Research Square

Preprints are preliminary reports that have not undergone peer review.
They should not be considered conclusive, used to inform clinical practice,
or referenced by the media as validated information.

From Affectivity to Affectedness: Sensibility, Embodiment and the Corporeal Constitution of Time

Adam Takács

takacsadam@hotmail.com

Budapest Metropolitan University

Research Article

Keywords: Affectivity, Affectedness, Embodiment, Irreversibility, Temporality, Corporeality, Lifeworld

Posted Date: November 12th, 2026

DOI: https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11516021/v1

License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Read Full License

Additional Declarations: No competing interests reported.

From Affectivity to Affectedness: Sensibility, Embodiment and the Corporeal Constitution of Time

Abstract

This article reconsiders the phenomenological relation between affectivity, embodiment, and temporality by examining the constitutive role of corporeality in the formation of temporal experience. Taking Enzo Paci's material reinterpretation of Husserl's phenomenology as its point of departure, it argues that the temporal organization of embodied existence cannot be fully understood within the framework of sensuous and affective time-consciousness alone. Through a reconstruction of Husserl's analyses of affectivity, passive synthesis, and embodiment, the article distinguishes between affectivity as the temporal structure of self-awareness and a different dimension of bodily affectedness, grounded in the body's material exposure to the world. It is argued that this dimension discloses a heterochronic form of corporeal temporality irreducible to the retentional-protentional synthesis of inner time-consciousness. Drawing upon Bernhard Waldenfels and Drew Leder, the article develops the concept of corporeal impermanence to describe the irreversible, heterogeneous, and materially conditioned processes through which bodily existence continually transforms and individuates itself. Finally, it is suggested that corporeal temporality provides the phenomenological condition not only of intercorporeality but also of the lifeworld's temporal structure, thereby opening a new perspective on the embodied foundations of intersubjective and social temporality.

Keywords

Affectivity, Affectedness, Embodiment, Irreversibility, Temporality, Corporeality, Lifeworld

Introduction

This article approaches the problem of temporality from a phenomenological perspective, but shifts the focus from the temporal structures of consciousness and existential self-understanding to the relation between temporality and embodiment. While the temporal constitution of experience has been extensively explored by phenomenologists such as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and many others the temporal significance of the body's own specific processes warrants further investigation. Recent phenomenological work has increasingly emphasized the constitutive role of embodiment in temporal experience (Tewes and Stanghellini, 2020). Building on this tendency, the article brings corporeal temporality into focus as a distinct dimension of embodied existence.

Just as the phenomenological turn toward embodiment has opened new perspectives on perception, affectivity, and the lifeworld, attending to corporeal temporality can illuminate these phenomena anew. The article argues that the body is not merely the embodied medium through which time is experienced, but also a site of heterogeneous material processes that shape and transform the conditions of experience. Taking corporeal temporality seriously thus calls for a reconsideration of the relations between affectivity, materiality, organic life, and the lifeworld. To develop this argument, the article returns to Husserl's analyses of sensibility, affectivity, and embodiment, which provide essential resources for elucidating the phenomena

at issue. It brings these analyses into dialogue with the work of Enzo Paci, Bernhard Waldenfels, and Drew Leder, whose distinct approaches help illuminate the material exposure of the body to the world and the heterogeneous, heterochronic processes through which corporeal existence unfolds. Rather than offering a comprehensive account of these thinkers, the article draws on their work to articulate dimensions of bodily temporality that remain insufficiently clarified when attention is directed primarily toward the temporal constitution of experience.

The argument culminates in a shift from affectivity, understood as a fundamental dimension of embodied self-awareness, to affectedness, understood as the body's constitutive exposure to worldly processes that may modify it without becoming affectively salient or entering conscious experience. This shift does not deny the unity of embodied subjectivity. Rather, it foregrounds the material relations through which this unity is continually sustained and transformed. Bodily singularity, on this account, cannot be understood solely in terms of identity or continuity, but must also be approached through the singular ways in which the body is constituted and deconstituted through its material contacts with the world. This provides the basis for reconceiving corporeal temporality in terms of heterogeneous processes whose effects extend beyond the temporal structures of conscious experience.

Irreversibility and the Material Order of Time

In the remarkable intellectual endeavor—one that has recently attracted renewed scholarly attention (Cavallaro and Popa 2026)—that sought to combine Husserlian phenomenology with key critical insights of Marxist thought, Enzo Paci assigned a particularly important role to the concepts of *temporality* and *irreversibility*. The prominence of these concepts in his work is clearly rooted in Husserl. Paci's interpretation of Husserl, based primarily on *The Crisis of European Sciences* and the insights of genetic phenomenology, devotes special attention to temporality, which he regards, so to speak, as an *organon* for phenomenological thought. Temporality provides the fundamental experiential framework that structures subjectivity's relation both to itself and to the world as well as the ontological ground for intersubjective practices. However, the claim that the cogito's essential relation to the world unfolds in time (Paci, 1961: 17) is more radical than it may initially appear. It not only allows temporality to be understood as a constitutive function that permeates any experiential attitude towards and within the world but also reveals the cardinal role of "finitude" within it. It is from this perspective that, for Paci, temporal irreversibility emerges as a central category, one that inseparably integrates into conscious and practical life such constitutive dimensions of experience as development, transformation, renewal, and, ultimately, death.

Irreversibility is one of Paci's key strategic philosophical concepts. Its sources of inspiration include both his engagement with existentialist thought and the influence of the second law of thermodynamics, as well as Whitehead's concept of emergence.[1] Yet it is within the Husserlian framework that the concept acquires its distinctive philosophical significance. As early as a note from 1956, Paci reminds himself that irreversibility is "not a technical concept," but rather "the lived, preconceptual, precategorical experience of the impossibility of return" (Paci, 2021: 19). The affinity between this formulation and Husserl's core idea regarding the temporal constitution of the "stream of consciousness" *(Erlebnisstorm)* is

[1] The conceptual foundations of Paci's account of irreversibility were laid in his so-called "relationist" works of the 1950s. See Paci, 1954; 1957.

unmistakable. At its most fundamental constitutive level, this stream secures the continuity of temporal flow through the progressive and as such irreversible modification of temporal phases and the layering of such phases upon phases (Paci, 1961: 220).[2] Thus, temporal irreversibility has a distinctive operative function: it is responsible not only for the directedness of temporal becoming but also for the individuality of experiences unfolding in time and of the objects disclosed through them. For Paci, however, this function is also elevated to the status of a fundamental operative principle of "life" as understood phenomenologically. As he writes, "Temporal irreversibility is the ground which makes the relation [of past and future] possible, and this relation incarnates itself in the schema as a synthesis of living forms" (Paci, 2021: 49).

This phenomenological radicalization of the concept of irreversibility pushes clearly the Husserlian framework to its limits. Paci is fully aware of this consequence when he declares irreversibility to be the "necessary basic modality of the lifeworld" (Paci, 1972: 266). But he also claims that Husserl stopped short of developing and radicalizing this insight. As he remarks, "Had he [Husserl] done so in relation to precategorial material causality, he would also have discussed precategorical irreversibility and lived consumption as tiredness, failures, the impoverishment of the ego, and, finally, the meaning of the inevitability of death" (Paci, 1972: 266). In making this claim, Paci not only delineates the terrain of his own philosophical contribution but also opens phenomenology toward a dialogue with certain fundamental intuitions of Marxist thought.[3] This undertaking is guided by the conviction that the experience of temporal irreversibility is phenomenologically inseparable from the factual instance of finitude manifested in *need* and *consumption* as elementary features of the material and dynamic organization of life.[4] As he writes, "Phenomenologically, irreversibility is a fact: it is the impossibility of really turning back in time, of denying need and consumption. On the precategorial level, consumption is something 'lived,' a necessity, just as I can never again live exactly what I have already lived" (Paci, 1972: 458). Or, as he formulates it elsewhere, "Consumption is inherent to the *Lebenswelt* if we consider it from the perspective of need. (…) needs impose themselves because everything is consumed in the sense that the basic experience is temporal and irreversible" (Paci, 1970a: 31). Paci thus places need and the process of its satisfaction at the center of the correlation between subjective life and the world.[5] These reflections are intended to build a bridge between phenomenological and Marxist insights by emphasizing the material and intersubjective constitution of the lifeworld while highlighting the precategorial basis of the economic organization underlying social life. As he argues, "the precategorical economic structure indicates in the clearest way man's dependence on natural and physical life dominated by ubiquitous irreversibility and entropy" (Paci, 1972: 266).[6]

---

[2] See Husserl's corresponding thesis concerning the constitution of time: "It is inconceivable that the continuity of phases would contain the same phase-mode twice or even contain it as stretched over an entire component section. Just as each point of time (and each extent of time) differs 'individually,' so to speak, from every other one and just as no one of them can occur twice, so no running-off mode can occur" (Husserl, 1991:29).

[3] Paci develops this philosophical project most fully in his major work, *The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man* (Paci, 1972), published in Italian in 1963.

[4] On the importance of the need in Paci, see, Croce, 2026.

[5] The significance of need and lack for bodily temporality is also emphasized more recently by Thomas Fuchs, who shows how bodily drives and recurrent needs generate temporal dynamics of lack, anticipation, and fulfilment. See Fuchs, 2020.

[6] It is important to emphasize, however, that for Paci human and social existence is not exhausted by the structure of irreversibility and its generative finitude (needs, consumption, production, etc.), but, precisely by virtue of this temporal-existential structure, is also characterized by "freedom" and the emergence of "value"

This radical attempt to materialize phenomenology and to relate it to concrete social and material practices, however, leaves unresolved a question to which Paci provides no clear answer. His account of irreversibility undoubtedly opens an ontological horizon in which natural and material processes, together with the socio-economic structures they entail, emerge as constitutive dimensions of the lifeworld. Need, consumption, depletion—but equally creation and production—thus appear as inescapable features of human existence. But Paci also maintains that temporality and world-time can be understood only on the basis of the unfolding of the subjectively grounded stream of experience. As he writes in one of his seminal texts, "Irreversibility is understandable by departing from the subjective and intersubjective *Erlebnisse* of the evolution of our psychic and biological life" (Paci 1970b: 68). What remains to be clarified, however, is the very correlation between subjective experience and the natural-material sphere which temporal irreversibility is meant to disclose in the first place. At several points, Paci locates this mediating dimension in the phenomenological register of the *lived body*. We can read for example that "Temporal irreversibility appears to man's precategorial experience as the necessity of satisfying the needs that arise from the consumption of his body" (Paci, 1972: 369). He also argues that "since we cannot go back in time, we experience in the first person the irreversibility of time in fatigue and in the aging of our bodies. This is a principle that is truly a factual experience" (Paci, 1972: 349). Yet, despite this promising opening, Paci does not offer a systematic phenomenological account of the experiential and ontological conditions that enable the lived body to mediate between subjective temporality and material irreversibility.

In this study, we seek to continue along the path opened by Paci by examining the role of corporeality in the constitution of temporal irreversibility. Combining conceptual reconstructions of Husserl's genetic phenomenology with phenomenological interpretations of such bodily phenomena as ageing, fatigue, regeneration, wear, and visceral functioning, we argue that corporeal existence discloses a phenomenologically distinct mode of temporality. Whereas Husserl ultimately conceives bodily life within the synthetic framework of affective self-awareness, we argue that corporeal temporality is constituted through the more originary dimension of bodily affectedness—that is, through the body's material exposure and responsiveness to the world. These hetero-affective processes do not merely accompany the constitution of time-consciousness; they generate a heterochronic and irreversible temporal organization through which embodied existence is continually transformed and individuated. Corporeal temporality thus appears not simply as an underlying dimension of subjective experience but as the phenomenological condition of intercorporeality and one of the constitutive dimensions of the lifeworld itself. The analyses thereby open a phenomenological perspective on the ways in which the temporality of corporeal existence is sedimented in, and carried forward by, the temporal practices through which social life is organized and reproduced.

Temporality, Affectivity and Sensory Materiality

It is to Husserl's enduring credit that he decisively reoriented the philosophical problem of temporality toward a phenomenological investigation of *sensibility* and *affectivity*.

through human praxis. As he puts it: "Human freedom, in general, can be defined only within the conditioning framework of temporal irreversibility. (…) Human freedom is the possibility of assuming the irreversible direction of time as a movement toward value. It is therefore the primordial foundation that enables us, without turning back time, to give meaning and value to life" (Paci, 1961: 272).

In doing so, he not only reformulated the problem of temporal schematization inherited from Kant, that is the relation between conceptuality and sensibility, but also radically transformed the question of the perception of time itself. This, more than anything else, accounts for the originality of Husserl's approach to time in relation both to the Kantian tradition, Brentano or to Bergson's philosophy. Nevertheless, the Husserlian thesis that "we regard sensing *(Das Empfinden)* as the original consciousness of time," or that "sensation is presenting time-consciousness" (Husserl, 1991: 112) means more than replacing the traditional notion of subjective receptivity with a phenomenologically more adequate account. By conceiving time-consciousness as constituted through sensory "hyletic impressions" and the extended temporal "living present" they sustain, Husserl simultaneously reveals consciousness as originally open to the world and as dynamically structured in a manner that permeates every other form and register of experience, including its own self-referential awareness.

This orientation becomes particularly evident in Husserl's extensive and repeatedly revised analyses of internal time-consciousness and receives decisive impetus in his lectures on *Passive and Active Synthesis*. These investigations systematically examine the genesis of conscious experience, beginning with elementary sensibility and culminating in an account of the associative syntheses that ground the active functions of consciousness, such as attention, recollection, reflection, and judgment. Within this framework, time-consciousness occupies a foundational role. Husserl describes it as "the most general and the most primary synthesis that necessarily connects all particular objects of which we become conscious originally in passivity as being" (Husserl, 2001: 73). Accordingly, the functioning of consciousness is ultimately grounded in sensibility. The continuous synthesis of time-consciousness is presented as a kind of "sense-field," which hyletic sensibility fills with concrete experiential content through its visual, tactile, and acoustic modalities (Husserl, 2001: 199). This account is inseparable from Husserl's concept of "affection", which designates the primary mode in which sensibility manifests itself within experience. Affection names the manner in which a sensory impression exerts an affective force within consciousness, endowing lived experience with "varying vivacity" and, as Husserl writes, "in doing so meets the ego, excites it, calls it to action, so to speak, awakens and possibly actually rouses it" (Husserl, 2001: 214). This "affective pull" precisely precedes and conditions egoic orientation, rather than depending upon it (Husserl, 2001: 215). In this way, affection is not an effect or a modification of an already constituted consciousness but belongs to the very genesis of conscious experience itself.

It is not surprising that many commentators interpreted Husserl's analyses of affection as providing the phenomenological foundation of the most elementary form of self-awareness (Zahavi 1998, Steinbock 2004, Taipale 2014). What is decisive in this respect is that affection does not merely designate a particular class of experiences but belongs to the very constitution of subjectivity in all of its cognitive and affective operations. The same holds true for the constitution of temporality. As Husserl makes clear, any sensory datum can acquire affective force only within the unifying synthesis of temporal continuity (Husserl, 2001: 188). However, the temporal flow of consciousness itself is generated through the dynamic interplay of sensory impression, retention, and protention, making affectivity appear as the intrinsic mode of self-awareness in which conscious life temporalizes itself. The awakening of the ego, described in the analyses of passive synthesis, is inseparable from the temporal synthesis that continuously unifies experience. But the stream of consciousness itself does not first exist and then become self-aware; rather, its temporal self-constitution already entails a minimal form of self-acquaintance through self-affection (Zahavi, 1998: 212). Self-awareness

is neither an additional act nor a result of a higher-order reflection. It is the stream of consciousness that manifests itself within its own affective self-referential functioning. Affectivity therefore appears as the most originary form of self-relatedness precisely because the consciousness of time is already consciousness of itself in its own affective unfolding.

At the same time, Husserl's account suggests that the elucidation of self-affection inevitably proceeds in a second direction, namely toward embodiment (Zahavi, 1998). Since the self-manifestation of consciousness is inseparable from the sphere of sensibility, it also brings into play the kinesthetic organization of experience through which the body first becomes a centre of orientation and movement in the world (Husserl 1989: 152-168). Kinesthetic affectivity, however, does not simply constitute a separate sensory modality. Rather, it is the constitutive dimension through which every sensory experience acquires its embodied quality and unity. In this respect, like temporality itself, it belongs to the original structure of self-affection (Taipale, 2014: 28).[7] Through kinesthetic sensibility, the lived body experiences itself from within as an affective capacity of orientation, movement, and possible action centered around the experience of the "I can" (Geniusas, 2012: 73-75). This type of embodied awareness is thus inseparable from the world's immediate givenness, since every kinesthetic experience already discloses the body's concrete openness to its worldly surroundings. Accordingly, affective self-awareness should not be conceived as a self-sufficient subjective self-presence but rather as a dynamic mode of self-manifestation that is inseparable from the subject's embodied openness to the world.

Husserl's philosophical radicalism lies precisely in the fact that, following a single phenomenological logic, he seeks to elucidate both the most elementary structure of consciousness's self-relatedness and its constitutive dependence upon the world's sensible givenness. In this respect, affectivity reveals a fundamental dimension of the a priori correlation between subjectivity and world. Through his analyses of sensibility, hyletic data, and passive synthesis, Husserl develops an account of consciousness in which its unity cannot be explained solely in terms of formal structures, intentional acts, or reflexive self-relation. Conscious life is also constituted through a sensible dimension that is not itself reducible to intentional meaning, yet provides an indispensable basis for its constitution. Husserl describes this dimension in terms of hyletic materiality: the sensuous matter *(hyle)* immanently belonging to experience, which is articulated through intentional and affective processes without being exhausted by them. As he remarks, "Nothing can be grasped in a stream of consciousness, or rather, in its ego, without this consciousness having accomplished the corresponding intentional genesis from its material of hyletic components" (Husserl, 2001: 270).[8] Hyletic materiality thus designates not merely the sensory content of particular experiences, but a constitutive dimension of conscious life within which sensory differences,

---

[7] This connection is further developed in Husserl's late C-Manuscripts, where analyses of the living present and temporal constitution intersect with investigations of kinesthetic striving and affective awakening, bringing temporality, bodily motility, and affection into a common genetic framework (Husserl, 2006: 120–122, 272–274).

[8] Husserl introduces the term hyle (ὕλη, "matter" or "stuff") in *Ideas I*, to designate the sensuous moments of experience—such as colour-, sound-, and touch-data, as well as sensations of pleasure and pain—which he distinguishes from the intentional moments of consciousness (morphē or noesis) (Husserl 1982). Hyletic data are thus "material" in a specifically phenomenological sense: they are immanent sensuous components of experience, not physical matter or physiological processes considered independently of their phenomenological significance. Although Husserl initially distinguishes hyletic matter from the intentional forms that animate it, his later analyses of passive synthesis examine the associative and affective relations through which the sensible field becomes organized prior to explicit egoic activity (Husserl, 2001). For discussion, see Williford, 2013.

bodily sensations, and affective intensities acquire their experiential significance. The hyletic dimension is therefore inseparable from the passive processes through which experience becomes differentiated and affectively articulated, prior to the ego's explicit acts of attention and reflection.

This emphasis on the material dimension of consciousness has been developed in different directions by several phenomenological commentators. Enzo Paci speaks of "the infinite material foundation of the temporality of life" in Husserl (Paci, 1961: 85); Michel Henry describes hyletic impressionality as "the matter and the phenomenological substance from which consciousness is made" (Henry, 2008: 23); and Joona Taipale characterizes self-affectivity as an "immediate material self-awareness" (Taipale, 2014: 182). More recently, Rolf Kühn has likewise emphasized the primordial significance of hyletic materiality and sensing for phenomenality itself (Kühn, 2024). Although these interpretations differ in their philosophical commitments, they converge in emphasizing the constitutive role of this sensible dimension without presupposing that it constitutes an autonomous or self-sufficient stratum of experience.

Yet the recourse to the vocabulary of materiality is justified by the fact that, for Husserl, self-affection can be constituted only through sensing and the mediation of hyletic contents. Whether one considers the impressional structure through which temporal continuity is constituted or the kinesthetic organization of bodily experience, self-awareness is inseparable from the sensible material embeddedness of consciousness. In this phenomenological sense, materiality designates neither an external physical substrate nor an objective reality existing independently of experience, but the indispensable sensible medium through which consciousness is affectively given to itself. As Dan Zahavi emphasized, this phenomenological materiality should therefore not be confused with any straightforward form of realism (Zahavi, 1998: 217). Although Husserl repeatedly characterizes the unfolding of hyletic affection as "ego-alien" *(Ichfremd)*,[9] thereby introducing a moment of alterity into the most intimate life of consciousness, this alterity remains immanent to subjectivity itself.[10] It is, as Zahavi puts it, "an immanent type of alterity which manifests itself directly in subjectivity, which belongs intrinsically to subjectivity, and which subjectivity cannot do without" (Zahavi, 1998: 217). Accordingly, material hetero-affection acquires its phenomenological significance only within the dynamic structure of self-affection. Yet the relation is reciprocal. As Zahavi concludes, "Self-awareness presupposes hetero-affection, since the subject only appears to itself across its affections, as an affected, exposed, and self-transgressing subject" (Zahavi, 1998: 218-19).

Nevertheless, the phenomenological status of sensory materiality as presented here—and, with it, the seemingly balanced relation between self-affection and hetero-affection—cannot be regarded as entirely unproblematic. Paci's impression that Husserl ultimately failed to confront the challenge posed by the material constitution of the lifeworld and the role of temporal irreversibility within it appears well founded once the relation between temporality

[9] Cf. for example, "The primal hyle, in its own temporalization, is, so to speak, the ego-alien (*ichfremd*) core of the concrete present. We would then have to say: in the streaming of concrete primal presence (*Urpräsenz*), purely immanent time is continuously temporalized as primordial time (*Urzeit*), in which primordial individual being is. In this way, we posit the pure stream of experience as the first "transcendent" in relation to the primal-impressional, streaming present of concrete primal presence. Through immanent time there continuously runs the hyletic field, which thus constitutes the hyletic core (matter) of the primal-impressional sphere (Husserl, 2006: 110).

[10] For an interpretation of the hyletic temporality as the basic form of "self-alterity" *(alterité à soi)* in Husserl, see Depraz, 1995: 251-259.

and embodiment is reconsidered in light of Husserl's own analyses. Didier Franck has already pointed out that Husserl's account is marked by a fundamental tension arising from the dual role assigned to hyletic sensibility as both the temporal and the bodily foundation of experience (Franck, 2014). Drawing on Husserl's thesis that the primal impressions which initiate and sustain the temporal flow are always given as sensuous and bodily affections, and that the most elementary level of temporal consciousness is therefore inseparable from bodily sensibility, Franck argues that the phenomenological ground of temporal constitution is inevitably displaced toward embodiment itself. Yet if the body is itself understood as contributing originally to the genesis of temporality, then Husserl's project of conceiving the constitution of time as a purely immanent and egologically driven process appears to be fundamentally compromised. As Franck insists, the lived body can never be understood as a purely immanent structure of consciousness; it is intrinsically exposed to exteriority, intersubjectivity, and, ultimately, contingency (Franck, 2014: 165). This, in turn, relocates the genesis of temporality to a sphere governed not by the immanent laws of temporal consciousness itself but by its irreducible factical relatedness to the world.

Yet, once this reopens the task of what Franck calls an "analytics of incarnation" (Franck, 2014: 166) further questions inevitably arise. Does not the body's continual exposure to the material composition of the world—through contact, resistance, fatigue, injury, regeneration, and ageing—inscribe it into an irreversible processes of material transformation and thereby confer upon it a temporal dynamic that can no longer be adequately explained solely in terms of the self-affective syntheses of time-consciousness? Do not these fundamental features of embodiment require us to rethink the phenomenological status of corporeality and hetero-affection in the constitution of temporality?

From Affectivity to Affectedness: The Primacy of Corporeal Temporality

Husserl never devoted a systematic investigation specifically to the relation between embodiment and temporality. Rather, this problem emerges only intermittently throughout his analyses, surfacing within different phenomenological contexts and in response to distinct constitutive questions. Yet when these dispersed discussions are considered from the perspective of genetic phenomenology, they reveal a remarkably consistent doctrinal orientation. The lived body appears as the absolute "zero-point" *(Nullpunkt)* of kinesthetic affectivity and spatial orientation (Husserl, 1989: 165-167). This bodily here is never simply an isolated spatial position, but belongs to the temporally structured field of the living present, constituted through the interweaving of primal impression, retention, and protention. Put differently, when it comes to bodily temporality, Husserl's approach seems to conceive it primarily in correlation with the immanent temporality of consciousness. This orientation becomes evident, for instance, in Husserl's analyses of kinesthetic capacities, which genetic phenomenology understands as "free actualizations" of present and past experiences. These bodily accomplishments are actualized within the temporal flow as meaningful possibilities of action and as concrete expressions of the subject's "I can" orientations (Husserl, 2001: 50-52). Clearly, kinesthetic and egoic self-awareness are interdependent because both sensations belong to one and the same retentional-protentional continuum of inner time-consciousness.

Husserl's late texts on time constitution further radicalize this position by insisting that the temporal flow are invariably given as sensuous and kinesthetic affections (Husserl, 2006: 272-273). The most originary level of temporal consciousness is therefore inseparable from bodily sensibility. Manuscript C 6 formulates this thesis in its strongest form. Here Husserl

argues that the experience of the world is constituted within the primordial, continuously flowing present (*Urpräsenz*), whose innermost layer consists of hyletic sensory material. However, within this temporal flow, the lived body functions as the enduring pole of synthetic unity through which space and nature are constituted. The body is therefore not simply an affective unity but the privileged structural center of temporal constitution, making possible the experience of nature, spatiality, and, ultimately, the constitution of the objective world. As Husserl summarizes: "In the streaming primal presence, we invariably always already have bodily perception; and thus, in the temporalization of immanent time, my perception of the lived body runs continuously throughout this entire temporalization, synthetically constituting one and the same lived body as identically the same at all times" (Husserl, 2006: 112, my translation).[11]

The question, however, is whether this phenomenological framework adequately accounts for the body's own temporality and for how it is related to and shaped by the material and natural conditions of worldly existence. Bernhard Waldenfels has argued that any phenomenology of embodiment must take into account the fundamentally "pathic" character of corporeal existence. The lived body is not merely the source of affectivity but is itself continually exposed to and affected by what is radically other than itself. As he writes, "being affected by and exposed to what is alien to myself *(Ichfremdes)* depends neither on our knowing nor on our willing, i.e. on our consciousness; it points back to our body. The domain of corporeality includes all that indubitably has to do with me yet without being done by me" (Waldenfels, 2011: 46-47). From this pathic structure Waldenfels derives a distinctive temporality grounded in the phenomenon of *Nachträglichkeit* or temporal posteriority. Bodily affectivity never fully coincides with itself but is always belated with respect to what affects it. This constitutive time-lag is not an accidental feature of experience but the very condition of passivity itself; without it, as Waldenfels remarks, "passivity would lose its force" (Waldenfels, 2011: 46). Bodily temporality thus unfolds through a continuous delay between affection and response. It is this delay that, according to Waldenfels, gives rise to an irreducible form of alienness—an "ecstatic alienness"—through which we discover that we are, in a fundamental sense, "older than ourselves" (Waldenfels, 2011: 51).

Building on Waldenfels's analyses, it becomes possible to distinguish between two phenomenologically different forms—and, correspondingly, two temporal registers—of bodily affection. *Affectivity* designates the prereflective unity of kinesthetic sensibility and bodily self-awareness through which the lived body experiences itself as a center of orientation and possible action. *Affectedness*, by contrast, refers to the body's material exposure to the world through the manifold sensory relations that embed it within a concrete environment. The latter comprises those elementary effects through which the body corporeally affected by external sensations, but also those by which its corporeal existence is sustained and transformed by such processes as metabolism, respiration, motility, visceral drives and predispositions, and the body's continuous physical contact-based relations with its worldly surroundings. Husserl himself approaches this sphere in *Ideas II* under the heading of

[11] Merleau-Ponty's conception of the body's role in the constitution of time appears to coincide with Husserl's thesis when he writes, "In every movement of focusing, my body ties a present, a past, and a future together. It secretes time, or rather it becomes that place in nature where for the first time events, rather than pushing each other into being, project a double horizon of the past and future around the present and acquire an historical orientation. (…) My body takes possession of time and makes a past and a future exist for a present; it is not a thing, rather than suffering time, my body creates it" (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 249). On the significance of corporeal temporality in Merleau-Ponty's late ontology, see Shen, 2021.

"stimulation-effects" and "psychophysical causality," where the material body is described as a material being subject to natural processes distinct from the immanent unfolding of psychic life (Husserl, 1989: 161-165).[12] From the perspective of genetic phenomenology, however, these relations cannot be understood merely as "physical-aesthesiological" processes. They belong to the lived constitution of embodiment itself, since they continually affect the body in and through its concrete organic and corporeal existence.[13] The distinction between affectivity and affectedness therefore indicates the body's "pathic" and "hetero-affective" dependence upon the world and tend to radicalize Husserl's thesis about the body affective exposure to material circumstances.[14] Many material affections never become thematically experienced and never acquire sufficient affective force to awaken the ego or motivate attention. Bodily metabolism, corporeal regeneration, fatigue, ageing processes, or countless organic and tactile effects remain phenomenally operative without ever attaining the salience characteristic of sensory affection. Yet they are not phenomenologically irrelevant. They continuously participate in the constitution of corporeal existence by affecting and modifying the body's own conditions of affection and action.

The temporality that emerges at the level of affectedness is therefore not simply an extension of affective temporality but should be recognized as a phenomenologically distinct temporal register. Whereas the temporality of egoistic or kinesthetic self-affection is synthesized through the retentional-protentional continuity of the living present, corporeal affectedness unfolds through materially conditioned processes that neither converge upon a single temporal *Nullpunkt* nor coincide within the unified field of living present. Husserl's late analyses of instinct *(Instinkt)* and drive *(Trieb)* may appear to point precisely in this direction. As Nam-In Lee has convincingly shown, some of the late manuscripts relocate the genesis of temporality to the level of the archi-passive stream, where primal kinesthesia *(Urkinästhese)* and primal hyle *(Urhyle)* form an original unity animated by an unthematic primordial instinct *(Urinstinkt)* (Lee, 1993: 117-124). This instinct is not yet object-directed but constitutes a blind, pre-egological orientation toward the world, expressed through the body's involuntary kinesthetic life. In Lee's words, the primordial instinct "flows out" into primordial kinesthesia and thereby constitutes the first opening of the world (Lee, 1993: 119.)

Yet this remarkable displacement of temporal genesis toward embodiment ultimately remains governed In Husserl by the teleological structure of "instinctive" or "drive intentionality" *(Triebintentionalität, Instinktintentionalitat)* (Husserl, 2006: 169, 327; Lee, 1993: 181-183). In this framework, bodily temporality is still understood primarily as the temporal unfolding of a transcendental orientation toward the world rather than as the heterogeneous temporalization grounded on the body's own material existence. The body's metabolic, regenerative, degenerative, or ageing processes do not themselves become constitutive sources of temporality; instead, they are reintegrated into the teleological

[12] In *Ideas II* Husserl describes "affectedness" when he states that "In each Bodily [external] sensation, the mere sensation is not grasped, but it is apprehended as belonging to a system of possible functional consequences which corresponds exactly to the extensive order, consequences that the material real must undergo in consistent parallels with possible material effects" (Husserl, 1989: 162).

[13] As Maxine Sheets-Johnstone has observed, Husserl ultimately stopped short of addressing the "organic nature" of embodiment: "Husserl wrote of bodies, but he did not write of embodied organisms; he wrote of action, but he did not write of active or enactive organisms; he wrote of the world, but he did not write of organisms being embedded in the world" ((Sheets-Johnstone, 2011, 52).

[14] Indeed, Husserl himself concedes, at least implicitly, that bodily sensibility is conditioned by the world's material conditions when he writes: "The Body, we can say, always has states of sensation, and which particular ones it has depend on the concomitant system of real circumstances under which it senses" (Husserl, 1989: 162).

continuity of the living present through the dynamics of instinctive striving. As opposed to this structure, one can argue that metabolism, respiration, fatigue, recovery, ageing, hormonal regulation, immune response, and other somatic processes follow heterogeneous temporal rhythms, each governed by its own finite duration, material conditions, and contactual dependencies.[15] Insofar as they belongs to the body's material capacity to be affected and modified, their temporality is sensible without necessarily becoming affectively salient, and operative without necessarily entering even the passive unity of conscious experience.

Corporeal temporality thus reveals itself as fundamentally *heterochronic*. It is not organized around a single synthetic present or teleological process but around the coexistence of multiple, only partially synchronized temporal processes, each unfolding according to its own material conditions and rhythms. For this reason, corporeal temporality cannot be adequately understood either as the sedimentation of past experience or as a form of bodily memory. What is at stake is not primarily the preservation of acquired habits and capacities but the body's ongoing ontological modification through its material interaction with its environment.[16] These heterogeneous processes continuously reshape the body's kinesthetic possibilities, its capacities for action and scope of "I can", and thus ultimately its manner of inhabiting the world, even though they themselves never form a unified temporal synthesis. Corporeal time therefore appears as an irreversible and heterochronic temporality whose relative coherence emerges not only from the synthetic achievements of sensible self-awareness but from the dynamic interplay of the body's singular material contacts with the world. In this respect, the Husserlian distinction between *Leib* and *Körper* becomes less sufficient as an explanatory framework insofar as it obscures the extent to which lived embodiment is constituted through the material processes by which the body is continually affected and transformed.[17] Also, hetero-affection no longer appears as a correlative moment within the constitution of self-affection but becomes a constitutive source of temporality itself, thereby inviting a fundamental reconsideration of Husserl's account of temporal constitution.

Just as Husserl takes the fading away of a melody as a paradigmatic phenomenon through which to elucidate the constitutive structures of inner time-consciousness (Husserl, 1991), fatigue, exhaustion, bodily wear, and ageing may serve as exemplary phenomena for investigating corporeal temporality. These phenomena direct attention not simply to how the body experiences time, but to how its own temporal processes gradually transform the conditions and capacities of experience. Ageing is particularly revealing in this respect. In a research manuscript, Husserl himself approaches it as a kind of limit-case at the horizon of

[15] As Hans Jonas argues with regard to the "all-pervasiveness of metabolism" within living systems, "The exchange of matter with the environment is not a peripheral activity engaged in by a persistent core: it is the total mode of continuity (self-continuation) of the subject of life itself" (Jonas, 1966: 76). Yet Jonas's own "phenomenology of the senses" implicitly suggests that metabolism is only one among several materially grounded temporalities through which embodied life is sustained and transformed.

[16] On the topic of body memory, see Fuchs, 2012. For a commentary that develops Fuchs's analyses in the phenomenological direction of "body-environment interaction", see Gendlin, 2012.

[17] Husserl's distinction between *Leib* and *Körper* should not be understood as separating two independent spheres of experience. In *Ideas II*, the lived body is both the bearer of localized sensations and kinaesthetic capacities and a physical body situated within the world. These dimensions are interdependent: the body experienced as a physical thing is also experienced as the functioning body through which the world is perceived and explored. The present argument does not therefore reject Husserl's distinction, but questions whether it fully captures the temporal significance of material bodily processes insofar as these processes modify the body's embodied capacities and the conditions of its lived experience.

death, describing it not merely as a psychophysical process but as a progressive diminution of the body's affective, perceptual, and cognitive capacities. He asks whether ageing consists in

> "...nothing other than a diminishing of all capacities—above all, of every capacity for memory, including, to an ever-increasing degree, the decline of recognition, of the apperceptive recognition of even the most familiar types of objects in one's surrounding world, and finally of things as such altogether; likewise of the lived body as lived body, of the hand as hand and as that with which one can do this or that; a diminishing of affectivity; an ever greater inability to follow sensory stimuli; an inability to know oneself as an ego, as the subject of capacities and the pole of affections and actions, which themselves have likewise progressively disappeared—until, as a limit, all conscious life ceases, and with it the ego as the pole of identity of this life and its corresponding capacities" (Husserl, 2006: 158-159, my translation).

Read from the perspective of corporeal affectedness, this passage points far beyond the Husserlian framework of temporal synthesis. What progressively declines under the label of "ageing" is not merely a particular affective content or a specific bodily capacity, but the very experiential field within which affectivity and action becomes possible.[18] Ageing, fatigue, or exhaustion do not simply constitute particular affective experiences; they transform the body's access both to itself and to the world by reconfiguring the subjective and objective affordances through which affective life unfolds. Indeed, even Husserl acknowledges that "the gradual disintegration of the lived body—for example, the decomposition and putrefactive dissolution of a hand, a foot, and so forth—can be experienced only as long as the lived body continues to function through its still healthy organs. The condition of the whole lived body as already disintegrated can no longer be experienced" (Husserl, 2006: 157, my translation). This observation suggests that the temporal unfolding of corporeal processes progressively modifies not only what the body experiences but also how it is capable of experiencing at all. Yet this temporal transformation cannot be adequately traced back as arising solely from the self-temporalization of the lived body, from its sedimented or progressive affectivity. It should also be rooted in the body's corporeal entanglement with the world. This temporality consequently appears as a mode of ongoing ontological transformation, in which the body's affective configuration is continually reshaped through the irreversible temporal rhythms of its worldly contacts and its own organismic performance. Within this framework, the temporality of consciousness can no longer claim phenomenological primacy; it becomes captive to the heterochronic temporality of corporeal existence itself.

Corporeal Impermanence and the Temporality of the Lifeworld

A related account of bodily temporality is developed by Thomas Fuchs, who emphasizes the rhythmic and cyclical character of vital processes and their constitutive role in

[18] See this important remark from Husserl: "In the possibility of the loss of strength *(Entkräftung)*, in ageing, there presents itself, as a possible end, a dreamless sleep from which no awakening is possible. More precisely: the ego, constituted for itself as a worldly being, could, on the basis of the experience of illness and the restriction of its powers, find itself in the course of continued ageing as in a kind of progressive illness, whose anticipated end would be this: no longer to see, hear, and so forth, thus no longer to be capable of anything within the world; finally, no longer to retain any remembrance of the world's past and, consequently, of its future" (Husserl, 2006: 157).

the continuity of embodied existence (Fuchs, 2020: 12–16). By grounding prereflective temporal experience in bodily rhythms, recurrent needs, and processes of expenditure and regeneration, Fuchs demonstrates how temporality is rooted in the embodied self's ongoing interaction with its environment. The focus on corporeal temporality shares this emphasis on the organismic foundations of temporal experience but approaches the relation between bodily processes and temporality through the concept of affectedness. This concept directs attention not only to how vital rhythms sustain the continuity of embodied existence, but also to how material processes affect and modify the body, including when their operation does not become affectively salient or enter the field of conscious experience. The question, then, is not simply how bodily rhythms sustain temporal continuity, but how heterogeneous corporeal processes shape and transform the bodily capacities and conditions through which experience becomes possible. This shift in emphasis brings into view a dimension of corporeal temporality that cannot be fully captured by the recurrence of vital rhythms alone or by the emphasis on body memory (Fuchs, 2020: 16-17).

In his highly instructive work, *The Absent Body*, Drew Leder develops the outlines of a phenomenological analysis that sheds light precisely on the heterogeneity and diachrony of human corporeality within the lifeworld. As he writes, "one can trace out a 'phenomenological anatomy' of the lived body, characterizing its different regions according to their usual forms of presence and absence and the modes of world-relation they permit or encourage" (Leder, 1990: 29–30). Leder's aim is, among other things, to explore those "corporeal depths" that testify to the body's distinctive phenomenological disappearances and absences. His central thesis is that certain bodily functions and visceral activities are not merely passively relegated to the background of experience but exhibit a more radical mode of non-presence or imperceptibility. As he observes, "just as it is possible to speak of null-points in relation to the surface body, the corporeal depths have their own phenomenological null-points. That is, there are visceral regions that are almost entirely insensitive" (Leder, 1990: 43). Through his distinction between the "surface body" and the "deep" or "visceral" body, Leder systematically identifies those dimensions of embodiment in which, as he puts it, "the visceral body gives rise not only to an 'I can' but to an 'I must''. I must eat, breathe, excrete, drink, sleep, at certain times and in certain ways to mollify inner demands", demands that ultimately point back to what he calls a constitutive structure of "personal inability", the body's intrinsic "I cannot" (Leder, 1990: 48). Most importantly, Leder does not hesitate to draw far-reaching phenomenological and ontological conclusions from these analyses, as the following passage makes clear:

> "My inner organs are for the most part neither the agents nor objects of sensibility. They constitute their own circuitry of vibrant, pulsing life, which precedes the perceptual in fetal life, outruns it in sleep, sustains it from beneath at all moments. Rather than 'Visibility,' one might call this the dimension of 'Viscerality.' Like the Visible, the Visceral cannot be properly said to belong to the subject; it is a power that traverses me, granting me life in ways I have never fully willed nor comprehended" (Leder, 1990: 64–65).

Beyond their theoretical significance, these analyses also illuminate what the preceding chapters have described as the heterochronic structure of corporeal temporality. The visceral processes identified by Leder exhibit a distinctly ecstatic dynamic (Leder, 1990: 21–22), yet one that differs from the form of temporal self-constitution associated with Husserl's

account of affective self-awareness. First, visceral processes manifest themselves in a fundamentally self-alien *(ichfremd)* manner. Their defining phenomenological characteristic is not affective self-awareness but a constitutive recessiveness: they sustain embodied existence without normally becoming objects of experience. Second, their temporality is characterized by *impermanence* and heterogeneous rhythms of material transformation. These processes unfold according to distinct temporalities, undergoing modification, exhaustion, and regeneration, while their ongoing interplay sustains the living body. In this respect, corporeal temporality differs from the constitutive history of consciousness that Husserl describes as "an incessant process of becoming as an incessant process of constituting objectivities in an incessant progressus of graduated levels. It is a never-ending history" (Husserl, 2001: 270). Whereas Husserl's formulation emphasizes the ongoing constitution of objectivities, corporeal temporality involves a plurality of heterogeneous material processes through which embodied life is sustained and whose operation also entails the continuous transformation of the body and the eventual deconstitution of its unity. It is in this sense that Leder concludes: "As ecstatic/recessive being-in-the-world, the lived body is necessarily self-effacing" (Leder, 1990: 69).

The heterochronic processes of corporeal temporality thus sustain the unity of the living body precisely through their own *impermanence*. This suggests, on the one hand, that corporeal existence is inseparable from its material relations to the world and, on the other, that the body's phenomenal and ontological unity emerges through processes whose finitude also entails its continuous transformation. Significantly, Leder illustrates the body's "temporal depth" through phenomena such as sleep and birth, approaching them not merely as limits of experience but as expressions of the body's cyclical transformations and historicity (Leder, 1990: 57). From this perspective, corporeal temporality constitutes a primary dimension of bodily individuation. If, as Leder remarks, "the body not only projects outward in experience but falls back into unexperienceable depths" (Leder, 1990: 53), then bodily unity must be understood through the ongoing interplay of constitution and deconstitution, through which the body continually establishes and transforms the boundaries of its phenomenal existence. Through its material affectedness, the body undergoes a singular inscription in the world while continually renewing—and transforming—the affective and phenomenal unity through which it exists.

The foregoing analyses suggest that the heterochronic processes of corporeal temporality fill the gap that Enzo Paci identified in Husserl's investigations, namely, his failure to relate temporal irreversibility to the natural and material processes of the lifeworld and, more specifically, to those aspects of these processes that shape experiential life, such as need, consumption, exhaustion, and ultimately finitude (Paci, 1972: 266). At the same time, they also address a difficulty that remains implicit in Paci's own analyses: the absence of a phenomenological account of how the irreversible temporality of material processes becomes the lived temporality of embodied existence. Within the framework of affectedness, temporal irreversibility no longer appears merely as the impossibility of reversing the stream of consciousness. It is rooted in the body's material exposure to the world and in the finite, individuating dynamics of corporeal existence. The temporality of the lifeworld is therefore not merely lived by embodied subjects; it continually inherits the various forms of material transformation through which corporeal existence individuates itself. In this sense, temporal irreversibility may indeed be understood, in accordance with Paci's original intuition, as one of the constitutive dimensions of the lifeworld. Yet its significance extends beyond providing the precategorial foundation of need, consumption, and the material economy of subjective

and social existence (Paci, 1972: 369). Indeed, its material scope encompasses every domain of social life whose appropriation, organization, and practical regulation presuppose the presence or intervention of the lived body.[19]

From this perspective, corporeal temporality also constitutes the primary temporal condition of the "intercorporeal" framework of the lifeworld (Taipale, 2014: 76).[20] Intercorporeality cannot be simply reduced to the simultaneous coordination of individual perceptions within the common horizon of anonymously given objects and situations. Rather, the corporeal organization of temporality provides the genetic background of this coordination by revealing that the shared and anonymous functioning of temporal experience already begins at the most elementary material level of the encounter between body and world. It is through the irreversible modification of embodied capacities, rhythms, and affective dispositions that the body acquires not only its singular but also its collective history, thereby sustaining its unifying role within ongoing processes of intersubjective constitution. In this respect, the emphasis on corporeal temporality reaffirms Husserl's fundamental thesis concerning the originally embodied constitution of intersubjectivity. At the same time, however, they extend it genetically beyond the phenomenological framework of empathy *(Einfühlung)* and shared perception (Zahavi 2014). What binds embodied subjects together is not merely the reciprocal accessibility of their experiences but the more fundamental participation in heterogeneous corporeal temporalities that are continually synchronized and desynchronized, transformed, and sedimented through the worldly occurrence of corporeal coexistence. This perspective also provides a phenomenological grounding for recent attempts to understand the temporality of intersubjectivity in terms of processes of synchronization and reciprocal intersubjective attunement realized through the temporal alignment of affective comportment (Pritzkau, Tewes & Fuchs, 2022).

Schütz famously described social coexistence based on simultaneity as a process of "growing older together" (Schutz, 1967:103) From the perspective developed here, however, this shared temporality of ageing presupposes the heterogeneous corporeal processes through which embodied existence continually individuates and shares itself before it becomes explicitly socially coordinated. Corporeal temporality provides the phenomenological basis for a broad range of socially organized temporal practices: sleeping and waking, ageing as a cultural phenomenon, work rhythms, care, illness and recovery, mobility, waiting, and countless other sequential activities and rituals through which everyday life is coordinated. In this sense, the time of the body is not superseded by social time but continually carried forward and sedimented within it. In its intersubjective framework, the irreversible unfolding of corporeal existence does not remain confined to the body's affective organization. It becomes sedimented and carried forward in bodily appearance, habits, and culturally organized forms of life, thereby providing the phenomenological basis upon which the intersubjective organization of temporality itself depends. Ultimately, it is on this *material* horizon of *affectedness* that the time of the body as *corporeal time* becomes the temporal substrate of many of the sequential and historically articulated practices through which social life is continually produced and reproduced.

---

[19] This approach also resonates with broader attempts to rethink phenomenology through the material conditions of embodied existence and its relation to nature and the lifeworld (Angus, 2021).

[20] Cf. "Things originally appear as being there for anybody, and therefore a priori intersubjectivity amounts to a 'lived-bodily intersubjectivity' *(Intersubjektivität des Leibes)*, or 'intercorporeity' *(intercorporéité)*. The perceived environment originally appears as being palpable, touchable, visible, audible, olfactory—not to our body exclusively, but to anybody (Taipale, 2014: 76).

References

Angus, I. H. (2021). *Groundwork of Phenomenological Marxism: Crisis, Body, World*. Lexington Books.

Cavallaro, M., & Popa, D. (2026). *The philosophy of Enzo Paci: Phenomenology, materialism, and critique*. Routledge. (Forthcoming).

Croce, R. (2026). Towards a phenomenology of need: Paci on grounding economics in the lifeworld. *Continental Philosophy Review*, 59, 105–123. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-025-09715-0

Depraz, N. (1995). *Trandcendance et incarnation. Le statut de l'intersubjectivité comme alterité à soi chez Husserl*. Vrin.

Franck, D. (2014). *Flesh and body: On the phenomenology of Husserl* (J. Rivera & S. Davidson, Trans.). Bloomsbury.

Fuchs, T. (2012). The phenomenology of body memory. In S. C. Koch, T. Fuchs, M. Summa, & C. Müller (Eds.), *Body memory, metaphor and movement* (pp. 9–22). John Benjamins.

Fuchs, T. (2020). Time, the Body, and the Other in Phenomenology and Psychopathology. In C. Tewes & G. Stanghellini (Eds.), *Time and Body. Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches* (pp. 12–40). Cambridge University Press.

Gendlin, E. T. (2012). Comment on Thomas Fuchs: The time of the explicating process. In S. C. Koch, T. Fuchs, M. Summa, & C. Müller (Eds.), *Body memory, metaphor and movement* (pp. 73–82). John Benjamins.

Geniusas, S. (2012). *The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl's Phenomenology*. Springer.

Henry, M. (2008). *Material phenomenology* (S. Davidson, Trans.). Fordham University Press.

Husserl, E. (1982). *Ideas Pertaining to a pure Phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology* (F. Kersten, Trans.). Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1989). *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: Second book: Studies in the phenomenology of constitution* (R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, Trans.). Kluwer Academic.

Husserl, E. (1991). *On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time* (1893–1917) (J. B. Brough, Trans.). Kluwer Academic.

Husserl, E. (2001). *Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis: Lectures on transcendental logic* (A. J. Steinbock, Trans.). Kluwer Academic.

Husserl, E. (2006). *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934): Die C-Manuskripte* (Husserliana Materialien VIII). Springer.

Jonas, H. (1996). *The phenomenon of life: Toward a philosophy of biology*. Delta Books.

Kühn, R. (2024). *Materie und Empfinden: Zur Grundgegebenheit von Hyletik, Aisthetik und Ästhetik in Natur und Kosmos*. Alber.

Leder, D. (1990). *The absent body*. University of Chicago Press.

Lee, N.-I. (1993). *Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte*. Kluwer Academic.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). *Phenomenology of perception* (D. A. Landes, Trans.). Routledge.

Paci, E. (1954). *Tempo e relazione*. Taylor.

Paci, E. (1957). *Dall'esistenzialismo al relazionismo*. D'Anna.

Paci, E. (1961). *Tempo e verità nella fenomenologia di Husserl*. Laterza.

Paci, E. (1970a). Due temi fenomenologici: I. Fenomenologia e dialettica; II. La fenomenologia e la fondazione dell'economia politica. *aut aut*, 116, 7–37.

Paci, E. (1970b). Towards a new phenomenology. *Telos*, 5, 58–81.

Paci, E. (1972). *The function of the sciences and the meaning of man* (P. Piccone & J. E. Hansen, Trans.). Northwestern University Press.

Paci, E. (2021). *Diario fenomenologico*. Orthotes.

Pritzkau, A., Tewes, C., & Fuchs, T. (2022). The intertwinement of temporality and intersubjectivity: Two dimensions of the embodied human mind and its pathologies. *Intercultural Philosophy*, 1, 3–21. https://doi.org/10.11588/icp.2022.1

Schutz, A. (1967). *The phenomenology of the social world* (G. Walsh & F. Lehnert, Trans.). Northwestern University Press.

Serban, C. (2022). Generative Temporality. In L. Ascarate & Q. Gailhac (Eds.). *Generative Worlds. New Phenomenological Perspectives on Space and Time*. (pp. 59-82). Lexington Books.

Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2011). The Corporeal Turn. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 18 (7-8): 145-168.

Shen, Y. (2021). The trio of time: On Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of time. *Human Studies*, 44, 511–528. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-021-09589-0

Steinbock, A. J. (2004). *Home and beyond: Generative phenomenology after Husserl*. Northwestern University Press.

Taipale, J. (2014). *Phenomenology and embodiment: Husserl and the constitution of subjectivity*. Northwestern University Press.

Tewes, C. & Stanghellini, G. (Eds.). *Time and Body. Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches*. Cambridge University Press.

Waldenfels, B. (2011). *Phenomenology of the alien: Basic concepts* (A. Kozin & T. Stähler, Trans.). Northwestern University Press.

Williford, K. (2013). Husserl's Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 12 (3): 501–519.

Zahavi, D. (1998). Self-awareness and affection. In D. Zahavi & N. Depraz (Eds.), *Alterity and facticity: New perspectives on Husserl* (pp. 205–228). Springer.

Zahavi, D. (2014). *Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame*. Oxford University Press.