenue-recycling mechanisms of the carbon tax, electricity bill rebates, green spending, and low-income programs were preferred over deficit reduction, in this order, whereas reducing labor taxes did not differ from deficit reduction; this order was found for both outcomes.

Differences between the outcomes were concentrated in the isolated-policy DCEs. For household policies, the absolute evaluation showed mandates as less supported than the reference label and subsidies as equally supported (B close to zero for all three levels), whereas under the relative outcome the subsidies were preferred over the label (pair-level B = 0.33 to 0.67) and later phase-out dates were no longer disadvantaged (phase-out by 2040: B = −0.07; by 2050: B = 0.06). Similarly, the 25% vegetarian meal mandate was preferred over the reference in the relative outcome (pair-level B = 0.25) but not in the absolute evaluation (B = 0.01), and a 15% public transport fare reduction was less preferred than the reference (federal funding; pair-level B = −0.14), while being more supported in the absolute evaluation (B = 0.44). These differences do not change the conclusion that pull policies are preferred over push policies, but they show that the ordering of specific instruments in the isolated DCEs is less stable across outcomes.

Ordering of policy configurations

Because absolute levels are not comparable between the outcomes, we compared the ordering of national MRP estimates of policy configurations rather than their levels (Supplementary Fig. 17B to H). The ordering was highly similar. Spearman rank correlations were ρ = .97 for carbon tax schemes (40 configurations) and .95 ≤ ρ ≤ .98 for policy packages (1,312 to 1,968 configurations); for isolated policies (7 to 8 configurations per domain) ρ was .96 for food, .90 for transport, and .86 for household policies (Supplementary Table 11). Of the 10% of package configurations with the highest support under the absolute evaluation, 77% to 91% were also among the top 10% under the relative outcome, and all four of the most supported carbon tax schemes coincided.

Partisan polarization

We first estimated partisan differences in attribute effects directly. In the Democrat and Republican subsample (N = 3,899), we fitted for each DCE and each outcome a logit mixed-effects model with the policy attributes, party affiliation, and their interactions (random intercepts for participant and state). The party × attribute interaction gives the difference between Democrats and Republicans in the effect of an attribute level (partisan gap,

Democrat minus Republican, in log-odds) with a model-based standard error. Partisan gaps in attribute effects for the relative outcome agreed closely with those for the absolute evaluation (Supplementary Fig. 18A; $r = .84$, $\rho = .74$ across 76 attribute levels; same sign for 89%). Correlations were $.78 \leq r \leq .97$ in five of the seven DCEs and lower for food packages ($r = .58$) and isolated food policies ($r = .31$; six coefficients; Supplementary Table 12).

At the level of policy configurations, we compared polarization scores (Democrat minus Republican difference in MRP-estimated support or preference; Supplementary Fig. 18B to H). Configuration-level polarization scores correlated across outcomes at $r = .93$ for carbon tax schemes and at $r = .92$ for transport and household packages respectively, but only at $r = .62$ for food packages. For isolated policies, correlations were $r = .34$ (food), .72 (transport), and .91 (household), based on seven to eight configurations each (Supplementary Table 12).

Supplementary Fig. 19 shows, as in Fig. 1 of the main text, the party-specific marginal means of the MRP estimates for the attribute levels of policy packages. Marginal means across the 25 attribute levels were highly correlated between the outcomes for Democrats ($r = .97$) and Republicans ($r = .96$), and so were the party differences ($r = .91$, $\rho = .80$). In six of the seven attribute blocks (tax level, revenue use, mandate, subsidy, label, federal funding), the difference between Democrats and Republicans was smallest at the reference level (e.g., no new tax, no mandate, no subsidy, deficit reduction) for both outcomes; for the seventh block (tax trajectory), the difference between the two levels was small (−0.8 and 2.6 percentage points for the absolute and relative outcome) and pointed in opposite directions.

At the level of attribute effects, neither outcome showed a systematic relation: the correlation between the average effect of an attribute level on support and its partisan gap was $r = .05$ for the absolute evaluation and $r = .07$ for the relative preference across 76 attribute levels, with differences between DCEs in both.

Policy packaging effect

We repeated the comparison of attribute-level coefficients between isolated policies and policy packages (Supplementary Figs. 6 and 7) for the relative outcome. Attribute effects were smaller in packages than in isolation for 88% (37 of 42) of the attribute levels for the

absolute evaluation, 88% (37 of 42) for the row-level relative model, and 95% (40 of 42) for the pair-level relative model (Supplementary Fig. 20A, Supplementary Table 13). The mean absolute coefficient decreased from 0.49 to 0.23 for the absolute evaluation, from 0.45 to 0.27 for the row-level model, and from 0.45 to 0.19 for the pair-level model. Pooled by policy type and domain, the attenuation was significantly greater than zero in eight of nine cells for the absolute evaluation (all but household pull policies), nine of nine for the pair-level model, and eight of nine for the row-level model (Supplementary Fig. 20B).

The attenuation of attribute effects in packages is therefore robust to the outcome. The comparison of push and pull policies, however, is more pronounced for the relative outcome: in the main text, attenuation did not differ systematically between push and pull policies, whereas for the relative outcome (pooled push – pull; row-level: $B = -0.27$, 95% CI [−0.43, −0.11], $p < .001$; pair-level: $B = -0.07$, 95% CI [−0.25, 0.11], $p = .43$) the attenuation of pull policies was larger than that of push policies in the food domain (pair-level: 0.51 vs. 0.33; row-level: 0.61 vs. 0.23) and the household domain (pair-level: 0.62 vs. 0.26; row-level: 0.84 vs. 0.17) and smaller in the transportation domain (pair-level: 0.14 vs. 0.33; row-level: 0.15 vs. 0.21). This pattern is consistent with the larger effects of pull policies in the isolated DCEs under the relative outcome described above. We therefore consider the push-pull comparison of attenuation dependent on outcome measurement.

Summary

For the analyses that are possible with a relative outcome, the conclusions of the main text were largely robust: attribute effects, the ordering of policy configurations, the direction and size of partisan differences, and the attenuation of attribute effects in policy packages were similar across the two outcomes. Two results depended on the outcome: the ordering of some policy instruments in the isolated DCEs (household subsidies and mandates, the 25% vegetarian meal mandate, the 15% public transport fare reduction), and the comparison of attenuation between push and pull policies.

Supplementary Table 10

Key attribute effects reported in the main text for the absolute evaluation and the relative preference

Effect	Absolute evaluation (main text)	Relative preference, row-level	Relative preference, pair-level
Food packages: least coercive mandate vs. no mandate (25% vegetarian meals)	0.15* [0.07, 0.23]	0.11* [0.05, 0.18]	0.10* [0.04, 0.15]
Household packages: least coercive mandate vs. no mandate (phase-out by 2050)	0.17* [0.09, 0.25]	0.18* [0.12, 0.24]	0.14* [0.08, 0.19]
Transport packages: least coercive mandate vs. no mandate (ICEV phase-out by 2050)	0.04 [−0.04, 0.12]	0.09* [0.02, 0.15]	0.05 [−0.00, 0.11]
Food packages: plant-based subsidy, 15% price reduction	0.19* [0.10, 0.27]	0.20* [0.14, 0.27]	0.12* [0.07, 0.18]
Food packages: plant-based subsidy, 30% price reduction	0.17* [0.09, 0.25]	0.16* [0.10, 0.23]	0.11* [0.06, 0.17]
Carbon tax: electricity bill rebates vs. deficit reduction	0.61* [0.52, 0.70]	0.46* [0.39, 0.53]	0.47* [0.39, 0.54]
Carbon tax: green spending vs. deficit reduction	0.53* [0.44, 0.62]	0.27* [0.20, 0.34]	0.28* [0.20, 0.35]
Carbon tax: low-income programs vs. deficit reduction	0.42* [0.33, 0.51]	0.23* [0.16, 0.30]	0.24* [0.17, 0.32]
Carbon tax: reduced labor/capital taxes vs. deficit reduction	0.06 [−0.04, 0.15]	0.07 [−0.00, 0.14]	0.07 [−0.01, 0.14]

Note. N = 5,463. Cells show the coefficient (log-odds) with 95% confidence intervals from logit mixed-effects models. Absolute evaluation: model of the main text. Relative preference, row-level: same specification for the preference between the two proposals of a trial. Relative preference, pair-level: one observation per trial (Bradley-Terry model). Mandate effects refer to packages and are compared with no mandate; revenue-use effects refer to the carbon tax DCE and are compared with deficit reduction. * $p < .05$.

Supplementary Table 11

Agreement between absolute evaluation and relative preference: attribute coefficients and ordering of policy configurations

DCE	Attribute levels	*r,* row-level	*r*, pair-level	Same sign	Configs (*n*)	*r*	ρ	Top-10% overlap
Carbon tax	8	.99***	.99***	100%	40	.98***	.97***	100% (4/4)
Food (isolated)	6	.99***	.99***	100%	7	.97***	.96***	100% (3/3)
Transport (isolated)	7	.91**	.92**	86%	8	.89**	.90**	67% (2/3)
Household (isolated)	6	.98***	.98***	67%	7	.82*	.86*	67% (2/3)
Food (package)	16	.98***	.98***	94%	1,312	.98***	.98***	83% (110/132)
Transport (package)	17	.98***	.99***	94%	1,968	.97***	.97***	91% (179/197)
Household (package)	16	.95***	.96***	88%	1,312	.95***	.95***	77% (102/132)
All DCEs	76	.86***	.86***	91%	–	–	–	–

Note. r = Pearson correlation; ρ = Spearman rank correlation. Attribute levels: correlation of the coefficients of the relative preference (row-level or pair-level model) with those of the absolute evaluation; same sign = share of coefficients with the same sign in the row-level relative and absolute model. Configs (*n*): number of policy configurations; *r* and ρ (right): correlation of the national MRP estimates of the policy configurations (absolute evaluation vs. relative preference). Top-10% overlap: share of the 10% of configurations with the highest support under the absolute evaluation that are also among the top 10% under the relative preference (top 4 for the carbon tax, top 3 for isolated policies; number of configurations in parentheses). Levels of the MRP estimates are not comparable between the outcomes. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Supplementary Table 12

Agreement between absolute evaluation and relative preference: partisan polarization

DCE	Attribute levels	*r*, gap in effect	ρ, gap in effect	Same sign	Configs (*n*)	*r*, gap in support	ρ, gap in support
Carbon tax	8	.97***	.83*	88%	40	.93***	.89***
Food (isolated)	6	.31	.43	83%	7	.34	.39
Transport (isolated)	7	.78*	.86*	86%	8	.72*	.69
Household (isolated)	6	.80	.66	100%	7	.91**	.79*
Food (package)	16	.58*	.44	88%	1,312	.62***	.60***
Transport (package)	17	.82***	.72**	94%	1,968	.92***	.92***
Household (package)	16	.82***	.78***	88%	1,312	.92***	.89***
All DCEs	76	.84***	.74***	89%	–	–	–


Note. N = 3,899. Gap in effect: correlation across outcomes of the Democrat–Republican difference in the effect of an attribute level (party × attribute interaction; log-odds). Configs (*n*): number of policy configurations. Gap in support: correlation across outcomes of the polarization score (Democrat minus Republican difference in MRP-estimated support or preference) of the policy configurations. Party-specific MRP models included random intercepts and party slopes for state. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Supplementary Table 13


Attenuation of attribute effects in policy packages compared with isolated policies

Outcome	Attribute levels	Attenuated in package, *n* (%)	Mean |*B*| isolated	Mean |*B*| package	Package / isolated
Absolute evaluation (main text)	42	37 (88%)	0.49	0.23	47%
Relative preference, row-level	42	37 (88%)	0.45	0.27	60%
Relative preference, pair-level	42	40 (95%)	0.45	0.19	42%


Note. N = 5,463. An attribute level is attenuated if the absolute value of its package coefficient (rebased to the isolated-condition reference category) is smaller than the absolute value of its coefficient in the isolated-policy DCE. Package / isolated: ratio of the mean absolute coefficients.




Supplementary Fig. 15 | Attribute effects on absolute evaluation and relative preference (carbon tax and isolated policies). *N* = 5,463. Coefficients (log-odds) of policy attribute levels from logit mixed-effects models for the absolute evaluation (blue circles; as in the main text) and for the relative preference between the two proposals of a trial (orange triangles: row-level model with random intercepts for participant and state, as in the main text; green squares: pair-level model with one observation per trial). Bars show 95% confidence intervals. A positive coefficient indicates a higher probability that a proposal is supported (absolute evaluation) or preferred over the other proposal (relative preference). Reference categories: $\$15/tCO_2e$ (tax level), no annual increase (tax dynamic), deficit reduction (revenue use), climate food label (food), increase federal funding by 50% (transportation), and update energy labels (household).



Supplementary Fig. 16 | Attribute effects on absolute evaluation and relative preference (policy packages). *N* = 5,463. Coefficients (log-odds) of policy attribute levels from logit mixed-effects models for the absolute evaluation (blue circles; as in the main text) and for the relative preference (orange triangles: row-level model; green squares: pair-level model) for food (top), household (middle), and transportation packages (bottom). Bars show 95% confidence intervals. Reference categories: no tax, no mandate, no subsidy, no label, and no additional funding (as applicable); the carbon tax revenue use is compared with deficit reduction.




Supplementary Fig. 17 | Agreement between absolute evaluation and relative preference: attribute coefficients and national MRP estimates. (A) Coefficients (log-odds) of the 76 attribute levels for the absolute evaluation (x-axis) and the row-level relative preference model (y-axis); the dashed line marks identity. (B to H) National MRP estimate of every policy configuration (dots) for the absolute evaluation (x-axis) and the relative preference (y-axis) for the carbon tax (40 configurations), isolated policies (food: 7, transportation: 8, household: 7 configurations), and policy packages (food: 1,312, transportation: 1,968, household: 1,312 configurations). Levels are not comparable (the mean of the relative preference is 50% by construction), so no identity line is shown. Orange lines are least-squares fits, and *r* is the Pearson correlation. Correlations for isolated policies are based on few configurations and are descriptive.



Supplementary Fig. 18 | Agreement between absolute evaluation and relative preference: partisan polarization. *N* = 3,899 (participants identifying as Democrat or Republican). (A) Partisan gap in the attribute effects (Democrat minus Republican, log-odds; negative party × attribute interaction of a logit mixed-effects model with random intercepts for participant and state, fitted separately for each outcome and DCE) for the 76 attribute levels; the dashed line marks identity. (B to H) Polarization score (Democrat minus Republican difference in MRP-estimated support [absolute evaluation] or preference [relative preference]) of every policy configuration. Party-specific MRP models included random intercepts and party slopes for state. Orange lines are least-squares fits, and *r* is the Pearson correlation.



Supplementary Fig. 19 | Party-specific marginal means of policy package attributes for absolute evaluation and relative preference. *N* = 3,899. Marginal means of the party-specific MRP estimates across the package configurations that contain the attribute level, averaged across the three domains, as in Fig. 1 of the main text. Left: absolute evaluation (share supporting). Right: relative preference (probability that a proposal is preferred over the alternative; the dashed line marks 50%, the mean of the outcome by construction). Blue: Democrats; red: Republicans. Error bars show 95% percentile bootstrap confidence intervals (1,000 draws of the party-specific MRP models; the marginal mean was recomputed in every draw). Only differences between attribute levels and between parties are comparable between the panels.



Supplementary Fig. 20 | Attenuation of attribute effects in policy packages for absolute evaluation and relative preference. *N* = 5,463. (A) Absolute value of the coefficient of every attribute level (*n* = 42) in the isolated-policy DCEs (x-axis) and in the policy package DCEs (y-axis); points below the diagonal indicate attenuation in packages. Package coefficients were recoded to the isolated-condition reference category (see Note to Supplementary Fig. 6). (B) Policy packaging effect pooled by policy type (pull, push, carbon tax revenue recycling) and domain with random-effects models. Bars show the pooled difference between isolated and package coefficients (positive values: attenuation), and error bars the 95% confidence intervals of the pooled estimate (see Note to Supplementary Fig. 7 for details).