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Gaṅgeśa on Yogyatā and the Validity of Verbal Awareness

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Abstract: In Nyāya, *yogyatā* is a condition required for the listener to understand a sentence's meaning. I argue that for Gaṅgeśa, author of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (c. 1325), *yogyatā* is not indexed to the listener, and it is defeated by instance-level sublation (fruits on the riverbank, when there are none) in addition to kind-level sublation (watering with fire). So *yogyatā* obtaining amounts to the relation holding. The problem, however, is that an awareness of *yogyatā* is required for every verbal awareness, and so how can a verbal awareness be false? And why does an awareness of *yogyatā* not put the listener in a position to ascertain the validity of their verbal awareness in the very act of understanding it? The answers are as follows. Gaṅgeśa's causal apparatus requires an awareness of any kind when it comes to *yogyatā*, and so a false sentence is understood through an error about *yogyatā*. When the listener's awareness of *yogyatā* is true, however, it is the epistemic virtue by which the verbal awareness is produced as a knowledge-event. But the virtue is invisible to the listener, who must accordingly ascertain the verbal awareness's validity from something else. Therefore, Gaṅgeśa's causal apparatus for verbal awareness, his account of validity's production in the case of testimony, and his account of its ascertainment all constitute a single design, turning on one factor: the listener's awareness of *yogyatā*.

Keywords: Testimony, validity (*prāmāṇya*), knowledge, Gaṅgeśa, Nyāya, *yogyatā*

§1 Introduction

In the *Śabdāprāmāṇyavāda*, Gaṅgeśa (c. 1325) states that the listener's awareness of *yogyatā* is a necessary auxiliary cause (*sahakārin*) of their verbal awareness, and that *any mode* of awareness suffices: uncertainty (*saṃśaya*), error (*viparyaya*), or knowledge-event (*pramā*). In the *Prāmāṇyotpattivāda*, Gaṅgeśa states that *yogyatā*, or the listener's true awareness of it, is the epistemic virtue (*guṇa*) which guarantees that a verbal awareness is produced as a knowledge-event. These two claims are made in different parts of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, and have not been read together.

This article reconstructs how Gaṅgeśa's claims in the *Śabdāprāmāṇyavāda* and *Prāmāṇyotpattivāda* cohere within one design. The listener's awareness of *yogyatā*, in any mode, is an auxiliary cause of every verbal awareness; under a stronger requirement, truth, the same awareness is the epistemic virtue in the production (*utpatti*) of validity; and its invisibility to the listener ensures that the ascertainment (*jñapti*) of verbal awareness's validity comes from something else (*parataḥ*)—from another awareness. Gaṅgeśa's three positions thus cohere within one design, turning on one factor: the listener's awareness of *yogyatā*. This is how Gaṅgeśa's theory of verbal awareness is a specific instance of his general theory of extrinsic validity (*parataḥprāmāṇya*), and not an exception.

My larger reconstruction rests upon my interpretation of Gaṅgeśa's position on *yogyatā*. First, *yogyatā* is not indexed to the listener; it is not a matter of what sublating knowledge-event (*bādhakapramā*) is currently available to the listener. Second, *yogyatā* is defeated not only where the referents cannot be related (watering with fire), but it is also defeated where the referents *can* be related and are not (fruits on the riverbank). *Yogyatā* obtaining therefore amounts to the relation conveyed by the sentence holding. I suggest "factual conformity" as a translation of *yogyatā* on Gaṅgeśa's perspective.

However, each above claim about Gaṅgeśa's view on *yogyatā* potentially threatens something else Gaṅgeśa holds. First, if the listener's awareness of *yogyatā* is an auxiliary cause of every verbal awareness, and if *yogyatā* obtaining amounts to the relation holding, then verbal awareness requires within its causal apparatus an awareness of what makes the sentence true: the relation holding. And so, how could false verbal awareness arise? Second, if the epistemic virtue in testimony is the listener's true awareness of *yogyatā*, then the listener can have a correct awareness that the relation holds *before* the verbal awareness arises. And so, how is the listener not in a position to ascertain that their verbal awareness is a knowledge-event in the very act of understanding it?

The first tension has been recognized. Mohanty (1994: 43) considers the factual reading of *yogyatā*, and then rejects it, because he believes it would undercut the possibility of false verbal awareness. The second tension has not been recognized, because it depends upon the identification of the listener's true awareness of *yogyatā* as the epistemic virtue, and this only first occurred with Das (2021).

Concerning the first question, the answer is that Gaṅgeśa's causal apparatus requires an *awareness* of *yogyatā*, not *yogyatā* itself, and this awareness may occur in *any mode*: uncertainty, error, or knowledge-event. A listener may therefore have an error about *yogyatā*. However, the listener cannot register this error simply by having it because both a knowledge-event and error are equally determinate. This is how false verbal awareness occurs on the position that *yogyatā* is "factual conformity."

Concerning the second question, the answer has multiple components. First, although the listener's true awareness of *yogyatā* is the epistemic virtue (*guṇa*) that guarantees their verbal awareness is produced as a knowledge-event, nevertheless the listener cannot register that their awareness of *yogyatā* is true simply by having it. As just noted, the listener can register determinacy, not truth. Second, ascertaining the validity of their awareness of *yogyatā* would require a second awareness, an inference, and the verbal awareness arises before such an inference can finish. Nor is a second awareness about the relation holding—either the verbal awareness itself or otherwise—in any better position: its own validity is no more established than the first awareness's. And familiarity (*abhyāsa*) makes no difference: Gaṅgeśa denies that validity is grasped from the awareness itself even in familiar cases. Therefore, the listener having what verbal awareness's causal apparatus requires—an awareness of *yogyatā*—never amounts to the listener being in a position to reach a verdict on the validity of their verbal awareness during the very act of understanding it. The epistemic virtue is an awareness of the listener's own within the causal apparatus of verbal awareness, but the essential feature therein—truth—is invisible to the listener.

These answers, therefore, reveal Gaṅgeśa's notion of *yogyatā* as "factual conformity" to not be in tension with his larger theory of testimony. Rather, it is precisely the factor that makes legible the larger design. An awareness of *yogyatā*, under any mode, is an auxiliary cause of *every* verbal awareness; that same awareness of *yogyatā*, under a stronger condition—truth—is the epistemic virtue by which the verbal awareness is produced extrinsically (*parataḥ*) as a knowledge-event; and because the virtue is invisible during the awareness's occurrence, its ascertainment (*jñapti*) is also necessarily extrinsic (*parataḥ*).

The article's five main contributions within the framework of its larger reconstruction are as follows. First, Gaṅgeśa's definition of *yogyatā* is not indexed to the listener (§3.3). Second, *yogyatā* is defeated by instance-level sublation in addition to kind-level sublation (§3.4). Third,

Gaṅgeśa's catalogue of auxiliary causes for verbal awareness distinguishes the *modes* of awareness in which the verbal awareness's auxiliary causes must occur (§4). Fourth, one and the same awareness of *yogyatā* plays two roles: it is a cause of *every* verbal awareness, and, when true, is verbal awareness's epistemic virtue. The fifth contribution is the reconstruction of how this all coheres with Gaṅgeśa's general theory that validity's ascertainment (*jñapti*) is extrinsic (*parataḥ*) (§6).

This article's second contribution has a precedent. Chakrabarti (1986) argued that *yogyatā* in Nyāya amounts to the relation obtaining, though Chakrabarti proceeds from the definition of Viśvanātha's *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* (c. 1650). However, such an interpretation of *yogyatā* was rejected by Mohanty (1994), and indeed by Chakrabarti (1994) himself. This article's fourth contribution builds upon Das (2021), whose identification of the listener's true awareness of *yogyatā* as the epistemic virtue in testimony is where §5 begins.

My claims do not all stand at the same distance from Gaṅgeśa's text. My interpretation of Gaṅgeśa's account of *yogyatā* is argued from his own statements, as is my analysis of his catalogue of verbal awareness's auxiliary causes. However, my account of how Gaṅgeśa's theory of verbal awareness coheres with his general theory of extrinsic validity—this is my own reconstruction. And while my reconstruction occurs at a further distance from specific textual statements, it is reinforced by its legibility in relation to all of Gaṅgeśa's separate statements.

§2 Background: the Production and Ascertainment of Validity

The Sanskrit tradition distinguished two questions about validity (*prāmāṇya*). The first question concerns the production (*utpatti*) of validity: what *makes* an awareness a knowledge-event? The second question concerns the ascertainment (*jñapti*) of validity: how does an agent come to *know* that their awareness was a knowledge-event? Both questions originated in Mīmāṃsā, and Gaṅgeśa's Nyāya theory is framed as a rejection of the Mīmāṃsakas'. This section sets out the competing core theories as background since the article speaks directly to them in the context of testimony.

The core Mīmāṃsā doctrine flows from Kumārila. Kumārila's key articulation of his theory of intrinsic validity (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) occurs at *Codanāsūtra* vs. 47:

> It is to be understood that the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of every awareness is intrinsic. For it is not possible that something else produces [in an awareness] a capacity that is not inherently existent [therein].[1]

A few verses later (vs. 53), Kumārila explains what this amounts to in practice:

[1] *Codanāsūtra* 47 (= Kataoka 2011: 10): *svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyam iti gamyatām. na hi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena śakyate.* I follow Kataoka's (2011: 246-249) translation on all points of syntax and interpretation. I align my translation with the terminology used in this article (e.g., I render Kataoka's "cognition" as "awareness").

> Therefore, the validity of an awareness attains [intrinsically], simply by virtue of its being an awareness. [Its validity] is removed by a subsequent awareness that the object is otherwise, or by an awareness of a flaw (*doṣa*) that has arisen among its causes.[2]

Validity attains to an awareness, as Kumārila puts it, by its very nature as an awareness (*bodhātmakatena*): to be an awareness is to present an object determinately, and this is precisely what an awareness's validity consists in. Thus, every awareness arises with its own validity. However, the awareness's claim to validity may be sublated: either by an awareness directly rebutting it, or by an awareness of a flaw among its causes undercutting it. Short of that, an agent is entitled to take an awareness at face value—what McCrea (2018: 110) calls the "innocent until guilty" principle—and unmotivated suspicion is to be discounted. This is, at its core, Kumārila's theory of intrinsic validity (*svataḥprāmāṇya*).[3]

Gaṅgeśa treats validity across two essays in his treatise, one on its production (*utpatti*), and one on its ascertainment (*jñapti*). The division is not his invention; it flows from Kumārila, and pervades subsequent Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā treatments of validity.[4] Gaṅgeśa denies intrinsicality on both counts.

Gaṅgeśa's disagreement also extends to what validity (*prāmāṇya*) is. For Gaṅgeśa, a knowledge-event (*pramā*) is a non-recollective awareness that presents its qualificand as possessing a qualifier it does in fact possess.[5] In other words, validity consists precisely in an awareness being true of its object. Validity for Gaṅgeśa thus involves how things stand, and not, as Kumārila would have it, how the awareness's content appears to the agent.[6]

Gaṅgeśa opens his discussion of validity's production by denying the Mīmāṃsā theory that validity is produced intrinsically:

> A knowledge-event is also produced extrinsically; and not intrinsically from the mere collection of causes sufficient for any awareness (*jñānasāmagrīmātra*). If [a knowledge-event] were produced by the [collection of causes sufficient for *any* awareness], a non-knowledge-event would be a knowledge-event.[7]

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[2] *Codanāsūtra* 53 (= Kataoka 2011: 12-13): *tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā. arthanyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānād apodyate.* My translation is closest to McCrea's (2018: 103), but does not differ in any notable ways from earlier translations (e.g., Kataoka 2011: 257-259).

[3] Kumārila's formulations are brief, and his premodern commentators interpreted the theory in markedly different ways: Umbeka, Sucarita, and Pārthasārathi. The question of how to interpret Kumārila's theory—and which commentator's interpretation most accurately presents it—has garnered a substantial modern literature (Taber 1992; Arnold 2001, 2005; Kataoka 2011; McCrea 2018). I do not adjudicate the question here.

[4] Kataoka (2011: 252-253) incisively notes that for Kumārila, there are *three* viewpoints concerning validity: its production (*utpatti*), its operation (*pravṛtti*), and its ascertainment (*jñapti*). To be clear, Kumārila does *not* hold that validity is ascertained intrinsically (Kataoka 2011: 253).

[5] *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (hereafter, TCM). TCM_{C1} p. 401 ll. 2-3: *ucyate. yatra yad asti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramā. tadvati tatprakārakānubhavo vā.* "We reply: a knowledge-event (*pramā*) is a non-recollective awareness (*anubhava*) of something where that thing [actually] is. Or, [a knowledge-event] is a non-recollective awareness which has something as its qualifier, [occurring] with respect to something that possesses that qualifier." The term *anubhava* excludes recollection (*smṛti*): only a non-recollective awareness is a candidate for a knowledge-event (*pramā*). This exclusion is by provenance, not content: it does not foreclose an awareness whose content the agent already knows from being a knowledge-event.

[6] I note that not all Mīmāṃsakas followed Kumārila on this point. See McCrea (2018).

[7] TCM_{C1} p. 287 ll. 2-3: *utpadyate 'pi pramā parato na tu svato jñānasāmagrīmātrāt. tajjanyatvenāpramāpi pramā syāt.*

In this passage, Gaṅgeśa denies the Mīmāṃsā theory of intrinsic validity; he claims that in knowledge-events there is a distinct causal apparatus containing a surplus feature, an epistemic virtue (*guṇa*), whose presence guarantees that the awareness is produced as a knowledge-event. That is, a knowledge-event is not produced by the mere collection of causes sufficient for *any* awareness of a given kind; a knowledge-event is produced by that same collection of causes plus an epistemic virtue.

Crucially, it follows that validity's production (*utpatti*) being "extrinsic" (*parataḥ*) on Gaṅgeśa's Nyāya theory marks the relation of the epistemic virtue to the causal apparatus for *any* awareness of that kind; it does not mark the epistemic virtue's physical location. That is, an epistemic virtue in the case of, e.g., verbal awareness, must be "extrinsic"—it must be a surplus feature—in relation to the causal apparatus for *any* awareness of that kind. It does not follow that the epistemic virtue must be external to the knower. Thus, nothing prevents the epistemic virtue from being one of the knower's own awarenesses—and in the case of Gaṅgeśa's account of testimony, it is (§5).

This surplus feature—the epistemic virtue—must be a positive factor. An opponent might reduce it to the absence of faults within the causal apparatus. Gaṅgeśa, however, argues that epistemic virtues are positive factors.[8] There is no single epistemic virtue shared by all the sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*): sensory contact with many parts of an object, for perception; and true awarenesses of the inferential mark, of similarity, and of the sentence meaning, for inference, comparison, and testimony.[9]

For Gaṅgeśa, an awareness is either a knowledge-event from the moment it arises, or it is not. Nothing can later make it a knowledge-event, or unmake it. All a subsequent awareness can do is allow the agent to ascertain that their awareness *was* a knowledge-event. The question of whether and how an agent has such an ascertainment belongs to Gaṅgeśa's second essay on validity, the *Prāmāṇyajñaptivāda*.

In the *Prāmāṇyajñaptivāda*, Gaṅgeśa argues that if validity is grasped intrinsically, there could be no uncertainty in the case of awarenesses that arise in unfamiliar circumstances—but such uncertainty regularly occurs.[10] Gaṅgeśa also says that validity's nature is such that it cannot be

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[8] TCM_{C1} p. 341 ll. 1-3: *apica liṅgasādṛśyavākyārthabhramadoṣābhāvamātrān nānumityādir iti satyaparāmarśādiguṇasiddhiḥ.* "Moreover, since an inferential knowledge-event and the rest do not arise from the mere absence of defects (*doṣa*)—error about the inferential mark, about similarity, [and] about sentence meaning—it is established that a true subsumptive judgment and the like are epistemic virtues (*guṇa*)." This passage is cited in Das (2021: 178).

[9] TCM_{C1} p. 327 ll. 2-5: *ucyate. pramāmātre ca nānugato guṇaḥ kintu tattatpramāyāṃ bhūyo'vayavendriyasannikarṣayathārthaliṅgasādṛśyavākyārthajñānānāṃ yathāyathaṃ pratyekam eva guṇatvam anvayavyatirekāt.* "We reply: there is no uniform epistemic virtue for every knowledge-event. Rather, the contact of a sense-faculty with many parts of an object and true awarenesses regarding an inferential mark, similarity, and a sentence meaning are each the respective (*yathāyatha*) epistemic virtue with regards to each specific [kind of] knowledge-event. This is based on positive and negative correlation [between each kind of knowledge-event and each of these epistemic virtues]." This passage is cited in Das (2021: 178). I follow Das's translation, differing only in how to interpret *yathāyatha*.

[10] TCM_{C1} p. 184 ll. 1-2: *siddhāntas tu prāmāṇyasya svato grahe 'nabhyāsadaśotpannajñāne saṃśayo na syāt.* "Our position, however, is that if validity is grasped intrinsically, there could be no uncertainty about it in the case of an awareness arisen in unfamiliar circumstances (*anabhyāsadaśā*), since validity would be determined in the grasping of the awareness."

grasped intrinsically; it must always be ascertained "extrinsically" (*parataḥ*), meaning, by something else—by another awareness.[11]

However, validity is not grasped by apperception (*anuvyavasāya*), the second-order awareness by which an agent grasps their own first-order awarenesses. An apperception only tracks the first-order awareness's *content*; not the first-order awareness's validity. This is demonstrated by the fact that when an agent is in error, their apperception of the erroneous awareness takes as its content the erroneously superimposed qualifier—not the actual qualifier that holds in the world.[12] An agent's apperception of an error is thus as accurate as their apperception of a knowledge-event because it is accurate about what the first-order awareness presents, not about whether what the first-order awareness presents holds.

When validity *is* ascertained by another awareness, it is ascertained by an inference. On the first occasion, it is inferred from negative concomitance alone.[13] The inferential mark is the success of the action prompted by the awareness of *x*: had the agent's awareness of *x* not been a knowledge-event, the agent's action upon *x* would not have succeeded—but it was successful.[14]

Gaṅgeśa's theory distinguishes between three cases concerning the undertaking of action (*pravṛtti*) as per the agent's epistemic state about the awareness's validity. The ordinary case is where no suspicion of invalidity has arisen: here, the agent's determinate awareness triggers action without hesitation—and importantly, its validity has not been ascertained at all.[15] The second case is where such suspicion has arisen, and action without hesitation is blocked. Action without hesitation requires the determination "this is actually so," and this depends upon a

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[11] TCM_{C1} p. 285 ll. 5-7: *viśeṣyaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogiprakārānavacchinatvādikaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ svato grahītum aśakyam iti parata eva gṛhyate.* I translate this passage below in the article's body. The term *parataḥ* ("extrinsic") here means "by something else"—it does not mean "subsequently." The claim is about the source of validity's apprehension, not the timing.

[12] TCM_{C1} p. 284 l. 5 – p. 285 l. 2: *evam anuvyavasāyasya prāmāṇyaniyatatvān na prāmāṇyaśaṅkā. na hy ajānan jānāmīti pratyeti. na vā ghaṭajñāne paṭaṃ jānāmīti. bhrame 'pi anuvyavasāyena rajatatvādikaṃ vyavasāyaprakāreṇollikhyate tac ca tathaiva.* "Similarly, since apperception is invariably valid, there is no uncertainty about its validity. For an agent who does not have an awareness does not have the [apperception] "I have an awareness." Nor, when the awareness is of a pot, does the agent have the [apperception] "I am aware of a cloth." Even in error, silverness and so on is presented by apperception as the qualifier of the determinate awareness—and that is just so."

[13] TCM_{C1} p. 246 l. 2: *prathaṃ ca prāmāṇyajñānaṃ vyatirekinā.* "And the first ascertainment of validity is by an inference based on negative concomitance alone."

[14] TCM_{C1} p. 255 l. 4 – p. 256 l. 2: *evaṃ vahnyapramāyāṃ vahnitvābhāvavati vahnitvaprakārakatvādisamarthapravṛttijanakatvābhāvayor vyāptigrahe 'prāmāṇyavyāpakahetvabhāvābhāvarūpād dhetor aprāmāṇyābhāvarūpaṃ sādhyaṃ sidhyati.* "In this way, the pervasion (*vyāpti*) is grasped between A) a non-knowledge-event of fire—possessing fireness as its qualifier with respect to something that contains an absence of fire—and B) the absence of producing successful action. Then, from an inference-warranting property which is the absence of the absence of the inference-warranting property that pervades non-validity, the thing to be proven, the absence of non-validity, is established."

[15] The two relevant passages are:

A) TCM_{C1} p. 282 ll. 4-5: […] *iti jñānāntaram agṛhītaprāmāṇyam api svārthaniścayarūpaṃ niṣkampapravṛttiṃ janayati*. "Thus, that further awareness produces action without hesitation, even though its own validity has not been ascertained, as it determines its own object."

B) TCM_{C1} p. 285 l. 7 – p. 286 l. 2: *jhaṭitipravṛttis tu karacaraṇādimati śarīrajñānatvāder viśeṣasyānuvyavasāyena grahād aprāmāṇyaśaṅkāśūnyād vyavasāyād eva na prāmāṇyajñānaṃ pravartakam ity uktam*. "However, instant action (*pravṛtti*) results only from a determinate awareness free from suspicion of invalidity—[free from it] because apperception grasps a specific feature, e.g., the awareness being of a body with respect to an object possessing hands and feet. An ascertainment of validity does not trigger action, as has been said."

further determination of validity.[16] Presumably action may still occur here, but with hesitation. The third case is where validity has been ascertained. The ascertainment of validity itself, however, does not trigger action, since the awareness whose validity has been ascertained has already perished by the time the inference finishes. Rather, what it does is block such suspicion from attaching to *another* awareness of the same object, and it is *that* other awareness of the object—its own validity unascertained—that may trigger action without hesitation.[17] Thus, an ascertainment about validity never triggers action; it block an obstacle to action.

Gaṅgeśa's essays on validity are general, and what exactly is to be made of it in the case of testimony is a question not explicitly answered by Gaṅgeśa himself. I reconstruct answers in §§5-6, bringing Gaṅgeśa's theory of verbal awareness into conversation with every point in this section.

§3 What is *Yogyatā* for Gaṅgeśa?

This section establishes two features of *yogyatā* for Gaṅgeśa: (1) *yogyatā* is not indexed to the listener; it doesn't concern what the listener happens to know. (2) *yogyatā* is not only defeated by kind-level sublation, but also by instance-level sublation; *yogyatā* obtaining amounts to the relation holding. I therefore suggest "factual conformity" as a translation of *yogyatā* for Gaṅgeśa. This section establishes the necessary foundation for investigating how Gaṅgeśa's theory of verbal awareness interfaces with his general theory of validity (*prāmāṇya*) because the listener's awareness of *yogyatā* is the factor connecting Gaṅgeśa's different accounts within one design.

§3.1 The Classical Conception of *Yogyatā* in Sanskrit Philosophy

In the earlier Sanskrit literature, *yogyatā* was defeated only by an incompatibility among kinds. Exemplary of this is Śālikanātha (c. 900), the earliest extant Sanskrit philosopher to define *yogyatā*, who explains that the listener understands that a referent is "suitable" (*yogya*) for a specific connection in a sentence meaning based on whether the referent can be observed in that relation in the world.[18] Seeing one token instance of fruits on a riverbank has no bearing on the truth value of a claim about another token instance of fruits on a riverbank. Rather, seeing one token gives evidence for whether the *kinds* are compatible. Thus, for Śālikanātha, *yogyatā* is about whether kinds are compatible. This means that Gaṅgeśa's conception of *yogyatā*—where, as we will see, *yogyatā* can be defeated by instance-level sublation—constitutes a departure from the classical conception.

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[16] TCM_{C1} p. 117 l. 3 – p. 121 l. 1: *atha kiṃ prāmāṇyajñānena. tasya pravṛttimātre vyabhicārāt* […]. *na. prāmāṇyasaṃśayānantaram idam ittham evety avadhāraṇasya niṣkampapravṛttyaṅgasya prāmāṇyaniścayādhīnatvāt.* "[If you say], what, then, is the purpose of ascertaining validity? Regarding action as such, it deviates […]. [We reply], No. Because after uncertainty about validity has arisen, the determination "this is actually so," which is a necessary auxiliary cause of action without hesitation, depends upon certainty about validity."

[17] TCM_{C1} p. 282 l. 5 – p. 283 l. 7: *kintu tajjñānasamānaviṣayakam aprāmāṇyaśaṅkāśūnyaṃ jñānāntaram eva.* […] *iti jñānāntaram agṛhītaprāmāṇyam api svārthaniścayarūpaṃ niṣkampapravṛttiṃ janayatīty aprāmāṇyaśaṅkāpratibandhadvārā niṣkampapravṛttāv upayujyate prāmāṇyajñānam iti na niṣphalam.* "Rather, it is just a further awareness having the same object, [and] free of suspicion of invalidity, [that triggers action]. […] Thus, that further awareness produces action without hesitation, even though its own validity has not been ascertained, as it determines its own object. Therefore, an ascertainment of validity is useful for action without hesitation by way of blocking suspicion of invalidity; it is not useless."

[18] *Prakaraṇapañcikā* p. 390 l. 21 – p. 391 l. 1: *kiṃ punar idaṃ yogyatvaṃ nāma. ucyate yat sambandhārham. sambandhārham idam iti katham avagamyate. sambandhitvena dṛṣṭatvat.* "But what is this thing called *yogyatva*? We say it is something's capability for a relation. How is [its capacity for a relation] ascertained? Based on that thing being observed in the relation."

§3.2 Gaṅgeśa's Conception of *Yogyatā*

Gaṅgeśa first provides a simple definition of *yogyatā*:

> We say that *yogyatā* is the absence of a sublating knowledge-event (*bādhakapramā*).[19]

Immediately thereafter, Gaṅgeśa provides an elaborated definition:

> And [*yogyatā*] is an absence—which resides in a relation with one word's referent (*padārtha*)—of being a qualificand in a knowledge-event regarding the counterpositiveness of an absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*) that resides in the referent of another word.[20]

As per Nyāya's direct realism, a *padārtha* is not a word's meaning, it is a word's referent. Gaṅgeśa therefore defines *yogyatā* in a way that it evaluates whether a real relation between real things is absent. Gaṅgeśa's definition can be unpacked with the example "he waters with fire" (*vahninā siñcati*).[21] The referent of the phrase "with fire" (*vahninā*) is the instrumentality occurrent in the fire. This referent is expected to occur in the verb's referent, "watering," by way of a relation of determinant-hood (*nirūpakatva*). However, "watering" is not the sort of act that can be done "with fire." Accordingly, there is an absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*) of this determinant-hood relation residing in the verb's referent, the act of watering. Therefore, *yogyatā* fails because the relation with the referent of "with fire" *is* a qualificand of a knowledge-event presenting that relation as the counterpositive of an absence occurring in the referent of "waters." This example used to unpack Gaṅgeśa's definition involves *yogyatā* operating in relation to kinds: no act of watering can be done with fire.

Gaṅgeśa's definition is therefore epistemic and negative, but it does not specify whose knowledge-event is absent or whether the absence must only pertain to kinds.[22] Is *yogyatā* the absence of the *listener's* sublating knowledge-event, in which case *yogyatā* is about the listener's epistemic state? Or is *yogyatā* the absence of *any* such knowledge-event, in which case *yogyatā* is about the relation holding? Similarly, Gaṅgeśa's definition does not explicitly demarcate *yogyatā*'s scope: is it only defeated at the level of kinds (watering with fire)? Or is it also defeated at the level of instances (fruits on the riverbank)? As I will now establish, for Gaṅgeśa *yogyatā* is not indexed to the listener, and it is defeated in instance-level cases.

§3.3 *Yogyatā* is Not Indexed to the Listener

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[19] *Śabdakhaṇḍa* (hereafter ŚKh$_J$). ŚKh$_J$ p. 29 l.3: *ucyate bādhakapramāviraho yogyatā*.

[20] ŚKh$_J$ p. 29 ll. 3-5: *sā cetarapadārthasaṃsarge 'parapadārthaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitvapramāviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ.* I translate this passage following Das (2021: 175 n. 41), modifying "absence" to "absolute absence" and "semantic relation" to "relation."

[21] The earliest attestation of this example that I know, used in a different context, comes from Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. 2 p. 36 l. 22): *tad bhaved agninā siñced ityādividhisannibham.* "It would be the equivalent of the prescription, "He should water with fire."" Mathurānātha unpacks Gaṅgeśa's definition with this example (TCM$_{C4.1}$ p. 263 ll. 4-7), and Das (2021: 175 n. 41) does too.

[22] Other mentions of *yogyatā* in the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* (ŚKh$_J$ p. 6 l. 21 – p. 7 l. 4 and ŚKh$_J$ p. 140 ll. 7-10) do not index *yogyatā* to a specific knower.

The recent literature has not settled—and indeed has not posed—the question of *yogyatā*'s indexing. Das's (2021) arguments require the unindexed reading, but he does not argue for it.[23] Chakrabarti (1994), however, glosses *yogyatā* as indexed to the listener, and Phillips (2020) explicitly reads Gaṅgeśa's definition of *yogyatā* as indexed to the listener.[24] In this section, I will analyze a textual passage to demonstrate that *yogyatā* is *not* indexed to the listener for Gaṅgeśa.

The following case study demonstrates what turns on the indexing question: a listener is told, falsely, that there are fruits on the riverbank, and the listener does not have any knowledge bearing on the matter. The listener-indexed reading predicts the following. The listener has no sublating knowledge-event (*bādhakapramā*), and so *yogyatā* obtains: the listener's awareness about *yogyatā* is true. The unindexed reading, however, predicts the following. The relation does not hold, and so *yogyatā* does not obtain: the listener's awareness about *yogyatā* is an error. Thus, the two readings about *yogyatā*'s indexing deliver contradictory outcomes in one and the same case. A statement by Gaṅgeśa about such a case will therefore be decisive.

The following passage from Gaṅgeśa's *Prāmāṇyotpattivāda* provides evidence that the unindexed reading is correct. In this passage, Gaṅgeśa provides his own conclusion, formulated against an earlier Nyāya view, that *yogyatā* or a true awareness about it is the epistemic virtue (*guṇa*) in the production of testimonial knowledge-events. Gaṅgeśa explains why this virtue is absent in cases where testimony fails, and in doing so explains what *yogyatā* is:

> On this we say the following. In ordinary cases, the speaker's true awareness about the sentence meaning is *not* the epistemic virtue in testimonial knowledge-events. Rather, *yogyatā*, and so on, or a true awareness about those conditions [is the epistemic virtue in testimonial knowledge-events] because it results in a parsimonious [theory] and because [those conditions are] necessary. There is no true awareness of *yogyatā* in the case of a non-fact-conforming (*visaṃvādin*) sentence produced by error, carelessness, or a desire to deceive. This is because the sentence meaning is sublated. This holds in the case of a non-fact-conforming sentence which conveys one thing due to a failure of the speech organs—when something else was to be conveyed. However, when [a sentence] *is* fact-conforming, it certainly is a source of knowledge. In certain cases, there is simply no awareness of *yogyatā*, and so on.[25]

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[23] Das (2021: 175) infers from the utterance's content being false to the existence of sublating knowledge-event, giving Īśvara's awareness as the sublating knowledge-event. This example of Īśvara (an omniscient God-like being) requires that *any* knower's awareness of a sublating knowledge-event count; Das's argument operates on the unindexed reading. The subject of Das (2021) is epistemic luck; the question of *yogyatā*'s indexing does not arise for him.

[24] Chakrabarti (1994: 116) defines *yogyatā* as "lack of *known* contradiction," (italics added), saying it "requires that the hearer does not know the opposite of what's being said," and suggests it "is best understood as plausibility"; cf. below for Chakrabarti (1986). Phillips (2020: 185) says, "if the hearer knows that the speaker is not a trustworthy authority, no testimonial knowledge will be generated even if the statement is true. Thus so-called semantic fit, *yogyatā*, is not just semantic but includes other kinds of defeater. Indeed, as we shall see early in vol. 3 (pp. 1271ff), Gaṅgeśa defines it negatively, as the absence of any defeater *known from the hearer's perspective*." (italics added). As we have already seen, however, Gaṅgeśa does *not*index his definition of *yogyatā* to the listener.

[25] TCM_{C4} p. 350 l.3 – p. 351 l. 2: *atra brūmaḥ. śābdapramāyāṃ loke vaktur yathārthavākyārthajñānaṃ na guṇaḥ kintu yogyatādikaṃ yathārthatajjñānaṃ vā lāghavād āvaśyakatvāc ca. bhramapramādavipralipsājanye vākye visaṃvādini na yathārthayogyatājñānaṃ vākyārthasya bādhitatvāt. evaṃ karaṇāpāṭavād anyasmin vaktavye 'nyābhidhāne visaṃvādini. saṃvādini tu pramāṇam eva. yogyatādijñānam eva tu kvacin nāsti.*
This passage is also translated in Das (2021: 186). Das gives *vaktṛyathārthavākyārthajñānaṃ* in his transliteration whereas the printed edition he cites gives *vaktur*. Das does not note *vaktṛ-* as a preferred reading from manuscripts.

The core of this passage has three parts: a class of sentence types (picked out as not fact-conforming and produced by error, carelessness, or a desire to deceive); a verdict (no true awareness of *yogyatā* on the part of the listener); and a reason (the sentence meaning is sublated).

The application of this passage to the above case study is as follows. The listener who was told falsely that there are fruits on the riverbank, and who doesn't have any knowledge bearing on the matter, has an awareness about a sentence which is not fact-conforming (*visaṃvādin*). In the passage at hand, Gaṅgeśa states that in such a case, the listener does *not* have a true awareness of *yogyatā*. Therefore, the listener's awareness of *yogyatā* is an error. That is the unindexed reading's prediction alone. This contradicts the prediction of the listener-indexed reading whereupon the listener would have a true awareness about *yogyatā*.

The reason Gaṅgeśa gives for the absence of a true awareness of *yogyatā* is that the sentence meaning is sublated (*vākyārthasya bādhitatvāt*). Crucially, Gaṅgeśa does not supply a specific knower.[26] This further demonstrates that the absence of a true awareness of *yogyatā* is not tied to the sentence meaning being sublated for the listener specifically. Rather, a true awareness of *yogyatā* is absent because the sentence meaning does not hold. On the listener-indexed reading, however, the listener would have a true awareness about *yogyatā* because the sentence meaning has not been sublated *for them*.

Therefore, the sublating knowledge event (*bādhakapramā*) in Gaṅgeśa's definition of *yogyatā* is not indexed to the listener: *yogyatā* turns on whether the relation holds, not what the listener knows. What *is* indexed to the listener is what blocks a verbal awareness from arising—the listener's determination that the relation does not hold. *Yogyatā* not being indexed to the listener has further implications: as we shall see below (§5), Gaṅgeśa's identification of *yogyatā* as the epistemic virtue in the case of testimony requires that the sublating knowledge-event is not indexed to the listener. Most immediately, however, had *yogyatā* been indexed to the listener, the question of its scope—is *yogyatā* defeated by kind-level sublation alone or by instance-level sublation too—would be a question of what the listener knows. With this question settled—*yogyatā* turns on whether the relation holds—the question can now be asked: does *yogyatā* fail only when kinds cannot be related, or also when the relation simply does not hold?

§3.4 *Yogyatā* is Defeated by Instance-level Sublation

This section demonstrates that *yogyatā* fails when the relation does not hold by answering two questions. The first is whether Gaṅgeśa treats *yogyatā* as failing in instance-level cases. The second is whether Gaṅgeśa's elaborated definition of *yogyatā* can accommodate instance-level cases. The answer is yes on both counts, and both answers together are necessary: if Gaṅgeśa

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The relevant differences in my translation are terminological: I leave *yogyatā* untranslated, and I translate *bādhitatvāt* as "sublated." Phillips (2020: 185) renders *vākyārthasya bādhitatvāt* as "since the statement's indication could be defeated," introducing a modality not overtly marked in the Sanskrit. That "true" (*yathārtha*) is to be taken with "awareness" (*jñāna*), and not with "*yogyatā*," in the compound *yathārthayogyatājñānaṃ* is corroborated by Mathurānātha, who glosses *evaṃ* saying (TCM_{C1} p. 350 ll. 16-17), *yogyatājñānaṃ na yathārthaṃ* […] "The awareness about *yogyatā* is not true […]."

[26] Nor do Gaṅgeśa's commentators: Rucidatta and Mathurānātha. Das (2021: 186) also translates *vākyārthasya bādhitatvāt* without supplying a knower. Notably, Gaṅgeśa uses the term "speaker" (*vaktṛ*) slightly later in the discussion when reintroducing a reformulated version of the opponent's position (TCM_{C4} p. 351 ll. 8-9). Therefore, Gaṅgeśa's consistent use of the term "speaker" in describing the opponent's position, coupled with its consistent absence in describing his own position, provides further corroboration of the unindexed reading.

applied *yogyatā* in a way his definition could not accommodate, one or the other interpretation would have to be wrong.

To the first question: whether Gaṅgeśa treats *yogyatā* as failing in instance-level cases. In the passage quoted above, Gaṅgeśa asserts that there is no true awareness of *yogyatā* in the case of a non-fact-conforming sentence (*visaṃvādin*). While the statement at the passage's core is limited to non-fact-conforming sentences produced by the speaker's error, carelessness, or a desire to deceive, Gaṅgeśa immediately thereafter provides the example of a non-fact-conforming sentence produced by a slip of the tongue. Since a true awareness of *yogyatā* fails here too, even though no *epistemic* defect on the speaker's part is involved, non-conformity alone is what accounts for the absence of a true awareness of *yogyatā*. And a sentence whose referents are able to combine—"there are fruits on the riverbank"—may be no less non-fact-conforming than a sentence whose referents simply cannot combine, "he waters with fire." Therefore, a true awareness of *yogyatā* also fails where the relation does not hold, not only where the referents cannot be related. *Yogyatā* is thus defeated by instance-level sublation. Gaṅgeśa therefore applies *yogyatā* to instance-level cases: a false sentence is one where *yogyatā* fails.

This says nothing, however, of whether Gaṅgeśa's definition can accommodate instance-level sublation. This question of *yogyatā*'s definition applying to instance-level cases in Nyāya has been addressed by Chakrabarti (1986: 14-16), who argued that *yogyatā* cannot be about kind-level compatibility; it is about the relation obtaining. Chakrabarti argues from a positive definition of *yogyatā* in the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* of Viśvanātha (c. 1650), saying, "Following *Muktāvalī* I should understand by 'fitness' simply: the relatedness of what is meant by one term (of the statement) with what is meant by the other terms. (*ekapadārthe aparapadārthasambandho yogyatā*). And this comes dangerously close to the truth of the statement or actual obtaining of the claimed relation."

To the best of my knowledge, Chakrabarti's conclusion has not been taken up. Indeed, Mohanty (1994: 43) rejects such an interpretation, and Chakrabarti himself (1994: 116-117), revisits the notion, recommending that *yogyatā* be read as the listener not knowing the opposite of what was said, and recognizes that on the stronger reading, *yogyatā* would be "indistinguishable from the factual truth of the content," and treats this as a difficulty. The field continues to render *yogyatā* in Nyāya as "semantic fitness" (Das 2021), and continues to characterize it as a property of the utterance rather than the relation between the referents.

Moreover, Chakrabarti (1986) works from two Naiyāyikas who postdate Gaṅgeśa (c. 1325) by several centuries: Jagadīśa (c. 1625) and Viśvanātha (c. 1650), and on this positive definition, the conclusion is immediate because the relation either obtains or it does not. In contrast, Gaṅgeśa's definition is negative and epistemic. Gaṅgeśa's *yogyatā* is an absence—and not an absence of the relation obtaining, but an absence of a knowledge-event presenting the relation as the counterpositive of an absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*).

This raises the question of whether an absolute absence only holds between kinds. The problem is this. Gaṅgeśa's definition of *yogyatā* involves an "absolute absence" (*atyantābhāva*), and a common characterization of an absolute absence is that it holds at all three times: past, present, and future.[27] If this is what Gaṅgeśa himself holds an absolute absence to be, his definition of *yogyatā* would only apply to kinds that can never be related: watering with fire, but not fruits on the riverbank.

[27] Potter (1977: 146) describes an *atyantābhāva* as "the nonexistence of a thing in another thing at all times, past, present, and future."

Gaṅgeśa, however, does not hold this view of an "absolute absence" (*atyantābhāva*). Gaṅgeśa differentiates two types of transient absence—prior absence (*prāgabhāva*) and destruction (*dhvaṃsa*)—based on the parameters of the counterpositive's existence. He illustrates a prior absence with the usage "at the stage of the pot's non-production, there is no pot in the [potsherds]," and illustrates destruction with "in the potsherds, on the ground, the pot is now destroyed."[28] A relation that simply fails to hold now—nothing is awaiting production and nothing has been destroyed whose absence is at issue—fails to fall under either type of absence. This leaves "absolute absence" to capture the absence at that locus of any physical contact with a pot whatsoever—which is distinct from the destruction (*dhvaṃsa*) of the particular physical contact (*saṃyoga*) of the pot with the ground. While one might object that an absolute absence is eternal, and the case of an absence upon a pot's removal is not eternal, this would be a mistake based on reading the Sanskrit *atyanta*. The Sanskrit term *atyanta* (*ati* + *anta*, literally "past the limit") marks that the absence has no temporal boundary, neither a beginning nor an end, but it does not follow from this that an *atyantābhāva* cannot be interrupted: it need not be continually related to a locus.[29] The decisive evidence that Gaṅgeśa conceives of an "absolute absence" (*atyantābhāva*)as holding in the case of an absence when a pot has been removed comes from a definition of validity (*prāmāṇya*) he offers:

> Validity—which is the property of not being delimited by a qualifier that is the counterpositive of an absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*) residing in the qualificand, and so on—cannot be grasped intrinsically. Thus, it is only grasped extrinsically.[30]

Gaṅgeśa's definition says that an awareness fails to have validity, and thus fails to be produced as a knowledge-event, when what the awareness predicates is the counterpositive of an absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*) residing in the qualificand. So, for "the pot is blue," said about a pot that is *not* blue, blue is the counterpositive of an *absolute absence* residing in the pot. The key point is this. Validity (*prāmāṇya*) is a property of every knowledge-event (*pramā*), whatever its content, and so Gaṅgeśa's definition—whose machinery operates via an absolute absence—must cover ordinary cases, "the pot is blue," said when it is not. If an absolute absence only held of kinds—"no cowness in a pot"—then only a category mistake would fail to be a knowledge-event, and no contingently false case could ever pass through Gaṅgeśa's definition. Therefore, Gaṅgeśa's notion of "absolute absence" (*atyantābhāva*) must reach contingently false cases. This is also how Phillips understands "absolute absence" (*atyantābhāva*) in his translation of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Phillips describes it as, "an absence of A at location L at a particular time," temporally indexed, "with a default reference to the present time" (2020: 31-32).[31] Therefore, the

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[28] TCM_{C1} p. 714 ll. 13-14: *ghaṭānutpādadaśāyām eteṣu ghaṭo nāstīti*, and TCM_{C1} p. 714 ll. 11-12: *kapāleṣu bhūtaleṣv idānīṃ ghato vinaṣṭa iti*. Gaṅgeśa's own example here of an absolute absence is categorical (TCM_{C1} p. 714 ll. 10-11: *ghaṭādau na gotvam* "there is not cowness in a pot, etc."). Therefore, my interpretation of a merely failing relation as an "absolute absence" does not proceed from a direct statement by Gaṅgeśa.

[29] "Unbounded absence" is thus a more accurate translation. Matilal (1968) renders it as "constant absence" which misleads in the same way as "absolute absence."

[30] TCM_{C1} p. 285 ll. 5-7: *viśeṣyaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogiprakārānavacchinatvādikaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ svato grahītum aśakyam iti parata eva gṛhyate.*

[31] Phillips (2020: 421) states about absence that "there are really five kinds, for there is the categorical type of absolute absence — 'no cowhood in a pot' — as well as the ordinary one of no pot on the floor."

presence of an absolute absence in Gaṅgeśa's definition of *yogyatā* does not preclude *yogyatā* being defeated by instance-level sublation.

Let us now consider whether the machinery of Gaṅgeśa's elaborated definition of *yogyatā* accommodates "there are fruits on the riverbank" uttered when there are no fruits on the riverbank in question. Unlike "he waters with fire," this is a sentence which might very well have been true. Gaṅgeśa's elaborated definition is:

> And [*yogyatā*] is an absence—which resides in a relation with one word's referent (*padārtha*)—of being a qualificand in a knowledge-event regarding the counterpositiveness of an absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*) that resides in the referent of another word.[32]

The referent of "fruits" is the fruits; the referent of "on the riverbank" is the locus-hood occurrent in the riverbank; the relation is physical contact (*saṃyoga*) by which the fruits would be located on the riverbank. But there are no fruits on the riverbank, and so there is an absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*) of that physical contact, located in the riverbank at the time the utterance presents the relation as holding. The absence is "absolute" in that its counterpositiveness cannot be delimited by any particular contact, whose production and destruction would bound it. The absence at issue in the definition of *yogyatā* must be one whose counterpositiveness is delimited by a general property: the absence, located at the riverbank, of contact-with-fruit-ness.[33] The relation—the specific physical contact—bears counterpositiveness with respect to that absence, delimited by contact-with-fruit-ness. What is absent is any contact of fruits with the riverbank, not the fruits, since the definition requires the *relation* to be the counterpositive. A knowledge-event presenting the relation as the counterpositive of that absence is therefore available (to someone); the relation is a qualificand of such a knowledge-event; and as such, *yogyatā* does not obtain.

Therefore, the machinery of Gaṅgeśa's definition operates the same way in both cases: in "he waters with fire," and "there are fruits on the riverbank." The only difference between the two cases is whether the absolute absence holds of a kind—no act of watering is ever done with fire—or of a locus at a time. This is merely a difference of where things stand in the world, not of how Gaṅgeśa's definition operates.

The two questions posed at the outset have now been answered: Gaṅgeśa treats a false sentence as one for which *yogyatā* fails, and his elaborated definition yields the same outcome: his definition does not discriminate between kind-level sublation and instance-level sublation. As I argue below, it is not just that Gaṅgeśa's definition permits instance-level sublation; his identification of *yogyatā* as the epistemic virtue (*guṇa*) in testimony requires it. If *yogyatā* were

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[32] ŚKh$_J$ p. 29 ll. 3-5: *sā cetarapadārthasaṃsarge 'parapadārthaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitvapramāviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ.*

[33] This is the most likely technical solution. The worry is about how a particular physical contact (*saṃyoga*) could be "unbounded" given that the physical contact *is* produced and destroyed. However, it does not arise for Gaṅgeśa because his definition of validity (*prāmāṇya*) given above—which involves an absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*)—must cover ordinary cases such as "there is a pot on the ground," when there is none. Gaṅgeśa's own usage thus shows that he does not take the difficulty to arise. Therefore, the presence of an absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*) in his definition of *yogyatā* does not preclude the definition from covering the physical contact (*saṃyoga*) at issue in the case of fruits on the riverbank, regardless of whether one accepts my technical solution.

defeated only where kinds could not be related, *yogyatā* could not guarantee that a verbal awareness is true.

We earlier saw that for Śālikanātha *yogyatā* is about whether tokens of kinds can hold in certain relations at all; the question of whether a specific relation holds between tokens of compatible kinds was beyond *yogyatā*'s scope for Śālikanātha. What was outside *yogyatā*'s scope for Śālikanātha, Gaṅgeśa holds to be inside it. *Yogyatā*, for Gaṅgeśa, is defeated no less by instance-level sublation than by kind-level sublation.

Let's take stock. *Yogyatā* for Gaṅgeśa is not indexed to the listener, and it is defeated by instance-level sublation in addition to kind-level sublation. Therefore, *yogyatā* obtaining amounts to the relation holding. And an awareness about *yogyatā*, as we will see in §4, is a necessary auxiliary cause of every verbal awareness. The problems, therefore, are the following. Determining *yogyatā* amounts to determining the same thing the sentence conveys, and the causal apparatus of *every* verbal awareness contains a condition whose satisfaction is equivalent to the truth of what the verbal awareness presents being had. How, then, is the listener not already in possession of the truth of what was said during the very act of processing the sentence meaning? And if *yogyatā* fails when the relation does not hold, how could a verbal awareness ever be false? A sentence whose meaning does not obtain lacks *yogyatā*, but an awareness of *yogyatā* is necessary for a verbal awareness to occur: how could a false verbal awareness ever arise?

§4 Gaṅgeśa's Causal Complex for Verbal Awareness

Answers to these two questions begin with what Gaṅgeśa's causal apparatus for verbal awareness requires of the listener when it comes to *yogyatā*, and specifically *in what mode* the listener must have an awareness of *yogyatā*. The key point: Gaṅgeśa's causal apparatus requires very little on this matter. The listener must *determine* syntactico-semantic expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) and proximate presentation to mind of the referents (*āsatti*) for a verbal awareness to occur. When it comes to *yogyatā*, however, an awareness of any type suffices, uncertainty included (*saṃśaya*).[34] As we will see, Gaṅgeśa's catalogue for verbal awareness's auxiliary causes, read for its *mode requirements*, encodes his epistemology. This will be drawn out fully below (§§5-6).

The catalogue comes from the *Śabdāprāmāṇyavāda*. Gaṅgeśa catalogues what are and are not the necessary auxiliary causes (*sahakārin*) of a verbal awareness in response to his Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka opponent who reduces ordinary testimony to inference. Before turning to Gaṅgeśa's catalogue, it will help to have in view the larger causal apparatus within which these auxiliary causes operate:

> Therefore, a word is the instrument; the recollection of the [isolated] word's referent is its operation; the non-recollective awareness of the connection of the recollected word referents is the result [brought about] by the force of the necessary auxiliary causes of syntactico-semantic expectancy, and so on […].[35]

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[34] I hereafter translate *āsatti* as "proximity," using it as shorthand for "the proximate presentation to awareness of the referents." I translate *saṃśaya* as "uncertainty." The standard translation of the Nyāya term *saṃśaya* into English is "doubt." I prefer "uncertainty" because it conveys that alternatives *x* and *y* are equipoised. In contrast, "doubt" in English leans against *x* instead of balancing *x* and *y*. A *saṃśaya* in Sanskrit holds the two alternatives in balance. I note that I earlier translate *śaṅkā* as "suspicion."

[35] ŚKhJ p. 178 ll. 19-21: *tasmāt padaṃ karaṇaṃ padārthasmaraṇaṃ vyāpāraḥ* ***ākāṅkṣādisahakāri****vaśāt smāritārthānvayānubhavaḥ phalaṃ* […]. Importantly, Gaṅgeśa here explicitly identifies syntactico-semantic expectancies (*ākāṅkṣā*), etc., as necessary auxiliary causes (*sahakārin*). Therefore, even though Gaṅgeśa only uses

According to Gaṅgeśa's theory, a word, heard by the listener, is an instrument (*karaṇa*) of verbal awareness, its maximally efficient cause; the operation it produces is the listener's recollection (*smaraṇa*) of an isolated word referent; and its result is a non-recollective awareness (*anubhava*) of the connection (*anvaya*) between the word referents.[36] Only a non-recollective awareness is a candidate for being a knowledge-event per Gaṅgeśa's definition; the verbal awareness being a non-recollective awareness is what makes it something whose validity can be at issue (§§5-6).[37] And while the listener's awareness of the connection (*anvaya*) between word referents is something new, not something retrieved, recollected word referents by themselves don't yield an awareness of their connection: the auxiliary causes (*sahakārin*) are necessary to generate this output and determine what specific connection the utterance conveys. This is the larger process presupposed in the following catalogue of necessary auxiliary causes:

> Therefore, [the listener's] awareness about [one of] the following properties, even if it is uniform (*anugata*), is not a necessary auxiliary cause of [the listener's verbal awareness]: the property of [the utterance] being spoken by a trustworthy person; the property of [the utterance] not being produced by an error, and so on; the property of [the utterance's] meaning not being sublated; and the property of [the utterance] being intent upon [producing] an awareness of a true sentence meaning. This is because [the listener] cannot have an awareness of [these properties] *before* [the listener has a verbal awareness].
> Rather, one of the following items—which are accepted as causes of [the listener's] awareness of the [utterance's] purport (*tātparya*), [and] which are uniform [when grouped together] by virtue of [their shared property of] being pervaded by the [utterance's] purport—[is a necessary auxiliary cause of the listener's verbal awareness]. [These properties are]: the [listener's] awareness produced by hermeneutic reasoning (*nyāya*), [and] the [listener's awareness] about context, and so on.
> Similarly, [the listener's] determination (*niścaya*) about [the referents'] syntactico-semantic expectancies (*ākāṅkṣā*) and their proximate presentation to mind (*āsatti*) [are also necessary auxiliary causes of the listener's verbal awareness]. This is proven by the fact that [a listener] does not have a verbal awareness when [the listener] knows [either one of them] to be absent or when [the listener] is uncertain about [either one of them].
> [The listener's] awareness of any kind (*jñānamātra*) of [the referents'] *yogyatā* is also a necessary auxiliary cause [of the listener's verbal awareness]. This is proven by the fact that [the listener] has an awareness of a sentence meaning [in a range of circumstances]: when [the listener] is uncertain about the [referents' *yogyatā*]; when [the listener] is in error about [their *yogyatā*]; and when [the listener] has a knowledge-event (*pramā*) [about their *yogyatā*].[38]

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the term "cause" (*hetu*) in the catalogue we'll explore momentarily, it is clear that Gaṅgeśa's term "cause" (*hetu*) in the catalogue means "necessary auxiliary cause" (*sahakārin*).

[36] The terms *anvaya* and *saṃsarga/sambandha* are synonyms in Sanskrit in this context. I translate *anvaya* as "connection" and *saṃsarga/sambandha* as "relation," intending them as synonyms.

[37] See above n. 11 for Gaṅgeśa's definition of a knowledge-event (*pramā*).

[38] SKh$_J$ p. 17 ll. 9-16: *tasmād āptoktatvaṃ bhramādyajanyatvam abādhitārthakatvaṃ yatyārthavākyārthapratītiparatvaṃ vā jñātam anugatam api na hetuḥ prathamaṃ grahītum aśakyatvāt. kintu tātparyagrāhakatvenābhimatānāṃ nyāyajanyajñānaprakaraṇādīnām anyatarat tātparyavyāpyatvenānugataṃ. tathākāṅkṣāsattiniścayaḥ tadviparyaye saṃśaye ca śābdajñānābhāvāt. yogyatāyāś ca jñānamātraṃ hetuḥ tatsaṃśaye viparyaye pramāyāñ ca vākyārthajñānāt.*

This is a catalogue of candidates for necessary auxiliary causes of verbal awareness. Gaṅgeśa first rules out a set of properties, then he states properties that are required, and states their *mode*. The four groups are: (1) excluded properties such as the utterance being spoken by a trustworthy speaker; (2) included properties which are indicators of purport (*tātparya*); (3) syntactico-semantic expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) and proximity (*āsatti*); and (4) *yogyatā*. I will analyze them in this order, explaining Gaṅgeśa's reasons in each case and why the categories and modes are divided in the way they are.

The first group—properties excluded as necessary auxiliary causes of a verbal awareness—are the listener's awareness of: A) the utterance being spoken by a trustworthy person; B) the utterance not being produced by an error, etc.; C) the utterance's meaning not being sublated; and D) the utterance being intent upon producing an awareness of a true sentence meaning. Gaṅgeśa's reason for their exclusion is that even if these properties are known and uniform (*anugata*), the listener cannot have an awareness of them *before* having a verbal awareness. Each property is something whose ascertainment would amount to the listener having grounds for taking what was said to be true; and this cannot be done without the listener already having the sentence meaning in hand. To judge that the speaker spoke truly here, or that the speaker's utterance was not the result of error, requires the listener to know what was said. Thus, "excluded" here means that these properties cannot be required as prior conditions—necessary auxiliary causes—of verbal awareness. However, this does not mean that they are irrelevant to ascertaining the verbal awareness's validity (§6).

Notably, the fourth property in this list—the utterance being intent upon producing an awareness of a true sentence meaning—is the "purport" (*tātparya*) that Gaṅgeśa's Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka opponent claimed the listener infers from a specific string of language. Truth is built into this property, which is precisely why Gaṅgeśa cannot allow it to be had *before* the verbal awareness. Gaṅgeśa's catalogue, therefore, is not an abstract list; it is a polemical reply to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā reduction of ordinary testimony to inference. If an awareness of this property was required *before* verbal awareness, as an auxiliary cause of it, the listener would have to determine the truth of what was said in order to understand it.

Having excluded these four properties as prior auxiliary causes of the verbal awareness, Gaṅgeśa needs an account of what *does* fix the specific connection presented by the sentence when multiple alternative connections are available. This is the second group: the listener's awareness of hermeneutic reasoning (*nyāya*) and of context (*prakaraṇa*), etc. Hermeneutic reasoning is only available for the Veda, and context is only available for ordinary testimony, and each property cannot, therefore, individually be a uniform (*anugata*) auxiliary cause present in the case of *every* verbal awareness. Rather, what makes them one class is that they are all indicators of purport (*tātparya*). This is how Gaṅgeśa satisfies the uniformity condition the catalogue is organized around in the case of this second group. The mention that these properties are indicators of purport is not a claim that purport plays a causal role in verbal awareness; it is a claim about a commonality whereby these properties are uniform auxiliary causes of verbal awareness.

In the third group, Gaṅgeśa changes to discussing the auxiliary causes' *mode*. He requires that the listener have a *determination* (*niścaya*) of syntactico-semantic expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) and proximity (*āsatti*) for them to operate as auxiliary causes of verbal awareness. His reason for this specific mode—determination—is his observation that verbal awareness fails if there is an uncertainty or known absence of either of these auxiliary causes on the listener's part. This reason is empirical; Gaṅgeśa is not arguing from principle, he is pointing to what happens.

In the fourth group, the mode changes. An awareness of *yogyatā* is a necessary auxiliary cause of verbal awareness, but any kind of awareness (*jñānamātra*) about *yogyatā* is sufficient: it need not be a determination. Gaṅgeśa's reason is the same as in the third group: he observes that verbal awareness arises whether the listener is uncertain about *yogyatā* (*saṃśaya*), is in error about it (*viparyaya*), or has a knowledge-event of it (*pramā*). Here too, he makes an empirical observation; he does not argue from principle. Thus, a determination of *yogyatā* is permitted, but not required.

This asymmetry of mode is striking: uncertainty (*saṃśaya*) about syntactico-semantic expectancies (*ākāṅkṣā*) or proximity (*āsatti*) blocks verbal awareness; uncertainty about *yogyatā* does not. This is a difference Gaṅgeśa himself marks, and he gives the same type of empirical reason in both cases. The asymmetry—and the weaker requirement for *yogyatā*—is thus deliberate.

Gaṅgeśa gives no further explanation for this difference in mode: why the listener must determine syntactico-semantic expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) and proximity (*āsatti*), but not *yogyatā*. An answer may be reconstructed as follows. Syntactico-semantic expectancy and proximity facilitate the mere combination of recollected word referents into a sentence meaning, and thus require only what the utterance itself gives, hence why their determination may be required as an auxiliary cause of verbal awareness. In contrast, *yogyatā*'s obtaining—as argued above—amounts to the relation holding. Thus, if verbal awareness requires a determination of *yogyatā*, it would require the listener to have already determined that the relation holds before the verbal awareness arises. This is frequently not possible. This is what informs the asymmetry.

Nevertheless, a determination about *yogyatā* earns its place because the listener may have independent purchase on it by, e.g., having seen the riverbank. Conversely, uncertainty about *yogyatā* earns its place too. One factor that could inform it is the listener's belief that the speaker is a habitual liar. That is, even though Gaṅgeśa excludes the listener's awareness of the utterance being spoken by a trustworthy speaker (*āptoktatva*) from being an auxiliary cause of verbal awareness, this same property need not be excluded from the causes upstream of the listener's awareness of *yogyatā*.

It also follows that the listener's verbal awareness itself may be a determination even if the listener's awareness of *yogyatā* is an uncertainty. This is because an uncertainty about *yogyatā* does not amount to uncertainty about what "there are fruits on the riverbank" means. Rather, an uncertainty about *yogyatā* is only an uncertainty about whether the relation holds.

Another crucial distinction at play in Gaṅgeśa's causal apparatus is this. The listener's *access* to the three modes of awareness about *yogyatā* divides only between uncertainty and determination. The listener can distinguish uncertainty from determination because the former has disjunctive content. However, if the listener is in error about *yogyatā*—if the listener believes the relation holds when it does not—such an erroneous awareness about *yogyatā* appears no differently to the listener than a knowledge-event about *yogyatā*: both are equally determinate. Thus, the listener's access stops precisely where the epistemic virtue's requirement lands (§§5-6).

This leads us to provisional answers to the questions posed at the end of §3.6:

First, nothing in Gaṅgeśa's causal apparatus requires the listener to have settled the truth of what was said. Where the world is concerned—*yogyatā*—an uncertainty is sufficient. And an uncertainty about *yogyatā* does not put the listener in possession of the truth.

Second, a verbal awareness may arise even when the relation does not hold because its causal apparatus awareness requires an awareness of *yogyatā*, not *yogyatā* itself, and the listener may be

in error about *yogyatā*. An error about *yogyatā* is no less determinate than a knowledge-event of *yogyatā*. This is how false verbal awarenesses arise on Gaṅgeśa's theory that *yogyatā* is "factual conformity."

However, Gaṅgeśa's causal apparatus also permits a knowledge-event of *yogyatā*. And in this situation, the listener has a knowledge-event that the relation holds *before* their verbal awareness arises. The question therefore remains: can the listener thereby ascertain that their verbal awareness is a knowledge-event in the very act of understanding it?

Before answering this question, I turn to a second role Gaṅgeśa assigns to *yogyatā*, in the production (*utpatti*) of validity: a *true* awareness of *yogyatā* is the epistemic virtue (*guṇa*) which results in a verbal awareness being produced as a knowledge-event, as Das (2021) has shown. This only sharpens the question: the virtue is an awareness the listener has and is part of the causal apparatus of verbal awareness. Thus it might seem the listener is in a position to establish that the relation holds *before* the verbal awareness arises.

§5 *Yogyatā* and the Production (*utpatti*) of Validity

Yogyatā performs a second role in Gaṅgeśa's theory in the production (*utpatti*) of validity. This section covers its second role, showing that two asymmetrical roles are performed by one and the same awareness.

On a Nyāya theory of the extrinsic production (*utpatti*) of validity, a knowledge-event requires a positive epistemic virtue (*guṇa*) among its causes, not merely an absence of defects (§2). The virtue guarantees the truth of the awareness it produces: where it is present, the awareness is a knowledge-event; where it is absent, the awareness is not a knowledge-event. In Nyāya before Gaṅgeśa, testimony's virtue was held to be the speaker's true awareness of what the utterance means: the epistemic standing of the listener's verbal awareness depends upon the speaker's. Two cases oppose this. A parrot utters a sentence that happens to be true; and a mistaken deceiver inadvertently tells the truth. In these cases, the speaker does not have a true awareness of the utterance's content, but the listener has a true and non-recollective awareness about the same content, and thus the listener's awarenesses are knowledge-events per Gaṅgeśa's definition.[39] What was previously taken to be the virtue—the speaker's true awareness of what the utterance means—is therefore absent, despite a knowledge-event having occurred.

Against the opponent's view on the virtue, Gaṅgeśa articulates his own:

> On this we say the following. In ordinary cases, the speaker's true awareness about the sentence meaning is *not* the epistemic virtue in testimonial knowledge-events. Rather, *yogyatā*, and so on, or a true awareness about those conditions [is the epistemic virtue in testimonial knowledge-events] because it results in a parsimonious [theory] and because [those conditions are] necessary.[40]

By locating the epistemic virtue (*guṇa*) with *yogyatā* or a true awareness about it, Gaṅgeśa relocates the virtue away from the speaker: the parrot and mistaken deceiver no longer pose a problem because whether the verbal awareness arises as a knowledge-event no longer turns on the speaker's epistemic standing. Among the two options for testimony's epistemic virtue,

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[39] Das (2021) establishes that these are knowledge-events for Gaṅgeśa, and treats these cases in full; I follow his account through this paragraph.

[40] TCM_{C4} p. 350 ll.3-5: *atra brūmaḥ. śābdapramāyāṃ loke vaktur yathārthavākyārthajñānaṃ na guṇaḥ kintu yogyatādikaṃ yathārthatajjñānaṃ vā lāghavād āvaśyakatvāc ca.*

yogyatā or a true awareness of it, Gaṅgeśa proceeds with the second. That this is Gaṅgeśa's own position was established by Das (2021), who describes it as a form of "epistemic localism": factors causally upstream of the utterance—the speaker's awarenesses—play no epistemically significant role in whether the listener's awareness is produced as a knowledge-event.[41]

An epistemic virtue (*guṇa*) must account for the truth of the resulting awareness. Thus, whatever *yogyatā* is, a true awareness of it must guarantee the verbal awareness is true. On either interpretation of *yogyatā* rejected in §3, it could not serve as testimony's epistemic virtue. If *yogyatā* is indexed to the listener, a true awareness of *yogyatā* would be the listener's awareness that they have no sublating awareness—and this is what a listener who believes a falsehood has. Thus if *yogyatā* is indexed to the listener, the virtue—a true awareness of *yogyatā*—would be present in this case where the verbal awareness is false. And if *yogyatā* is defeated only where the referents could never be so related—"he waters with fire"—then a true awareness of *yogyatā* would amount to an awareness that fruits and riverbanks *can* be so related. A listener told "there are fruits on the riverbank" when there are none would have such an awareness—an awareness they *can* be so related—and an epistemic virtue would again be present in a case where the verbal awareness is false. Gaṅgeśa's identification of a true awareness of *yogyatā* as the epistemic virtue in testimony thus requires the reading established in §3: that *yogyatā* is unindexed and is defeated by instance-level sublation.

When Gaṅgeśa's catalogue of necessary auxiliary causes for verbal awareness from the *Śabdāprāmāṇyavāda* is placed next to this passage from the *Prāmāṇyotpattivāda*, the same factor appears twice: an awareness of *yogyatā*—in any mode—is a necessary auxiliary cause of every verbal awareness; and that same awareness of *yogyatā*, if true, makes the verbal awareness a knowledge-event. Gaṅgeśa states each point in its own topic; he does not put them together. However, *these are two roles of one and the same awareness*. The listener must have an awareness of *yogyatā* in order to have verbal awareness, and its truth is what makes the verbal awareness a knowledge-event. The two causal roles are asymmetrical: the first is met by any type of awareness of *yogyatā*—uncertainty, error, or knowledge-event—and the second is met only by a *true* awareness of *yogyatā*. Thus, the requirement for a verbal awareness to occur is weaker than for a knowledge-event's production, and the former requirement is met whenever the latter is met, but not vice-versa.

Therefore, Gaṅgeśa's account of the causal apparatus of verbal awareness and his account of what makes a verbal awareness a knowledge-event are not two theories to be reconciled. They constitute one design, turning on one factor—the listener's awareness of *yogyatā*. This structure is not unique to testimony. In inference, a subsumptive judgment (*parāmarśa*) is among the causes of *every* inferential awareness, including erroneous inferential awarenesses, while the epistemic virtue (*guṇa*) which makes it a knowledge-event is a *true* subsumptive judgment.[42]

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[41] On the reading of *yogyatā* argued for above, the positive half of this characterization requires modification. Das (2021: 186) describes the epistemic virtue as a property "of a sentence and its hearer." However, on the first option Gaṅgeśa gives—that *yogyatā* itself is the epistemic virtue—it is neither a property of the sentence nor of the speaker because *yogyatā* concerns how things stand among the referents. On the second option—that the listener's true awareness of *yogyatā* is the epistemic virtue—it is still not a property of the sentence; the awareness is a property belonging to the listener. The negative half of the characterization—that factors upstream play no epistemically significant role—remains unaffected.

[42] TCM_{C1} p. 341 ll. 1-3: *apica liṅgasādṛśyavākyārthabhramadoṣābhāvamātrān nānumityādir iti satyaparāmarśādiguṇasiddhiḥ.* "Moreover, since an inferential knowledge-event and the rest do not arise from the mere absence of defects (*doṣa*)—error about the inferential mark, about similarity, [and] about sentence meaning—it is proven that a true subsumptive judgment and the like are epistemic virtues (*guṇa*)."

Thus, one and the same thing—a subsumptive judgment—is required for *any* inferential awareness, and under the stronger requirement that the subsumptive judgment be true, that awareness is a knowledge-event.

Gaṅgeśa states that a knowledge-event being produced "extrinsically" means it is not produced just from the causes sufficient for any awareness as such (*jñānasāmagrīmātra*); rather, its production involves a surplus feature, an epistemic virtue (*guṇa*).[43] Thus, "extrinsic" does not mean external to the listener; it means having a surplus feature beyond what is required of the minimal causal apparatus for *any* awareness of a kind (e.g., verbal awareness).

With this in sight, we can see how the two asymmetrical roles of the listener's awareness of *yogyatā* account for the "extrinsic" (*parataḥ*) production of a testimonial knowledge-event on Gaṅgeśa's theory. The listener's awareness of *yogyatā* is among the causes of every verbal awareness; but it need not be a *true* awareness of *yogyatā* for a verbal awareness to arise. This same cause within the causal apparatus of *every* verbal awareness—the listener's awareness of *yogyatā*— is the epistemic virtue (*guṇa*) for testimony, under the stronger requirement of a surplus feature: truth. Had the causal collection for *every* verbal awareness required a true awareness of *yogyatā*, there would be no surplus feature in some verbal awarenesses but not others; no feature "extrinsic"—that is, above and beyond—the causal apparatus of *every* verbal awareness by which some verbal awareness are produced as knowledge-events and others are not. This is how the production of a verbal awareness as a knowledge-event is "extrinsic" (*parataḥ*) on Gaṅgeśa's theory: the epistemic virtue, the listener's *true* awareness of *yogyatā*, is not part of the minimum necessary causal apparatus of *every* verbal awareness.

§6 *Yogyatā* and the Ascertainment (*jñapti*) of Validity

On Gaṅgeśa's theory, the epistemic virtue (*guṇa*) in testimony is an awareness the listener has—the listener's true awareness of *yogyatā*. Let us consider, then, the listener who has such an awareness. This listener was told something true, correctly takes the relation to hold, and thus has a verbal awareness that is a knowledge-event. If the listener is ever in a position to *ascertain* that their verbal awareness is a knowledge-event in the very act of understanding what was said, it would be in this scenario. And if this were so, Gaṅgeśa's theory that validity is ascertained from something else (*parataḥ*) would fail in the case of testimony.

Let us evaluate what the listener actually registers in this maximal scenario. The listener has a determinate awareness of *yogyatā*: it presents the relation as holding. The listener's awareness of *yogyatā* is also true—and this is what makes their awareness of *yogyatā* the epistemic virtue (*guṇa*). Of these two features, however, the listener only registers the awareness's determinacy. The listener cannot register that their awareness of *yogyatā* is true. Even if the listener immediately accesses their first-order awareness of *yogyatā* via a second-order apperception (*anuvyavasāya*), the apperception is only accurate as to what the first-order awareness presents to the listener (§2). The apperception presents that the listener has an awareness of the relation holding; it does not present that this awareness is true. Therefore, the listener whose awareness has the epistemic virtue (*guṇa*) cannot see it; it is invisible to them. All that is visible is a determinate awareness that *yogyatā* obtains.

The second case is the naïve listener told "there are fruits on the riverbank," when there are none. Here too, the listener has a determinate awareness of *yogyatā* that the relation holds—but their awareness is an error (*viparyaya*). In this case too, nothing is available for the listener to register

[43] TCM_{C1} p. 287 ll. 2-3: *utpadyate 'pi pramā parato na tu svato jñānasāmagrīmātrāt.* "A knowledge-event is also produced extrinsically; and not intrinsically from the mere collection of causes sufficient for any awareness."

that their awareness is an error—apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) included. Nothing, then, distinguishes their situation from the listener's situation in the first case.

This also resolves Mohanty's (1994: 43) objection that if *yogyatā* amounts to the relation holding, a verbal awareness would be true by birth, and extrinsic validity would be contradicted. *Yogyatā* obtaining is what makes the verbal awareness true. However, the listener has a determinate awareness of *yogyatā* even when it does not obtain—an error—and thus false verbal awarenesses do arise. And so, what Mohanty (1994) and Chakrabarti (1994) took to be damning on the factual read is not (§3.4).

The third case is the listener who has an uncertainty about *yogyatā*. In this case, the listener's verbal awareness is itself determinate, even though the awareness of *yogyatā* is not. The verbal awareness concerns the sentence meaning; the awareness of *yogyatā* concerns whether the relation holds. A determinate verbal awareness thus arises in this case too.

Gaṅgeśa's theory therefore turns on more than the asymmetry of modes of awareness (§4). It is true that a determination is required of expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) and proximity (*āsatti*), but an awareness of any kind (*jñānamātra*) suffices concerning *yogyatā*. However, Gaṅgeśa's theory also turns on where a listener can locate themselves on this range of awarenesses concerning *yogyatā*. The listener can only locate themselves along the first division between determination and uncertainty; but not along the second division between a knowledge-event and error, since both are determinate. And this latter division—which the listener cannot access—is precisely where the epistemic virtue's requirement falls.

Two questions remain. Even though the listener cannot register that their awareness of *yogyatā* is true, could they not establish it by some further awareness? And if they could establish that their awareness of *yogyatā* is true, would that put them in a position to ascertain that their verbal awareness is a knowledge-event in the very act of understanding it?

Let's consider the maximal scenario where the listener has a determinate awareness of *yogyatā*, and *yogyatā* obtains. This awareness is a certainty that the relation holds (§3): that there *are* fruits on the riverbank. What is at issue is whether this may somehow facilitate the listener's verbal awareness being ascertained as a knowledge-event during the very act of understanding it. And while there is nothing stopping the listener from comparing the content of their awareness about *yogyatā* with the content of the verbal awareness upon the latter's occurrence, the question is whether the listener is entitled to rely upon the former to ascertain that the verbal awareness is a knowledge-event during the very act of understanding it.

The answer is no. The listener's determinate awareness of *yogyatā* is an awareness like any other, and on Gaṅgeśa's account, an awareness's validity is *not* apprehended together with it. Rather, its validity is ascertained "extrinsically" (*parataḥ*), meaning from something else—from another awareness. Were an awareness's validity ascertained intrinsically, says Gaṅgeśa, there could be no uncertainty about an awareness's validity in unfamiliar circumstances—but such uncertainty *does* occur (§2). Nor does familiarity (*abhyāsa*) alter this. Recall that Gaṅgeśa rejects validity being grasped intrinsically in familiar cases. Rather, what happens is that no suspicion of invalidity arises: apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) grasps some feature of the awareness, suspicion fails to arise, and action (*pravṛtti*) occurs without hesitation (§2).

But what if the listener ascertains by inference that their awareness of *yogyatā* was valid? Even here, the ascertainment will not reach the awareness it concerns because the awareness will have perished by the time the inference completes (§2). The inference will simply block suspicion from attaching to a subsequent awareness of the same content. And this succeeding awareness

would merely be free from suspicion: it would not come with its own validity ascertained (§2). This also answers the question at the section's opening. An inference to the validity of the awareness of *yogyatā* takes time to complete, and it would thus necessarily occur *after* the causal apparatus for verbal awareness has produced the verbal awareness. Therefore, there is no path for ascertaining the validity of the listener's awareness of *yogyatā* and utilizing it to ascertain the verbal awareness's validity within the very act of understanding the verbal awareness.

I now consider whether such ascertainment is available at all, and what it requires. Gaṅgeśa's account of validity's extrinsic ascertainment maintains that, in the first instance, the agent ascertains validity through negative concomitance alone. Had the awareness of *x* not been a knowledge-event, action towards *x* would not have succeeded (§2). So, a listener first ascertains the validity of their verbal awareness by acting on what they were told, succeeding, and then making an inference. Ascertainment (*jñapti*) is therefore downstream of action (*pravṛtti*) in testimony; it cannot be had during the very act of understanding the verbal awareness, which was the difficulty raised at the section's outset. And recall that familiarity does not result in validity being ascertained; validity cannot be ascertained in subsequent familiar instances either.

Another route available for the listener to ascertain the verbal awareness's validity, but here too validity's ascertainment is necessarily extrinsic (*parataḥ*). Recall the four properties Gaṅgeśa excludes from the causal apparatus of verbal awareness: A) the property of the utterance being spoken by a trustworthy person; B) the property of the utterance not being produced by an error, etc.; C) the property of the utterance's meaning not being sublated; and D) the property of the utterance being intent upon producing an awareness of a true sentence meaning. Each of these properties gives the listener an inferential mark (*liṅga*) from which they may infer that a verbal awareness was a knowledge-event. Gaṅgeśa explained (§4) that none of these properties can be accessed *before* the sentence's meaning is understood because every property can only be determined in relation to the sentence meaning. For example, the property of the utterance being spoken by a trustworthy person is not about the speaker's trustworthiness in general; evaluating whether the speaker spoke truly is case-specific, and thus requires knowing what was said. Therefore, the very feature that disqualified these properties from being prior conditions to understanding a verbal awareness is exactly what qualifies them as grounds for inferring the verbal awareness's validity. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas made speaker-oriented inferences a precondition to verbal awareness, and thereby epistemically reduced testimony to inference. Gaṅgeśa, however, repositions these properties as accessible to the listener only *after* the listener's verbal awareness occurs. By doing so, Gaṅgeśa does not only reject testimony's reduction; he also creates a mechanism for the listener's extrinsic inferential ascertainment (*jñapti*) of validity. The pieces are the same; their position is not, and their position underpins the competing theories.

However, ascertainment of validity is not necessary for a listener to act. When no suspicion of invalidity has arisen about the verbal awareness, a determinate verbal awareness triggers action without hesitation—and in no way has its validity been ascertained (§2). Therefore, the listener acting in such a scenario is in the normal position of any agent; verbal awareness is no exception to Gaṅgeśa's general theory.

Lastly, it bears mention that a verbal awareness is not disqualified from being a knowledge-event on the grounds that the listener's awareness about *yogyatā* already presented the *same* content. It is not disqualified because Gaṅgeśa's definition does not impose a novelty condition. Gaṅgeśa says that a candidate for a knowledge-event must be a "non-recollective awareness" (*anubhava*) (§2). This excludes recollection (*smaraṇa*) by its provenance; it does not exclude a subsequent

awareness with the same content from being a knowledge-event. Therefore, a verbal awareness is a candidate for a knowledge-event even though the listener's prior awareness of *yogyatā* already presented the same relation.

In sum, there is nothing the listener has, under any mode that the causal apparatus permits, that puts them in a position to ascertain, in the very act of understanding what was said, that their verbal awareness is a knowledge-event. And likewise, when its validity is ascertained, it is ascertained in exactly the same way that Gaṅgeśa's general theory requires.

§7 Conclusion

Let's take stock. *Yogyatā* is not indexed to the listener, it reaches instance-level cases, and *yogyatā*'s obtaining amounts to the relation holding (§3). The listener's awareness of *yogyatā*, in any mode, is a necessary auxiliary cause of verbal awareness; uncertainty suffices (§4). That same awareness of *yogyatā*, when true, is the epistemic virtue (*guṇa*) by which a verbal awareness is guaranteed to be produced as a knowledge-event (§5). However, the listener cannot register that their awareness of *yogyatā* is true simply by having it, nor can the listener ascertain its validity before the verbal awareness arises. Nothing, therefore, is available by which the listener could establish that their verbal awareness is a knowledge-event in the very act of understanding it. Rather, the validity of verbal awareness is ascertained extrinsically (§6). Gaṅgeśa's account of verbal awareness is thus not an exception to his general theory of validity. Rather, it is an instance of it: the same conditions on action apply, validity is ascertained the same way, and the same limits hold for what the listener can directly access of their own awarenesses. And one factor ties together Gaṅgeśa's theory of verbal awareness with his general theory of validity. That factor is the listener's awareness of *yogyatā*.

Two questions this article resolves—to establish its interpretation of Gaṅgeśa's position on *yogyatā* and to thereby establish its larger reconstruction of Gaṅgeśa's theory—are as follows. If *yogyatā* obtaining amounts to the relation conveyed by the sentence holding, and if an awareness of *yogyatā* is a necessary cause of *every* verbal awareness, then how can a verbal awareness be false and how can its validity be ascertained extrinsically? The answer to how a verbal awareness can be false is that its causal apparatus requires an awareness of *yogyatā*, not *yogyatā* itself. And specifically, a false verbal awareness is caused by an error about *yogyatā*. The answer to how validity is ascertained extrinsically in the case of verbal awareness is that the causal apparatus permits any mode of awareness about *yogyatā*, but the epistemic virtue requires a stronger condition on the listener's awareness of *yogyatā* than the apparatus requires—truth. And crucially, the listener cannot register or establish that their awareness of *yogyatā* is true before their verbal awareness arises. Thus, the listener having what the causal apparatus requires—an awareness of *yogyatā*—does not amount to establishing that one's verbal awareness is a knowledge-event.

This article reconstructs how Gaṅgeśa's claims in the *Śabdāprāmāṇyavāda* and *Prāmāṇyotpattivāda* cohere within one design. The listener's awareness of *yogyatā*, in any mode, is an auxiliary cause of every verbal awareness; under a stronger requirement, truth, the same awareness is the epistemic virtue in the production (*utpatti*) of validity; and its invisibility to the listener ensures that the ascertainment (*jñapti*) of the validity of verbal awareness comes from something else (*parataḥ*)—from another awareness. Gaṅgeśa's three positions thus constitute one design, turning on one factor: the listener's awareness of *yogyatā*.

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