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What Security Leaves Behind: Security Sedimentation and the Political Afterlife of Classified Subjects

Dilek Celebi

dilek.celebi@manchester.ac.uk

University of Manchester

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Abstract

Securitization scholarship has developed sophisticated accounts of how security meanings are produced, routinized, institutionalized and reproduced beyond the initial securitizing act. Yet these approaches largely continue to follow what becomes of security itself. This article asks a different question: what becomes of the political subject constituted through security when that subject later enters a normative or institutional field no longer organized primarily around threat? I develop the concept of security sedimentation to describe the historical accumulation through which classifications generated or reinforced through security practices become available as background conditions of later recognition. Such classifications need not survive intact. They may be rearticulated as they move across fields while retaining elements of the histories through which they were produced. I then introduce political actionability to capture the forms through which recognized subjects, claims and suffering become available for collective response. Drawing on illustrative evidence from British Muslim organizational responses to Palestine, Sudan and Kurdistan between 2019 and 2025, the article identifies three forms of actionability: infrastructured solidarisation, humanitarianised visibility and solidarity displacement. The cases do not establish securitization as a singular cause of differential response. Rather, they show how historically accumulated classifications interact with organizational repertoires and normative fields to shape what recognized suffering can become politically. The article therefore shifts securitization analysis from the persistence of security to the political afterlife of security classification.

Introduction

Over the past three decades, securitization theory has developed into one of the most extensive and internally differentiated research programmes in critical security studies. What began with the Copenhagen School's attempt to specify the political logic through which issues are constituted as matters of security has generated debates over audiences, context, practices, institutions, professional fields, temporality, materiality, affect and the boundaries between security and ordinary politics. The result is a body of scholarship considerably broader than the speech-act model with which securitization theory is still sometimes identified. Williams (2003), Stritzel (2007) and Balzacq (2005), in different ways, located securitizing acts within wider social and historical conditions; Bigo (2002) and Huysmans (2011) shifted attention toward professional practices and mundane forms of security; while subsequent work has examined the routinization, institutionalization and normalization of security beyond the exceptional moment (Vuori, 2008; Hansen, 2012; Lupovici, 2014; Neal, 2019).

This broadening substantially changes what can plausibly be treated as an unresolved problem. Security can no longer be understood simply as an exceptional utterance whose political effects begin and end with the declaration of existential threat. Existing scholarship already shows that security meanings can become historically embedded, practically reproduced, institutionally normalized and detached from continuous explicit articulation. The unresolved question pursued here is therefore not whether security

can persist beyond the initial securitizing act. It is what becomes of the subject constituted through security when analysis ceases to follow security itself.

Much of the literature, even when it extends securitization across time, continues to ask what becomes of security: whether it is reproduced, routinized, normalized, institutionalized, rearticulated, contested or desecuritized. This article changes the destination of that inquiry. It follows the political subject that these processes help to constitute. A population repeatedly made intelligible through terrorism, insurgency, separatism or territorial threat may later be encountered within a humanitarian organization, a rights-based institution, a religious association or a solidarity movement whose immediate normative vocabulary is no longer organized around danger. At that point, the central question is not simply whether the subject remains securitized. It is whether classifications produced through an earlier security history continue to shape the terms under which that subject becomes recognizable in a different political field.

To address this problem, the article develops the concept of security sedimentation. Security sedimentation refers to the historical accumulation through which classifications generated or reinforced through security practices become available as background conditions of later recognition. What persists is not an intact security discourse or an unchanged threat representation. Classifications may instead be rearticulated as they move across institutional and normative settings, acquiring new forms while retaining elements of the histories through which they were produced. The analytical move is therefore from the reproduction of security to the political afterlife of security classification: how a classificatory history continues to matter when the classified subject enters a field governed by a different normative grammar.

Recognition, however, is not the endpoint of that process. A subject may become visible, intelligible or morally recognizable without becoming available for every form of collective response. I use *political actionability* to describe the form in which a recognized subject, claim or suffering becomes available for collective action within a particular normative and institutional field. Humanitarian relief, legal advocacy, lobbying, protest, public identification, institutional representation and non-engagement do not constitute different degrees of the same response. They are different repertoires through which recognition becomes politically actionable. Security sedimentation and political actionability therefore address distinct but connected moments: the former concerns the historical availability of classifications, while the latter concerns the forms of response that recognition helps make possible.

The argument proceeds in four stages. First, I reconstruct the development of securitization theory to show why the problem of classificatory afterlife follows from some of its strongest claims rather than from a return to a narrow critique of the speech act. Second, I develop security sedimentation as a way of theorizing how security-produced classifications become available across time and institutional fields through processes of rearticulation, translation and material reproduction. Third, I develop political actionability to account for the different repertoires through which recognized suffering becomes available for collective response. Finally, I use Palestine, Sudan and Kurdistan in British Muslim

organizational publics as illustrative cases through which to examine three forms of actionability: infrastructured solidarisation, humanitarianised visibility and solidarity displacement. The cases are not used to isolate securitization as a single cause of these differences. They are used to examine how historically accumulated classifications interact with organizational repertoires, normative vocabularies and institutional settings in shaping what recognized suffering becomes politically.

From Securitization to the Classified Subject

In securitization theory, security is treated not as an objective condition but as the outcome of a particular social process. The analytical focus falls on the practices through which issues, actors and relationships come to be represented and recognized in security terms, and on the political consequences that follow from this representation. In the formulation associated with the Copenhagen School, speech acts occupy a central place because they provide the mechanism through which a development is moved into the realm of security. As Wæver famously puts it, “the utterance itself is the act”: in saying security, something is done (Wæver, 1995, pp. 55). The importance of this formulation is not that language somehow substitutes for political reality. It is that the political status of threat cannot be read directly from the existence of harm. Something becomes a security issue through a social accomplishment in which danger is represented, a referent object constituted as endangered, and particular forms of intervention rendered legitimate. Williams’s reconstruction of the Copenhagen School makes precisely this point: securitization is a form of social construction, but a specific one, organized around existential threat and the possibility of action beyond ordinary political rules.

The apparent openness of this formulation is immediately qualified by the conditions under which such an act can succeed. Not every actor can securitize with equal authority, not every representation of danger will be recognized, and not every object is equally available for construction as a threat. Williams draws attention to this qualification when he notes that the claims likely to prove effective, the forms in which they can be made, the objects to which they refer and the positions from which they can be spoken are usually “deeply ‘sedimented’” rhetorically, culturally and institutionally (Williams, 2003, pp. 514). The term is important because it places something prior to the immediate act inside the conditions of its possibility. A securitizing claim enters a political landscape already structured by conventions of authority, inherited representations and institutional arrangements that make some claims easier to recognize than others. Yet Williams is equally careful not to dissolve the act into those conditions. Securitization remains a political intervention. Its contextual embeddedness constrains the act without determining it.

Much of the subsequent development of securitization theory can be read as an attempt to give greater analytical substance to this contextual dimension. Balzacq’s intervention is especially significant because it refuses to locate the efficacy of securitization within the utterance alone. Effective securitization, he argues, is “audience-centred,” “context-dependent” and “power-laden” (Balzacq, 2005, pp. 171). Context here is not merely the empirical scenery surrounding a security claim. The “semantic repertoire of security” itself combines linguistic meaning with cultural meaning accumulated through

previous interactions and situations (Balzacq, 2005, pp. 183). An audience can recognize a particular object as threatening because the claim enters an already available frame of reference through which the category of threat becomes meaningful. What appears at first to be an encounter between speaker and audience therefore carries a history within it.

Stritzel makes the temporal implications of this move more explicit. His criticism of an autonomous speech-act model is not simply that context matters, but that texts are embedded within relational structures of meaning and power whose histories enter the present act. Threat texts are often, in his formulation, “historically intertextual”; they “transform/translate past meaning structures into the present” (Stritzel, 2007, pp. 374). This formulation alters the temporal picture of securitization in an important way. The present does not merely contain memories of earlier security claims. Earlier structures of meaning provide materials through which present claims become possible and intelligible. A securitizing move may therefore be new as an intervention without being new in the symbolic resources from which it is assembled.

Seen in this way, the distinction between an act and its background becomes increasingly difficult to sustain as a simple temporal sequence. The background does not merely precede the act; it enters into it. Nor does this imply that the past is mechanically reproduced. Stritzel’s language of transformation and translation matters precisely because what is inherited may be rearranged in the present. The significance of history lies neither in perfect repetition nor in deterministic path dependency, but in the availability of already constituted meanings that condition what can plausibly be made of a new situation. The question of securitization consequently begins to concern not only how threat is declared but how classifications acquire histories.

The movement away from the singular act becomes still more pronounced once security is approached through practice. Bigo’s analysis of migration provides perhaps the clearest example. The linkage of migration to insecurity does not depend upon the constant repetition of a dramatic political declaration. It is produced through professional fields, technologies of surveillance, databases, profiling, risk assessment and bureaucratic routines. Customs officials, police, intelligence services and other security professionals share what Bigo, drawing on Bourdieu, calls a particular “sense of the game.” They may compete institutionally while nevertheless learning to “act/react in a similar way”; in this process they become “managers of unease” (Bigo, 2002, pp. 75).

This is more than an alternative location for securitization. It changes the form in which classification operates. Political labels acquire practical substance through apparently technical procedures: risk profiles, databases, categories of suspicion and patterns of surveillance. Security is reproduced because these devices continuously sort populations and make distinctions actionable. The classification need not be reinvented each time it is used. It can be incorporated into a professional habitus and into technologies that give particular distinctions an appearance of administrative normality. The dramatic declaration of danger becomes only one possible moment in a wider field of security production.

It would therefore be misleading to present the durability of security as something that securitization theory has failed to notice. The literature has gone considerably further. Vuori's reconstruction of the illocutionary functions of securitization is particularly important on this point. The legitimation of future extraordinary action is only one possible strand of securitization. Another is explicitly concerned with "legitimating past acts or … reproducing the security status of an issue" (Vuori, 2008, pp. 76). Security can therefore work retrospectively and reproductively. It can sustain an already established classification, renew the legitimacy of earlier action and maintain political order without having to inaugurate an entirely new emergency.

Nor does repetition necessarily preserve the exceptional appearance of security. Once security practices become routinized, the contrast between security and "normal politics" becomes unstable. Neal poses the problem directly when he asks whether it is possible for security to become qualitatively normal and institutionally located within ordinary political arenas. Parliamentary contestation, administrative procedure and routine policy bargaining do not necessarily desecuritize an issue. They may instead constitute the institutional forms through which security continues. Normalization, in this sense, describes a transformation in the mode of security rather than its disappearance.

This creates a particular difficulty for desecuritization. If explicit threat language is neither necessary for all forms of security practice nor sufficient evidence of their political effects, then movement away from security cannot be identified simply by listening for the disappearance of security words. Hansen's reconstruction of desecuritization makes this difficulty particularly visible. She distinguishes stabilization, replacement, rearticulation and silencing, each of which entails a different relationship between security and politics. More significantly, she notes that securitizations may become so institutionalized that explicit speech acts are no longer present, while securitization theory offers no settled method for identifying such "silent institutionalisations" (Hansen, 2012).

Silencing carries the problem beyond institutional persistence. In Hansen's discussion of female ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, disappearance from security discourse does not simply return the subject to an uncomplicated realm of ordinary politics. Female combatants may cease to register within the securitized category of combatant while, precisely through that exclusion, losing access to forms of recognition and institutional response available to their male counterparts. Hansen consequently observes that silencing "straddles the securitised, politicised and non-politicised," making the boundaries among these spheres difficult to maintain. The implication is significant. The trajectory of the security issue and the trajectory of the subject constituted through it need not be identical.

The literature on security imaginaries brings this distinction still closer to the problem pursued here. Van Rythoven argues that collective fear does not arise automatically from an encounter with danger. Fear appraisals are culturally learned and constrained by the symbolic resources available within a local security imaginary. Collective fears are thus "fragile cultural constructs," embedded in memories, practices and prior experiences that make some representations of threat resonate while making others implausible or even comic (Van Rythoven, 2015, pp. 458). In some circumstances, a past event may

become so deeply lodged in this imaginary that a later event is already recognizable in security terms before an authoritative contemporary declaration has performed much classificatory work.

Such an account considerably narrows the distance between securitization and historically inherited recognition. An audience approaches the present through accumulated symbolic resources, and those resources can preconfigure what a new object resembles before a securitizing actor names it. Yet Van Rythoven remains interested in how this inheritance conditions a later security judgment. The object is still recognized as threatening. The accumulated past enters the present in order to help explain whether securitization succeeds, fails or becomes almost reflexive.

Weldes goes further still by asking how historically constructed representations acquire the character of ordinary reality. Her concept of common sense describes the point at which constructed meanings cease to appear as constructions. Through articulation and interpellation, representations become naturalized until they are treated as transparent descriptions of the world. Common sense thereby "sets the limits on the possible" and, drawing on Hall, becomes the "horizon of the taken-for-granted: What the world is and how it works, for all practical purposes" (Hall, 1988, pp. 44, quoted in Weldes, 1999, pp. 226). The force of classification now lies partly in the obscurity of its genealogy. Its historical production no longer needs to be reconstructed each time the classification informs judgment.

The importance of this argument becomes clearer in Weldes's discussion of Cuba after the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not simply erase the representational structure through which Cuba had previously become intelligible within US security politics. Nor did that structure survive unchanged. The principal articulation shifted from Cuban communism as part of a Soviet international threat to Cuba as an anachronistic and dying communist order. Continuity therefore occurred through rearticulation. An inherited political classification could survive substantial changes in the context that had originally sustained it because its elements were reorganized within a new representation.

This is an important limit on any argument built around the afterlife of securitization. Historical durability, routinization, tacit reproduction and common sense cannot themselves constitute the theoretical problem. Existing scholarship has already shown how security classifications can become sedimented, historically transmitted, practically reproduced, institutionally normalized and rearticulated across changing contexts (Vouri & Gong, 2025; Williams, 2003; Bigo, 2002; Vuori, 2008; Hansen, 2012; Van Rythoven, 2015; Weldes, 1999).

What these developments leave less clearly specified is not whether security has a history after the initial act. It plainly does. What they do not normally do is change the destination of the inquiry. They continue, for good analytical reasons, to ask what becomes of security: whether it is reproduced, routinized, institutionalized, normalized, rearticulated, contested or desecuritized.

A somewhat different question arises when attention turns instead to the political subject that these processes have helped to constitute. A subject repeatedly made intelligible through insurgency, separatism, terrorism or territorial threat does not remain permanently inside the security institutions in

which these classifications were produced. It may subsequently appear before humanitarian organizations, religious associations, advocacy networks or solidarity movements whose immediate question is not whether that subject constitutes a danger.

The difference is not semantic. To ask whether such a subject is still securitized risks preserving security as the measure of a political encounter that may now be organized around suffering, obligation, legitimacy or solidarity. Yet treating the later encounter as entirely separate from the earlier security history creates the opposite difficulty. It assumes that classifications lose their political force when the institutional setting or normative vocabulary changes. Neither position follows comfortably from a literature that has already shown how deeply classifications may become embedded in discourse, practice, institutions and common sense.

It is at this point that the distinction between the reproduction of security and the afterlife of security classification becomes necessary. The former remains concerned with the continued performance, institutionalization, normalization or transformation of security. The latter asks what becomes of the subject produced through these histories when it is recognized within a field whose organizing vocabulary is no longer security. The issue is therefore not simply whether an earlier threat classification persists. It is how the history contained in that classification may enter another form of political recognition, and what transformation it undergoes in doing so.

That shift—from the reproduction of security to the later recognition of the classified subject—is the point at which the concept of security sedimentation becomes necessary.

Security Sedimentation and the Afterlife of Classification

That shift in analytical attention also changes what has to be explained. Once the classified subject rather than the continuing security process becomes the object of inquiry, the persistence of a classification cannot be inferred simply from the continued presence of security language or institutions. The question concerns how meanings produced through a security history become available beyond the circumstances in which their political force was first established. This is the problem captured here by security sedimentation.

Security sedimentation does not describe the persistence of security as such. It concerns the historical accumulation through which classifications generated or reinforced in security practices acquire sufficient stability to enter the background conditions of later recognition. What persists, on this account, is neither the original speech act nor an intact security narrative. It is a classificatory relation whose genealogy may become less visible even while elements of that relation remain available for subsequent political use.

The first part of this process concerns the production of such relations. Weldes's account of articulation provides a particularly useful starting point because meaning is neither invented from nothing nor discovered in the objects to which it is attached. Articulation works upon already available "cultural raw

materials or linguistic resources," combining them into chains through which political objects and subjects acquire particular identities and relations. Terms that possess meanings separately come to "summon" one another within a representation, so that their association itself becomes politically consequential (Weldes, 1999). Through repetition, such contingent associations may come to appear natural and to describe reality rather than construct it (Weldes, 1999).

This movement from articulation to apparent naturalness is central to sedimentation. A classification becomes politically durable when its constitutive history no longer has to be reconstructed each time the subject is encountered. The association may have been produced through repeated conjunctions of insurgency, territorial threat, extremism, illegality or political disorder, but its later intelligibility need not depend upon the repetition of the entire chain. Once a classificatory relation has become familiar, it can enter subsequent acts of recognition as an available distinction rather than a proposition requiring fresh justification.

Such availability should not be confused with conscious remembrance. One of Bourdieu's central contributions to a theory of practice was precisely to show how socially produced dispositions can generate regular perceptions and practices "without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any 'rule'."(Bourdieou, 1991). The force of habitus lies in the way histories become practical without having to appear as history to the actor. Linguistic and classificatory practices are similarly related to positions, markets and dispositions acquired through prior participation in structured fields.

This is important for the argument here, but only up to a point. Habitus offers a powerful account of practical reproduction without reflective deliberation; it does not by itself identify which dispositions possess a specifically security genealogy. Security sedimentation therefore cannot simply be another name for habitus. It requires demonstrating that a later classificatory disposition draws upon distinctions generated or reinforced through prior security practices.

Butler makes the historical problem sharper from another direction. The efficacy of an utterance, in her account, cannot be located wholly in the intention or sovereign authority of its present speaker. Injurious language acts because it is citational. Racist speech, she writes, "could not act as racist speech if it were not a citation of itself"; "only because we already know its force from its prior instances" (Butler, 1997) can the present utterance acquire recognizable force.

The relevance here extends beyond language. A classification may carry the force of prior iterations even when the later actor does not reconstruct those iterations as the source of present judgment.

This point establishes an important limit on how sedimentation should be understood. It does not imply that later actors secretly retain the beliefs of earlier securitizing actors. The claim is structural rather than psychological. Historically produced distinctions can become part of the conditions under which a subject is intelligible, without requiring those who employ them to recover their genealogy or consciously endorse the security reasoning from which they emerged. Yet this very possibility introduces a further

difficulty. If the genealogy is partly obscured, what allows us to say that the later classification is still connected to its security history rather than simply being a new political judgment?

The answer cannot lie in resemblance alone. Political meanings rarely move between institutional settings without alteration, and a later description cannot be treated as the mere surface appearance of an intact earlier one. Fairclough's account of intertextuality is especially important at this point because it places transformation at the centre of historical continuity. Texts are constituted through previous texts and conventions, but those inheritances are assimilated, "reworked" and "reaccentuated." (Fairclough, 1992). Intertextuality inserts history into the present precisely because present discourse is built from materials whose meanings may be altered in the process of being reused. Fairclough therefore treats texts historically as transforming the past into the present, sometimes routinizing and naturalizing prior conventions, at other times combining them in ways that produce new discursive arrangements (Fairclough, 1992).

For security sedimentation, the implication is decisive. A classification does not move from one field to another as a sealed object. It is recontextualized. The meaning available in a security field encounters different genres, purposes, institutional expectations and moral vocabularies in the receiving field. The earlier classification therefore enters a new representational environment, and what survives does so through transformation.

This is why the language of residue is ultimately inadequate. It suggests that an unchanged remainder lies beneath later representation waiting to be uncovered. Interdiscursivity offers a more dynamic model. Earlier distinctions may be incorporated into a new order of discourse without being explicitly quoted and may eventually appear as unmarked assumptions of the later text. Fairclough notes that incorporated discourse can become integrated into surrounding language and even enter the "background assumptions" (Fairclough, 1992) of a text through presupposition. The historical relation is therefore best conceived as one of inheritance through translation.

Walker and Cooper's genealogy of resilience provides a useful analogue for this kind of movement. Their argument follows resilience from systems ecology into economic, governmental and security domains, showing how a concept capable of functioning critically in one setting can become something markedly different as it enters another. Its trajectory, in their formulation, moves "from critique to methodology of power."(Walker&Cooper, 2011). What matters for present purposes is less the substantive content of resilience than the political logic of conceptual mobility. A concept can carry a genealogy across fields while changing what it does. Indeed, such mutation may be the condition of its successful travel.

Security classifications can be expected to move in similar ways. Their later political force need not reproduce the original security grammar. An inherited association may be translated into questions of legitimacy, innocence, respectability, risk, political complexity or the acceptable boundaries of solidarity. The transformation may weaken the earlier classification, intensify parts of it, combine it with the receiving field's own distinctions, or sever some of its original associations altogether. Security

sedimentation therefore describes continuity through rearticulation rather than the intact survival of an original security meaning.

The routes through which this happens are also wider than discourse alone. Aradau's (2010) account of securitization as materialization makes this particularly clear. Critical infrastructures, in her analysis, do not simply exist prior to security as neutral objects waiting to be named, nor are they exhausted by discourse. They emerge through iterative material-discursive practices in which particular objects, boundaries and relations are made to matter as objects of protection. Categories may be carried through organizational procedures, technical standards, infrastructures, files or systems whose operation continually reproduces distinctions without restating their original justification.

Voelkner demonstrates the practical significance of such carriers in her analysis of migrant health governance in Thailand. Folders, logframes, mapping practices, information systems and administrative categories do more than record an already constituted population. They participate in rendering that population intelligible and governable. The "Folder," for example, orders migrant health according to variables established by governmental standards, while computerized information systems classify migrants through distinctions whose political implications extend far beyond public health. Most strikingly, efforts formally to bracket contentious questions of legal status do not prevent legality and illegality from returning through technical categories within the health-information system (Voelkner, 2011). The political distinction is reproduced within a different administrative form. Voelkner's case remains within an explicitly human-security intervention, so its relevance here is mechanistic rather than directly analogous.

Walters pushes the material problem in another useful direction. Security objects, he argues, need not be fully present and stable in order to organize political controversy. They can be partial, uncertain, technically mediated and "absent-present" (Walters, 2014, pp. 102-103). The forensic trace, fragment or material remnant acquires political force through practices that render it legible to particular publics. The attraction of this formulation for an account of classificatory afterlife is clear. The past need not survive as a complete discourse in order to remain consequential. It can persist through traces that acquire new political significance when they are taken up elsewhere.

Yet sedimentation should not be confused with closure. Schouten treats apparently settled security arrangements as provisional outcomes of controversy, enrolment, assembly and translation rather than as expressions of an irreversible logic (Schouten, 2014). Apparatuses may acquire durability, but that durability remains contingent. Adey and Anderson capture the same point in describing security apparatuses as "always in the midst of being made and unmade" (Adey and Anderson, 2012, pp. 100). A historical classification may therefore become deeply available without becoming inevitable; counter-representations, institutional change and shifts in the receiving field can weaken, displace or rearticulate it.

The concept can now be stated more precisely. Security sedimentation refers to the historically accumulated process through which classifications generated or reinforced through security practices

become available as background resources for the later recognition of political subjects, including after those classifications have been recontextualized within different normative or institutional fields. The definition contains three limits that are as important as the claim itself.

First, sedimentation requires a demonstrable security genealogy. A stigmatizing category, political prejudice or difficult organizational relationship cannot be treated as sedimented security simply because it produces exclusion. Second, continuity has to be traced through processes of reproduction, materialization or rearticulation rather than inferred from similarity. Third, the classification conditions later recognition without determining it. The receiving field possesses histories, categories and political interests of its own, and these may reinforce, redirect or contest what arrives from the security field.

The language of “unconscious security” may be useful only in a narrow structural sense, to describe the reproduction of distinctions with a demonstrable security genealogy where that genealogy is no longer explicitly invoked. It should not be used to infer hidden beliefs or security effects from silence alone.

Seen in this way, the afterlife of securitization is neither the indefinite continuation of the original threat nor the simple disappearance of security once its vocabulary recedes. It lies in the historically produced conditions under which a subject becomes recognizable after the immediate security relation has changed. What security leaves behind may therefore be less visible than the securitizing act itself: a classificatory distinction embedded in discourse, practical disposition, organizational routine or material device, available for translation into another political grammar.

Once classification is understood in these terms, the next problem is no longer how it persists. It is what such persistence permits political actors to do with the subject they recognize. That question moves the argument from sedimentation to political actionability.

From Recognition to Political Actionability

If security sedimentation concerns the conditions under which a classified subject becomes recognizable beyond the security field, recognition cannot be the endpoint of the argument. A subject may be recognized and still be recognized in a form that sharply limits what can be done in relation to it. Visibility, sympathy and political response therefore have to be separated analytically. The question is no longer simply whether an inherited classification remains available, but what kinds of response become possible once a subject has been rendered intelligible through it.

The difficulty is built into classification itself. Categories make collective response possible because they convert heterogeneous harms into forms that institutions and publics know how to recognize. Mitchell captures this productive and restrictive character particularly clearly. Abstract categories, she argues, “underpin the recognition of harms and prescribe responses,” (Mitchell, 2014, pp. 15-16) making coordinated protective action possible. Yet precisely because they organize recognition, they can also predetermine the kinds of beings to which that protection can be extended. To recognize a harm through one category rather than another is also to locate it within a repertoire of appropriate responses.

Suffering can be extensively represented without becoming available for every form of political response. A population may appear clearly as vulnerable, for example, while remaining difficult to recognize as an agent with political claims. Conversely, a population may be highly visible precisely because it has become associated with danger, controversy or illegitimacy. Neither case involves invisibility. What differs is the position from which the subject can enter public action.

Carpenter's analysis of gender-based violence makes the point in a particularly concrete form. Her argument is directed at a category whose humanitarian purpose is explicitly protective, yet whose institutional use had come to identify gender-based vulnerability overwhelmingly with women. The effect was institutional: it shaped what humanitarian actors were equipped to see. Carpenter's insistence that “gender must be defined inclusively so as not to remain synonymous only with women” (Carpenter, 2006, pp.100) follows from the finding that male vulnerability could become marginal within programmes formally committed to gender-sensitive protection. The significance of the example lies in the relation between category and response. Harms that do not fit an established classificatory repertoire are harder to document, harder to name as instances of the relevant problem and, consequently, harder to make governable through the practices attached to that category.

The same problem appears at a more general level in feminist critiques of human security. Hudson's concern with “masking differences under the rubric of the term ‘human’”(Hudson, 2005, pp.155) is directed precisely against the assumption that widening a moral category necessarily equalizes the subjects who enter it. The universalism of the vocabulary may coexist with highly differentiated conditions of recognition. Marhia develops this difficulty further by turning attention to the category of the human itself. Her distinction between human and Human (Marhia, 2013) draws attention to the historically specific criteria through which some differences become “morally relevant” to whether a life can be recognized as fully human. The category, she argues, carries a history of exclusion rather than functioning as a neutral description of embodied persons.

A classified subject does not enter a receiving field as a blank object of compassion. Nor does the universal language of humanity, suffering, faith or solidarity guarantee that all subjects will become recognizable in equivalent ways. Receiving fields possess categories through which suffering is sorted, narrated and connected to action. Sedimented security classifications may enter these arrangements as one historical source of differential recognizability, but they do so within a field that is already structured.

The distinction between recognizability and decision can be pushed further. Butler's discussion of implicit censorship is useful because it shifts attention from what an actor explicitly prohibits to the prior conditions under which something becomes speakable at all. If censorship is understood productively, she argues, it precedes the text by delimiting the field within which intelligible expression becomes possible. The individual speaker does not create the rules according to which this selection occurs; the “rules that govern the intelligibility of speech” are already decided before the particular act of speaking (Butler, 1997). Agency operates in an already circumscribed field of possibilities.

For political action, this means that exclusion need not take the form of an explicit refusal. A cause may rarely be denounced and still encounter narrow conditions under which it can be spoken about. A population may be acceptable as an object of relief but uncomfortable as a political constituency; recognizable as civilian suffering but less readily as a collective actor; available for charitable concern while claims about responsibility, sovereignty or political representation remain harder to articulate. The effect lies not simply in what is said about the subject, but in the range of statements and responses that appear natural, legitimate or institutionally appropriate once the subject is named.

Aharoni's analysis of the “cultural hypothesis” offers an illuminating example of this form of prior structuring. In interviews concerning women's participation in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, claims about the presumed attitudes of Palestinian men often appeared less as propositions requiring demonstration than as common knowledge. Aharoni notes the matter-of-fact assumption that “‘everybody knows’” what Arab culture is supposedly like (Aharoni, 2014, pp.382-383), even though the hypothesis itself was not established as a formal causal explanation for women's exclusion. The analytical significance lies in the way background knowledge can organize an institutional judgment before the judgment is presented as a political decision. Who appears to be an appropriate negotiator is shaped by what the organization already “knows” about the people with whom negotiation will occur.

The example is also a warning against conceptual overreach. Aharoni's analysis draws together gender hierarchy, Orientalist cultural representation, organizational practice and strategic knowledge. It would be analytically careless to rename that entire configuration security sedimentation. The point is narrower. Background classifications can structure organizational possibilities without appearing in the form of explicit prohibition, and the genealogy of those classifications matters. Security sedimentation can explain such an effect only where the relevant distinction can be traced specifically through prior security practices. Otherwise the explanation may lie in gender, race, colonial representation, nationalism, organizational hierarchy or some combination of these.

This problem of multiple possible genealogies becomes particularly important once recognition is connected to humanitarian action. Mainwaring's analysis of Mediterranean migration demonstrates how readily humanitarian and security repertoires can coexist. Political discourse can speak of saving lives while intensifying border control, thereby mobilizing “a humanitarian and security discourse simultaneously” (Mainwaring, 2019). Migrants consequently become recognizable through sharply constrained subject positions: as victims stripped of political agency or as threatening actors endowed with a dangerous form of agency. Neither position makes them invisible. Both make them actionable, but they make different actions appear appropriate.

This distinction is central. Humanitarianization is itself a form of actionability. Food appeals, emergency relief, fundraising, shelter, medical aid and rescue are substantial collective responses. The analytical issue is instead the repertoire within which a recognized subject can be acted upon. Humanitarian recognition makes some responses readily intelligible while potentially leaving others weakly developed. A population recognizable predominantly as vulnerable life may generate powerful infrastructures of

relief while appearing less readily as a political partner whose claims demand endorsement, representation or confrontation with responsible institutions.

Political actionability therefore refers here to the form in which a recognized subject, claim or suffering becomes available for collective response within a particular normative and institutional field. The emphasis on form is crucial. Actionability is not a measure of how much people care. It is not equivalent to visibility, sympathy, media attention or mobilization intensity. Nor does high actionability necessarily imply a more politically radical response. Donation, legal advocacy, lobbying, protest, public condemnation, humanitarian relief, institutional representation and deliberate non-engagement are different repertoires through which an object of concern can become actionable.

The same acknowledgement of suffering may be translated into markedly different practices depending on the subject position through which that suffering becomes intelligible. Recognition as an innocent civilian may facilitate humanitarian aid. Recognition as a rights-bearing constituency may support legal advocacy. Recognition as a politically legitimate collective actor may make solidarity, lobbying or public identification available. Recognition through a category associated with political danger or controversy may produce caution, depoliticized concern, restricted language or avoidance. These are not points on a single scale running from indifference to solidarity. They are different political forms.

Tickner's feminist critique of strategic discourse makes clear why those forms cannot be understood solely by following the history of the incoming subject. Drawing on feminist analyses of security expertise, she observes that the language through which security professionals establish seriousness and authority also restricts what can legitimately be said; “the limits on what can be said with the language of strategic discourse” (Tickner, 2001) constrain what can be thought about security itself. The wider implication is that receiving fields distribute credibility unevenly. They establish standards for the kinds of subjects, claims, emotions and responses that can appear politically serious.

Security sedimentation therefore enters an already structured field whose own histories and repertoires share its effects. A Muslim humanitarian organization, for example, does not respond to an inherited security classification in isolation from its own theology, organizational mission, donor environment, legal obligations, political history or understanding of legitimate humanitarian conduct. A civil-liberties organization encounters the same subject through another repertoire. A diaspora organization through another again. Organisational fields do not merely provide channels for the expression of political commitments; they also shape the forms of political engagement available to actors, sometimes enabling participation while constraining transformative possibilities (Anderl & Salehi, 2025). This also requires reconstructing the receiving field on its own terms rather than imposing an external security vocabulary upon it (Kent, 2006).

This also complicates the interpretation of absence. Silence is especially tempting evidence because the effects under examination may no longer be accompanied by explicit security claims. But organizational silence can have many sources: limited resources, strategic prioritization, uncertainty, competing crises, legal caution, doctrinal concerns or simply the absence of an established constituency. Rosert (2026)

similarly demonstrates how competition for limited advocacy capacity, public attention and agenda space can privilege some normative campaigns while marginalising others, independently of fundamental incompatibilities between their underlying commitments. Even within securitization scholarship, audience responses cannot be reduced to a binary of acceptance and rejection. Jarvis and Legrand (2017) identify an “intermediate space” in which questioning neither straightforwardly accepts nor contests a security claim. The same sensitivity is needed here. Qualified statements, humanitarian appeals without political endorsement, selective terminology and episodic advocacy may be more theoretically revealing than a simple count of support versus silence.

The relationship between sedimentation and actionability can consequently be stated without turning it into a deterministic chain. Security sedimentation concerns the historically accumulated availability of security-generated classifications. Recognition concerns the form in which a subject becomes intelligible within a receiving field. Political actionability concerns the repertoire of collective response that this recognition helps make available. The three are analytically connected, but none determines the next.

Mithcells’ (2014) dilemma therefore remains: abstraction enables shared recognition and coordinated response while also risking the exclusion of subjects who do not fit the category. The task is not to imagine politics without classification, but to ask how classifications organize the passage between suffering and response.

That passage is where the empirical illustrations that follow become theoretically useful. They allow examination of different relations between recognition and response. What varies, then, is not whether suffering exists or whether it is seen. It is what recognized suffering is allowed to become politically.

Three Forms of Political Actionability

The three cases that follow are used illustratively rather than as tests of a single causal proposition. They concern the public-facing outputs of British Muslim organisations between 2019 and 2025 and ask how suffering became available for collective response across the same broad organisational field. The comparison does not assume that Palestine, Sudan and Kurdistan are equivalent conflicts, nor that the volume or severity of suffering can be held constant between them. It examines something narrower: the political form through which suffering entered organisational practice. The documentary record can establish patterns of public representation, campaign infrastructure, political demand and organisational location. It cannot recover private deliberation or establish why an organisation did not publish on a particular issue. Absence therefore remains an empirical property of the audited record rather than evidence of an unspoken motive. Seen through the concept of political actionability, the comparison reveals three different relations between recognition and response. Palestine becomes actionable through a dense infrastructure of political solidarity. Sudan is extensively recognized, but predominantly through a humanitarian repertoire. Kurdistan produces a more unusual configuration: political solidarity is visible and organized, but largely outside the Muslim organisational field in which the other two cases are examined. The comparison concerns the forms through which recognized suffering becomes

available for collective action. It concerns the forms through which recognized suffering can be converted into collective action.

Infrastructured solidarisation

Palestine provides the clearest example of recognition entering an already developed political repertoire. In the audited record, the Muslim Council of Britain maintained a permanent Palestine feature page, issued guidance on lawful solidarity shortly after the October 2023 escalation, incorporated Palestine into its general-election commitments, provided action resources, and linked its Palestine work to media monitoring, parliamentary advocacy and community mobilisation (Muslim Council of Britain, 2023a, 2023b, 2024a). The current MCB Palestine page continues to bring together guidance, advocacy materials, community briefings, khutbah resources, media work and routes for contacting MPs, while its 2024 election commitments explicitly called for Palestinian statehood recognition, a permanent ceasefire and changes to UK arms policy (Muslim Council of Britain, 2023b, 2024a).

The significance of this record lies less in the number of outputs than in the relations among them. Recognition of Palestinian suffering is linked to a repertoire that already knows what political solidarity should look like. Humanitarian concern can move into parliamentary pressure, public advocacy, mosque resources, legal guidance, media criticism and collective identification without requiring the organisational field to invent those practices anew. Palestine therefore illustrates infrastructured solidarisation: a condition in which the recognition of suffering is connected to established organisational devices capable of translating concern into sustained political response.

Infrastructure here should not be understood merely as administrative capacity. It is also interpretive. A cause becomes more readily actionable when organisations possess a vocabulary for locating it politically, established ways of naming responsibility, and familiar forms through which supporters can act. The MCB's Palestine materials do not present Palestinians only as recipients of humanitarian aid. They place them within a political vocabulary of occupation, international law, statehood, ceasefire, advocacy and public responsibility. The resulting subject is simultaneously vulnerable and political. Its suffering is not stripped of political claims as the price of becoming recognizable. Terentyeva's (2026) analysis of mnemonic diplomacy similarly illustrates how historically constituted narratives can become resources through which political actors seek recognition and cultivate solidarity, although her focus is on deliberate diplomatic mobilisation rather than the organisational reception of security-classified subjects.

This case is important to the argument for another reason. Palestine cannot plausibly be described as a subject untouched by security classification (Browne&Philips, 2025). Palestinian politics and Palestine solidarity have themselves been deeply entangled with terrorism discourse, public-order regulation, counter-extremism controversies and disputes over legitimate political expression. The MCB's own Palestine guidance includes advice about the lawful expression of solidarity and explicitly responds to the legal and policing environment surrounding public support (Muslim Council of Britain, 2023a). Yet those security pressures have not eliminated political actionability. The case therefore guards against a

deterministic reading of security sedimentation. A security history does not mechanically produce weak solidarity. Its downstream force depends upon the receiving field and upon the countervailing infrastructures available within it.

What matters, then, is not simply that Palestine is recognized differently, but that recognition meets an organisational field already capable of rearticulating that subject through a competing political grammar. Religious solidarity, anti-colonial language, humanitarian concern, legal advocacy and parliamentary action reinforce one another rather than appearing as mutually exclusive ways of responding. This is what makes infrastructured solidarisation theoretically important. It demonstrates that historically accumulated classifications can be contested not only discursively but organizationally. Where alternative repertoires have themselves become durable, they can provide another route through which the subject becomes intelligible.

Humanitarianised visibility

Sudan presents a different relation between recognition and action. The audited record does not support an argument that Sudanese suffering was simply invisible. Islamic Relief UK and Muslim Hands UK maintained substantial Sudan emergency appeals (Islamic Relief UK, ongoing; Muslim Hands UK, ongoing). Their outputs addressed displacement, hunger, health-system collapse and urgent humanitarian need, and mobilised charitable resources through established Islamic aid infrastructures. The relevant distinction is therefore not between response and non-response. Sudan became highly actionable, but the dominant form of that actionability was humanitarian.

In the Sudan material, the humanitarian repertoire centres urgent need while leaving other political questions comparatively weakly developed. The appeals emphasize displacement, food, shelter, water, health and emergency assistance without sustained perpetrator attribution, political demand or Muslim-solidarity language.

The result can be described as humanitarianised visibility. Sudanese suffering is legible as human need and becomes actionable through relief infrastructure, while its translation into a sustained political cause is considerably weaker. The distinction becomes especially visible when the organisational responses are compared. The MCB's dedicated statement on Sudan appeared in October 2025, roughly thirty months after the outbreak of war (Muslim Council of Britain, 2025b). It named the Rapid Support Forces, called for UK action and humanitarian access, but did not employ an ummah or Muslim-solidarity register and was not followed by a dedicated campaign infrastructure in the audited record. The verification report confirms the statement's publication date, the absence of Muslim/Islam/ummah language in its body, and the lack of identified follow-through infrastructure.

This does not mean that Sudan was politically unintelligible in Britain. The opposite is important. Sudanese diaspora and left-solidarity organisations developed political demands around ceasefire, civilian rule, visa policy and international accountability, demonstrating that political repertoires were available in the broader civil-society environment (MENA Solidarity Network, 2023; Darfur Union UK,

2023; Rich Mix/London For Sudan, 2024). What differs is the organisational location through which those repertoires were activated. Within the audited Muslim organisational field, Sudan was far more strongly connected to charitable infrastructure than to sustained political-solidarity infrastructure.

That asymmetry illustrates the argument developed in previous sections. Sudanese civilians can be rendered highly recognizable as people requiring food, shelter and protection without the conflict becoming equally actionable as a sustained Muslim political cause. The same population can occupy a powerful humanitarian subject position and a comparatively weak political-solidarity position at the same time.

The Sudan case also underscores why receiving-field explanations cannot be collapsed into security sedimentation. Several features of the conflict complicate straightforward political framing, including competing armed actors, racialised violence within a predominantly Muslim national context, multiple external interventions and recurring representations of the war through a proxy-war frame (De Waal, 2005; Sharkey, 2007; Harir, 1993; 5Pillars, 2023a). These are not reducible to an inherited security classification. They point instead to difficulties of diagnostic framing, organisational history and constituency formation specific to the Sudan case. Sudan is therefore useful precisely because it demonstrates that differential actionability can arise through mechanisms other than sedimented securitization. The theory gains explanatory discipline by preserving th at distinction.

Solidarity displacement

Kurdistan produces a different configuration. The public audit found no recoverable political-solidarity output on Kurdish suffering across the eight examined Muslim organisations during the 2019–2025 period, while Kurdish diaspora organisations, civil-liberties actors, trade unions and left-solidarity networks did publicly mobilise around Kurdish political causes. The relevant empirical pattern is therefore not simply silence. Political actionability exists, but its organisational location shifts.

This is why solidarity displacement is a more precise description than solidarity absence. The same broad subject becomes politically actionable within one field while remaining weakly available in another. The distinction also prevents the analysis from treating Kurdish political claims as inherently difficult to mobilise. The existence of legal, trade-union, diaspora and civil-liberties mobilisation shows that claims can be translated into public repertoires of advocacy, protest and institutional challenge. What requires explanation is the uneven distribution of those repertoires.

The security genealogy is more directly visible here than in the Sudan case. The PKK has been proscribed in the United Kingdom since 2001 (UK Home Office, 2025; Sentas, 2016), and Kurdish political organisation has repeatedly intersected with counter-terrorism policing, surveillance and criminal prosecution. In November 2024, counter-terrorism police raided the Kurdish Community Centre in Haringey and other addresses in London (Käyhkö, 2025). The Institute of Race Relations records seven arrests in the operation and describes the subsequent policing and demonstrations around the centre, while contemporaneous reporting identifies the raid as part of an investigation into suspected PKK

activity. Institute of Race Relations Later criminal proceedings against six community members continued to be framed through PKK membership charges (Kurdistan Solidarity Network Legal Group/Netpol, 2026).

This institutional history matters analytically because it provides more than a general atmosphere of political controversy. It supplies a demonstrable security genealogy through which Kurdish political organisation has repeatedly been associated with terrorism, proscription, criminal liability and counter-terrorism enforcement. That genealogy is precisely the kind of prior classificatory structure required by the concept of security sedimentation. The theoretical claim, however, must remain narrower than the empirical temptation. The documentary record does not show that Muslim organisations consciously interpreted Kurdish suffering through terrorism categories, nor does it reveal that legal anxiety caused the absence of outputs. The evidence establishes the security history and the differential organisational pattern. The connection between them remains an illustrative interpretation rather than a demonstrated internal decision mechanism.

The distinction is essential because solidarity displacement is not a synonym for repression. Kurdish civilians, political organisations and diaspora actors may enter British Muslim organisational publics not through an explicit statement that they constitute a threat, but through a political history in which Kurdish collective agency is already difficult to detach from categories such as PKK, separatism, insurgency and terrorism. The effect of such a history need not be renewed securitization. It may instead appear as caution over political identification, a preference for depoliticized humanitarian language, an inability to locate Kurdish claims within established solidarity vocabularies, or simply the absence of a durable organisational repertoire through which the cause can be taken up.

At this point the concept of sedimentation earns its analytical value. It is that a political subject enters a new field carrying a history whose classificatory effects may already have shaped the boundaries of recognizability. The Kurdistan case illustrates what such availability could look like empirically: not a repetition of “terrorist” language by Muslim organisations, but a field in which solidarity with Kurdish political agency is markedly less institutionalised than solidarity with Palestinian political agency, even while Kurdish suffering is actionable elsewhere.

The contrast with Palestine is particularly instructive. Both cases exist in politically contested environments and both encounter forms of security regulation. Yet their downstream organisational trajectories are very different. Palestine enters a dense Muslim solidarit y infrastructure capable of rearticulating the subject through religious, legal and anti-colonial vocabularies. Kurdistan lacks an equivalent infrastructure in the audited Muslim organisational field, while alternative networks elsewhere provide the vocabulary and organisational capacity through which Kurdish claims become actionable. The comparison therefore suggests that security sedimentation works, if it works at all, through interaction with organisational repertoires rather than through classificatory inheritance alone.

Differential translation

Taken together, the three cases resist a simple hierarchy of more and less solidarity. Palestine is not merely the case with the highest mobilisation, Sudan the case with less, and Kurdistan the case with least. Each reveals a different relation between recognition and collective response.

The comparison therefore shifts attention to differential political translation: the route through which a recognized subject moves from intelligibility into response. What matters is the route through which a recognized subject moves from intelligibility into response. Existing organisational infrastructures, moral vocabularies, legal environments and historical classifications all participate in structuring that movement. Where a demonstrable security genealogy is present, sedimented classifications may form one element of that translation.

The theoretical implication is consequently more limited, but also more defensible, than a claim that securitization simply suppresses solidarity. What security leaves behind may be visible not in another declaration of danger, but in the differentiated conditions under which a subject can become a victim, a constituency, a political partner or a cause. The political afterlife of classification lies, in this sense, in the forms through which recognition becomes actionable.

Conclusion

Securitization theory has travelled a considerable distance from the narrow image of an authoritative speaker declaring an existential threat. Audiences, professional practices, institutions, technologies, affect, temporality and ordinary politics have all been brought within its analytical field. That development matters for the argument advanced here because it means that the durability of security is not itself an unexplored problem. Security can be routinized, institutionalized, normalized and reproduced without constant recourse to dramatic speech. The unresolved issue is different. If securitization is constitutive, and if the classifications through which political subjects become associated with danger can acquire historical durability, then analysis cannot end once security ceases to be the explicit grammar through which those subjects are encountered.

This shift in analytical focus is important because it also sets limits on what can count as sedimented security. Political stigma, exclusion or organizational hesitation are not in themselves evidence of securitization's afterlife. A security genealogy has to be established rather than inferred from the later effect. Continuity cannot be assumed merely because two representations resemble one another, and the disappearance of explicit threat language cannot be taken as proof that security has left the field. Receiving fields possess histories and classificatory structures of their own. Sedimentation therefore names a conditioning relation, not a hidden causal force capable of explaining every subsequent judgment.

Following the classified subject also required a second conceptual move. Recognition is politically consequential because subjects do not simply become visible and then confront an unrestricted range of possible responses. Categories connect intelligibility to action. Political actionability was introduced to capture the form in which a recognized subject, claim or suffering becomes available for collective

response within a particular normative and institutional field. Donation, humanitarian relief, protest, lobbying, legal advocacy, public identification and institutional representation are not interchangeable measures of a single underlying quantity of concern. They are different repertoires produced through different relations between subjects, classifications and organizational fields.

The three illustrations show that recognized suffering can become politically available through markedly different repertoires of action. The point is not to rank the cases by degrees of concern, but to identify how recognition is translated into distinct organizational forms.

The cases also clarify the limits of the argument. Security sedimentation conditions later recognition without determining it, and its effects depend upon the repertoires and histories of the receiving field. This emphasis on the receiving field resonates with De Franco and Gelot's (2025) account of normative competence negotiation, which demonstrates how recognition of legitimate authority and appropriate conduct is shaped by relational struggles within particular institutional fields. The empirical illustrations therefore establish patterns of differential actionability and their historical contexts rather than a single causal mechanism.

This has a broader implication for how the effects of securitization are conceptualized. Much of the literature quite reasonably asks whether security succeeds, persists, becomes normalized, is resisted or is desecuritized. Those questions follow security itself across time. The argument developed here suggests another trajectory. Once securitization contributes to constituting a political subject, the effects of classification may become visible in later settings where the question being asked is no longer whether that subject constitutes a threat. The subject may instead be encountered as a victim, a rights-bearer, a humanitarian constituency, a religious community or a possible object of solidarity. At that point the politically consequential inheritance of security may lie in the conditions under which some of those positions become easier to occupy than others.

This is why the political afterlife described here should not be confused with the indefinite survival of securitization. An afterlife is consequential precisely because its effects can be displaced from the language that first made them visible. Security may leave behind classifications that become available to new institutional purposes and normative judgments, even as they are transformed in the process. Some may be reproduced. Others may be contested or reversed. Still others may survive only partially, as assumptions about legitimacy, innocence, agency or political complexity that no longer announce themselves as security claims.

The theoretical question that follows is therefore not only what happens when an issue becomes security, or even how security persists after the securitizing moment. It is also what security has taught later fields to recognize. Once the classified subject is followed beyond the security setting, the effects of securitization may become politically significant precisely where security itself is no longer what anyone appears to be talking about.

Declarations

Author Contribution

The article has a single author.

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