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# How to Protect Learner Autonomy in the Age of Generative AI: EMM

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## Abstract

Generative AI is increasingly used to interpret feedback and prepare consequential educational conversations, yet manipulation benchmarks largely evaluate models as external observers. The gap is particularly salient in student supervision, where an assistant drafting a student's reply must recognize unreasonable pressure without treating legitimate academic demands as abuse. To fill this gap, we introduce EMM (E*** Mental Manipulation), an education-centered benchmark that pairs first-person student reply generation with 14-way observer-style classification on the same advisor utterances. Its educational set contains 1,014 Chinese-language cases: 676 manipulative utterances across 13 categories and 338 matched healthy, high-pressure controls. We extend the protocol to workplace and parent-child relationships, yielding 3,042 evaluation cases, and provide a disjoint 11,521-example three-domain SFT corpus. Across 15 model configurations, we find a recognition–response gap: an accurate manipulation label does not always lead to an aware first-person reply, while high awareness can coincide with over-defensiveness on healthy cases. Three-domain SFT improves manipulation awareness for three matched models but reduces their healthy-case calibration. A 2×2 ablation shows that third-person generation does not consistently outperform first-person generation; a minimal-prompt ablation shows that tuned models retain more awareness without explicit boundary guidance but remain prompt-sensitive. EMM provides an audit protocol for evaluating recognition and proportionate response together in learner-facing AI. Whether better benchmark performance protects student autonomy in practice requires further study.

**Keywords:** generative AI; educational AI; learner autonomy; doctoral supervision; psychological manipulation; LLM evaluation

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## 1 Introduction

Generative AI is being developed for educational support and used by students to seek feedback (Dan et al., 2023; Henderson et al., 2026). In a survey across four Australian universities, Henderson et al. (2026) found that 49.7% of 6,960 respondents to the relevant item had sought feedback from generative AI. These respondents had already reported using AI in their university studies, and the voluntary survey does not establish a population-wide usage rate. Still, the study identifies a concrete educational practice: students value the accessibility and immediacy of AI feedback while regarding teacher feedback as more trustworthy and contextually informed. In a self-study of doctoral supervision, Jensen et al. (2026) compared actual supervisory feedback with simulated chatbot exchanges about the same student concerns. Their analysis suggests a possible role for chatbots in helping students explore questions before a supervisory meeting, while supervisors bring relational, disciplinary, and developmental knowledge that a chatbot may not supply. These findings motivate examining what an educational assistant might say when a student brings it a difficult message from an advisor.

The stakes of that response are unusually high in doctoral supervision. Advisors may influence access to projects, research resources, authorship, recommendations, and academic opportunities. A student can reasonably seek help interpreting an advisor's message or preparing a reply. An AI-generated response that uncritically accepts a coercive premise may reinforce dependency, self-blame, or exclusion. A response that treats every demanding request as abuse may needlessly escalate a legitimate supervisory exchange. Both errors matter because critical feedback and explicit academic standards can be part of good supervision. Lee (2008) describes doctoral guidance as including project management, disciplinary induction, critical thinking, the development of independence, and a supportive relationship. Carless and Boud (2018) similarly locate productive feedback in learners' interpretation, judgment, management of affect, and action, rather than in passive receipt of comments; Winstone et al. (2017) likewise emphasize learners' active engagement with feedback. At the same time, abusive supervision research shows why institutional power and dependence

merit scrutiny in academic science (Tepper, 2000; Moss and Mahmoudi, 2021). An educational AI response should preserve the student's room to judge and act while remaining responsive to legitimate academic demands.

We use learner autonomy in this narrower, interactional sense: the student retains room to assess a claim, request reasons or standards, and choose a response without being steered into either automatic deference or automatic confrontation. EMM observes a model's proposed reply as one possible support for that process. It does not directly measure the student's autonomy or subsequent decisions.

Current manipulation benchmarks provide an important but incomplete test of this situation. MentalManip asks models to identify manipulative dialogue and classify techniques and targeted vulnerabilities in movie conversations (Wang et al., 2024). MultiManip and SELF-PERCEPT extend detection to multi-person, multi-turn reality-show conversations and use staged behavioral inference to improve classification (Khanna et al., 2025). Intent-aware and other prompting methods improve analysis of an existing exchange (Ma et al., 2025; Yang et al., 2024). These studies assess whether a model can analyze a conversation. In contrast, an assistant assigned the student's role must produce a usable reply under the relationship's social constraints. Classification accuracy cannot by itself establish that the assistant will clarify a questionable demand, ask for a concrete standard, or avoid an unfounded accusation. We use observer-style and first-person to describe these task positions. The distinction is conceptually related to actor–observer perspectives (Jones and Nisbett, 1972), but we do not assume that a human attribution effect transfers to LLMs.

EMM addresses this evaluation gap through an advisor-student benchmark with two tasks over the same input. In Task 1, the model writes a Chinese reply as the student, without receiving the sample label. In Task 2, it selects Healthy or one of 13 advisor-student manipulation categories. For each category, EMM includes healthy utterances with comparable academic stakes and surface pressure. These controls make it possible to measure over-defensiveness alongside failure to respond to manipulation. The educational component has 1,014 cases. We subsequently apply the same construction and evaluation protocol to manager-employee and parent-child relationships, with secondary categories adapted to each relationship. The three-domain evaluation contains 3,042 cases, and a separate 11,521-example three-domain corpus supports matched supervised fine-tuning (SFT) experiments.

This study asks four questions. First, can 15 model configurations combine awareness of manipulative pressure with an appropriately cooperative response to healthy pressure? Second, can the protocol be applied to other asymmetric relationships? Third, how does three-domain SFT change educational responses and their calibration? Fourth, what do framing, prompt, and scoring checks allow us to conclude about the observed differences?

Our contributions are threefold. (1) We operationalize five mechanisms and 13 advisor-student manipulation categories, with neighboring healthy high-pressure controls. (2) We provide a benchmark centered on directly sendable, role-conditioned replies while retaining fine-grained observer-style classification on the same utterances. To our knowledge, this is the first benchmark to combine these two tasks with matched healthy high-pressure cases in advisor-student interactions. (3) We evaluate 15 model configurations in education and examine two relationship extensions, matched SFT, framing and prompt ablations, and human and model-based reliability checks. EMM measures outputs to simulated messages; it does not measure changes in students' autonomy, learning, or well-being.

Figure 1 illustrates the difference between identifying manipulation in an observed dialogue and responding from the student's position. The contrast motivates evaluating the content of the student's reply alongside the observer label.

# 2 Related work

## 2.1 Generative AI, feedback, and relational safety in education

Research on generative AI feedback emphasizes both access and judgment. Education-oriented chatbots such as EduChat demonstrate the breadth of instructional support settings in which LLMs may be used (Dan et al., 2023). Henderson et al. (2026) find that students value AI feedback for its availability and intelligibility but assign greater trust to teachers' feedback. Their respondents also describe AI feedback as carrying less interpersonal risk. In the doctoral setting, Jensen et al. (2026) contrast simulated chatbot exchanges, which followed the student's stated questions, with supervisory dialogue that redirected attention to a more consequential issue in the manuscript. Their single-team self-study cannot establish a general advantage for either source, but it shows why the relationship and the quality of the reply matter beyond the correctness of isolated advice. An observational study of ChatGPT feedback use and a conceptual framework of feedback engagement both caution that access to feedback alone need not produce careful judgment or action (Zhan and Yan, 2026; Zhan et al., 2025). For learner-facing AI, relational safety therefore includes the possibility that a plausible answer narrows the student's judgment or escalates a legitimate exchange. This motivates evaluating the reply the assistant proposes, alongside its analysis of the advisor's words.

Feedback literacy provides a useful educational lens. Carless and Boud (2018) identify appreciating feedback, making judgments, managing affect, and taking action as interconnected capacities; Winstone et al. (2017) organize feedback recipience around students' active engagement. These are capacities of learners, not scores that can be read directly from a model's output. Lee (2008) describes project management, critical think-





**Figure 1:** Schematic contrast between observer-style manipulation classification and first-person student reply generation. The difficulty labels refer to the illustrated examples, not aggregate performance.

ing, and the development of independence as concepts of doctoral supervision. Accordingly, deadlines, critical questions, and standards need not be treated as abuse. At the same time, supervisors' control over opportunities and disciplinary access creates conditions in which the same vocabulary of development can conceal exclusion or dependency. Work on abusive supervision and supervisory power motivates examining these boundaries (Tepper, 2000; Moss and Mahmoudi, 2021; Moshtari and Schleper, 2025). EMM tests whether model replies remain calibrated around them; it does not estimate the prevalence of harmful supervision.

### 2.2 Manipulation benchmarks and model perspective

MentalManip contributes 4,000 annotated, fictional, English-language dialogues with labels for manipulation presence, 11 techniques, and five targeted vulnerabilities (Wang et al., 2024). Its classification experiments demonstrate the difficulty of identifying subtle, context-dependent manipulation. The dataset's human annotation agreement also illustrates that these labels can be contestable. Subsequent work improves diagnostic detection through prompting or training, including intent-aware prompting, advanced prompting, and MentalMAC (Ma et al., 2025; Yang et al., 2024; Gao et al., 2025). Khanna et al. (2025) introduce the balanced 220-dialogue MultiManip dataset and SELF-PERCEPT, a two-stage method that observes participants' behavior and infers their attitudes and manipulation tactics. Despite its name, SELF-PERCEPT remains a method for analyzing people in an existing conversation; it does not ask the model to write as a target who must answer a manipulator. LegalCon and CLAIM study manipulative courtroom dialogue, while a speech benchmark extends mental-manipulation detection beyond text (Sheshanarayana et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2026). These resources motivate fine-grained EMM classification but do not replace response evaluation.

### 2.3 The remaining evaluation gap

The gap is defined by the combination of relationship, model role, output, and calibration control. An observer task can identify a tactic without producing an answer a student could actually send. A response task without difficult healthy controls can reward generalized suspicion. Existing work on psychological AI, conversation safety, security, and trustworthiness covers a wider set of uses and failures, but does not supply this paired advisor-student test (He et al., 2023; Dong et al., 2024; Li and Fung, 2025; Shi et al., 2024; Huang et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2023). Table 1 locates EMM among the nearest manipulation benchmarks. EMM places the tasks on shared inputs, keeps the generation prompt label-blind, and adds healthy high-pressure cases anchored to the same category families. A two-by-two task-framing ablation crosses first- versus third-person framing with generation versus classification, while a minimal-prompt ablation examines reliance on explicit response guidance. Together, these analyses probe how task framing and prompt guidance relate to observed model performance.

## 3 Task formulation

Each EMM item contains a domain, a single utterance from the higher-power speaker, a binary benchmark status, and an observer label. In the educational domain, the higher-power speaker is an advisor and the lower-power role is a graduate student. The label is either Healthy or one of 13 manipulation categories. The gold status is withheld from Task 1.

**Task 1: first-person reply.** The model is asked to write a concise Chinese message that the student could send directly to the advisor. The standard prompt specifies the relationship and conditionally guides the model: where the message contains unreasonable pressure, it should clarify facts or standards, ask a concrete question, or state an appropriate boundary. This is an instruction-conditioned test of calibrated reply gen-

**Table 1:** Task-level comparison with related manipulation benchmarks. The distinction concerns what the evaluated model must output, not whether a dataset contains first-person language.

| Resource | Interaction setting | Evaluated model role | Principal output |
|---|---|---|---|
| MentalManip (Wang et al., 2024) | Fictional movie dialogue | Observer | Detection, tactics, vulnerabilities |
| MultiManip / SELF-PERCEPT (Khanna et al., 2025) | Multi-person reality-show dialogue | Observer with staged inference | Detection and tactics |
| CLAIM / LegalCon (Sheshanarayana et al., 2025) | Courtroom dialogue | Observer | Detection and analysis |
| EMM (this study) | Advisor-student, then work and family | Lower-power respondent and observer | Sendable reply plus Healthy/13-way label |

eration. The prompt does not tell the model which condition applies to the current item.

An LLM judge scores each reply from 0 to 2. A score of 0 denotes compliance, self-blame, or reinforcement of the manipulative framing; 1 denotes an ambiguous or incomplete response; and 2 denotes clear, context-appropriate awareness and a usable boundary response. Only the numeric score, with 2 as the threshold, defines awareness in the reported metrics. Let $z_i = 1$ for a manipulative item and $\hat{z}_i = 1$ when the reply receives score 2. We report the manipulative-case awareness rate Recall $= P(\hat{z} = 1 \mid z = 1)$, the healthy-case non-over-defensiveness rate H-OK $= P(\hat{z} = 0 \mid z = 0)$, and BalAcc $=$ (Recall + H-OK)/2. Aware F1 uses manipulation as the positive class. No single metric suffices: high Recall with low H-OK can reflect indiscriminate suspicion. Under this benchmark's scoring convention, a score-2 boundary response to a healthy item counts as over-defensive; replies scoring below 2 count toward H-OK. This does not establish that a reply scoring below 2 was helpful, factually grounded, or pedagogically appropriate. We therefore interpret H-OK as a narrow non-over-defensiveness measure.

**Task 2: observer-style classification.** On the same utterance, the model chooses one of 14 outputs: Healthy or one of the domain's 13 manipulation categories. The classification instruction requires a single exact label; outputs that cannot be mapped to one of these labels count as incorrect. We report exact 14-way accuracy and macro-F1. Binary F1 after collapsing categories is secondary. With EMM's 2:1 manipulation-to-healthy ratio, predicting manipulation for every item already yields binary F1 of approximately 0.800. Task 1 F1 and Task 2 macro-F1 concern different outputs and should not be subtracted to quantify a perspective effect.

# 4 Benchmark construction and validation

## 4.1 Advisor-student taxonomy

The educational taxonomy groups 13 secondary categories under five relationship mechanisms. The labels describe how an advisor's utterance can constrain a student's interpretation or choices, rather than classifying a message solely by harshness of tone.

Figure 2 visualizes the five educational mechanisms and their 13 secondary categories. Some names in the illustration are shortened display forms of the released category labels.

For example, withholding access to a research discussion on the premise that the student is not yet sufficiently "stable" may function as exclusion, whereas setting an explicit authorship standard and allowing a later review may be demanding but legitimate. The boundary concerns the entitlement, evidential basis, and available path for the student, not whether the advisor sounds warm or severe.

## 4.2 Item construction and data separation

Figure 3 summarizes the construction pipeline. EMM uses seed dialogues and a scene pool to anchor the advisor–student relationship, communication settings, and target mechanisms. Two model agents take complementary generation and assessment roles, with their roles exchanged across rounds, to produce candidate manipulative and non-manipulative dialogues. The retained single-turn Chinese advisor utterances become evaluation inputs; separately generated student replies support the SFT pool. Manipulative candidates foreground one dominant mechanism, while healthy candidates reuse nearby personas and stakes but specify legitimate responsibility, feedback, or care. Subsequent LLM auditing checks category collisions, multiple-mechanism positives, and healthy false positives; targeted refresh or wording repair addresses unstable candidates before human verification and the benchmark freeze.

Each of the 13 category anchors has 52 manipulative and 26 healthy items, producing 676 and 338 cases, respectively, in the educational benchmark. The healthy cases retain nearby academic stakes while specifying legitimate standards or responsibilities. They are not a generic pool of neutral sentences. For example, an advisor who excludes a student from research discussion until the student becomes sufficiently "stable" restricts access without a concrete criterion; an advisor who asks for a specified revision before the next meeting can set




**Figure 2:** Five educational relationship mechanisms and their 13 secondary categories. Some category names are abbreviated in the illustration.

a demanding but actionable standard.

The same protocol was adapted to manager-employee and parent-child relationships. All three domains retain five broad mechanisms, while their 13 secondary categories reflect the resources and norms of the specific relationship. Each domain has 1,014 evaluation cases (676 manipulative and 338 healthy), for 3,042 in total. The SFT pool contains 3,797 educational, 3,824 workplace, and 3,900 parent-child first-person reply examples, totaling 11,521. Evaluation and SFT examples come from separate pools. Text-overlap audits found no exact or normalized matches, prefix overlap, or lexical near-duplicates above a character TF-IDF similarity of 0.75 between the evaluation and SFT pools. These checks do not establish semantic independence of all scenarios.

### 4.3 Human verification and its boundary

For each domain, 195 evaluation utterances were sampled and independently judged by three annotators, who could assign a status of manipulative, healthy, or uncertain and a fine label where applicable. In education, the annotator majority matched the construction status on 177/195 items (0.908), including all 65 healthy controls. This indicates that annotators usually accepted the intended distinction between manipulative pressure and demanding but legitimate guidance in this sample. Exact secondary-label matching was 129/195 (0.662) and 64/130 (0.492) among manipulative items; 14 educational items had no fine-label majority. The 13 categories thus provide mechanism-level probes, while exact classification against construction labels requires caution.

Across all three domains, verification covered 585 utterances and 1,755 independent judgments. Pooled three-way Fleiss' $\kappa$ was 0.7878, and majority labels matched the construction labels for 526/585 items (0.899) on status and 475/585 (0.812) on the fine label. The educational subset's lower fine-label match indicates that these aggregate results vary by relationship setting.

## 5 Experimental setup

We assess six API models (Qwen-3.7-Plus, DeepSeek-V4-Pro, GLM-5.2, Gemini-3.1-Pro, GPT-5.5, and Claude-Sonnet-5), six local base models (Gemma-4-12B-IT, GLM-4-32B, Llama-3.2-3B, Qwen-3.5-2B, Qwen-3.5-9B, and Qwen-3-8B), and three matched LoRA-SFT variants with complete Task 1 judging and Task 2 predictions. The local families follow the Gemma, GLM, Llama, and Qwen model lines (Gemma Team et al., 2025; GLM Team et al., 2024; Dubey et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2025). Thus the main educational comparison contains 15 configurations, each evaluated on the same 1,014 items. Three additional SFT versions have incomplete Task 1 judging and are excluded from the complete dual-task table.

The selected SFT variants are trained on the mixed three-domain corpus, not on education-only data. The shared LoRA settings include rank 16, alpha 32, dropout 0.05, three epochs, and a 1,024-token cutoff. The Qwen-family learning rate is `2e-4`, and the Llama learning rate is `1e-5`; micro-batching differs by model and available hardware. Matched base/SFT contrasts use the same educational evaluation inputs. They are not zero-shot tests of transferring an education-only training set to other domains.

Most API Task 1 outputs were primarily scored by





**Figure 3:** EMM data construction from seed dialogues and scenario settings through two-agent collaborative generation of manipulative and healthy candidates, followed by model-based and human verification. The diagram illustrates the workflow; human verification is performed on a sample, as detailed in the text.

GPT-5.5; the GPT-5.5 target was scored by Claude-Sonnet-5 to avoid direct self-judging. Local base and selected SFT replies used GPT-5.5 as the primary judge. This mixed API judging arrangement limits fine ranking comparisons.

### 5.1 Ablation and reliability design

The two-by-two task-framing ablation uses the same 390 stratified items per domain for each of three local base models and their matched SFT variants. Its cells cross first- versus third-person framing with generation versus classification: A is first-person generation, B third-person generation, C first-person classification, and D third-person classification. A and D reuse matching main-evaluation outputs; B and C use the alternate task prompts. Generation scores are thresholded at 2, while classification labels are collapsed to a binary manipulation decision for this ablation. We report both binary F1 and balanced accuracy because always predicting manipulation already yields approximately 0.800 binary F1 under the 2:1 class ratio.

The separate minimal-prompt ablation aligns 152 educational items (102 manipulative and 50 healthy) per local configuration. It retains the role, utterance, and direct-reply request while removing explicit conditional advice about manipulation, cooperation, and boundaries.

For API Task 1 reliability, 152 sampled items per domain are rescored for each of the six API targets, producing 912 educational and 2,736 three-domain pairs. We report both the complete education subset and the subset excluding cases where the cross judge is also the target model. GPT-5.5 and Claude-Sonnet-5 targets fall in the latter risk category, leaving four targets in the 608-pair no-risk educational subset. A separate cross-judge sample assesses only B, the third-person generation cell of the two-by-two ablation: 59 educational items for each of six local configurations (354 paired replies).

## 6 Results

### 6.1 RQ1: Can models combine awareness with healthy-case calibration?

Table 2 presents the educational-domain results for all 15 model configurations, revealing different error profiles. Each configuration is evaluated on the same 1,014 advisor-student cases; Task 1 is reply-based and Task 2 is exact observer classification.

Because both tasks use the same inputs, we also pair their outcomes item by item. Qwen-3.5-9B assigns the correct manipulation category but lacks a score-2 reply on 96 of its 676 manipulative educational items. A representative case appears in Appendix D. These aligned outputs show that an exact observer label need not yield a usable reply; they do not identify a causal effect of changing perspective.

Figure 4 visualizes the educational API results. Among the API targets, Gemini-3.1-Pro reaches 0.966 Recall and the highest Task 2 macro-F1 (0.562), but its H-OK is 0.053. Its replies are therefore judged as clear boundary responses on nearly all manipulative items

**Table 2:** Educational-domain results on the same 1,014 advisor-student utterances per configuration. Recall and H-OK jointly describe Task 1 calibration; Task 2 is exact 14-way classification.

| Configuration | Task 1 Aware F1 | Recall | H-OK | Balanced accuracy | Task 2 accuracy | Task 2 macro-F1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qwen-3.7-Plus | 0.734 | 0.786 | 0.290 | 0.538 | 0.589 | 0.427 |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro | 0.603 | 0.589 | 0.275 | 0.432 | 0.641 | 0.495 |
| GLM-5.2 | 0.704 | 0.775 | 0.148 | 0.462 | 0.595 | 0.474 |
| Gemini-3.1-Pro | 0.792 | 0.966 | 0.053 | 0.510 | 0.685 | 0.562 |
| GPT-5.5 | 0.828 | 0.910 | 0.423 | 0.666 | 0.633 | 0.483 |
| Claude-Sonnet-5 | 0.756 | 0.744 | 0.553 | 0.649 | 0.675 | 0.549 |
| Gemma-4-12B-IT | 0.174 | 0.115 | 0.580 | 0.348 | 0.486 | 0.365 |
| GLM-4-32B | 0.080 | 0.047 | 0.731 | 0.389 | 0.367 | 0.341 |
| Llama-3.2-3B | 0.229 | 0.135 | 0.917 | 0.526 | 0.081 | 0.047 |
| Qwen-3.5-2B | 0.303 | 0.194 | 0.831 | 0.513 | 0.178 | 0.152 |
| Qwen-3.5-9B | 0.706 | 0.643 | 0.639 | 0.641 | 0.475 | 0.379 |
| Qwen-3-8B | 0.204 | 0.118 | 0.914 | 0.516 | 0.261 | 0.240 |
| Llama-3.2-3B-SFT | 0.600 | 0.503 | 0.654 | 0.578 | 0.098 | 0.054 |
| Qwen-3.5-2B-SFT | 0.786 | 0.855 | 0.361 | 0.608 | 0.369 | 0.233 |
| Qwen-3.5-9B-SFT | 0.807 | 0.950 | 0.192 | 0.571 | 0.579 | 0.416 |





**Figure 4:** Educational Task 1 profiles for the six API targets under the standard prompt (1,014 cases each). Qwen+=Qwen-3.7-Plus, DS=DeepSeek-V4-Pro, Gem=Gemini-3.1-Pro, and GPT=GPT-5.5. Higher is better on both series.

and as over-defensive on nearly all healthy high-pressure items. GPT-5.5 and Claude-Sonnet-5 achieve educational balanced accuracy of 0.666 and 0.649, respectively, through different Recall/H-OK balances. Five of the six local base models show manipulation Recall between 0.047 and 0.194; Qwen-3.5-9B is the exception at 0.643.

## 6.2 RQ2: Does the protocol extend to other asymmetric relationships?

The workplace and parent-child sets each contain 1,014 cases and apply the same dual-task structure with relationship-specific secondary labels. Across the six API models, the simple mean of per-model Task 1 F1 is 0.736 in education, 0.717 at work, and 0.764 in parent-child interactions. The corresponding H-OK means are 0.290, 0.246, and 0.120, showing that similar F1 values conceal different healthy-case response profiles. Task 2 macro-F1 means are 0.498, 0.836, and 0.911. Complete per-model workplace and parent-child results appear in Appendix A. The protocol can thus be run in all three settings, although differences in category wording, scenario norms, and annotation boundaries limit direct comparisons of domain difficulty.

## 6.3 RQ3: What does three-domain SFT change in educational replies?

For all three matched pairs, SFT increases Task 1 Recall on manipulative educational cases and decreases H-OK on healthy cases. Table 3 reports Aware F1 alongside both rates and their balanced average.

At the score-2 awareness threshold, balanced accuracy rises for Qwen-3.5-2B and Llama-3.2-3B but falls for Qwen-3.5-9B. For Qwen-3.5-9B, the number of healthy inputs receiving score 2 increases from 122/338 before SFT to 273/338 afterward, indicating more over-defensive replies to legitimate demands. If score 1 also counts as awareness, the base-to-SFT balanced accuracies become 0.645 to 0.527, 0.607 to 0.558, and 0.752 to 0.634 for Qwen-3.5-9B, Qwen-3.5-2B, and Llama-3.2-3B, respectively. Thus the direction of the balanced-accuracy change depends on how partial awareness is thresholded.

## 6.4 RQ4: How do task form and prompting affect the interpretation?

The education-only two-by-two ablation results are shown in Table 4, with per-configuration results in Appendix B. Across the three base configurations, mean first-person and third-person generation F1 are 0.424 and 0.387; after SFT they are 0.733 and 0.707. The third-person generation cell therefore does not show a mean advantage in education. Classification binary F1 is higher, but its always-manipulative baseline is approximately 0.800. Balanced accuracy gives a more restrained comparison: base A/B/C/D values are 0.572/0.426/0.617/0.631 and SFT values are 0.582/0.575/0.739/0.734. The result identifies a response-generation difficulty under these prompts; it does not isolate a causal penalty from first-person framing alone.

Removing conditional boundary and cooperation guidance from the Task 1 prompt substantially reduces awareness on educational cases (Table 5). Across 152 aligned items per local configuration, mean Aware F1 falls from 0.391 to 0.041 for the three base models and from 0.736 to 0.513 for their SFT variants. The tuned models retain more awareness under the mini-

**Table 3:** Educational Task 1 results before and after three-domain SFT, using judge score 2 as the awareness threshold. Each matched pair uses the same 1,014 educational inputs.

| Model | Stage | Aware F1 | Recall | H-OK | Balanced accuracy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qwen-3.5-9B | Base | 0.706 | 0.643 | 0.639 | 0.641 |
| | SFT | 0.807 | 0.950 | 0.192 | 0.571 |
| Qwen-3.5-2B | Base | 0.303 | 0.194 | 0.831 | 0.513 |
| | SFT | 0.786 | 0.855 | 0.361 | 0.608 |
| Llama-3.2-3B | Base | 0.229 | 0.135 | 0.917 | 0.526 |
| | SFT | 0.600 | 0.503 | 0.654 | 0.578 |

**Table 4:** Educational two-by-two task-framing ablation on 390 aligned inputs per configuration. Each stage averages three local configurations; A/B are judged generation, C/D are binary classification. F1 and balanced accuracy (BA) are reported together because of the 2:1 class ratio.

| | A: first-gen. | | B: third-gen. | | C: first-class. | | D: third-class. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stage | F1 | BA | F1 | BA | F1 | BA | F1 | BA |
| Base | 0.424 | 0.572 | 0.387 | 0.426 | 0.841 | 0.617 | 0.847 | 0.631 |
| SFT | 0.733 | 0.582 | 0.707 | 0.575 | 0.835 | 0.739 | 0.876 | 0.734 |

mal prompt, but both groups remain sensitive to the response instructions. For the tuned models, H-OK rises from 0.453 to 0.660 as manipulation Recall falls from 0.768 to 0.451, indicating that fewer over-defensive replies to healthy inputs coincide with more missed manipulation.

### 6.5 Reliability checks

On educational API replies, the two LLM judges agree exactly on 0/1/2 scores for 688/912 pairs (0.754) and on score-2 awareness for 743/912 (0.815). The 608-pair subset without cross self-judge risk reaches 0.773 exact and 0.840 binary agreement, with score Cohen's $\kappa = 0.572$; it covers four, not all six, API targets. The remaining 304 pairs have 0.717 exact and 0.763 binary agreement but include cross self-judge risk. In the no-risk subset the cross judge's mean score is 0.196 lower than the primary judge's, so small score differences between API targets should not be treated as stable rankings. Three-domain cross-judge agreement is summarized in Table 9 in Appendix C.

The separate two-by-two cross-judge check covers B, third-person generation, only: 354/354 educational replies yield 0.726 exact and 0.814 binary agreement. It is not a reliability check of A, C, or D. Human verification concerns input labels, whereas cross-judging concerns generated replies; neither establishes that these replies would help students in use.

## 7 Discussion

EMM shows why educational AI response safety needs more than a manipulation label. The strongest awareness rate in the educational results coincides with near-total over-defensiveness on healthy controls, while several local base models appear non-defensive largely because they seldom challenge manipulative demands. The educational taxonomy creates a setting in which both errors are visible. A system intended to help a student prepare a message should be evaluated for factual re-anchoring, concrete requests for standards, proportionate boundaries, and the ability to cooperate when an advisor's demanding request is legitimate.

The educational literature clarifies the meaning of this balance. Henderson et al. (2026) indicate that students already use AI to obtain feedback, but also distinguish its accessibility from the credibility and contextual knowledge of teachers. The self-study by Jensen et al. (2026) suggests that chatbot exchanges may help students prepare questions for supervision, while supervisory feedback may raise an issue the student initially overlooked. Carless and Boud (2018) locate productive feedback in the student's judgment and action, and Lee (2008) describes critical challenge and independence as legitimate goals of supervision. Accordingly, an assistant that always recommends resistance could undermine the kind of dialogue these works value. An assistant that always defers could equally narrow the student's capacity to question an unsupported demand.

The item-level comparison confirms that an observer label and a usable reply are distinct outputs, while also showing that a binary Task 2 flag is a weak indicator when models tend to label most inputs manipulative. In the two-by-two ablation, third-person generation does not consistently outperform first-person generation, so the response difficulty cannot be attributed to first-person framing alone. The three-domain extension demonstrates the portability of the audit protocol, while the mixed-domain SFT experiment exposes a deployment risk: examples of boundary-setting can make a model more responsive to manipulation and more likely to infer manipulation where there is none. Training and evaluation should therefore include healthy high-pressure cases and should monitor Recall and H-OK together. Minimal-prompt results also imply that a deployment's instruction wording is part of the observed behavior.

Several limitations narrow these conclusions. EMM uses constructed Chinese, single-turn utterances, primarily from graduate advisor-student situations. A real student's response depends on history, local norms, disciplinary expectations, support networks, and the student's own preferences. Task 1 mainly relies on

**Table 5:** Educational minimal-prompt sensitivity. Values are simple means over three matched local configurations per stage, with 152 aligned items per configuration. H-OK is the healthy-case non-over-defensiveness proxy.

| | Aware F1 | | Manipulation Recall | | Healthy H-OK | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stage | Main | Minimal | Main | Minimal | Main | Minimal |
| Base | 0.391 | 0.041 | 0.301 | 0.023 | 0.773 | 0.827 |
| SFT | 0.736 | 0.513 | 0.768 | 0.451 | 0.453 | 0.660 |

LLM judges, with only partial cross-judge coverage, differing primary judges among API targets, and detectable judge-severity differences. H-OK detects the absence of a score-2 boundary response on healthy items but does not establish helpfulness, factual grounding, or respectful cooperation. The study lacks systematic human evaluation of generated replies, observed student-advisor use, learning outcomes, and multi-turn follow-up. Future studies should examine real educational dialogues with appropriate protections, collect students' and supervisors' judgments about usefulness and proportionality, test multi-turn assistance, and train against both missed manipulation and needless escalation.

# 8 Conclusion

EMM offers an education-centered benchmark for two capacities that should be checked together: recognizing manipulative advisor language and writing a proportionate first-person student reply. Across 15 configurations, the educational results distinguish awareness, fine-grained classification, and healthy-case calibration. Extension to two further relationships shows that the protocol can be applied beyond education; matched three-domain SFT improves awareness but often worsens calibration. By making these tradeoffs measurable, EMM provides a reproducible starting point for auditing learner-facing generative AI. Whether better benchmark performance protects learner autonomy in practice remains to be established through human-centered, longitudinal, and multi-turn research.

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# Appendix

## A Complete three-domain model results

The main text reports six educational Task 1/Task 2 measures for 15 configurations. Tables 6 and 7 provide five corresponding measures for workplace and parent-child cases. Each configuration has 1,014 evaluation items in each domain. Task 1 Recall and H-OK should be read together; Task 2 accuracy and macro-F1 retain the domain-specific 14-way labels.

## B Educational task-framing ablation

Table 8 reports the education-domain two-by-two ablation results by configuration. Each configuration uses the same 390 educational inputs across A/B/C/D; the always-manipulative baseline yields a binary F1 of approximately 0.800 for the classification cells.

## C Cross-judge reliability details

The API cross-judge check uses a common 152-item sample in each domain for six target outputs per item. Most target replies were primarily scored by GPT-5.5 and rescored by Claude-Sonnet-5. The GPT-5.5 target instead has Claude-Sonnet-5 as primary judge and GPT-5.5 as cross judge; the Claude-Sonnet-5 target has GPT-5.5 as primary judge and Claude-Sonnet-5 as cross judge. Both cases create a cross self-judge risk, even though the primary judge avoided direct self-scoring. The no-risk subset consequently consists only of Qwen-3.7-Plus, DeepSeek-V4-Pro, GLM-5.2, and Gemini-3.1-Pro. Table 9 reports API Task 1 cross-judge agreement separately for education, workplace, and parent-child interactions, with 912 paired replies per domain.

## D Selected educational cases

The following cases illustrate recognition–reply mismatch, healthy-case over-defensiveness, and fine-label ambiguity. They are shortened English renderings of Chinese records, identified by their original sample IDs; individual cases do not estimate prevalence.

**Exact recognition without a usable reply (ID 478).** The advisor disputes an earlier data-processing discussion and says the student must have misremembered it. The constructed category is Gaslighting and Reality Distortion, which Qwen-3.5-9B identifies in Task 2. Yet its first-person reply accepts the alleged mistake: "I mixed up the data-processing logic in my notes; that was my oversight" (score 0). The matched SFT reply proposes comparing the notes with the discussion record and adjusting if the student misunderstood (score 2). It preserves the student's evidence without presuming that the advisor is wrong.

**Healthy pressure and over-defensiveness (ID 60).** The advisor cites a college rule requiring independent results for the current endorsement or authorship list, says the student's present data do not yet qualify, and offers a review after replication work next quarter. The constructed label is Healthy, which both Gemini-3.1-Pro and Claude-Sonnet-5 also predict in Task 2. Gemini's reply asserts, "I have already completed core data collection and preliminary analysis," and requests recognition in the current round, although those completed contributions are not stated in the input; its Task 1 score is 2, counted as over-defensive by H-OK. Claude instead accepts the stated rule and asks for the precise independence standard and next-quarter review process (score 1). This case also shows why a score below 2 on a healthy item should not, by itself, be called a high-quality educational reply.

**An intentionally overlapping mechanism (human-audit ID advisor_student_src_0034).** The constructed item says the advisor deliberately maintained an information asymmetry and excluded the student from meetings where research directions were set. Its construction label is Active Exclusion. Two annotators chose Resource/Information Withholding and one chose Active Exclusion; all three judged the utterance manipulative. Two annotators cite the deliberate information asymmetry, while the third cites exclusion from the meetings. The disagreement concerns which mechanism dominates a mixed utterance, rather than whether its pressure is acceptable. This case motivates reporting the binary and fine-label human verification separately.

**Table 6:** Complete workplace results for the 15 configurations. T1 = first-person reply; T2 = exact 14-way observer classification.

| Configuration | T1 Aware F1 | T1 Recall | T1 H-OK | T2 accuracy | T2 macro-F1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qwen-3.7-Plus | 0.702 | 0.716 | 0.355 | 0.831 | 0.788 |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro | 0.697 | 0.743 | 0.225 | 0.875 | 0.828 |
| GLM-5.2 | 0.709 | 0.797 | 0.095 | 0.871 | 0.836 |
| Gemini-3.1-Pro | 0.774 | 0.928 | 0.059 | 0.896 | 0.876 |
| GPT-5.5 | 0.792 | 0.916 | 0.207 | 0.896 | 0.868 |
| Claude-Sonnet-5 | 0.628 | 0.564 | 0.536 | 0.861 | 0.824 |
| Gemma-4-12B-IT | 0.274 | 0.194 | 0.562 | 0.790 | 0.716 |
| GLM-4-32B | 0.286 | 0.191 | 0.716 | 0.663 | 0.710 |
| Llama-3.2-3B | 0.035 | 0.018 | 0.985 | 0.149 | 0.143 |
| Qwen-3.5-2B | 0.198 | 0.115 | 0.902 | 0.306 | 0.348 |
| Qwen-3.5-9B | 0.602 | 0.499 | 0.683 | 0.701 | 0.685 |
| Qwen-3-8B | 0.073 | 0.038 | 0.956 | 0.453 | 0.500 |
| Llama-3.2-3B-SFT | 0.240 | 0.143 | 0.899 | 0.163 | 0.127 |
| Qwen-3.5-2B-SFT | 0.676 | 0.626 | 0.550 | 0.403 | 0.335 |
| Qwen-3.5-9B-SFT | 0.796 | 0.868 | 0.373 | 0.813 | 0.719 |

**Table 7:** Complete parent-child results for the 15 configurations, using the same measures as Table 6.

| Configuration | T1 Aware F1 | T1 Recall | T1 H-OK | T2 accuracy | T2 macro-F1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qwen-3.7-Plus | 0.760 | 0.888 | 0.107 | 0.908 | 0.867 |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro | 0.737 | 0.858 | 0.062 | 0.933 | 0.915 |
| GLM-5.2 | 0.780 | 0.948 | 0.033 | 0.918 | 0.890 |
| Gemini-3.1-Pro | 0.799 | 0.991 | 0.018 | 0.944 | 0.929 |
| GPT-5.5 | 0.770 | 0.919 | 0.062 | 0.945 | 0.936 |
| Claude-Sonnet-5 | 0.739 | 0.751 | 0.438 | 0.940 | 0.928 |
| Gemma-4-12B-IT | 0.636 | 0.649 | 0.213 | 0.939 | 0.931 |
| GLM-4-32B | 0.353 | 0.287 | 0.320 | 0.660 | 0.675 |
| Llama-3.2-3B | 0.411 | 0.286 | 0.793 | 0.062 | 0.032 |
| Qwen-3.5-2B | 0.308 | 0.203 | 0.775 | 0.205 | 0.223 |
| Qwen-3.5-9B | 0.738 | 0.735 | 0.488 | 0.758 | 0.747 |
| Qwen-3-8B | 0.383 | 0.265 | 0.766 | 0.395 | 0.404 |
| Llama-3.2-3B-SFT | 0.417 | 0.321 | 0.565 | 0.121 | 0.055 |
| Qwen-3.5-2B-SFT | 0.752 | 0.862 | 0.139 | 0.441 | 0.424 |
| Qwen-3.5-9B-SFT | 0.788 | 0.962 | 0.041 | 0.853 | 0.828 |

**Table 8:** Education-domain two-by-two ablation results by configuration. Each cell is binary F1 / balanced accuracy. A/B are judged generation; C/D are binary classification.

| Model family | Stage | A: first-gen. | B: third-gen. | C: first-class. | D: third-class. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qwen-3.5-2B | Base | .286/.485 | .393/.396 | .816/.552 | .811/.537 |
| Qwen-3.5-2B | SFT | .782/.594 | .789/.569 | .728/.762 | .850/.748 |
| Qwen-3.5-9B | Base | .747/.690 | .516/.423 | .907/.798 | .932/.856 |
| Qwen-3.5-9B | SFT | .791/.542 | .782/.594 | .977/.956 | .977/.954 |
| Llama-3.2-3B | Base | .238/.542 | .251/.458 | .800/.500 | .800/.500 |
| Llama-3.2-3B | SFT | .627/.610 | .549/.562 | .800/.500 | .800/.500 |

**Table 9:** API Task 1 cross-judge agreement by domain, 912 paired replies in each row. Exact is agreement on 0/1/2; adjacent allows one point of difference; binary uses the strict score-2 awareness threshold. Score delta is cross minus primary mean score.

| Domain | Pairs | Exact | Adjacent | Binary | Score $\kappa$ | Score delta |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Education | 912 | 0.754 | 0.956 | 0.815 | 0.507 | -0.059 |
| Workplace | 912 | 0.737 | 0.974 | 0.787 | 0.433 | -0.046 |
| Parent–child | 912 | 0.865 | 0.984 | 0.872 | 0.529 | +0.044 |