Online Resource. Whose Democracy? Collective Winners and Losers in Africa

This Online Resource is organized by function. Section A documents the sample and every coding decision the designs depend on. Section B validates the alignment measure. Section C reports robustness of the within-group estimates. Section D contains the identification diagnostics for the turnover change design and the election-pair comparison. Section E reports mechanism material and the secondary ethnicization analysis. Section F documents the CSES external validation. Sections A, B and D are essential for evaluating the main claims; Sections C, E and F are supporting.

A. Sample and coding audit

A1. Sample construction

Table A1 traces the sample from every Afrobarometer country-round in the respondent extract to the analysis sample. The audit of governing parties covers 192 country-rounds in the 35 countries with party ethnicization data; 18 are removed for the reasons listed, leaving 174 surveys.

Table A1. Sample flow

Stage	Countries	Country-rounds	Respondents	Country-groups
All Afrobarometer country rounds, Rounds 3 to 10, in the respondent extract	42	226	321,466	
Country rounds in countries covered by the party ethnicization data (governing party audit)	35	192	280,026	
minus surveys without party-by-group data	35	185	270,588	
minus military or transitional governments at fieldwork	35	177	260,988	
minus surveys without an identifiable governing party (independent president without party or alliance, ambiguous)	35	175	258,588	
minus surveys without a usable ethnic group item (Algeria Round 5)	35	174	257,384	
Respondents in analysed surveys who report a standardized ethnic group (analysis sample)	35	174	244,374	961
Frozen alignment sample: governing party or predecessor observed in the previous round	30	133	174,139	555

Note. Respondent counts in the first six rows include respondents without a usable ethnic group; the analysis sample is restricted to respondents who report a group that can be standardized. Military or transitional governments: Burkina Faso Rounds 6 and 9, Gabon 10, Guinea 9 and 10, Madagascar 5, Mali 5 and 9. No identifiable governing party: Benin 7 (independent president with no party or formal alliance) and Madagascar 6 (president between parties). No party-by-group data: Angola 8, Benin 10, Burundi 6, Guinea 7, Ivory Coast 10, Morocco 5, Zimbabwe 3.

A2. Governing party, coalition and party lineage

The governing party is the party of the head of government at the median fieldwork date. Table A2 lists every decision that departs from the default rule or from the ruling-party flag in the source file. The full audit for all 192 country-rounds is in the replication files.

Table A2. Governing party coding decisions that differ from the default rule or from the source file

Country	Round	Fieldwork	Coded governing party	Decision
Benin	3	04/2005 to 05/2005	UBF (Union pour le Bénin du Futur)	Independent president Kérékou, UBF was the presidential alliance. Source flag (RB, an opposition party) was wrong.
Benin	4	06/2008 to 07/2008	FCBE	Independent president Yayi Boni, FCBE presidential alliance.
Benin	5	11/2011 to 12/2011	FCBE (Yayi Boni)	Independent president Yayi Boni.
Benin	6	05/2014 to 06/2014	FCBE (Yayi Boni)	Independent president Yayi Boni.
Benin	7	12/2016 to 01/2017	excluded	Talon (independent) had no party or formal alliance at fieldwork (Dec 2016).
Benin	8	11/2020 to 12/2020	Union Progressiste (UP)	Talon independent, UP and BR form the presidential bloc, UP is the largest.
Benin	9	01/2022	Union Progressiste (UP)	Talon independent, UP and BR form the presidential bloc.
Burkina Faso	6	04/2015 to 05/2015	excluded	Transitional government after the Oct 2014 uprising (Kafando).
Burkina Faso	9	09/2022 to 10/2022	excluded	Military rule (Damiba) at fieldwork Sep to Oct 2022.
Ethiopia	8	12/2019 to 02/2020	EPRDF (TPLF/OPDO/ANDM/SEPDM)	PM Abiy, EPRDF merged into the Prosperity Party on 1 Dec 2019, weeks before fieldwork, survey lists EPRDF.
Gabon	10	04/2024 to 05/2024	excluded	Military rule after Aug 2023 coup.

Country	Round	Fieldwork	Coded governing party	Decision
Ghana	4	03/2008	NPP	Kufuor (NPP) in office at fieldwork Mar 2008, source flag NDC was wrong.
Guinea	9	08/2022	excluded	Military rule (Doumbouya) at fieldwork Aug 2022.
Guinea	10	05/2024 to 06/2024	excluded	Military rule at fieldwork 2024.
Kenya	4	10/2008 to 11/2008	Party of National Unity (PNU)	President Kibaki (PNU), grand coalition with ODM (PM Odinga).
Kenya	5	11/2011	Party of National Unity (PNU)	President Kibaki (PNU), grand coalition with ODM.
Kenya	6	11/2014 to 12/2014	The National Alliance (TNA)	President Kenyatta (TNA) in Jubilee coalition with URP.
Kenya	9	11/2021	Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP)	Kenyatta (Jubilee) in office at fieldwork Nov 2021, source flag UDA was wrong.
Liberia	6	05/2015	Unity Party (UP)	Sirleaf (UP) in office May 2015, source flag CDC was wrong.
Madagascar	5	03/2013 to 04/2013	excluded	High Transitional Authority after the 2009 coup (Rajoelina, unelected).
Madagascar	6	12/2014 to 01/2015	excluded	President Hery had broken with MAPAR and had not yet founded HVM (2015).
Malawi	6	03/2014 to 04/2014	PP	Joyce Banda (PP) president until 31 May 2014, fieldwork Mar to Apr 2014. Source flag DPP was wrong.
Mali	4	12/2008	Mouvement citoyen / ATT	Independent president Touré, his citizen movement.

Country	Round	Fieldwork	Coded governing party	Decision
Mali	5	12/2012 to 01/2013	excluded	Transitional government after the Mar 2012 coup.
Mali	8	03/2020 to 04/2020	RPM	Keïta (RPM) in office at fieldwork Mar to Apr 2020, before the Aug 2020 coup.
Mali	9	07/2022 to 08/2022	excluded	Military rule at fieldwork.
Morocco	8	02/2021	Justice and Development Party (PJD)	Head of government El Otmani (PJD) at fieldwork Feb 2021, RNI took office Oct 2021. Source flag RNI was wrong.
The Gambia	7	07/2018 to 08/2018	United Democratic Party (UDP)	Barrow (independent) elected as coalition candidate, UDP main coalition party.
The Gambia	8	02/2021	National People's Party (NPP)	Barrow founded NPP Dec 2019.

Note. The default rule codes the party of the head of government at the time of fieldwork, confirmed against WhoGov and the fieldwork dates in the Afrobarometer files. The full audit for all 192 country rounds, including sources of each decision, is in the replication files.

Coalition coding. The coalition check in Section C counts a respondent as a coalition supporter if she feels close to any party in the governing coalition or presidential bloc. Membership is taken at the median fieldwork date, as recorded in the audit file. Alignment is then built from the pooled supporters of these parties, just as for a single party. In 166 of 174 surveys, the coalition is the executive's party alone. The check therefore differs from the main measure only in the eight surveys in Table A3.

Table A3. Surveys in which the governing coalition includes more than the executive's party

Country	Round	Executive party	Coalition parties
Benin	8	Union Progressiste (UP)	Union Progressiste (UP); Bloc Républicain (BR)
Benin	9	Union Progressiste (UP)	Union Progressiste (UP); Bloc Républicain (BR)
Ivory Coast	6	Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR)	Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (PIT); Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI); Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR)
Ivory Coast	7	Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR)	Mouvement des Forces d'Avenir (MFA); Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (PIT); Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI); Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP); Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR)
Ivory Coast	8	Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP)	Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP); Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR)
Kenya	4	Party of National Unity (PNU)	Party of National Unity (PNU); Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)
Kenya	5	Party of National Unity (PNU)	Party of National Unity (PNU); Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)
Kenya	6	The National Alliance (TNA)	The National Alliance (TNA); United Republican Party (URP)

Party lineage rules. The frozen measure requires the governing party, or its direct predecessor, in the previous Afrobarometer round. A party is matched to itself across rounds when its name in both rounds matches (fuzzy score of 95 or more). I code a predecessor by hand only for renamed, merged or successor parties listed in the lineage file. These are CPDM and RDPC in Cameroon (two spellings of one party), EPRDF to Prosperity Party in Ethiopia, and RDR to RHDP in Ivory Coast. In Kenya, they are NARC to PNU, TNA to Jubilee, and Jubilee to JAP. In Uganda, the NRM appears under different survey codes. Where no party or predecessor is observed in the previous round, the survey has no frozen profile.

Table A4. How frozen profiles are linked across rounds

Link	Surveys	Frozen-sample respondents
first observed round, no frozen profile	34	0
manually coded predecessor (rename, merger, alliance)	11	15,778
no predecessor in previous round, no frozen profile	6	0
same party name in both rounds	124	158,361

Note. 15,778 of 174,139 frozen-sample respondents (9 percent) rely on a manually coded predecessor. Excluding these surveys gives frozen estimates of 0.113*** (0.023), 0.116*** (0.024), 0.124*** (0.029) for the index, satisfaction and electoral-commission trust. The table lists 175 surveys because it also counts Algeria Round 5, which has no usable ethnic group item. Two surveys with a linked predecessor, Algeria Round 6 and Mali Round 4, have no frozen profile because the previous round has no usable group data, so the frozen sample has 133 surveys.

A3. Ethnic group harmonization

The within-group design treats a group as the same unit in every round. The matching of ethnic labels is therefore part of the research design. I cleaned labels within each country, fixing case, spelling, punctuation and common noun-class prefixes. Answers that gave only a national identity, no group, a refusal or “other” were set to missing. I then merged labels whose stems matched with a fuzzy score of 90 or more. Table A5 summarizes the result by country; Table A6 gives representative merges. The complete crosswalk is in the replication files.

Table A5. Ethnic labels, harmonized groups and group-by-survey cells, by country

Country	Raw labels	Cleaned labels	Labels merged	Groups in analysis	Rounds	Median cell	Cells under 20	Share without usable group
Algeria	8	5	0	5	1	107	1	0.41
Angola	21	24	0	19	2	64	7	0.01
Benin	32	24	0	23	6	75	11	0.01
Botswana	49	37	2	35	7	34	51	0.08
Burkina Faso	40	34	2	31	4	20	40	0.03
Burundi	7	3	0	3	1	184	1	0.10

Country	Raw labels	Cleaned labels	Labels merged	Groups in analysis	Rounds	Median cell	Cells under 20	Share without usable group
Cameroon	72	59	1	58	6	13	179	0.12
Chad	21	19	0	19	1	36	3	0.01
Ethiopia	40	35	1	34	2	21	24	0.04
Gabon	25	20	1	19	4	59	7	0.01
Ghana	85	57	5	52	7	22	56	0.07
Guinea	17	15	1	11	3	64	7	0.02
Ivory Coast	17	30	0	6	5	178	0	0.03
Kenya	80	64	2	62	8	28	78	0.02
Liberia	27	18	0	18	6	55	21	0.01
Madagascar	55	29	3	24	4	35	27	0.03
Malawi	30	18	0	18	7	56	37	0.01
Mali	33	30	4	25	4	29	35	0.01
Mauritania	5	4	0	4	1	48	2	0.10
Mauritius	35	20	4	16	6	24	25	0.04
Morocco	24	13	1	12	5	130	1	0.15
Mozambique	65	52	10	42	7	46	36	0.09
Namibia	42	29	1	28	8	20	61	0.02
Niger	19	13	2	11	5	76	11	0.00
Nigeria	88	80	1	79	7	16	131	0.09
Republic of the Congo	14	11	0	11	1	29	5	0.09
Senegal	33	19	0	19	7	54	27	0.02
Sierra Leone	25	19	2	17	5	36	17	0.01
South Africa	39	26	8	18	7	117	3	0.06
Tanzania	198	182	91	91	7	25	126	0.15
The Gambia	20	13	1	12	4	31	14	0.02
Togo	52	31	0	31	5	33	40	0.03
Uganda	61	48	5	43	8	47	49	0.02
Zambia	51	41	3	38	7	18	108	0.01
Zimbabwe	38	40	0	27	6	50	33	0.03

Note. Raw labels are distinct ethnic-group answers in the analysed rounds; cleaned labels are distinct labels after cleaning, pooled over all rounds; cells are group-by-survey combinations. Tanzania's many raw labels reflect fine-grained responses that were merged into 91 groups.

Cleaned labels also include rounds of the respondent extract that are outside the analysis, so they can exceed raw labels (Angola, Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe).

Table A6. Representative merges of ethnic labels

Country	Cleaned label	Merged into	Respondents	Match score
Botswana	mohurutshe	mokhurutshe	90	95
Burkina Faso	dafin	dafing	11	91
Cameroon	moudang	moudan	26	91
Ethiopia	agnwak	agnawak	10	91
Gabon	nzébi/métié	nzébi/métiè	317	91
Ghana	ewe/anglo	ewe/anlo	848	94
Guinea	soussou	sossou	761	92
Kenya	rendile	rendille	7	93
Madagascar	mahafafly	mahafaly	15	93
Mali	peulh/fulfude	peulh / fulfude	301	93
Mauritius	hindou	hindu	982	91
Morocco	sussi	soussi	108	91
Mozambique	machangana	changana	123	94
Namibia	kavango rukwangali/rumanyo/hambukushu	kavango rukwangali rumanyo hambukushu	239	95
Niger	kanuri	kanouri	46	92
Nigeria	okirika	okrika	7	92
Sierra Leone	themne	temne	768	91
South Africa	setswana/ tswana	setswana/tswana	220	97

A4. Ethnicity of the head of executive

Of the 174 analysed surveys, the leader's group is coded with high confidence in 142, medium confidence in 29 and low confidence in 3. Results in Table 3 of the main text are the same when only high-confidence codings are used.

Table A7. Ethnic group of the head of executive at fieldwork

Country	Rounds	Leader	Group coded	Confidence
Algeria	5, 6	Abdelaziz Bouteflika	Arab	medium
Angola	9, 10	Joao Lourenco	Mbundu	medium
Benin	3	Mathieu Kerekou	Somba (Ditammari)	high
Benin	4, 5, 6	Thomas Yayi Boni	Yoruba (Nago)	medium
Benin	8, 9	Patrice Talon	Fon	high
Botswana	3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Festus Mogae / Ian Khama	Bangwato	high
Botswana	8, 9	Mokgweetsi Masisi	Bangwaketse	low
Burkina Faso	4, 5, 7, 8	Blaise Compaore / Roch Kabore	Mossi	high
Burundi	5	Pierre Nkurunziza	Hutu	high
Cameroon	5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10	Paul Biya	Beti (Bulu)	high
Chad	10	Mahamat Idriss Deby	Zaghawa	high
Ethiopia	8, 9	Abiy Ahmed	Oromo	high
Gabon	6, 7, 8, 9	Ali Bongo	Teke	high
Ghana	3, 4	John Kufuor	Akan (Asante)	high
Ghana	5	John Atta Mills	Akan (Fante)	high
Ghana	6	John Mahama	Gonja	high
Ghana	7, 8, 9	Nana Akufo-Addo	Akan (Akyem)	high
Guinea	5, 6, 8	Alpha Conde	Malinke	high
Ivory Coast	5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Alassane Ouattara	Mande du nord (Dioula)	high
Kenya	3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Mwai Kibaki / Uhuru Kenyatta	Kikuyu	high
Kenya	10	William Ruto	Kalenjin	high
Liberia	4, 5, 6	Ellen Johnson Sirleaf	Gola (mixed)	medium
Liberia	7, 8, 9	George Weah	Kru	high
Madagascar	3, 4, 7, 9	Ravalomanana / Rajaonarimampianina / Rajoelina	Merina	medium
Malawi	3, 4, 6, 7, 8	Bingu and Peter Mutharika	Lomwe	high
Malawi	5	Joyce Banda	Yao	high
Malawi	9	Lazarus Chakwera	Chewa	high

Country	Rounds	Leader	Group coded	Confidence
Mali	4	Amadou Toumani Toure	Fulani (Peul)	high
Mali	6, 7, 8	Ibrahim Boubacar Keita	Malinke	medium
Mauritania	9	Mohamed Ould Ghazouani	Maure	high
Mauritius	5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10	Navin Ramgoolam / Pravind Jugnauth	Hindu	high
Morocco	6	Abdelilah Benkirane (head of government)	Arab	high
Morocco	7, 8	Saadeddine El Othmani (head of government)	Amazigh (Soussi)	high
Morocco	9, 10	Aziz Akhannouch (head of government)	Amazigh (Soussi)	high
Mozambique	3, 4, 5	Armando Guebuza	Changana (Tsonga)	medium
Mozambique	6, 7, 8, 9	Filipe Nyusi	Makonde	high
Namibia	3, 4, 5, 6, 10	Hifikepunye Pohamba / Nangolo Mbumba	Ovambo	high
Namibia	7, 8, 9	Hage Geingob	Damara	high
Niger	5, 6, 7, 8	Mahamadou Issoufou	Hausa	high
Niger	9	Mohamed Bazoum	Arab	high
Nigeria	3	Olusegun Obasanjo	Yoruba	high
Nigeria	4	Umaru Yar’Adua	Fulani	high
Nigeria	5, 6	Goodluck Jonathan	Ijaw	high
Nigeria	7, 8, 9	Muhammadu Buhari	Fulani	high
Republic of the Congo	9	Denis Sassou Nguesso	Mbochi	high
Senegal	3, 4	Abdoulaye Wade	Wolof	high
Senegal	5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Macky Sall	Haalpulaar	high
Sierra Leone	5, 6	Ernest Bai Koroma	Temne and Limba	medium
Sierra Leone	7, 8, 9	Julius Maada Bio	Sherbro	high
South Africa	3, 4	Thabo Mbeki	Xhosa	high
South Africa	5, 6	Jacob Zuma	Zulu	high
South Africa	7, 8, 9	Cyril Ramaphosa	Venda	high
Tanzania	3	Benjamin Mkapa	Makua	high
Tanzania	4, 5, 6	Jakaya Kikwete	Kwere	medium

Country	Rounds	Leader	Group coded	Confidence
Tanzania	7, 8	John Magufuli	Sukuma	high
Tanzania	9	Samia Suluhu Hassan	Zanzibari (Shirazi)	low
The Gambia	7, 8, 9, 10	Adama Barrow	Fula	medium
Togo	5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Faure Gnassingbe	Kabye	high
Uganda	3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10	Yoweri Museveni	Banyankole	high
Zambia	3	Levy Mwanawasa	Lenje	high
Zambia	4	Rupiah Banda	Chewa	medium
Zambia	5, 6	Michael Sata	Bemba	high
Zambia	7, 8	Edgar Lungu	Nsenga	high
Zambia	9	Hakainde Hichilema	Tonga	high
Zimbabwe	4, 5, 6, 7	Robert Mugabe	Shona (Zezuru)	high
Zimbabwe	8, 9	Emmerson Mnangagwa	Shona (Karanga)	high

Note. The leader in office at the median fieldwork date. For Morocco, the head of government. Confidence is high for well documented cases, medium where sources differ or parentage is mixed, and low where the group is inferred from place of origin. Results hold when only high confidence codings are used.

A5. The 67 election pairs

Table A8 lists every pair of consecutive surveys with an executive election between them. Where power changed hands, the challenger is the party that took power. Otherwise, it is the largest opposition party among supporters in the earlier survey. The last column compares this coding with the official runner-up. The coded challenger is the runner-up's party in 30 of 54 non-turnover pairs. I count a match when it is the runner-up's own party, its direct predecessor or the core party of the runner-up's alliance. Section D reports the comparison with the challenger recoded as the runner-up's party. Where two executive elections fall between the surveys (Kenya 2017, Zambia 2008 and 2016), the later one is used.

Table A8. Election pairs, challenger coding and election results

Country and rounds	Election	Incumbent party → coded challenger	Winner's party	Runner-up's party	Margin	Turnover / challenger is runner-up
Angola 9–10	2022-08-24 (legi.)	MPLA → UNITA	MPLA	UNITA	7.2	no / yes
Benin 4–5	2011-03-13 (pres.)	FCBE → PRD	Independent (FCBE-backed)	Party of the Democratic Renewal (PRD)	17.5	no / yes
Benin 8–9	2021-04-11 (pres.)	Union Progressiste (UP) → Bloc Républicain (BR)	Independent	Cowry Forces for an Emerging Benin (FCBE)	74.9	no / no
Botswana 4–5	2009-10-16 (legi.)	BDP → BNF	BDP	BNF	31.3	no / yes
Botswana 6–7	2014-10-24 (legi.)	BDP → BCP	BDP	UDC	16.4	no / no
Botswana 8–9	2019-10-23 (legi.)	BDP → UDC	BDP	UDC	16.8	no / yes
Burkina Faso 4–5	2010-11-21 (pres.)	CDP → ADF/RDA	Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP)	Party for Democracy and Socialism	72.0	no / no
Cameroon 7–8	2018-10-07 (pres.)	RDPC → SDF	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM)	Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC)	57.0	no / no
Ethiopia 8–9	2021-06-21 (legi.)	EPRDF (TPLF/OPDO/ANDM/SEPDM) → Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	Prosperity Party	EZEMA	86.2	no / no

Country and rounds	Election	Incumbent party → coded challenger	Winner's party	Runner-up's party	Margin	Turnover / challenger is runner-up
Gabon 6–7	2016-08-27 (pres.)	PDG (Parti Démocratique Gabonais) → UN (Union Nationale)	Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG)	Union of Forces for Change (UFC)	3.4	no / yes
Ghana 4–5	2008-12-28 (pres.)	NPP → NDC	National Democratic Congress (NDC)	New Patriotic Party (NPP)	0.5	yes
Ghana 6–7	2016-12-07 (pres.)	NDC → NPP	New Patriotic Party (NPP)	National Democratic Congress (NDC)	9.2	yes
Ghana 8–9	2020-12-07 (pres.)	NPP → NDC	New Patriotic Party (NPP)	National Democratic Congress (NDC)	3.9	no / yes
Guinea 6–8	2015-10-11 (pres.)	Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinée (RPG) → Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG)	Rally of the Guinean People (RPG)	Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG)	26.4	no / yes
Ivory Coast 6–7	2015-10-25 (pres.)	Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) → Front populaire ivoirien (FPI)	Rally of the Republicans/RHDP	Ivorian Popular Front (FPI)/Alliance of Democratic Forces	74.4	no / yes
Ivory Coast 8–9	2020-10-31 (pres.)	Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP) → Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI)	RHDP	Independent	93.3	no / no

Country and rounds	Election	Incumbent party → coded challenger	Winner's party	Runner-up's party	Margin	Turnover / challenger is runner-up
Kenya 3–4	2007-12-27 (pres.)	National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) → Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	Party of National Unity (PNU)	Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)	2.4	no / yes
Kenya 7–8	2017-10-26 (pres.)	Jubilee Party/JAP → Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)	Jubilee Party	National Super Alliance (NASA)	97.3	no / yes
Kenya 9–10	2022-08-09 (pres.)	Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP) → United Democratic Alliance (UDA)	United Democratic Alliance (UDA)	Azimio la Umoja	1.6	yes
Liberia 4–5	2011-11-08 (pres.)	Unity Party (UP) → Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)	Unity Party (UP)	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)	81.4	no / yes
Liberia 6–7	2017-12-26 (pres.)	Unity Party (UP) → Coalition for Democratic Change (CDC)	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)	Unity Party (UP)	23.1	yes
Madagascar 3–4	2006-12-03 (pres.)	TIM → AREMA	Tiako i Madagasikara (TIM)	Independent	43.1	no / no
Madagascar 7–9	2018-12-19 (pres.)	HVM → TGV	Young Malagasies Determined (TGV)	Tiako i Madagasikara (TIM)	11.3	yes
Malawi 6–7	2014-05-20 (pres.)	PP → DPP	Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)	Malawi Congress Party (MCP)	8.6	yes

Country and rounds	Election	Incumbent party → coded challenger	Winner's party	Runner-up's party	Margin	Turnover / challenger is runner-up
Malawi 7–8	2019-05-21 (pres.)	DPP → MCP	Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)	Malawi Congress Party (MCP)	3.2	no / yes
Malawi 8–9	2020-06-23 (pres.)	DPP → MCP	Malawi Congress Party (MCP)	Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)	19.4	yes
Mali 7–8	2018-08-12 (pres.)	RPM → ADEMA – PASJ	Rally for Mali (RPM)	Union for the Republic and Democracy (URD)	34.3	no / no
Mauritius 6–7	2014-12-10 (legi.)	Mauritian Labour Party → Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien (MSM)	MSM-led coalition	Labour-led coalition (incumbent)	11.3	yes
Mauritius 7–8	2019-11-07 (legi.)	Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien (MSM) → Organisation du Peuple Rodriguais (OPR)	MSM-led coalition	Labour-led coalition	4.4	no / no
Morocco 6–7	2016-10-07 (legi.)	Justice and Development Party (PJD) → Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)	PJD	PAM	6.9	no / no
Morocco 8–9	2021-09-08 (legi.)	Justice and Development Party (PJD) → National Rally of Independents (RNI)	RNI	PAM	9.2	yes

Country and rounds	Election	Incumbent party → coded challenger	Winner's party	Runner-up's party	Margin	Turnover / challenger is runner-up
Mozambique 4–5	2009-10-28 (pres.)	FRELIMO → RENAMO	FRELIMO	RENAMO	58.6	no / yes
Mozambique 5–6	2014-10-15 (pres.)	FRELIMO → MDM	FRELIMO	RENAMO	20.4	no / no
Mozambique 7–8	2019-10-15 (pres.)	FRELIMO → RENAMO	FRELIMO	RENAMO	52.0	no / yes
Namibia 4–5	2009-11-28 (pres.)	SWAPO Party of Namibia (SWAPO) → Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP)	SWAPO	Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP)	65.3	no / yes
Namibia 6–7	2014-11-28 (pres.)	SWAPO Party of Namibia (SWAPO) → Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP)	SWAPO	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)	81.8	no / no
Namibia 8–9	2019-11-27 (pres.)	SWAPO Party of Namibia (SWAPO) → Popular Democratic Movement (PDM)	SWAPO	Independent	26.9	no / no
Niger 6–7	2016-03-20 (pres.)	PNDS Tarayya → MNSD Nassara	PNDS	MODEN/FA	85.0	no / no
Niger 8–9	2021-02-21 (pres.)	PNDS Tarayya → MODEN FA Lumana	PNDS	RDR-Tabbat	11.3	no / yes

Country and rounds	Election	Incumbent party → coded challenger	Winner's party	Runner-up's party	Margin	Turnover / challenger is runner-up
Nigeria 3–4	2007-04-21 (pres.)	PDP → ANPP	People's Democratic Party (PDP)	All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP)	50.9	no / yes
Nigeria 4–5	2011-04-16 (pres.)	PDP → ANPP	People's Democratic Party (PDP)	Congress for Progressive Change (CPC)	26.9	no / no
Nigeria 6–7	2015-03-28 (pres.)	PDP → APC	All Progressives Congress (APC)	People's Democratic Party (PDP)	9.0	yes
Nigeria 7–8	2019-02-23 (pres.)	APC → PDP	All Progressives Congress (APC)	People's Democratic Party (PDP)	14.4	no / yes
Senegal 3–4	2007-02-25 (pres.)	PDS → PS	Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS)	Rewmi	41.0	no / no
Senegal 7–8	2019-02-24 (pres.)	APR → PDS	Alliance for the Republic (APR)	Rewmi	37.8	no / no
Sierra Leone 5–6	2012-11-17 (pres.)	APC → SLPP	All People's Congress (APC)	Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)	21.3	no / yes
Sierra Leone 6–7	2018-03-31 (pres.)	APC → SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)	All People's Congress (APC, incumbent)	3.6	yes
South Africa 4–5	2009-04-22 (legi.)	African National Congress (ANC) → Democratic Alliance – Democratic Party (DA-DP)	ANC	DA	49.2	no / yes
South Africa 5–6	2014-05-07 (legi.)	African National Congress (ANC) → Democratic Alliance (DA)	ANC	DA	39.9	no / yes

Country and rounds	Election	Incumbent party → coded challenger	Winner's party	Runner-up's party	Margin	Turnover / challenger is runner-up
South Africa 7–8	2019-05-08 (legi.)	African National Congress (ANC) → Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	ANC	DA	36.7	no / no
Tanzania 3–4	2005-12-14 (pres.)	CCM → CUF	Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)	Civic United Front (CUF)	68.6	no / yes
Tanzania 4–5	2010-10-31 (pres.)	CCM → CUF	Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)	Chadema	35.8	no / no
Tanzania 6–7	2015-10-25 (pres.)	CCM → CHADEMA	Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)	Chadema	18.5	no / yes
Tanzania 7–8	2020-10-28 (pres.)	CCM → CHADEMA	Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)	Chadema	71.4	no / yes
The Gambia 8–9	2021-12-04 (pres.)	National People's Party (NPP) → Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC)	National People's Party (NPP)	United Democratic Party (UDP)	25.5	no / no
Togo 6–7	2015-04-25 (pres.)	UNIR → ANC	Union for the Republic (UNIR)	National Alliance for Change (ANC)	23.6	no / yes
Togo 7–8	2020-02-22 (pres.)	UNIR → ANC	Union for the Republic (UNIR)	Patriotic Movement for Democracy and Development (MPDD)	51.3	no / no

Country and rounds	Election	Incumbent party → coded challenger	Winner's party	Runner-up's party	Margin	Turnover / challenger is runner-up
Uganda 3–4	2006-02-23 (pres.)	National Resistance Movement (NRM) → Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC)	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	21.9	no / no
Uganda 4–5	2011-02-18 (pres.)	National Resistance Movement (NRM) → Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	42.4	no / yes
Uganda 6–7	2016-02-18 (pres.)	National Resistance Movement (NRM) → FDC	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	25.0	no / yes
Uganda 8–9	2021-01-14 (pres.)	National Resistance Movement (NRM) → FDC	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	National Unity Platform (NUP)	23.3	no / no
Zambia 3–4	2008-10-30 (pres.)	Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) → United Party for National Development (UPND)	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD)	Patriotic Front (PF)	2.0	no / no
Zambia 4–5	2011-09-20 (pres.)	Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) → Patriotic Front (PF)	Patriotic Front (PF)	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD)	6.7	yes

Country and rounds	Election	Incumbent party → coded challenger	Winner's party	Runner-up's party	Margin	Turnover / challenger is runner-up
Zambia 6–7	2016-08-11 (pres.)	Patriotic Front (PF) → United Party for National Development (UPND)	Patriotic Front (PF)	United Party for National Development (UPND)	2.7	no / yes
Zambia 8–9	2021-08-12 (pres.)	Patriotic Front (PF) → United Party for National Development (UPND)	United Party for National Development (UPND)	Patriotic Front (PF)	20.3	yes
Zimbabwe 5–6	2013-07-31 (pres.)	ZANU PF → MDC-T	ZANU-PF	Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T)	27.5	no / yes
Zimbabwe 7–8	2018-07-30 (pres.)	ZANU PF → MDC-T	ZANU-PF	Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC Alliance)	6.5	no / yes

Note. Winner and runner-up are given by party (candidate names are in the replication files). The last column marks whether power changed hands and, where it did not, whether the coded challenger is the runner-up's party. Margin is the difference in vote share between winner and runner-up in the decisive round (seat shares for legislative elections where noted in the replication files). Sources for each election are listed in the replication files.

B. Measurement validation

B1. Descriptive statistics

Table B1. Descriptive statistics, Afrobarometer analysis sample

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Satisfaction with democracy (1 to 4)	230,238	2.44	1.00	1.00	4.00
Trust in electoral commission (0 to 3)	228,172	1.50	1.12	0.00	3.00
Own group treated unfairly (0 to 3)	193,678	0.64	0.92	0.00	3.00
Democracy preferable (0 or 1)	230,008	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00
Alignment with governing party, same survey (log ratio)	244,374	-0.15	0.62	-4.72	2.28
Alignment with governing party, previous survey (log ratio)	174,139	-0.16	0.65	-4.57	1.99
Outside largest supporting group (0 or 1)	244,374	0.70	0.46	0.00	1.00
Feels close to governing party	244,374	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Feels close to another party	244,374	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Age	243,135	36.72	14.42	18.00	100.00
Female	231,240	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Education (0 to 9)	243,718	3.41	2.17	0.00	9.00
Urban	240,093	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00
Coethnic with the head of executive	244,374	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00
Services in the enumeration area (share of six)	244,313	0.54	0.30	0.00	1.00
Lived poverty (0 to 4)	244,295	1.31	0.94	0.00	4.00
Government handling, four areas (1 to 4)	242,442	2.24	0.74	1.00	4.00
Trust in the president (0 to 3)	235,351	1.73	1.14	0.00	3.00
Country's economic condition (1 to 5)	241,169	2.50	1.29	1.00	5.00
Own living conditions (1 to 5)	243,548	2.69	1.24	1.00	5.00
Last election free and fair (1 to 4)	225,265	2.89	1.13	1.00	4.00
Extent of democracy (1 to 4)	227,171	2.68	0.92	1.00	4.00

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Trust in the ruling party (0 to 3)	235,806	1.48	1.14	0.00	3.00
Trust in opposition parties (0 to 3)	232,485	1.19	1.04	0.00	3.00
Trust in the courts (0 to 3)	234,420	1.67	1.07	0.00	3.00
National over ethnic identity (1 to 5)	240,878	3.57	1.19	1.00	5.00

Note. Respondents with a valid ethnic group in 174 surveys from 35 countries, Rounds 3 to 10 (2005 to 2025).

B2. What alignment measures, cell sizes and reliability

Bayes identity. With $p = \Pr(G|D)$ and $s = \Pr(G)$, $p/s = \Pr(D|G)/\Pr(D)$. Before shrinkage, the ratio is the group's rate of attachment to the governing party divided by the party's national attachment rate. A numerical check over all 3,191 group-by-survey cells gives a maximum absolute difference of 8.9e-16 between the two expressions.

Cell sizes. There are 3,191 group-by-survey cells. At the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles, group size is 5, 11, 29, 80 and 195 respondents. The number of governing-party supporters in the group is 1, 2, 8, 23 and 54 at the same percentiles. Because large groups contribute more respondents, the median respondent is in a cell of 205. The shares of respondents in cells smaller than 10, 20 and 30 are 1.3, 4.8 and 8.0 percent. Governing parties have between 153 (10th percentile) and 840 (90th percentile) supporters per survey.

Reliability. I split each survey at random into two halves, 20 times. Each time, I computed alignment in each half and correlated the two measures across cells, weighted by cell size. The average correlation is 0.69 in levels and 0.52 within country-groups over time. By the Spearman-Brown formula, this implies full-sample reliabilities of 0.82 and 0.69. In cells with 30 or more respondents, the within-group reliability is 0.82.

B3. Same-sample construction, shrinkage prior and cell size

For the same-survey measure, each respondent's own answer enters the alignment assigned to her. The leave-one-out measure removes it. Cross-fitting gives each respondent the alignment computed in the other random half of her survey. Half-sample alignment is less reliable, so the cross-fitted estimate is biased toward zero. The expected shrinkage is the ratio of half-sample to full-sample reliability, about 0.76. Correcting for it brings 0.11 to about 0.15, the leave-one-out estimate. Table B2 also varies the prior and drops small cells. Weaker priors and small cells add noise and pull the estimate down. The main specification, with a prior of ten respondents and all cells, is therefore conservative.

Table B2. Leave-one-out, cross-fitting, shrinkage prior and minimum cell size

Alignment measure or sample	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction	Electoral commission trust
Main: same survey, prior of 10	0.179*** (0.023)	0.169*** (0.023)	0.209*** (0.027)
Leave-one-out alignment	0.148*** (0.026)	0.140*** (0.025)	0.172*** (0.030)
Main alignment, leave-one-out sample	0.181*** (0.023)	0.170*** (0.024)	0.212*** (0.027)
Cross-fitted alignment, mean of 20 splits	0.112*** (0.022)	0.106*** (0.021)	0.131*** (0.027)
Raw ratio, no prior (cells with supporters)	0.212*** (0.024)	0.199*** (0.027)	0.248*** (0.025)
Prior of 1	0.119*** (0.022)	0.112*** (0.021)	0.140*** (0.026)
Prior of 5	0.158*** (0.023)	0.149*** (0.023)	0.185*** (0.027)
Prior of 20	0.204*** (0.023)	0.193*** (0.024)	0.238*** (0.027)
Prior of 50	0.248*** (0.024)	0.235*** (0.026)	0.289*** (0.028)
Empirical Bayes prior (per survey)	0.250*** (0.029)	0.231*** (0.033)	0.296*** (0.029)
Cells with 10+ respondents	0.200*** (0.024)	0.188*** (0.025)	0.233*** (0.027)
Cells with 20+ respondents	0.224*** (0.023)	0.212*** (0.026)	0.260*** (0.025)
Cells with 30+ respondents	0.238*** (0.024)	0.227*** (0.027)	0.277*** (0.025)
Cells with 50+ respondents	0.246*** (0.026)	0.234*** (0.030)	0.286*** (0.027)
Frozen: prior of 10 (main)	0.103*** (0.024)	0.107*** (0.024)	0.112*** (0.030)
Frozen: prior of 1	0.060*** (0.019)	0.065*** (0.019)	0.064** (0.024)
Frozen: prior of 5	0.088*** (0.023)	0.092*** (0.023)	0.095*** (0.028)
Frozen: prior of 20	0.121*** (0.026)	0.125*** (0.026)	0.133*** (0.031)
Frozen: prior of 50	0.151*** (0.029)	0.155*** (0.030)	0.168*** (0.035)
Frozen: empirical Bayes prior	0.148*** (0.033)	0.154*** (0.034)	0.159*** (0.040)
Frozen: cells with 10+ respondents	0.117*** (0.023)	0.121*** (0.024)	0.127*** (0.029)
Frozen: cells with 30+ respondents	0.149*** (0.026)	0.154*** (0.027)	0.163*** (0.032)
Frozen: cells with 50+ respondents	0.157*** (0.026)	0.164*** (0.029)	0.169*** (0.033)

Note. Models as in Table 1 of the main text. The empirical Bayes prior is chosen separately in each survey. It maximizes the Dirichlet-multinomial likelihood of the governing party's supporter counts, given group shares. Its median is 113 respondents (interquartile range 45 to 428). The cross-fitting row reports the mean coefficient and mean standard error across 20 splits. Its stars use the largest p-value across splits.

B4. The democratic confidence index

Satisfaction with democracy and trust in the electoral commission correlate at 0.37 (Cronbach's alpha for two items 0.54). I combine them because both concern how the democratic process works, not the regime itself. Every result is also reported for each item. The weighting does not drive the results. An index of the two items rescaled to 0-1 correlates with the standardized index at 0.999. Its standardized version gives 0.217*** (0.028) with same-survey alignment and 0.124*** (0.029) with frozen alignment.

B5. Ethnic groups defined by Ethnic Power Relations

The main analysis uses the ethnic categories that respondents report in Afrobarometer. These categories are fine-grained. Some also change their labels across rounds. As a check, I aggregate them into the politically relevant groups of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data (Vogt et al. 2015).

I link each Afrobarometer category in Rounds 3 to 8 to the EPR groups of the same country through the language tree, using LEDA (Müller-Crepon, Pengl and Bormann 2022). Two groups are linked when they share a dialect. If a category links to more than one EPR group, it takes the group that covers the largest share of its dialects. Categories in Rounds 9 and 10 take the assignment of the harmonized group they belong to. Categories that link to no EPR group are left out, because EPR does not code them as politically relevant. LEDA has no Afrobarometer lists for Chad, Mauritania and the Republic of the Congo.

The EPR sample contains 186,145 respondents (76 percent of the analysis sample) in 167 surveys from 32 countries. The 412 Afrobarometer groups that link to EPR collapse into 151 EPR groups. I rebuild alignment with EPR groups exactly as in the main analysis, both in the outcome survey and frozen at the previous round. Same-survey alignment based on EPR groups correlates at 0.84 with the main measure.

Table B3 reports the results. In the same respondents, the main measure gives 0.21 for the democratic confidence index. With EPR groups, the estimate is 0.26 with same-survey alignment and 0.17 with frozen alignment (wild bootstrap $p < .001$ and $p = .002$). Satisfaction, electoral commission trust and perceived unfair treatment move in the same way. Support for democracy as a form of government again does not move. The EPR coefficients are larger, but EPR-based alignment also varies less (standard deviation 0.50 against 0.61). Per standard deviation of alignment, the two estimates are almost the same (0.12 and 0.13). Holding EPR inclusion in executive power constant changes the alignment estimate very little (0.26). Alignment and EPR inclusion correlate at only 0.10. As in the CSES analysis, alignment captures something different from formal inclusion. EPR status could be matched for 90 percent of the EPR sample, so the models with EPR inclusion use somewhat fewer respondents.

Table B3. Alignment with the governing party when ethnic groups are defined by Ethnic Power Relations

	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction with democracy	Trust in electoral commission	Group treated unfairly	Democracy preferable
Afrobarometer groups, same respondents	0.206*** (0.027)	0.192*** (0.029)	0.242*** (0.029)	−0.126*** (0.021)	0.005 (0.008)
EPR groups, same-survey alignment	0.257*** (0.027)	0.243*** (0.029)	0.297*** (0.029)	−0.159*** (0.022)	0.009 (0.010)
Wild cluster bootstrap p	< .001	< .001	< .001	.002	.458
EPR groups, frozen alignment	0.171*** (0.029)	0.175*** (0.032)	0.186*** (0.036)	−0.124*** (0.026)	0.006 (0.009)
Wild cluster bootstrap p	.002	.004	.003	.006	.522
EPR groups, same-survey, EPR inclusion held constant	0.256*** (0.025)	0.243*** (0.028)	0.295*** (0.027)	−0.158*** (0.022)	0.009 (0.010)
EPR inclusion in executive power	0.136*** (0.048)	0.089** (0.040)	0.180** (0.071)	−0.059 (0.048)	−0.001 (0.014)
EPR groups, frozen, EPR inclusion held constant	0.164*** (0.026)	0.169*** (0.032)	0.174*** (0.025)	−0.121*** (0.029)	0.004 (0.009)
EPR inclusion in executive power	0.229*** (0.041)	0.178*** (0.031)	0.307*** (0.066)	−0.151* (0.084)	0.010 (0.009)
Respondents (same-survey)	152,724	161,720	159,966	133,199	161,920
Respondents (frozen)	119,063	124,907	123,681	114,305	124,810

Note. OLS with survey and country-by-group fixed effects (EPR groups, except in the first row) and controls for age, gender, education and urban residence. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The first row uses the main Afrobarometer-based alignment in the respondents who belong to an EPR group. EPR inclusion equals one for groups with status monopoly, dominant, senior partner or junior partner in the fieldwork year (EPR Core 2021; 2021 for later surveys). Wild cluster bootstrap p-values use Webb weights, 9,999 replications and the null imposed. Stars use clustered standard errors. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.

C. Robustness of the within-group estimates

Table C1. Robustness of the alignment effect

Specification	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction with democracy	Trust in electoral commission	Group treated unfairly
Alignment built with survey weights	0.173*** (0.022)	0.164*** (0.022)	0.202*** (0.026)	-0.094*** (0.017)
Governing coalition instead of the executive party	0.187*** (0.022)	0.174*** (0.021)	0.222*** (0.029)	-0.110*** (0.018)
Survey weights in the regression	0.181*** (0.023)	0.173*** (0.023)	0.210*** (0.028)	-0.104*** (0.020)
Nonpartisans only	0.114*** (0.017)	0.113*** (0.018)	0.123*** (0.021)	-0.070*** (0.019)
Controlling own party attachment	0.099*** (0.017)	0.094*** (0.019)	0.113*** (0.019)	-0.065*** (0.016)
Excluding Mauritius and South Africa	0.186*** (0.023)	0.176*** (0.023)	0.216*** (0.027)	-0.103*** (0.018)
Excluding presidential alliance codings	0.177*** (0.024)	0.169*** (0.024)	0.204*** (0.028)	-0.098*** (0.018)
Surveys with 100 or more governing party supporters	0.186*** (0.023)	0.175*** (0.024)	0.216*** (0.027)	-0.105*** (0.017)
Countries with a change of governing party	0.209*** (0.025)	0.195*** (0.026)	0.243*** (0.029)	-0.120*** (0.020)
Countries without a change of governing party	0.108*** (0.026)	0.106*** (0.030)	0.125*** (0.032)	-0.050*** (0.012)
Below median electoral democracy	0.134*** (0.023)	0.127*** (0.025)	0.161*** (0.029)	-0.034** (0.015)
Above median electoral democracy	0.199*** (0.033)	0.186*** (0.033)	0.233*** (0.039)	-0.115*** (0.021)
Alignment × electoral democracy (interaction)	0.029 (0.145)	0.009 (0.136)	0.063 (0.180)	-0.084 (0.109)
Placebo, alignment with the main opposition party	-0.052*** (0.010)	-0.050*** (0.010)	-0.061*** (0.012)	0.035*** (0.009)
Group by survey cells, equal weights	0.107*** (0.016)	0.098*** (0.014)	0.126*** (0.021)	-0.044*** (0.014)

Specification	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction with democracy	Trust in electoral commission	Group treated unfairly
Group by survey cells, equal weights, frozen alignment	0.036*** (0.013)	0.039*** (0.012)	0.038** (0.016)	-0.018 (0.012)
Wild cluster bootstrap p value, same survey alignment	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002
Wild cluster bootstrap p value, same survey alignment, turnover countries only	0.0015	0.0010	0.0017	0.0043
Wild cluster bootstrap p value, frozen alignment	0.0069	0.0042	0.0104	0.0173
Wild cluster bootstrap p value, frozen alignment, turnover countries only	0.0053	0.0049	0.0087	0.0218

Note. Coefficient on log alignment measured in the same survey unless stated. Survey and country by group fixed effects and controls as in Table 1. The placebo row reports alignment with the main opposition party's support base, holding alignment with the governing party constant. Wild cluster bootstrap uses Webb weights, 9,999 replications and the null imposed. Electoral democracy is the V-Dem polyarchy index in the fieldwork year.

Ordered outcomes. A full ordered logit with about 1,100 fixed effects is not practical to estimate. Table C2 instead estimates fixed-effects logit models at each threshold of the two four-category outcomes. Alignment raises the odds of being above every threshold by similar amounts, as a proportional-odds relationship would. The same-survey model at the top threshold of electoral-commission trust did not converge because of the many fixed effects.

Table C2. Fixed-effects logit at each threshold (log odds)

Outcome and threshold	Same-survey alignment	Frozen alignment	Share above threshold
Satisfaction ≥ 2	0.283*** (0.041)	0.167*** (0.060)	0.78
Satisfaction ≥ 3	0.382*** (0.052)	0.263*** (0.055)	0.50
Satisfaction ≥ 4	0.374*** (0.050)	0.238*** (0.051)	0.16
Electoral commission trust ≥ 1	0.376*** (0.047)	0.226*** (0.060)	0.75
Electoral commission trust ≥ 2	0.383*** (0.050)	0.214*** (0.057)	0.50
Electoral commission trust ≥ 3	did not converge	0.161*** (0.059)	0.24

Note. Survey and country-by-group fixed effects, controls as in Table 1, standard errors clustered by country.

Placebo alignment with other parties. Table C3 adds alignment with the main opposition party and with a third party. The third party is the second-largest opposition party. It is used in the 137 surveys where it has at least 20 supporters.

Table C3. Alignment with governing, main opposition and third parties in one model

Term	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction	Electoral commission trust	Group treated unfairly
Governing party	0.135*** (0.023)	0.128*** (0.025)	0.157*** (0.026)	−0.058*** (0.016)
Main opposition party	−0.054*** (0.012)	−0.048*** (0.012)	−0.067*** (0.014)	0.032*** (0.010)
Third party	−0.014** (0.006)	−0.007 (0.006)	−0.023*** (0.007)	0.000 (0.009)

Sensitivity to unobserved confounding. Following Cinelli and Hazlett (2020), Table C4 asks how much the estimate would change under a confounder as strong as an observed benchmark, or *k* times as strong. The most plausible confounders here are shocks to particular groups at particular times. The benchmarks are therefore group-level factors that change over time. These are executive coethnicity and the group's average education, urban residence and lived poverty in the survey. Individual attachment to the governing party is shown for comparison. These are sensitivity statistics, not evidence that confounding is absent.

Table C4. Sensitivity of the democratic confidence index estimate to confounding as strong as observed benchmarks

Alignment	Benchmark	Partial R^2 with alignment	Partial R^2 with outcome	Estimate	Adjusted, 1×	Adjusted, 2×	Adjusted, 3×
Same survey	Executive coethnicity	0.0581	0.0005	0.169	0.156	0.143	0.129
Same survey	Group mean education	0.0022	0.0000	0.179	0.179	0.179	0.178
Same survey	Group mean urban residence	0.0055	0.0000	0.180	0.179	0.179	0.179
Same survey	Group mean lived poverty	0.0026	0.0008	0.177	0.174	0.171	0.168
Same survey	Own attachment to governing party	0.0295	0.0452	0.107	0.030	−0.049	−0.131
Frozen	Executive coethnicity	0.0602	0.0005	0.092	0.079	0.066	0.051
Frozen	Group mean education	0.0044	0.0000	0.103	0.103	0.102	0.101
Frozen	Group mean urban residence	0.0003	0.0000	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.103
Frozen	Group mean lived poverty	0.0012	0.0010	0.101	0.098	0.096	0.094
Frozen	Own attachment to governing party	0.0062	0.0505	0.069	0.034	−0.001	−0.036

Note. The estimate column is the alignment coefficient in a model that includes the benchmark. Adjusted values are the bias-adjusted estimates for a confounder 1, 2 or 3 times as strongly related to alignment and to the outcome as the benchmark. Robustness values: 0.080 (same survey) and 0.045 (frozen).

How to read Table C4. Confounders as strong as coethnicity or the group-level benchmarks barely move the estimates; even three times as strong, they leave most of each estimate in place. Own attachment to the governing party is a much more demanding benchmark. It is an individual trait with a far stronger link to the outcome (partial R^2 of about 0.05, against 0.001 or less for the group benchmarks). A confounder as strong as this benchmark reduces the same-survey estimate from 0.107 to 0.030. One twice as strong removes the frozen estimate (−0.001). The robustness value of the frozen estimate is 0.045. A group-level shock would need to explain about 4.5 percent of the residual variance of both alignment and the outcome to remove it. The table cannot show whether such a shock exists.

C5. Comparisons within regions: region-by-survey fixed effects

The main models compare a group with itself over time, net of everything common to a survey. Shocks that hit a region at a particular time, such as regional favoritism, a drought or new roads,

could still move both a group's tie to the governing party and its evaluations. Table C5 replaces survey fixed effects with region-by-survey fixed effects. Region is the first-level administrative unit recorded in each Afrobarometer file (read from the original files; 99 percent of respondents). Members of a group are then compared with respondents from other groups interviewed in the same region and survey. Almost all respondents (99 percent) live in region-surveys with two or more groups, and the standard deviation of alignment net of the fixed effects falls only from 0.38 to 0.30, so the comparison keeps most of the variation. Still, the estimates fall by about half, and by nearer three fifths for nonpartisans and for frozen alignment. With same-survey alignment they remain statistically significant for the index, satisfaction and commission trust, including among nonpartisans. With frozen alignment they remain significant for the index and satisfaction; for commission trust the wild bootstrap p-value is .077. Districts are recorded in some Round 3 to 5 files only. District-by-survey fixed effects reduce the estimate further, but in a sample of 19 countries the estimate is imprecise. The half of the association that is shared within regions may reflect regional confounding or spillovers to other groups in the same region. The group lens cannot claim it.

Table C5. Alignment with region-by-survey and district-by-survey fixed effects

	Confidence index	Satisfaction	Commissio n trust	Unfair treatment	Prefers democracy
Same survey: survey and group FE (region sample)	0.182*** (0.023) [<.001]	0.172*** (0.023) [<.001]	0.212*** (0.027) [<.001]	−0.099*** (0.018)	0.003 (0.006)
Same survey: region-by-survey and group FE	0.097*** (0.018) [<.001]	0.090*** (0.017) [<.001]	0.110*** (0.022) [<.001]	−0.055*** (0.019)	0.003 (0.003)
Same survey: region-by-survey, nonpartisans	0.046*** (0.015) [.009]	0.049*** (0.013)	0.042** (0.020)		
Same survey: region-by-survey, coethnicity held constant	0.090*** (0.017) [<.001]				
Frozen: survey and group FE (region sample)	0.103*** (0.024) [.007]	0.108*** (0.024) [.004]	0.112*** (0.030) [.011]	−0.067*** (0.020)	0.005 (0.006)
Frozen: region-by-survey and group FE	0.042** (0.016) [.035]	0.049*** (0.015) [.010]	0.039** (0.019) [.077]	−0.034* (0.020)	0.008* (0.004)
Frozen: region-by-survey, nonpartisans	0.036*** (0.011) [.004]	0.047*** (0.013)	0.026** (0.013)		
Frozen: region-by-survey, coethnicity held constant	0.034** (0.014) [.050]				
Same survey: survey and group FE (district sample, Rounds 3–5)	0.152** (0.057) [.025]	0.121* (0.059)	0.207*** (0.058)		
Same survey: district-by-survey and group FE	0.037 (0.058) [.664]	0.036 (0.054)	0.049 (0.068)		
Respondents, region-by-survey (same survey; frozen)	198,951; 142,522				

Note. Confidence index is the democratic confidence index; unfair treatment is the belief that one's group is treated unfairly; prefers democracy is the belief that democracy is preferable to any other form of government. OLS with controls for age, gender, education and urban residence and the fixed effects listed. The region sample keeps respondents whose file records a region, so the baseline rows differ slightly from Table 1. Standard errors clustered by country in

parentheses; stars use them. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets (Webb weights, 9,999 replications, null imposed).

C6. Group-specific time trends

Table C6 gives each country-group its own intercept and its own linear slope in the survey year. Only groups observed in three or more surveys can identify a trend, so the baseline is re-estimated on the same sample. The trends are absorbed by alternating projections, and the code checks that the method reproduces the standard fixed-effects estimate without trends and the estimate with explicit group-by-year terms in a subsample. Same-survey estimates change little. Frozen estimates fall by between a third and three fifths and lose statistical significance at the .05 level. With survey fixed effects and trends, their confidence intervals still include the baseline estimates. With region-by-survey fixed effects and trends, the frozen estimate is clearly smaller than the baseline.

Table C6. Alignment with group-specific linear time trends

	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction with democracy	Trust in electoral commission	Group treated unfairly
Same survey: survey and group FE (groups in 3+ surveys)	0.183*** (0.025) [<.001]	0.170*** (0.025)	0.216*** (0.028)	−0.103*** (0.020)
Same survey: survey FE and group-specific trends	0.154*** (0.023) [<.001]	0.133*** (0.029) [<.001]	0.192*** (0.023) [<.001]	−0.087*** (0.024)
Same survey: group-specific trends, nonpartisans	0.093*** (0.020) [<.001]			
Same survey: region-by-survey FE and group-specific trends	0.089*** (0.017) [<.001]			
Frozen: survey and group FE (groups in 3+ surveys)	0.105*** (0.025) [.008]	0.111*** (0.025)	0.115*** (0.030)	−0.074*** (0.021)
Frozen: survey FE and group-specific trends	0.056 (0.037) [.235]	0.072* (0.039) [.171]	0.048 (0.043) [.362]	−0.048 (0.032)
Frozen: group-specific trends, nonpartisans	0.041 (0.031) [.302]			
Frozen: region-by-survey FE and group-specific trends	0.021 (0.021) [.463]			
Respondents (same survey; frozen), index	176,835; 124,391			

Note. Controls for age, gender, education and urban residence. Groups observed in fewer than three surveys are dropped from every row. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; stars use them. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets (Webb weights, 9,999 replications, null imposed).

C7. Mixed and homogeneous regions

Table C7 asks whether alignment matters differently where a group lives among other groups. Mixing is the ethnic fractionalization of each region in each survey, one minus the sum of squared group shares among the region's respondents (median 0.61, interquartile range 0.39 to 0.74). Mixed regions are those above the median. A local minority is a respondent whose group makes up less than half of the region-survey (57 percent of respondents). With survey fixed effects, the association is larger in homogeneous regions and for local majorities. With region-

by-survey fixed effects, mixed and homogeneous regions give similar estimates, and the interaction with fractionalization is small. Respondents from different groups in the same mixed region differ by alignment, including nonpartisans.

Table C7. Alignment in mixed and homogeneous regions

Democratic confidence index	Same survey, all	Same survey, nonpartisans	Frozen, all	Frozen, nonpartisans
Mixed regions: survey and group FE	0.123***	0.068***	0.050***	0.035**
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)
	[<.001]	[<.001]	[.019]	[.035]
Mixed regions: region-by-survey and group FE	0.094***	0.045**	0.037**	0.029*
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.015)
	[<.001]	[.036]	[.072]	[.065]
Homogeneous regions: survey and group FE	0.200***	0.143***	0.125***	0.097***
	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.033)
	[<.001]	[<.001]	[.041]	[.046]
Homogeneous regions: region-by-survey and group FE	0.110***	0.045***	0.059***	0.048***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.017)
	[<.001]	[.034]	[.067]	[.065]
Alignment × fractionalization (z): survey and group FE	−0.046***	−0.042***	−0.041***	−0.033***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)
	[<.001]	[<.001]	[.003]	[.006]
Alignment × fractionalization (z): region-by-survey and group FE	−0.012*	−0.007	−0.014*	−0.012*
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)
	[.093]	[.294]	[.096]	[.085]
Alignment × local minority: survey and group FE	−0.149***	−0.151***	−0.114***	−0.089***
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.018)
	[<.001]	[<.001]	[<.001]	[<.001]

Note. Controls for age, gender, education and urban residence, country-by-group fixed effects and the fixed effects listed. Interaction models include the fractionalization or local-minority main effect where it is not absorbed. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; stars use them. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets (Webb weights, 9,999 replications, null imposed).

D. Identification diagnostics for the event designs

D1. Inference

Every event estimate in Tables 4 and 5 of the main text reports a wild cluster bootstrap p-value. The bootstrap uses Webb six-point weights and 9,999 replications, imposes the null, and removes event or pair fixed effects with the same weights. Two further exercises are permutation tests. The first permutes the alignment shift across groups within each turnover event (5,000 draws). It gives $p < .001$ for the index, satisfaction, electoral commission trust and unfair

treatment. The second reassigns which 8 of the 18 close-election pairs had a turnover (5,000 draws, p = .002). Both assume that the reshuffled units are exchangeable. This is an assumption about observational data, not a known assignment rule. Dropping one event at a time leaves the turnover estimate for the index between 0.12 and 0.15. Dropping one close pair at a time leaves the close-election estimate between 0.13 and 0.18.

D2. Pretrends and the timing of the earlier survey

Satisfaction with democracy alone shows a small pretrend in the election-pair comparison of the main text. Table D1 reports three responses. Adding group specific linear time trends to group by survey cells leaves the estimates largely unchanged. Next, I use the change after the election minus the change before it as the outcome. Clear effects remain for the democratic confidence index and electoral commission trust. The effect on satisfaction alone falls by about half and is no longer significant (wild bootstrap p = .13). Finally, I split pairs by when the earlier survey was taken. The satisfaction pretrend comes from surveys taken within a year of the election. This is consistent with anticipation during campaigns.

Table D1. Pretrends, group trends and the timing of surveys

	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction with democracy	Trust in electoral commission
Group by survey cells, weighted by size			
Same survey alignment	0.192*** (0.022)	0.181*** (0.023)	0.225*** (0.025)
Same survey alignment, group specific linear trends	0.170*** (0.027)	0.148*** (0.034)	0.215*** (0.027)
Frozen alignment	0.112*** (0.024)	0.114*** (0.022)	0.123*** (0.029)
Frozen alignment, group specific linear trends	0.080* (0.039)	0.086** (0.038)	0.087* (0.051)
Election-pair comparison, realized shift			
Change after the election, pairs with a previous period	0.142** (0.028) [.020]	0.118** (0.030) [.031]	0.181*** (0.034) [.006]
Change after minus change before	0.132** (0.031) [.019]	0.060 (0.034) [.132]	0.224*** (0.051) [.006]
Change after, previous change as control	0.146** (0.029) [.019]	0.137** (0.033) [.030]	0.165*** (0.032) [.008]
Change after minus change before, margin under 10 points	0.187* (0.066) [.055]	0.071 (0.071) [.504]	0.306** (0.079) [.041]
Timing of the earlier survey			
Placebo, earlier survey within 12 months of the election	0.021 (0.029) [.533]	0.067* (0.030) [.085]	-0.034 (0.041) [.468]
Change after, earlier survey within 12 months	0.092* (0.031) [.077]	0.075 (0.036) [.113]	0.126** (0.037) [.046]
Placebo, earlier survey 12 or more months before	-0.010 (0.063) [.888]	0.044 (0.072) [.834]	-0.052 (0.078) [.555]
Change after, earlier survey 12 or more months before	0.171** (0.018) [.028]	0.130** (0.017) [.022]	0.199** (0.028) [.041]

Note. Cells are group by survey means with at least ten respondents, survey and country by group fixed effects, weighted by cell size. Election-pair models as in Table 5 of the main text. Standard errors clustered by country. In the group-by-survey cell models, stars use the clustered standard errors. In the election-pair rows, wild cluster bootstrap p-values are in brackets (Webb weights, 9,999 replications, null imposed), and stars use them. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.




Figure D1. The realized shift in the election-pair comparison as the margin that defines a close election widens. The lower panel shows the number of pairs with a turnover (blue) out of all pairs (grey) at each margin, in the democratic confidence index sample; the narrowest estimates rest on very few turnovers. Pair fixed effects, 95 percent confidence intervals, standard errors clustered by country.

D3. Overlap of the potential shift

Figure D2 shows the distribution of the potential shift in turnover and non-turnover pairs. I define the common support as the range from the larger of the two 2.5th percentiles to the smaller of the two 97.5th percentiles. It runs from −3.75 to 3.05 and contains 94 percent of group-pairs. Table D2 reports estimates on the common support. It also reports estimates with weights that balance the potential-shift deciles across turnover and non-turnover pairs.




Figure D2. Distribution of the potential shift in election pairs with and without a turnover. Dashed lines mark the common support.

D4. Common support and challenger coding

Table D2. Election-pair comparison: common support and alternative challenger codings (realized shift)

Sample or coding	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction	Electoral commission trust
All pairs (main)	0.125** (0.025) [.029]	0.098** (0.028) [.049]	0.166** (0.030) [.013]
Common support only	0.152** (0.029) [.014]	0.121** (0.033) [.026]	0.206*** (0.035) [.006]
Common support, margin under 10	0.191*** (0.020) [.002]	0.127*** (0.025) [.004]	0.283*** (0.033) [.006]
Reweighted to balance potential-shift deciles	0.126*** (0.023) [.008]	0.099** (0.027) [.021]	0.165*** (0.029) [.004]
Challenger is the runner-up (strict)	0.133** (0.026) [.017]	0.101** (0.030) [.040]	0.178*** (0.032) [.005]
Challenger recoded as runner-up party	0.136** (0.025) [.018]	0.107** (0.028) [.035]	0.179*** (0.031) [.006]
Strict, margin under 10	0.187** (0.047) [.021]	0.120 (0.051) [.109]	0.265** (0.039) [.014]
Recoded, margin under 10	0.192** (0.044) [.022]	0.133 (0.051) [.108]	0.260** (0.033) [.011]
Placebo, strict	0.010 (0.022) [.692]	0.062 (0.026) [.102]	−0.049 (0.034) [.209]
Placebo, recoded	0.009 (0.022) [.697]	0.060* (0.026) [.097]	−0.048 (0.032) [.203]

Note. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets; stars use them. The strict sample keeps all 13 turnover pairs and the 30 non-turnover pairs whose coded challenger is the runner-up (43 pairs in the index sample). The recode replaces the challenger with the runner-up's party wherever that party has at least ten supporters in the earlier survey. It drops nine pairs where the runner-up was an independent or a party not in the survey (58 pairs in the index sample).

D5. Changing group composition across repeated cross-sections

Composition-adjusted group means subtract from each respondent's outcome the contribution of age, age squared, gender, education and urban residence, estimated within groups with survey and country-group fixed effects, before averaging. The alternative adds the change in the group's mean age, share female, education and share urban as controls.

Table D3. Event designs with adjustment for group composition

Design and adjustment	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction	Electoral commission trust
Turnover design, raw group means (main)	0.129** (0.022) [.026]	0.103** (0.023) [.037]	0.167*** (0.024) [.001]
Turnover design, composition-adjusted means	0.126** (0.025) [.034]	0.109** (0.027) [.046]	0.153*** (0.028) [.009]
Turnover design, raw means with composition controls	0.128* (0.026) [.051]	0.113** (0.026) [.044]	0.157** (0.033) [.042]
Turnover placebo, composition-adjusted	0.001 (0.016) [.971]	0.045 (0.020) [.150]	−0.050 (0.026) [.138]
Election pairs, raw group means (main)	0.125** (0.025) [.029]	0.098** (0.028) [.049]	0.166** (0.030) [.013]
Election pairs, composition-adjusted means	0.121** (0.028) [.050]	0.105* (0.030) [.062]	0.148** (0.034) [.034]
Election pairs, raw means with composition controls	0.125* (0.028) [.052]	0.104* (0.032) [.075]	0.159** (0.034) [.029]
Election pairs placebo, composition-adjusted	0.011 (0.019) [.593]	0.060* (0.023) [.085]	−0.045 (0.030) [.213]
Close elections, composition-adjusted means	0.178** (0.025) [.012]	0.120** (0.028) [.033]	0.247*** (0.021) [.007]

Note. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets; stars use them. Adjusted models lose one country cluster with missing covariates. At turnovers, the mean absolute change in a group's mean age is 3.6 years, in share female 0.12, in education 0.58 points and in share urban 0.16.

D6. Time from the election to the post-turnover survey

Table D4. Months from the turnover election to the post-turnover survey

Event	Election	Post-turnover fieldwork	Months
Ghana R4–R5	2008-12-28	2012-05-15	41
Ghana R6–R7	2016-12-07	2017-09-16	9
Kenya R9–R10	2022-08-09	2024-04-18	20
Liberia R6–R7	2017-12-26	2018-06-30	6
Madagascar R7–R9	2018-12-19	2022-05-08	41
Malawi R6–R7	2014-05-20	2016-12-30	31
Malawi R8–R9	2020-06-23	2022-02-19	20
Mauritius R6–R7	2014-12-10	2017-10-10	34
Morocco R8–R9	2021-09-08	2022-09-08	12
Nigeria R6–R7	2015-03-28	2017-04-30	25
Sierra Leone R6–R7	2018-03-31	2018-07-18	4
Zambia R4–R5	2011-09-20	2013-01-28	16
Zambia R8–R9	2021-08-12	2022-08-16	12

Table D5. Turnover effects by time since the election

Model	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction	Electoral commission trust
Turnover, post survey within 20 months of the election	0.161** (0.010) [.010]	0.121** (0.010) [.011]	0.211** (0.023) [.039]
Turnover, post survey more than 20 months after	0.083 (0.045) [.183]	0.079 (0.054) [.284]	0.104** (0.042) [.041]
Turnover, shift x years since election (centered)	−0.044 (0.024) [.237]	−0.034 (0.027) [.528]	−0.043 (0.027) [.274]
Pairs, realized x years since election (centered)	−0.044 (0.023) [.248]	−0.034 (0.026) [.534]	−0.043 (0.026) [.283]

Note. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets (Webb weights, 9,999 replications, null imposed); stars use them. The split is at the median of 20 months; seven events fall at or below it and six above.

D7. Event heterogeneity




Figure D3. Event-specific slopes of the change in the democratic confidence index on the alignment shift, with 95 percent confidence intervals (heteroskedasticity-robust, weighted by group size). Morocco 2021 has too few groups for a separate slope. The dashed line is the pooled estimate.




Figure D4. Mean change in the democratic confidence index after each change of government, for groups that gained alignment with power, groups whose alignment stayed roughly stable, and groups that lost alignment. Alignment shifts use party profiles measured before the turnover.

D8. The turnover design within regions

This version splits each group into the regions where its members were interviewed. The unit is a group in a region at a turnover. The outcome is the change in the group-region mean between the surveys before and after the turnover, and the shift is the group's alignment shift from Table 4 of the main text. Event-by-region fixed effects compare groups that live in the same region at the same turnover. Regions are matched across rounds by their names. 86 percent of the groups in Table 4 of the main text can be matched, and only event-regions with two or more groups enter. The design keeps 11 events and 129 event-regions. The estimates keep their sign and are somewhat smaller than in the same cells without region fixed effects, but they are imprecise.

Table D6. Turnover change design within regions

	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction with democracy	Trust in electoral commission
Change after the turnover, event-by-region FE	0.092 (0.027) [.111]	0.073 (0.023) [.151]	0.114 (0.039) [.193]
Placebo: change before, event-by-region FE	−0.052 (0.029) [.277]	−0.020 (0.030) [.639]	−0.084 (0.037) [.251]
Change after the turnover, event FE only (same cells)	0.118** (0.026) [.043]	0.099 (0.031) [.143]	0.147** (0.024) [.020]
Placebo: change before, event FE only (same cells)	−0.031 (0.024) [.223]	0.005 (0.029) [.848]	−0.082* (0.029) [.091]
Group-region cells (after; placebo)	652; 471	658; 474	659; 481

Note. Weighted by group size (the square root of twice the harmonic mean of the cell sizes in the two surveys). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets (Webb weights, 9,999 replications, null imposed); stars use them.

E. Mechanisms and secondary analyses

E1. Evaluations as controls

Evaluations of the incumbent also account for much of the link between alignment and specific support. In a common sample, the coefficient on alignment for the democratic confidence index is 0.19. Adding local services and lived poverty barely changes it. Adding ratings of government handling lowers it to 0.11, and adding trust in the president lowers it to 0.06. With all of these together it falls to 0.03. These comparisons are only descriptive, because the evaluations are measured at the same time as the outcomes. Still, they fit the account in which alignment shapes specific support through judgments of the government, not through what it delivers.

E2. Alignment by own partisan status

Table E1. Alignment slopes by the respondent's own partisan status

Slope	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction	Electoral commission trust
Same survey: Close to governing party	0.052** (0.020)	0.065** (0.025)	0.038* (0.023)
Same survey: Close to another party	0.089*** (0.028)	0.075** (0.030)	0.117*** (0.031)
Same survey: No party attachment	0.118*** (0.016)	0.112*** (0.017)	0.134*** (0.019)
Same survey: difference, close to another party minus no attachment	−0.028 (0.020)	−0.037 (0.025)	−0.017 (0.022)
Same survey: difference, close to governing party minus no attachment	−0.066*** (0.012)	−0.047*** (0.016)	−0.095*** (0.017)
Frozen: Close to governing party	0.029 (0.019)	0.051** (0.022)	0.007 (0.023)
Frozen: Close to another party	0.042 (0.028)	0.047 (0.031)	0.044 (0.033)
Frozen: No party attachment	0.083*** (0.016)	0.087*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.018)
Frozen: difference, close to another party minus no attachment	−0.040* (0.022)	−0.040 (0.027)	−0.044* (0.023)
Frozen: difference, close to governing party minus no attachment	−0.054*** (0.014)	−0.036** (0.014)	−0.081*** (0.021)

Note. One model per outcome and measure with separate alignment slopes for the three groups, partisan-status indicators, survey and country-by-group fixed effects and controls. Shares of respondents: no attachment 50 percent, governing party 30 percent, another party 20 percent.

Vote intention. A skeptic might argue that many nonpartisans quietly lean toward the governing party. Afrobarometer asks which party's candidate respondents would vote for if a presidential election were held tomorrow. The item is Q99 in Rounds 3 and 5 to 8, Q97 in Round 4, Q96 in Round 9 and Q98 in Round 10. It was not asked in Cabo Verde Round 4 or in Eswatini Rounds 5 to 7. A respondent intends to vote for the governing party when her answer carries that party's code. As a check, 89 percent of respondents who feel close to the governing party give this answer, against 5 percent of those close to another party. Table E2 splits respondents with no party attachment by this answer. The effect is not concentrated among nonpartisans who would vote for the governing party. It holds among those who would vote for another party, would not vote, or do not answer. In a pooled model, the slope among intending governing-party voters is slightly smaller than among the rest. Vote intention is measured in the same survey as the

outcomes, so this split conditions on an answer that alignment may itself affect. Group members who resist the governing party despite their group's tie to it are likely the hardest to move. If so, the subgroup estimates are biased toward zero.

Table E2. Alignment slopes among respondents with no party attachment, by vote intention

Vote intention among nonpartisans	Share (%)	Same-survey alignment	Frozen alignment
All nonpartisans	100	0.114*** (0.017) [<.001]	0.072*** (0.018) [.001]
Would vote for the governing party	23	0.077*** (0.019) [.006]	0.054*** (0.018) [.016]
Would not vote for the governing party (three groups below)	77	0.089*** (0.016) [<.001]	0.053*** (0.017) [.012]
Would vote for another party	21	0.070*** (0.022) [.007]	0.043** (0.016) [.025]
Would not vote	16	0.056*** (0.015) [.002]	0.031 (0.022) [.215]
Don't know or refused	40	0.100*** (0.020) [.001]	0.055** (0.022) [.100]
Difference, would vote for the governing party minus the rest		−0.031* (0.016)	−0.020 (0.016)

Note. Democratic confidence index. A separate model for each subgroup, with survey and country-by-group fixed effects and controls. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; stars use them. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets (Webb weights, 9,999 replications, null imposed). Because these are separate models, the estimate for all nonpartisans differs slightly from Table E1. Shares are of nonpartisans; 0.9 percent give no valid answer. The difference comes from a pooled model of nonpartisans that interacts alignment with intending to vote for the governing party. Models for all nonpartisans use 97,143 respondents in 35 countries (same survey) and 69,383 in 30 countries (frozen).

E3. The ethnicization of the governing party (secondary)

Both alignment and party ethnicization are functions of the same party-by-group support distribution. Table E3 therefore reports two kinds of interactions. In the first, ethnicization is measured in the outcome survey. In the second, ethnicization is taken from the previous survey, the same survey that defines frozen alignment. With ethnicization from the previous survey, the interaction is not significant. I also ran a simulation. It imposes a constant effect of frozen alignment (0.103), permutes the residual outcome within surveys and re-estimates the interaction 200 times. The simulated interaction has a mean of 0.0004 and a 95 percent range from −0.009 to 0.011. Building both measures from the same data therefore does not by itself create an interaction. The frozen estimate (0.028) lies just outside that range, so a small positive moderation cannot be ruled out. But it is imprecise under clustered inference ($p = .27$). It is also about a third of the estimate that used the outcome-survey ethnicization score. One more version

standardizes alignment within each survey and gives a positive estimate. That version, however, mechanically rescales the slope by how spread out alignment is, and alignment is more spread out where parties are more ethnicized. I do not treat the moderation expectation as established.

Table E3. Ethnicization of the governing party as a moderator

Interaction	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction	Electoral commission trust
Frozen alignment × ethnicization in the outcome survey	0.080*** (0.028)	0.067** (0.026)	0.100*** (0.035)
Frozen alignment × frozen ethnicization, dissimilarity	0.028 (0.025)	0.036 (0.022)	0.020 (0.033)
Frozen alignment × frozen ethnicization, Hamza and Maeda	0.010 (0.016)	0.022 (0.016)	−0.004 (0.019)
Within-survey standardized frozen alignment × frozen ethnicization	0.047*** (0.011)	0.051*** (0.010)	0.046*** (0.015)

Note. Each cell is the interaction coefficient; the main effect of ethnicization is absorbed by survey fixed effects. Ethnicization is the bias-corrected dissimilarity score unless stated, standardized across surveys. Interactions with same-survey alignment and with the binary measure are in the replication files.




Figure E1. Effect of frozen alignment on the democratic confidence index across levels of governing-party ethnicization measured in the previous survey. The shaded area is the 95

percent confidence interval. The lower panel shows the distribution of surveys, with one tick per survey; the right tail is sparse.

E4. A leader’s death during fieldwork

President Magufuli of Tanzania died on 17 March 2021, during Round 8 fieldwork, and was succeeded by Samia Suluhu Hassan of the same party. This changed the president’s group while leaving the governing party in place. I compare respondents interviewed before and after his death, with group and interview-day fixed effects. Sukuma respondents lost a coethnic president. They show no change in trust in the president (−0.03, standard error 0.10) or in the democratic confidence index. Only 25 Zanzibari respondents, whose group gained the presidency, were interviewed after the death. That is too few for a reliable estimate. The result fits the finding that a new leader from the same party matters less than a new party. But it rests on a small number of late interviews.

E5. Collective and individual winning compared

Table E4 compares the size of collective and individual winning. The governing party’s core group is the ethnic group that supplies the largest share of its supporters in the survey (same survey) or in the previous survey (frozen). Members of other groups are coded zero. With country-by-group fixed effects, the comparison comes from groups that move into or out of the core, which happens mostly at changes of government. The individual gap compares respondents who feel close to the governing party with those who feel close to another party, holding the group’s position constant. Among nonpartisans, being in the core group raises the democratic confidence index by 0.158, about a third of the individual gap of 0.466. With the frozen core it is 0.091, about a fifth. The pattern is the same for satisfaction and electoral commission trust.

Table E4. Collective and individual winning: the governing party's core group and own party attachment

	Democratic confidence index	Satisfaction with democracy	Trust in electoral commission
Nonpartisans: core group, same survey	0.158*** (0.033) [<.001]	0.165*** (0.035) [<.001]	0.162*** (0.038) [<.001]
Nonpartisans: core group, frozen	0.091*** (0.030) [.012]	0.100** (0.039) [.043]	0.088** (0.035) [.016]
All respondents: core group, same survey	0.152*** (0.031)	0.158*** (0.035)	0.165*** (0.034)
All respondents: close to the governing party	0.345*** (0.023)	0.331*** (0.023)	0.399*** (0.026)
All respondents: close to another party	−0.121*** (0.026)	−0.099*** (0.026)	−0.163*** (0.033)
Individual gap: governing party minus other party	0.466 (0.045)	0.431 (0.044)	0.562 (0.054)
Respondents: nonpartisans, same survey	97,143	104,312	102,197
Respondents: nonpartisans, frozen	69,383	73,718	72,341
Respondents: all	200,372	211,799	210,041

Note. OLS with survey and country-by-group fixed effects and controls for age, gender, education and urban residence. The all-respondent rows come from one model per outcome with the core-group indicator and both partisanship indicators (no attachment is the reference). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses (35 countries; 30 for frozen); stars use them. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets (Webb weights, 9,999 replications, null imposed). The individual gap is a linear combination with its clustered standard error.

E6. Ethnic identity as a moderator

Afrobarometer asks respondents whether they feel only ethnic, more ethnic than national, equally ethnic and national, more national than ethnic, or only national. Alignment does not move this item (Table 6 of the main text), so it can serve as a moderator. I code respondents in the first three categories (57 percent) as identifying with their group at least as strongly as with the nation. The interaction of alignment with this indicator is positive in all twelve models. With frozen alignment it is significant for all three outcomes among all respondents, and for the index among nonpartisans. With same-survey alignment it is small and imprecise. Identity is measured in the same survey as the outcomes, so the comparison is descriptive.

Table E5. Alignment by strength of ethnic identification

	Same survey, all	Same survey, nonpartisans	Frozen, all	Frozen, nonpartisans
Index: alignment (nation first)	0.172*** (0.029)	0.107*** (0.020)	0.087*** (0.025)	0.057*** (0.020)
Index: alignment × ethnic at least equal	0.011 (0.011) [.350]	0.011 (0.009) [.256]	0.026*** (0.008) [.006]	0.024** (0.009) [.022]
Index: ethnic at least equal	−0.031*** (0.008)	−0.021** (0.010)	−0.029*** (0.009)	−0.017 (0.011)
Satisfaction: alignment × ethnic at least equal	0.012 (0.010)	0.011 (0.012)	0.024** (0.010)	0.020 (0.013)
Commission trust: alignment × ethnic at least equal	0.015 (0.014)	0.017 (0.015)	0.031*** (0.011)	0.031* (0.017)
Respondents (index)	198,064	95,907	141,107	68,480

Note. One model per column and outcome with alignment, its interaction with identifying ethnically at least as strongly as nationally, the indicator itself, survey and country-by-group fixed effects and controls. The alignment row is the slope for respondents who put the nation first. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; stars use them. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets for the index interaction (Webb weights, 9,999 replications, null imposed).

E7. Perceived economic standing of one's group

In Rounds 3 and 4, Afrobarometer asked whether the economic conditions of the respondent's ethnic group were worse, the same or better than those of other groups (1 much worse to 5 much better). The item covers 37,387 respondents in 18 countries. With survey and country-by-group fixed effects, same-survey alignment is associated with a −0.073 standard-deviation change in this rating (clustered standard error 0.042; wild bootstrap p = .074). Among nonpartisans the estimate is −0.101 (0.047). Aligned groups do not see themselves as economically better off than others. With only two rounds, the within-group variation is limited, so I treat this as a supporting result.

E8. News exposure as a moderator

Afrobarometer asks how often respondents get news from radio, television and newspapers (never to every day). I code respondents who get news every day from at least one of these sources as daily news users (60 percent). The items were read from the original files with the standard question numbers of each round. If citizens must see their group's position, alignment should matter more for daily news users. Because news use rises with education and urban residence, the second set of models also interacts alignment with both. None of the eight news interactions for the index is statistically significant, and all are close to zero. Among the satisfaction and commission models, only one interaction is significant: satisfaction among nonpartisans with same-survey alignment, without the education and urban interactions (−0.019** (0.009)), and it is negative, the opposite of the prediction.

Table E6. Alignment by daily news use

	Same survey, all	Same survey, nonpartisans	Frozen, all	Frozen, nonpartisans
Index: alignment (no daily news, average education and urban residence)	0.179*** (0.025)	0.117*** (0.018)	0.099*** (0.026)	0.074*** (0.020)
Index: alignment × daily news	−0.009 (0.009) [.335]	−0.009 (0.009) [.317]	0.001 (0.011) [.953]	−0.005 (0.010) [.679]
Index: alignment × daily news, × education and × urban held constant	0.008 (0.009) [.362]	0.006 (0.009) [.512]	0.009 (0.011) [.421]	0.001 (0.010) [.923]
Satisfaction: alignment × daily news (same controls)	0.003 (0.007)	−0.008 (0.008)	−0.001 (0.012)	−0.015 (0.011)
Commission trust: alignment × daily news (same controls)	0.011 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.019 (0.013)	0.014 (0.014)
Respondents (index)	200,219	97,047	142,786	69,300

Note. Survey and country-by-group fixed effects and controls; models include the daily-news indicator. The first row is the alignment slope for respondents without daily news and with average education and urban residence (both centred), from the model with the education and urban interactions. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; stars use them. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets (Webb weights, 9,999 replications, null imposed).

F. The CSES sample

The CSES extension differs from the Afrobarometer analysis in three ways that limit it to a check on scope. Alignment is built from vote choice in the election just held rather than from reported party closeness, so it is closer to individual electoral behavior. Group categories combine race, language, ethnicity and nationally specific EPR categories. And the sample is selected by the availability of harmonizable group categories across modules.

Table F1. CSES elections and Ethnic Power Relations groups

Country	Elections	Groups	Respondents
Brazil	2002, 2010, 2014, 2018, 2022	Afrobrazilians, Indigenous peoples, Whites	9,948
Canada	1997, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2019	English speakers, French speakers, Indigenous peoples	16,466
Finland	2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019	Finns, Swedes	6,805
Hungary	2002, 2018	Germans, Hungarians, Roma	2,277
Israel	1996, 2003, 2006, 2013, 2020	Israeli Arabs, Jewish composite	5,524
Latvia	2010, 2011, 2014, 2018	Byelorussians, Latvians, Russians, Ukrainians	2,743
Montenegro	2012, 2016, 2023	Albanians, Bosniaks and Muslims, Croats, Montenegrins, Serbs	2,803
New Zealand	1996, 2002, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2020, 2023	Asians, Maori, New Zealanders, Pacific Islanders	12,109
Romania	1996, 2004, 2012, 2016	Germans, Hungarians, Roma, Romanians	6,078
Slovakia	2010, 2016, 2020, 2023	Hungarians, Slovaks	4,206
Slovenia	2008, 2011, 2022	Hungarians, Italians, Roma, Slovenes	2,529
Turkey	2011, 2015, 2018, 2023	Kurds, Turkish	4,481
Taiwan	1996, 2001, 2012, 2016, 2020, 2024	Indigenous/Aboriginal Taiwanese, Mainland Chinese, Taiwanese	8,808
United States	1996, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020	African Americans, American Indians, Asian Americans, Latinos, Whites	16,803
South Africa	2009, 2014	Afrikaners, Asians, Coloreds, English Speakers, Ndebele, Pedi (North Sotho), South Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa, Zulu	2,364

Note. Respondents with a valid satisfaction answer. Satisfaction was not asked in the United States in 2024, and Taiwan's 2004 and 2008 surveys lack usable vote data, so these elections contribute only as earlier surveys where possible. The governing party is the party of the head of government after the election, the president's party in Brazil, Taiwan, Turkey and the United States. In a few cases, the largest party in government was not the head of government's party, as

in Latvia in 2011 and 2018 and Romania in 2004. In these cases, I use the head of government's party.

Table F2. CSES group-by-election cell sizes and country-specific estimates

Country	Group-elections	Smallest cell	Median cell	Cells under 30	Country-specific estimate	Within-group SD of alignment
Brazil	15	5	670	2	−0.060 (0.054)	0.16
Canada	18	4	671	1	0.277*** (0.035)	0.18
Finland	10	39	592	0	−0.022 (0.080)	0.09
Hungary	5	11	43	1	−7.318** (3.078)	0.01
Israel	10	131	507	0	0.057 (0.047)	0.28
Latvia	14	4	132	6	−0.026 (0.058)	0.24
Montenegro	15	3	94	4	0.359*** (0.025)	0.62
New Zealand	31	13	84	6	0.164*** (0.024)	0.30
Romania	16	1	57	7	−0.354*** (0.089)	0.12
Slovakia	8	57	520	0	0.021 (0.173)	0.07
Slovenia	7	2	8	4	0.131 (0.131)	0.08
Turkey	8	78	541	0	0.349*** (0.124)	0.10
Taiwan	18	7	164	5	0.171*** (0.029)	0.28
United States	28	12	176	5	0.091*** (0.015)	0.42
South Africa	26	10	84	5	−0.007 (0.059)	0.32
All	229	1	141	46		

Note. Cells are respondents with a valid satisfaction answer. Country-specific estimates regress satisfaction on alignment with election and group fixed effects within each country, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. These are single-country models, so there are no country clusters to bootstrap, and their stars use the robust standard errors. They are descriptive, since several countries have few groups and elections. Hungary's within-group variation in alignment is too small for a meaningful estimate. Dropping group-election cells with fewer than 30 respondents leaves the pooled estimate at 0.142** (0.042; wild cluster bootstrap p = .025).




Figure F1. Country-specific within-group effects of alignment on satisfaction in the CSES sample (95 percent confidence intervals). Hungary is omitted because alignment barely varies within its groups. The dashed line is the pooled estimate.

I also built a turnover design for the CSES, as for Afrobarometer. The alignment shift predicts later changes in group satisfaction (0.12, standard error 0.03, 21 turnovers in 8 countries). But it also predicts earlier changes with the opposite sign (−0.08, standard error 0.02). The CSES election-pair comparison (Table F3) absorbs this pattern through the potential shift. The CSES questions on government performance and the economy refer to the period before the election. A different party often governed then, so I do not use them to test the group lens. The item on whether the election was conducted fairly refers to the election just held.

Election fairness. Eleven countries in the analysis sample asked whether the election was conducted fairly, but only New Zealand and the United States asked it in two elections that enter the sample. With country-by-group fixed effects, the within-group estimates in Table F3 rest on these two countries. With so few countries contributing, the wild bootstrap is not reliable for these rows (p = .28 for all respondents and .77 for respondents who did not vote for the governing party). I do not interpret these rows.

Table F3 reports the CSES estimates summarized in the main text. As in Africa, alignment is distinct from formal inclusion: its correlation with EPR inclusion in executive power is 0.21, and the alignment estimate remains positive when both measures are in the model.

Table F3. CSES respondents in fifteen democracies, fourteen of them outside Africa, with groups mapped to Ethnic Power Relations

Model	Coefficient	Respondents or units	Countries
Satisfaction with democracy (1 to 4)			
Log alignment, election and country-by-group fixed effects	0.142** (0.041)	103,944	15
Wild cluster bootstrap p	.025		
Frozen alignment	0.104** (0.012)	68,479	12
Wild cluster bootstrap p	.047		
Log alignment, own vote for the governing party held constant	0.081** (0.040)	103,944	15
Log alignment, respondents who did not vote for the governing party	0.077 (0.048)	73,872	15
Log alignment, with EPR inclusion in executive power	0.149** (0.038)	103,944	15
Election-pair comparison, change in group mean satisfaction			
Realized shift	0.115** (0.036)	130 group-pairs	11
Potential shift	0.001 (0.022)	130 group-pairs	11
Placebo, realized shift in previous period	0.042 (0.039)	91 group-pairs	9
Election conducted fairly (1 to 5)			
Log alignment, election and country-by-group fixed effects	0.316 (0.033)	21,474	11
Log alignment, respondents who did not vote for the governing party	0.280 (0.084)	15,319	11

Note. Data come from CSES Modules 1 to 6. Groups are politically relevant groups from the Ethnic Power Relations data and are harmonized across elections. Switzerland is excluded because its collegial executive does not have a single governing party. Standard errors are clustered by country. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values use Webb weights and 9,999 replications. Stars are based on the bootstrap p-values.

Ethnicized governing parties. The argument implies that collective winning should matter most where the governing party is tied to particular groups. I merge the ethnicization score of each election's governing party from the CSES party ethnicization data (Hamza and Maeda 2025), which covers all 67 elections with satisfaction data. Table F4 interacts alignment with the standardized score, with election and group fixed effects, and splits elections at the median score. The prediction fails. Among respondents who did not vote for the governing party, alignment is unrelated to satisfaction where the governing party is more ethnicized. Where it is less ethnicized, the estimate is positive, though not significant under the bootstrap. The interaction is negative. Countries with more ethnicized governing parties include Finland, Israel, Latvia and South Africa, so the split partly compares countries, and with fifteen countries the test has little power.

Table F4. Alignment and the ethnicization of the governing party, CSES

	Did not vote for the governing party	All respondents
Alignment × governing-party ethnicization (z)	−0.052 (0.033) [.074]	−0.079* (0.039) [.063]
Alignment, more ethnicized governing party (above median)	−0.001 (0.032) [.982]	0.024 (0.028) [.485]
Alignment, less ethnicized governing party (below median)	0.173** (0.056) [.144]	0.270*** (0.056) [.118]
Respondents (interaction model)	73,872	103,944

Note. Satisfaction with democracy (1 to 4). Election and country-by-group fixed effects, no controls, as in Table F3. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; stars use them. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets (Webb weights, 9,999 replications, null imposed).

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