

Applying Crime Science to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: Insights for P/CVE Policy and Practice

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Abstract

Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) remains conceptually fragmented, with prevention goals, intervention logics, and evaluation standards often insufficiently aligned. This article examines how established crime prevention approaches can inform P/CVE. Drawing on qualitative documentary and comparative analysis of crime prevention literature, international strategies, and relevant P/CVE policy materials, it considers developmental, community, situational, psychosocial, and law-enforcement approaches. Three practical implications emerge. First, prevention benefits from early and proportionate support. Second, local actors and multi-agency collaboration support context-sensitive responses. Third, interventions require attention to evidence, legitimacy, and evaluation. The article also considers limits to policy transfer, including risks of stigmatisation, over-securitisation, and assuming that evidence from general crime prevention automatically transfers to extremism prevention. It argues for layered, context-sensitive P/CVE approaches that draw selectively on crime prevention while preserving distinctions between vulnerability, radicalisation, extremist engagement, and violence.

Introduction

Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) has become a significant concern of contemporary public policy, particularly in Europe, yet the field remains characterised by conceptual ambiguity and methodological challenges (Gielen 2019). Although countering violent extremism has become an important component of national counterterrorism strategies, uncertainty remains regarding what CVE includes, how its components should be designed, and how effectiveness should be assessed (de France and Jiménez-González 2021; Harris-Hogan et al. 2016). This uncertainty is compounded by differences between countries in how extremism and radicalisation are conceptualised, which can complicate comparison, policy transfer, and evaluation (de France and Jiménez-González 2021; Mastroe 2016).

Against this background, crime science provides a broader interdisciplinary knowledge base for understanding crime, its contexts, opportunities, and prevention. Within this broader field, crime prevention theory offers a potentially useful framework for analysing and designing P/CVE interventions. Crime prevention approaches provide established ways of considering risk, opportunity, social environments, prevention timing, and institutional responses. Hardy (2022) has specifically argued for crime prevention as a conceptual framework for CVE, encompassing situational, developmental, community, third-party policing, and procedural justice approaches. More recent criminological scholarship reflects growing engagement with terrorism and violent extremism (Dmello 2025).

Rather than treating extremism exclusively as an ideological or security issue, a crime prevention perspective places it within broader discussions of prevention, social context, opportunity, governance, and institutional legitimacy. It considers developmental, community, situational, psychosocial, and law-enforcement approaches and their relevance to contemporary prevention. It also considers the limits of transferring concepts and evidence from general crime prevention to extremism prevention. The central argument is not that crime prevention provides a complete explanation of radicalisation or violent extremism, but that it offers conceptual and practical tools for developing layered, proportionate, and context-sensitive prevention strategies.

The article outlines crime prevention concepts and typologies, then examines key approaches, policy transfer, and implications for P/CVE

Method

This article uses a qualitative documentary and comparative approach. The analysis draws on established crime prevention literature, the GLOBSEC database on the crime-terror nexus in European Union Member States, international

crime prevention strategies and models relevant to extremism, and relevant academic and policy documents. Sources were selected for their relevance to established crime prevention approaches and their potential applicability to P/CVE.

The analysis is interpretative, synthesising key concepts, findings, and policy implications across these sources, with attention to developmental, community, situational, psychosocial, and law-enforcement approaches. The objective is to examine their contribution to P/CVE while recognising the conceptual and ethical limits of policy transfer.

Conceptualising Crime Prevention

Crime prevention has historically been difficult to define because the term encompasses a broad range of activities and approaches. Van Dijk and de Waard (1991), for example, conceptualised crime prevention as the totality of private initiatives and state policies aimed at reducing harm caused by criminal acts. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010) similarly adopts a broad understanding, emphasising strategies and measures intended to reduce the risk and harmful effects of crime through action across multiple domains.

This broader understanding is relevant to P/CVE because it avoids reducing prevention to policing or criminal justice responses alone. Crime prevention involves multiple actors, including government institutions, communities, schools, families, civil society, health and social services, and law-enforcement agencies. Such an approach is consistent with contemporary prevention debates in extremism studies, where early support, resilience, social trust, and community capacity may be relevant alongside intelligence and security measures.

It is also important to distinguish crime prevention from related concepts such as community safety, crime reduction, and crime control. In P/CVE, terminological overlap can create additional difficulties, with similar activities being described as resilience-building, safeguarding, disengagement, deradicalisation, or prevention. Crime prevention theory provides a structured vocabulary for distinguishing interventions according to their timing, target, context, and intended mechanisms of action.

Typologies of Prevention

Two influential approaches to classifying prevention are particularly relevant to P/CVE. The first derives from public health and distinguishes between primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. Primary prevention seeks to address environmental and social conditions before harmful behaviour occurs. Secondary prevention focuses on situations in which additional or targeted support may be appropriate before offending begins. Tertiary prevention addresses established offending and seeks to reduce recurrence.

The second approach distinguishes developmental, community, situational, and law-enforcement forms of prevention (Hommel 2005; Hommel and Thomsen 2017). Developmental prevention focuses on processes across the life course and on strengthening conditions associated with positive development. Community prevention addresses neighbourhood relationships, social organisation, services, and collective capacity. Situational prevention seeks to reduce opportunities for offending by modifying immediate environments. Law-enforcement prevention includes policing and criminal justice interventions intended to prevent or reduce offending.

These approaches overlap in practice rather than operating as isolated categories (Van Dijk and de Waard 1991). This is particularly relevant to P/CVE because processes associated with extremist engagement are shaped by multiple contexts and cannot be assumed to follow a single pathway. A prevention strategy may therefore combine school-based support, family interventions, community engagement, digital measures, and targeted case management. The value of the typology lies less in rigid categorisation than in providing a structured way to consider different layers of prevention.

Developmental Prevention and Early Intervention

Developmental crime prevention places emphasis on early intervention. Its principle is that preventive action can be more effective when supportive conditions are strengthened before harmful patterns become established (Homel 2005; Homel and Thomsen 2017). However, the effectiveness of early prevention cannot be assumed to remain stable when programmes are implemented across broader populations or settings. Evidence from crime prevention highlights challenges in scaling up interventions, including maintaining implementation fidelity, service capacity, and effectiveness under less controlled conditions (Welsh et al. 2010). This is relevant to P/CVE, where interventions developed in one institutional or social context may require adaptation before being applied elsewhere.

The literature identifies individual, family, educational, and environmental conditions associated with later offending, including low educational attainment, difficulties with self-regulation, inadequate parental supervision, family conflict, association with delinquent peers, high-delinquency school environments, and deprived neighbourhoods. Evidence-informed interventions have included preschool enrichment, child skills training, parent-management programmes, home visiting, mentoring, community support, and school-based cognitive or behavioural initiatives (Homel 2005; Welsh et al. 2010).

For P/CVE, the relevance of this approach lies in demonstrating that prevention does not necessarily begin with ideology. Broader developmental, social, and educational conditions may be important areas for preventive support. This does not mean that such conditions should be interpreted as indicators of radicalisation. Rather, developmental prevention suggests that strengthening wellbeing, social inclusion, educational engagement, and supportive relationships can form part of a broader prevention environment.

Developmental prevention presents ethical challenges. Identifying people as being 'at risk' can lead to stigmatisation if broad social or developmental characteristics are interpreted as evidence of future offending or extremist involvement. This concern is particularly important in extremism prevention, where overbroad risk labelling can pathologise poverty, minority status, social grievance, or other forms of disadvantage (de France and Jiménez-González 2021). The lesson is therefore not simply to intervene earlier, but to ensure that interventions are proportionate, supportive, and non-stigmatising.

Community Prevention and Collective Efficacy

Community crime prevention is one of the most transferable dimensions of crime prevention to P/CVE. It seeks to change social conditions associated with crime by strengthening local institutions, relationships, and forms of social organisation (Sampson and Groves 1989). Social disorganisation theory has highlighted how structural conditions such as socioeconomic disadvantage, residential mobility, and weak informal networks can affect a community's capacity to maintain social order.

The concept of collective efficacy is particularly relevant. Collective efficacy refers to a community's capacity to maintain social order through mutual trust and shared expectations regarding intervention. Where residents trust one another and perceive legitimate opportunities to address local problems collectively, communities may be better positioned to respond to harmful behaviour and support local wellbeing.

In P/CVE, this perspective suggests that communities can contribute to prevention when they have social cohesion, trusted institutions, and legitimate channels for addressing concerns. Effective community prevention therefore requires connections between residents and external services, including police, health and social services, schools, nongovernmental organisations, and other support institutions.

This has direct implications for multi-agency prevention. Effective collaboration requires communication, appropriate information sharing, coordinated service planning, and shared approaches to assessing intervention outcomes. For P/CVE, strengthening such connections may help reduce gaps between safeguarding, welfare, community, and security functions.

Situational Prevention and Opportunity Reduction

Situational crime prevention focuses on reducing opportunities for offending by modifying the immediate environments in which harmful acts can occur (Clarke 1997; Cornish and Clarke 2003). It draws on rational choice, routine activity, and crime pattern perspectives, which emphasise the interaction between individuals, targets, guardianship, and particular temporal and spatial contexts (Brantingham and Brantingham 2008; Felson and Cohen 1980).

These approaches emphasise that harmful acts do not occur randomly but within particular environments and opportunity structures. Preventive measures can therefore seek to increase the effort or perceived risks associated with offending, reduce potential rewards, limit provocations, or strengthen forms of guardianship. Crime pattern theory similarly suggests that opportunities can cluster around particular places, routes, and routines.

The implications for P/CVE extend to online environments. Situational approaches can inform measures intended to reduce the accessibility, visibility, or dissemination of extremist propaganda and other harmful content, provided that such measures are proportionate and compatible with legal and democratic safeguards. At the same time, situational prevention should not be treated as sufficient in isolation.

A longstanding criticism of situational approaches concerns the possibility of displacement, whereby harmful behaviour may move to other locations, targets, or methods. Evidence suggests, however, that displacement is neither inevitable nor necessarily complete. Situational measures should therefore be considered as one component within broader prevention strategies rather than as a stand-alone response.

Law Enforcement and Procedural Justice

Crime prevention frameworks incorporate law-enforcement and criminal justice institutions but do not require a purely coercive model. Police, courts, and correctional services can form part of a wider prevention architecture alongside education, welfare, health, community, and civil society actors. Problem-oriented policing, community policing, court-based interventions, and rehabilitation can contribute to prevention when implemented proportionately and in coordination with other forms of support.

Procedural justice is particularly relevant because perceptions of legitimacy can influence public cooperation with authorities. Research has linked fair and respectful treatment by police with willingness to cooperate and share information, including in the context of counterterrorism (Harris-Hogan et al. 2016; Murphy et al. 2019). Trust is therefore not simply an operational consideration but an important component of legitimate preventive practice.

In P/CVE, this is especially significant. Communities may be less willing to engage with preventive initiatives when police contact is perceived as discriminatory, opaque, or unnecessarily securitised. A crime prevention perspective therefore contributes not only operational approaches but also principles concerning legitimacy, proportionality, and democratic accountability.

The Local Level and Multi-Agency Governance

The local level is particularly important within preventive policy because local actors possess knowledge of specific social contexts and may be well placed to identify emerging concerns and coordinate proportionate responses. Municipal authorities, schools, social services, local police, healthcare providers, and civil society organisations can contribute different forms of knowledge and support that are not necessarily available to national institutions.

Multi-agency collaboration is consequently a central feature of effective prevention. Each actor may possess only part of the overall picture, while coordinated approaches can bring together welfare, educational, social, community, and security perspectives. Such collaboration requires trust, clear working arrangements, appropriate information-sharing procedures, and a shared understanding of roles.

Importantly, multi-agency approaches do not imply that the police should always lead. Leadership may appropriately rest with different actors depending on the circumstances, the needs involved, and the nature of the intervention. This principle is particularly relevant to P/CVE because it allows prevention to remain proportionate and responsive to context, not defaulting to a security-led model.

The Psychosocial Level

A psychosocial perspective adds an important dimension to prevention because individual experiences are embedded within wider social and environmental contexts. Previous research has highlighted the potential relevance of emotional distress, identity-related difficulties, marginalisation, trauma, and perceived injustice to how radical narratives may be experienced or interpreted in particular circumstances (Jiménez-González 2022).

Mental health conditions should not, however, be treated as direct causes of radicalisation or violent extremism. Psychosocial experiences may be relevant to prevention without constituting a diagnostic explanation for extremist engagement. A nuanced approach therefore requires attention to individual wellbeing and social context without turning psychological characteristics into proxies for radicalisation.

Frontline practitioners in education, social work, mental health, and community settings may be well placed to notice changes in wellbeing, behaviour, relationships, or social functioning. Strengthening their capacity to respond appropriately, while maintaining clear professional boundaries and safeguards, can contribute to proportionate prevention. Cross-sector communication can also support more coordinated responses where concerns arise.

The integration of psychosocial perspectives should therefore be understood as part of a broader prevention framework, not as an attempt to medicalise radicalisation. Care-based and community-based responses can complement security-oriented measures where appropriate, while preserving clear distinctions between psychological distress, vulnerability, extremist engagement, and violence (Jiménez-González 2024).

Taken together, these considerations reinforce the need to situate psychosocial processes within a broader prevention architecture and avoid treating them in isolation.

Integrating the Approaches: A Layered Prevention Architecture for P/CVE

Taken together, these approaches suggest that the main contribution of crime science to P/CVE is not a single intervention model but a way of organising prevention across levels and mechanisms. Developmental and community approaches address the conditions in which vulnerability and social exclusion may be experienced; psychosocial approaches attend to individual meaning-making, wellbeing, relationships, and support needs; situational approaches address opportunities and environments; and law-enforcement approaches address threats, offending, and disruption

where proportionate intervention is required. These layers should not be interpreted as sequential stages of radicalisation or as a predictive pathway. Rather, they represent complementary domains in which preventive action may be relevant depending on the context (Homel and Thomsen 2017; Hardy 2022).

This distinction is important because the same preventive measure can have different functions across settings. For example, strengthening school belonging may constitute universal developmental prevention, whereas intensive family or educational support may be appropriate where specific needs have emerged. Similarly, online interventions may combine situational measures aimed at reducing harmful exposure or access with community or psychosocial approaches that provide alternative sources of belonging, meaning, or support. The appropriate combination therefore depends on the problem being addressed, the population concerned, the setting, and the available evidence.

A layered approach also clarifies the relationship between prevention and intervention. Prevention should not be understood solely as action taken before any concern becomes visible. Some measures are intended to reduce opportunities for harm, others to strengthen protective environments, and others to interrupt emerging harmful behaviour or prevent recurrence. What matters is that the intensity and purpose of an intervention remain proportionate to the concern being addressed. This principle can help avoid both under-response to genuine threats and over-extension of security measures into domains better addressed through welfare, education, community, or psychosocial support.

For P/CVE policy, this architecture implies that coordination is not simply an administrative requirement but part of prevention itself. Different actors hold different forms of knowledge, and no single sector can adequately address developmental, social, situational, psychosocial, and security dimensions simultaneously. Coordination should nevertheless preserve professional roles and avoid indiscriminate information sharing. Clear thresholds, lawful information governance, referral pathways, and agreed responsibilities are therefore essential to ensuring that multi-agency prevention remains both effective and rights-compatible.

The framework also points to a need for evaluation at the level of implementation and mechanism rather than relying only on broad outcome measures. Evaluation should examine whether an intervention reached the intended population, whether it was implemented as designed, what mechanisms appear to have been activated, and whether unintended effects such as stigma, displacement, disengagement, or reduced trust occurred. This approach is particularly relevant where extremism-specific outcome data are limited (Gielen 2019). It allows crime prevention knowledge to inform P/CVE without assuming that effectiveness in general crime prevention automatically transfers to violent extremism.

This layered architecture provides the basis for considering how crime prevention knowledge can be selectively translated into P/CVE, while recognising that the relationship between crime and violent extremism is neither uniform nor equivalent.

Crime-Terror Nexus and Policy Transfer

The crime-terror nexus provides a basis for considering what criminology can contribute to P/CVE. Research has highlighted intersections between criminality, terrorism, illicit activity, social harm, and broader patterns of violence (Omelycheva and Markowitz 2021). Modelling research has also examined the dynamics of organised crime and terrorist networks, including processes of recruitment, interaction, and network development (Martinez-Vaquero et al. 2019). This does not mean that extremism and ordinary criminality should be treated as equivalent phenomena. Rather, criminological perspectives can contribute concepts and prevention tools that complement approaches traditionally associated with political science and security studies. This potential for integration has also been recognised within European P/CVE practice, where recent RAN POL discussions have examined the advantages and challenges of

bringing generic crime prevention and PVE closer together, while emphasising the need to preserve distinctions between the two domains (Radicalisation Awareness Network POL Working Group 2024).

Crime prevention provides an established vocabulary for considering prevention timing, opportunity structures, social environments, intervention targets, and institutional responses. It also has a tradition of examining implementation and evaluation (Mastroe 2016). Recent criminological scholarship further demonstrates the growing engagement of criminology with terrorism and violent extremism (Dmello 2025).

The transfer of these concepts must nevertheless remain selective and critically informed. Not every process of radicalisation should be treated as criminality, and extremist beliefs do not automatically translate into violence or warrant criminal justice intervention. Evidence that an intervention is effective in reducing general crime cannot simply be assumed to demonstrate the same effect in extremism prevention. Crime prevention is therefore most useful to P/CVE when it informs proportionate and layered prevention without collapsing ideological, social, psychological, and criminal phenomena into a single category.

The crime-terror nexus further illustrates why selective policy transfer is required. Criminal and extremist actors may intersect through financing, logistics, recruitment, illicit markets, or network relationships, but the existence of an intersection does not make the phenomena interchangeable. The preventive relevance of criminological concepts therefore depends on the specific mechanism under consideration. Opportunity reduction may be relevant to disrupting logistical or material facilitation; community approaches may be relevant to strengthening local capacity and trust; and procedural justice may be relevant to maintaining cooperation with authorities. These applications should be grounded in the particular form of harm or interaction being addressed without assuming that crime and terrorism share a common pathway.

The proposed framework can therefore be understood as a process of selective translation: identify the prevention problem, identify the mechanism through which a crime prevention approach may be relevant, assess the evidence available for that mechanism in the specific P/CVE context, and adapt the intervention to local institutional and social conditions. This sequence is preferable to importing established crime prevention programmes wholesale. It also creates a clearer basis for evaluating which elements of an intervention are transferable, which require modification, and which should not be transferred at all.

Table 1
Key Issues in P/CVE from a Crime Prevention Perspective

Dimension	Core idea	Evidence base	Implications for P/CVE	Key challenge
Conceptual framework	Crime prevention provides a structured vocabulary for fragmented prevention activity.	Criminological prevention theory.	Supports a broader approach beyond purely security responses.	Different national definitions and policy frameworks.
Prevention typologies	Primary, secondary, and tertiary approaches can be combined with developmental, community, situational, and law-enforcement approaches.	Public health and criminological models.	Supports layered prevention.	Categories may overlap in practice.
Developmental prevention	Early support can strengthen developmental and social conditions.	Developmental prevention literature.	Supports family, school, and community-based prevention.	Risk labelling and potential stigmatisation.
Community prevention	Local relationships and collective capacity can support social order and wellbeing.	Social disorganisation and collective efficacy research.	Strengthens local prevention and community engagement.	Inequality, weak trust, and fragmented services.
Situational prevention	Modifying environments can reduce opportunities for harmful behaviour.	Opportunity, routine activity, and situational prevention theories.	Relevant to physical and online environments.	Possible displacement and proportionality concerns.
Law enforcement and procedural justice	Prevention can include policing and criminal justice within a broader governance framework.	Procedural justice and crime prevention research.	Supports legitimacy, cooperation, and proportionate intervention.	Over-securitisation can undermine trust.
Local governance	Local actors can provide context-specific knowledge and responses.	Community and multi-agency prevention literature.	Enables tailored interventions.	Resource and coordination constraints.
Multi-agency prevention	Prevention requires cooperation across sectors.	Prevention policy and practice literature.	Connects welfare, education, health, community, and security functions.	Institutional silos and information-sharing barriers.
Crime-terror nexus	Criminological perspectives can illuminate intersections between crime, violence, and extremism.	Crime-terror and criminological research.	Enables selective policy transfer.	Risk of oversimplifying radicalisation.
Evaluation and evidence	Prevention requires clearer evidence of implementation and outcomes.	Crime prevention evaluation literature.	Encourages stronger evaluation in P/CVE.	Limited data and security constraints.
Ethical considerations	Prevention must balance targeting with proportionality and rights.	Critical prevention and P/CVE literature.	Supports rights-based and non-stigmatising practice.	Balancing targeted support with universal approaches.

Figure 1 synthesises the article's central argument by showing how crime science can inform P/CVE through complementary prevention layers, while the crime–terror nexus provides a specific domain for selective transfer, not direct equivalence.

Critical Discussion

Crime prevention offers a useful framework for P/CVE, but several limitations require attention. First, many prevention models discussed are supported by broader criminological evidence rather than extensive extremism-specific evaluation (Hardy 2022; Mastroe 2016). This does not invalidate their relevance, but policy claims should remain proportionate. Evidence that an intervention reduces general offending does not automatically demonstrate similar effects on extremist engagement or violence.

Second, counterterrorism and extremism research operates under data constraints. National security considerations, limited information sharing, and difficulties obtaining comparable longitudinal data can restrict evaluation. This reinforces the need for mixed-method and longitudinal approaches capable of examining intended and unintended consequences.

Third, ethical risks require attention. Identifying psychosocial or socioeconomic characteristics as 'risk factors' can contribute to stigmatisation if structural disadvantage is interpreted primarily as an individual problem. In extremism prevention, similar dynamics may produce 'suspect communities', increase surveillance of marginalised populations, or undermine trust in public institutions. Legitimate P/CVE therefore requires evidence-informed practice and attention to rights, proportionality, and non-discrimination.

Finally, there is a tension between universal prevention and targeted intervention. Universal programmes can reduce stigma and strengthen protective environments, but may be too broad to respond to specific support needs. Targeted approaches can provide tailored assistance, but may also label or isolate individuals and communities. A layered model combining universal, selected, and indicated approaches can help address these tensions while allowing interventions to be adapted to context.

Implications for Research and Policy

The broader significance of a crime prevention perspective is that it encourages P/CVE to be considered as a domain of preventive governance that extends beyond an emergency security response. This perspective supports investment in early-years provision, schools, family services, local capacity, community trust, psychosocial support, and online environments alongside intelligence and criminal justice measures. It therefore broadens the preventive focus from responding to identified threats to strengthening the social, institutional, and environmental conditions that can support resilience and reduce opportunities for harm.

Three implications are particularly relevant for policy. First, prevention should be early, sustained, and embedded within ordinary wellbeing, safeguarding, educational, and community systems, not activated only when a visible security threat emerges. Second, prevention should be locally grounded and multi-agency, with leadership adapted to the circumstances of each intervention. Third, interventions should be evidence-informed, proportionate, context-sensitive, and procedurally fair, recognising that institutional legitimacy can itself support effective prevention (Murphy et al. 2019).

For research, greater attention is needed to evaluation design, implementation processes, and transparent criteria for assessing effectiveness. Comparative research should also consider differences between jurisdictions, including institutional structures, local governance arrangements, and the social consequences of prevention policies.

Criminology and psychology can contribute to this agenda alongside political science, security studies, public health, and other relevant disciplines.

Conclusion

Crime prevention provides a useful and policy-relevant set of concepts for informing the prevention and countering of violent extremism. Developmental, community, situational, psychosocial, and law-enforcement perspectives each offer different insights into how preventive systems can be designed and implemented. Taken together, they support a layered approach that combines complementary forms of prevention across different levels and mechanisms.

Early prevention is relevant because supportive developmental, educational, family, and community environments can contribute to positive outcomes before harmful behaviour emerges. The local level is important because context-specific knowledge and trusted relationships can facilitate proportionate responses. Multi-agency cooperation matters because no single institution can address the full range of social, educational, psychosocial, community, and security considerations involved in prevention. Evidence and legitimacy are equally important because poorly evaluated or stigmatising interventions may undermine trust and produce unintended consequences.

These conclusions do not imply that crime prevention can explain radicalisation or violent extremism in its entirety. Nor do they suggest that approaches developed in general crime prevention can simply be transferred without adaptation. Instead, the value of crime prevention lies in providing established tools for thinking about prevention, opportunity, context, implementation, and governance. Used selectively and critically, these tools can contribute to P/CVE approaches that are proportionate, context-sensitive, evidence-informed, and consistent with democratic principles.

Declaration of Generative AI Use

ChatGPT (GPT-5.6) was used for language and editorial refinement, assistance with reference checking and Fig. 1 design based on the authors' conceptual framework. The authors reviewed all outputs and retain full responsibility for the manuscript's originality, accuracy, content, references, and conclusions.

Declarations

Author Contribution

E.M.J.G. conceptualised the study, conducted the literature review and analysis, developed the manuscript, prepared the initial manuscript draft, and prepared Figure 1. A.J.M.-F. contributed to the contextualisation of the manuscript and prepared Table 1. Both authors reviewed and approved the final manuscript.

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Figures




Figure 1

A Layered Crime Prevention Framework for P/CVE