

Supplementary Material: Much of politicians' perceptual error is domain-general processing of proportions

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SM.1 Methods: Additional Information

SM.1.1 Sample Construction: Inclusion and Exclusion

Table SM.1 provides an overview of every study of the perceptions of constituents elicited from politicians (or candidates for elected office) in the past decade. We include every study in which (a) politicians' estimates are elicited as proportions and (b) replication data are available for use. This includes the overwhelming majority of recent studies of politicians' perceptual accuracy. Note that items marked "indirectly" are part of larger projects whose data are incorporated from another study; including these data would thus create duplication in our own dataset.

Table SM.1: Population of Studies: Elite Perceptual Accuracy

Year	Citekey	Country	Type	Elites	Included	Discussion
2014	(1)	Portugal	Ideology	National politicians	No	Perceptual variable is 0-10 ideology scale, not proportion.
2018	(2)	United States	Policy Attitudes	State legislative candidates	Partial	Aggregate estimates of issue-level misperceptions included in descriptive plots. Individual-level data unavailable.
2020	(3)	United States	Demographics	State legislators	No	For confidentiality reasons, individual-level replication data unavailable
2021	(4)	Switzerland	Policy Attitudes	Local politicians	Yes	Dataset includes Study 2 from Pereira 2021. Study 1 data does not include continuous measure of politicians' perceptions.
2021	(5)	United States	Policy Attitudes	State legislators	No	Data not available for directional misperceptions (only absolute misperceptions are included in replication data).
2023	(6)	United States	Demographics	Local policymakers	No	Replication data unavailable (note that perceptions are of "local need" measured using 2-1-1 calls)

2021	(7)	Switzerland	Policy Attitudes	National politicians	Indirectly	Included in POLPOP data (Pilet et al. 2023)
2021	(8)	Belgium	Policy Attitudes	National and regional politicians	Indirectly	Included in POLPOP data (Pilet et al. 2023)
2024	(9)	Canada	Policy Attitudes	Local politicians	Yes	
2022	(10)	Switzerland	Policy Attitudes	National politicians	Indirectly	Included in POLPOP data (Pilet et al. 2023)
2022	(11)	Belgium, Canada, Israel	Policy Salience	National and regional politicians	No	Perceptual variable is 0-10 scale, not proportions
2022	(12)	Switzerland	Policy Attitudes	National politicians	Indirectly	Included in POLPOP data (Pilet et al. 2023)
2023	(13)	United States	Demographics	State legislative candidates	Yes	
2023	(14)	Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland	Policy Attitudes	National and regional politicians	Yes	Part of POLPOP international study of political elites
2023	(15)	Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland	Policy Attitudes	National and regional politicians	Indirectly	Included in POLPOP data (Pilet et al. 2023)
2023	(16)	Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland	Policy Attitudes	National and regional politicians	Indirectly	Included in POLPOP data (Pilet et al. 2023)
2024	(17)	Denmark, Netherlands	Policy Attitudes	Local and national politicians	Yes	
2024	(18)	Germany	Ideology and Policy Attitudes	Election candidates	No	Perceptual variables are scales, not proportions
2024	(19)	Belgium and Germany	Policy Attitudes	National and regional politicians	Indirectly	Included in POLPOP data (Pilet et al. 2023)
2024	(3)	Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland	Policy Attitudes	National and regional politicians	Indirectly	Included in POLPOP data (Pilet et al. 2023)
2024	(20)	Canada	Policy Attitudes	Local politicians	No	Perceptual variables are not proportions and not measured at constituency level
2024	(21)	United States	Policy Attitudes	Political elites	No	Examined sample excludes elected politicians
2024	(22)	Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland	Policy Attitudes	National and regional politicians	Indirectly	Included in POLPOP data (Pilet et al. 2023)

2024	(23)	Canada	Ideology	Local politicians	No	Perceptual variable is 0-10 ideology scale, not proportion.
2025	(24)	Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland	Policy Attitudes	National and regional politicians	Indirectly	Included in POLPOP data (Pilet et al. 2023)
2025	(25)	Belgium	Policy Attitudes	Local politicians	No	Replication data unavailable
2025	(26)	Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland	Policy Attitudes	National and regional politicians	No	National estimates included in POLPOP data, other estimates are not measured at constituency level
2025	(27)	Norway	Policy Attitudes	Local, Regional, and National Politicians	No	Replication data unavailable
2026	(28)	Switzerland	Policy Attitudes	National politicians	Indirectly	Included in POLPOP data (Pilet et al. 2023)
2026	(29)	Switzerland	Policy Attitudes	Election candidates	No	Replication data unavailable

SM.1.2 Pre-Existing Data Sources

Table SM.2 describes each of the pre-existing data sources included in our analysis, reporting the study and project, the countries and year of data collection, the type of perceptual task and of political elite surveyed, and the number of elites, perceptual tasks, and perceptions contributed by each study.

Table SM.2: Description of Sample: Pre-Existing Data Sources

Study	Project	Countries	Year	Type	Elite Type	Elites	Tasks	N
Lucas et al. 2024	CMB	Canada	2020	Policy Attitudes	Local politicians	771	9	6221
Butler et al. 2025	POLPOP	Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland	2018-19	Policy Salience	National and regional politicians	866	50	7296
Pilet et al. 2023	POLPOP	Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland	2018-19	Policy Attitudes	National and regional politicians	522	40	4140
Broockman and Skovron 2018		United States	2014	Policy Attitudes	State legislative candidates	1803	7	
Otjes and Rasmussen 2024		Denmark, Netherlands	2020	Policy Attitudes	National and local politicians	2106	10	10470
Pereira 2021		Switzerland	2018	Policy Attitudes	Local politicians	2787	2	5574
Thal 2023		United States	2018	Demographics	State legislative candidates	1265	3	3795
Eisner et al. 2026		Switzerland	2023	Policy Attitudes	National candidates	2527	4	7675

First, Broockman and Skovron (2) collected data on 1,800 state legislative candidates' perceptions of constituents' policy attitudes on seven social policy issues. Candidates' perceptions were compared to state-level public opinion estimates from the Cooperative

Congressional Election Study using a sample-weighting technique as well as Multilevel Regression and Poststratification (MRP). Note that Broockman and Skovron’s results are included in our main text task-level descriptive plots (Figure 1, Panels A and B) but are not included in our models, because individual-level replication data are not available due to the authors’ confidentiality commitments. We extracted error estimates directly from Broockman and Skovron’s article (Table 2).

Miguel Pereira (4) collected data from 2,787 local politicians in Switzerland in advance of two referendums. Politicians’ perceptions were compared to actual referendum results in the politicians’ localities, providing a precise ground truth with which to measure politicians’ accuracy. Note that our data are taken from Study 2 in Pereira’s original article. We downloaded Pereira’s replication data from (30).

Pilet and his coauthors (14) collected data from more than 500 national and regional politicians on a total of 50 policy attitude questions (the research team selected similar types of questions across countries, politicians in each country were asked about a distinct list of questions appropriate to their country). These perceptions were compared with weighted estimates from public opinion surveys completed by the research team. The study also included the same policy issues for the politician’s party electorate (supporter of the politician’s own party). This project is part of POLPOP (Politicians and Public Opinion) and is grouped as “POLPOP” in the main text. We downloaded Pilet et al. replication data from (31).

Adam Thal (13) collected data from 1,265 state legislative candidates on three state-level demographic features: financial insecurity, unaffordable healthcare, and college debt. Thal compared political elites’ perceptions with available state-level data from federal government and (in the case of college debt) a private firm. We downloaded Thal’s replication data from (32).

Lucas and his coauthors (9) collected data from 771 local politicians in Canada on perceptions of municipal-level policy attitudes for nine distinct policy questions. Lucas et al. compare politicians’ perceptions to municipal-level public opinion using a large national survey dataset and MRP. We collected data from the Lucas et al. study directly from the authors.

Otjes and Rasmussen (17) collected data from 2,106 local and national politicians in Denmark and the Netherlands on perceptions of citizens’ attitudes on five policy issues. Otjes and Rasmussen use original public opinion survey data from both countries to construct weighted public opinion estimates with which to assess politicians’ perceptual accuracy. We downloaded Otjes and Rasmussen’s data from (33).

Butler and his coauthors (34) collected data from 866 regional and national politicians

in Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland. The researchers asked politicians for their perception of the proportion of their constituents (party supporters) who *did not have an opinion* on each issue. These perceptions were then compared with public opinion estimates from original surveys of the public in each country. This project is part of POLPOP and is drawn from the same underlying dataset as Pilet and his coauthors (14); we group these data as “POLPOP” in the main text. We downloaded data from this study from (35).

Finally, Eisner and her coauthors (29) collected data from more than 2,500 Swiss national election candidates. The researchers asked candidates for their perception of the proportion of constituents (party supporters) who supported four policy issues, which were compared with estimates from a large public opinion survey. Data from Eisner et al. are available at <https://www.swissubase.ch/fr/catalogue/studies/20738/20092/datasets>.

SM.1.3 Original Data: The Canadian Municipal Barometer

Table SM.3 compares the CMB sample with the underlying population of Canadian local politicians in each of the three survey waves (2023, 2025, and 2026), reporting the population and sample percentages for province, municipal population size, and politician gender.

SM.1.4 Measuring Actual and Perceived Values

For each study, “Perception” captures the perception elicited from political elites and “Actual” captures the value to which political elites’ perceptions were compared.

SM.1.5 Estimating Municipal Opinion: MRP Specification

These models include individual-level gender (man or woman), age categories (18–34, 35–54, 55+), and educational attainment (no university degree vs. university degree), combined into a fully-interacted twelve-category variable. We select these demographic indicators for reasons of data availability: these are the indicators for which complete data for each combination of gender, age, and education are available at the municipality (csd) scale from the Canadian census. In addition to these individual-level predictors, we include nine municipality-level census predictors in both MRP models: (logged) municipal population size, (logged) municipal population density, median municipal income,

Table SM.3: CMB Data: Population and Sample

Item	2023		2025		2026	
	Population (%)	Sample (%)	Population (%)	Sample (%)	Population (%)	Sample (%)
Province						
Alberta	10.00	12.00	11.7	14.5	11.70	13.70
British Columbia	12.00	13.00	10.8	11.7	11.90	10.40
Manitoba	3.00	3.00	4.6	4.1	4.54	3.29
New Brunswick	3.00	2.00	2.8	3.0	5.64	4.70
Newfoundland and Labrador	1.00	1.00	2.3	2.2	2.26	2.66
Northwest Territories	0.10	0.01	0.2	0.1	0.38	0.35
Nova Scotia	3.00	3.00	3.8	4.7	3.87	5.47
Nunavut			0.8	0.8		
Ontario	35.00	32.00	32.4	27.7	29.40	21.40
Prince Edward Island	0.01	0.01	0.5	0.6	0.60	0.07
Quebec	29.00	21.00	27.6	27.9	27.30	35.90
Saskatchewan	2.00	3.00	2.2	2.3	2.30	2.03
Yukon	0.20	0.00	0.4	0.4	0.10	0.07
Population Size (2023 Data)						
9,000–15,000	28.00	25.00				
15,000–25,000	22.00	18.00				
25,000–50,000	17.00	15.00				
50,000–100,000	12.00	10.00				
100,000–500,000	14.00	13.00				
500,000+	7.00	8.00				
Population Size (2025-26 Data)						
<5,000			19.3	21.1	20.40	22.60
5,000–9,999			23.0	26.1	25.60	27.40
10,000–24,999			26.6	23.0	25.20	23.80
25,000–49,999			10.1	9.9	9.51	8.64
50,000–99,999			7.8	7.0	7.84	6.96
100,000–249,999			6.7	5.6	6.28	5.13
250,000–499,999			2.2	2.5	1.97	2.74
>500,000			4.3	4.7	3.26	2.74
Gender						
Women	36.00	39.00	34.0	38.8	34.60	41.40
Men	64.00	60.00	66.0	61.0	65.40	58.50
Non-binary			0.0	0.2	0.06	0.09

(logged) proportion immigrants in municipality, (logged) proportion renters in municipality, proportion Christian in municipality, (logged) proportion of municipal residents who commute to work by transit, and (logged) proportion of municipal residents who are racialized (census category “visible minority”). In addition, we follow previous Canadian studies and include federal political party support for the Conservative Party, New Democratic Party, and Green Party, each of which is estimated from polling-station-level federal election results and aggregated to the municipality scale using areal weighted interpolation (36). Our model is thus:

$$\Pr(y_i = 1) = \text{logit}^{-1} \left(\theta_0 + \alpha_{j[i]}^{age.sex.edu} + \alpha_{k[i]}^{mun} + \alpha_{l[i]}^{region} \right) \quad (1)$$

In this model, y_i represents each individual i 's binary policy attitude (or, in the policy

Table SM.4: Actual and Perceived Values

Study	Year	Type	Perception	Actual
Canadian Municipal Barometer	2023	Demographics	Municipal residents	Municipality-level data from Canadian census
Canadian Municipal Barometer	2025-26	Policy Attitudes	Municipal residents	MRP estimates from national survey data
Canadian Municipal Barometer	2025-26	Policy Salienc	Municipal residents	MRP estimates from national survey data
Lucas et al. 2024	2020	Policy Attitudes	Municipal residents	MRP estimates from national survey data
Butler et al. 2025	2018-19	Policy Salienc	National population (or in Switzerland, cantonal)	National (or, in Switzerland, cantonal) estimates from national surveys
Pilet et al. 2023	2018-19	Policy Attitudes	National population (or in Switzerland, cantonal)	National (or, in Switzerland, cantonal) estimates from national surveys
Broockman and Skovron 2018	2014	Policy Attitudes	State residents	MRP estimates from national survey data
Otjes and Rasmussen 2024	2020	Policy Attitudes	National population	National estimates from survey data
Pereira 2021	2018	Policy Attitudes	Municipal results in national referendums	Municipal results in national referendums
Thal 2023	2018	Demographics	State residents	State-level data from Federal Reserve and Peterson's
Eisner et al. 2026	2023	Policy Attitudes	Own party supporters	Party-level estimates from national survey data

salienc models, whether the individual has an opinion), θ_0 represents an overall intercept on the log-odds scale, α_j captures varying individual-level demographic intercepts, α_k captures varying municipality-level intercepts, and α_l captures varying regional intercepts. We model the age, gender, and education intercepts as drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero:

$$\alpha_j^{age.sex.edu} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_{age.sex.edu}^2) \quad (2)$$

We model the municipal intercepts as predicted by the regional intercepts (that is, the region in which the municipality is situated) as well as the n municipality-level predictors, γ , listed above:

$$\alpha_k^{mun} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_k^{mun}, \sigma_{mun}^2) \quad (3)$$

$$\mu_k^{mun} = \alpha_{l[k]}^{region} + \gamma_1 x_{k1} + \dots + \gamma_n x_{kn} \quad (4)$$

For computational feasibility (we have 52 models to fit for each of the outcome variables, issue salienc and issue position) we fit all models in a maximum likelihood setting.

SM.1.6 Midpoint Hedging Model: Priors, Implementation, and Convergence

For some readers, R syntax provides a clearer overview of our model than mathematical notation. Our R syntax for the uncertainty-based rescaling model is:

```
# Model Priors
priors <-
  prior(normal(.5, 1), nlpar = "delta", lb = 0) +
  prior(normal(.5, .5), nlpar = "gamma", lb = 0, ub = 1)

# Model Fit
model <-
  brm(bf(perception ~ (((delta^(1 - gamma)) *
    (actual)^gamma)/((((delta^(1-gamma)) * ((actual)^gamma))) + (1 -
    actual)^gamma)),
    delta ~ 1,
    gamma ~ 1,
    nl = TRUE),
    data = all, prior = priors, iter = 4000, chains = 4, warmup =
    1000, cores = 4, seed = 12345)
```

SM.2 Perceptual Error: Additional Detail

Table SM.5 provides an overview of all tasks included in the main text. Note that in some cases (e.g. state-level or municipal-level politician perceptions), the actual value to which individual politicians' perceptions are compared are measured at a lower level of aggregation than the country as a whole. Nevertheless, the overview in Table SM.5 provides an overview of the task types and issues available, along with the aggregated error (as displayed in Figure 1, Panel A in the main text) for each task.

Table SM.5: Issue-Level Perceptual Error Estimates

Source	Country	Task Type	Issue	Actual	Error	Lower	Upper
B&S 2018	United States	Policy Attitude	Abortion Legal	0.55	-0.09	-0.12	-0.07
B&S 2018	United States	Policy Attitude	Background Checks	0.84	-0.36	-0.38	-0.33
B&S 2018	United States	Policy Attitude	Ban Assault Rifles	0.57	-0.18	-0.21	-0.16
B&S 2018	United States	Policy Attitude	Birth Control: Religious Exemptions	0.44	0.04	0.02	0.05
B&S 2018	United States	Policy Attitude	Immigrant Amnesty	0.46	-0.09	-0.11	-0.06
B&S 2018	United States	Policy Attitude	Question Undocumented	0.38	0.12	0.09	0.15
B&S 2018	United States	Policy Attitude	Same Sex Marriage	0.57	-0.07	-0.09	-0.05
CMB	Canada	Demographics	Commute by Car	0.87	-0.08	-0.09	-0.07
CMB	Canada	Demographics	Education Level	0.18	0.23	0.22	0.25
CMB	Canada	Demographics	Home Ownership	0.72	-0.07	-0.08	-0.06
CMB	Canada	Demographics	Poverty Rate	0.04	0.22	0.21	0.23
CMB	Canada	Demographics	Racialized Residents	0.14	0.10	0.09	0.11
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Affordable Housing	0.75	-0.22	-0.28	-0.17
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Allow apartments near houses	0.50	-0.13	-0.17	-0.09
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Ban Handguns and Assault Rifles	0.81	-0.16	-0.18	-0.14
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Ban Single-Use Plastics	0.67	-0.15	-0.19	-0.11
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Ban gas lawn equipment	0.29	-0.04	-0.08	0.00
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Bus lanes instead of car lanes	0.37	-0.09	-0.13	-0.05
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Civilian oversight of police	0.84	-0.34	-0.39	-0.29
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Continue Carbon Tax	0.44	0.05	0.03	0.07
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Corporate Contributions	0.71	-0.20	-0.24	-0.16
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Cut business taxes to attract jobs	0.55	-0.18	-0.22	-0.14
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Economic Growth Priority	0.42	-0.01	-0.05	0.04
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Economy vs. Climate	0.58	-0.01	-0.05	0.04
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	End funding for immigrant festivals	0.63	-0.20	-0.25	-0.15
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	End land acknowledgements	0.62	-0.18	-0.24	-0.12
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Environmental Regulations	0.69	-0.18	-0.22	-0.14
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Equal Representation Women	0.59	-0.19	-0.24	-0.15
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Expand Bike Lanes	0.40	-0.06	-0.10	-0.02
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Historical Commemoration	0.68	-0.14	-0.18	-0.10
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Homeowner control over zoning	0.73	-0.16	-0.21	-0.11
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Housing for immigrant families	0.30	-0.02	-0.06	0.03
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Improve Roads	0.45	0.05	0.01	0.10
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Increase Local Immigration	0.43	0.08	0.07	0.10

Table SM.5: Issue-Level Perceptual Error Estimates (*continued*)

Source	Country	Task Type	Issue	Actual	Error	Lower	Upper
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Increase User Fees	0.51	-0.02	-0.06	0.01
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Indigenous Reconciliation	0.43	-0.12	-0.16	-0.08
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Language and Job Training	0.50	-0.19	-0.23	-0.15
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Legalize fourplexes everywhere	0.65	-0.26	-0.30	-0.22
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Legalize multi-unit housing citywide	0.68	-0.25	-0.30	-0.21
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Limit density in established areas	0.64	-0.07	-0.12	-0.01
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Low-Income Transit Subsidies	0.82	-0.26	-0.28	-0.25
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Lower neighbourhood speed limits	0.76	-0.17	-0.22	-0.13
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Mandatory household composting	0.65	-0.15	-0.19	-0.10
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	More police power in public spaces	0.79	-0.12	-0.16	-0.07
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	No race-based municipal policies	0.92	-0.29	-0.34	-0.25
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	No special programs for immigrants	0.77	-0.24	-0.29	-0.19
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Prioritize Community Outreach	0.66	-0.23	-0.27	-0.18
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Privatize Waste Management	0.52	-0.05	-0.09	-0.01
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Protect Existing Neighbourhoods	0.53	0.02	-0.02	0.06
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Raise Income Tax on Wealthy	0.83	-0.23	-0.24	-0.21
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Raise Property Taxes	0.63	-0.21	-0.26	-0.17
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Raise property taxes for services	0.61	-0.14	-0.18	-0.10
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Reallocate Police Spending	0.47	-0.09	-0.13	-0.05
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Reduce Bike Lane Funding	0.54	-0.06	-0.11	-0.02
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Reduce Business Taxes	0.40	-0.01	-0.05	0.03
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Reduce EDI Funding	0.66	-0.16	-0.20	-0.11
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Reduce Immigrant Funding	0.81	-0.21	-0.26	-0.17
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Relax Environmental Standards	0.31	0.00	-0.04	0.05
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Remove Controversial Statues	0.36	0.02	-0.02	0.06
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Rename colonial-era places	0.43	0.00	-0.05	0.06
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Services regardless of status	0.85	-0.27	-0.32	-0.23
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Shared civic identity over programs	0.78	-0.22	-0.27	-0.18
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Single-Family Zoning	0.65	-0.12	-0.15	-0.08
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Stop renaming streets and statues	0.82	-0.24	-0.29	-0.19
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Strict Limits on Urban Sprawl	0.67	-0.12	-0.14	-0.10
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Support co-ops over corporations	0.77	-0.29	-0.33	-0.24
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Tax Breaks Green Businesses	0.63	-0.21	-0.25	-0.17
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Tax Breaks for Local Businesses	0.63	-0.14	-0.16	-0.13
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Taxes to reduce inequality	0.79	-0.35	-0.39	-0.30
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Trade with China	0.54	-0.07	-0.09	-0.05
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Transit Investment	0.77	-0.10	-0.12	-0.09
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Vote rights for permanent residents	0.43	-0.02	-0.08	0.03
CMB	Canada	Policy Attitude	Widen roads over bike lanes	0.57	-0.07	-0.11	-0.02
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Affordable Housing	0.90	-0.30	-0.34	-0.25
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Allow apartments near houses	0.89	-0.21	-0.25	-0.17
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Ban Single-Use Plastics	0.92	-0.31	-0.35	-0.27
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Ban gas lawn equipment	0.88	-0.27	-0.33	-0.22
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Bus lanes instead of car lanes	0.88	-0.28	-0.34	-0.23

Table SM.5: Issue-Level Perceptual Error Estimates (*continued*)

Source	Country	Task Type	Issue	Actual	Error	Lower	Upper
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Civilian oversight of police	0.86	-0.37	-0.41	-0.33
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Corporate Contributions	0.86	-0.37	-0.41	-0.33
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Cut business taxes to attract jobs	0.85	-0.37	-0.41	-0.32
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Economic Growth Priority	0.89	-0.22	-0.25	-0.19
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Economy vs. Climate	0.88	-0.23	-0.27	-0.19
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	End funding for immigrant festivals	0.88	-0.33	-0.38	-0.28
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	End land acknowledgements	0.74	-0.25	-0.31	-0.19
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Environmental Regulations	0.90	-0.30	-0.34	-0.27
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Equal Representation Women	0.89	-0.35	-0.40	-0.30
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Expand Bike Lanes	0.90	-0.34	-0.39	-0.29
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Historical Commemoration	0.89	-0.31	-0.35	-0.26
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Homeowner control over zoning	0.89	-0.36	-0.41	-0.31
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Housing for immigrant families	0.90	-0.26	-0.30	-0.21
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Improve Roads	0.87	-0.27	-0.32	-0.23
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Increase User Fees	0.86	-0.26	-0.30	-0.22
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Indigenous Reconciliation	0.83	-0.36	-0.42	-0.31
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Language and Job Training	0.88	-0.41	-0.45	-0.37
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Legalize fourplexes everywhere	0.86	-0.21	-0.25	-0.17
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Legalize multi-unit housing citywide	0.88	-0.22	-0.26	-0.19
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Limit density in established areas	0.87	-0.21	-0.25	-0.16
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Lower neighbourhood speed limits	0.90	-0.22	-0.26	-0.18
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Mandatory household composting	0.92	-0.32	-0.36	-0.27
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	More police power in public spaces	0.91	-0.21	-0.25	-0.17
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	No race-based municipal policies	0.92	-0.20	-0.24	-0.16
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	No special programs for immigrants	0.91	-0.26	-0.31	-0.22
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Prioritize Community Outreach	0.84	-0.32	-0.37	-0.28
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Privatize Waste Management	0.86	-0.29	-0.33	-0.25
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Protect Existing Neighbourhoods	0.87	-0.22	-0.26	-0.18
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Raise Property Taxes	0.91	-0.38	-0.43	-0.33
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Raise property taxes for services	0.87	-0.17	-0.20	-0.13
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Reallocate Police Spending	0.90	-0.34	-0.38	-0.29
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Reduce Bike Lane Funding	0.89	-0.27	-0.31	-0.22
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Reduce Business Taxes	0.87	-0.35	-0.39	-0.30
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Reduce EDI Funding	0.85	-0.30	-0.34	-0.25
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Reduce Immigrant Funding	0.91	-0.29	-0.33	-0.24
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Relax Environmental Standards	0.89	-0.26	-0.29	-0.22
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Remove Controversial Statues	0.86	-0.30	-0.34	-0.25
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Rename colonial-era places	0.84	-0.27	-0.32	-0.22
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Services regardless of status	0.94	-0.26	-0.30	-0.22
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Shared civic identity over programs	0.89	-0.25	-0.29	-0.21
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Single-Family Zoning	0.85	-0.25	-0.28	-0.21
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Stop renaming streets and statues	0.91	-0.37	-0.42	-0.32
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Support co-ops over corporations	0.85	-0.32	-0.37	-0.28
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Tax Breaks Green Businesses	0.89	-0.37	-0.42	-0.33

Table SM.5: Issue-Level Perceptual Error Estimates (*continued*)

Source	Country	Task Type	Issue	Actual	Error	Lower	Upper
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Taxes to reduce inequality	0.83	-0.27	-0.32	-0.23
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Vote rights for permanent residents	0.85	-0.28	-0.34	-0.22
CMB	Canada	Policy Salience	Widen roads over bike lanes	0.87	-0.24	-0.29	-0.19
Eisner et al. 2026	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Foreign Voting Rights	0.66	-0.05	-0.06	-0.04
Eisner et al. 2026	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Minimum Wage	0.76	-0.17	-0.19	-0.16
Eisner et al. 2026	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Retirement Age (Reversed)	0.35	0.16	0.14	0.17
Eisner et al. 2026	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Same-Sex Rights	0.83	-0.10	-0.11	-0.09
O&R 2024	Denmark	Policy Attitude	Asylum Centres	0.10	0.26	0.23	0.28
O&R 2024	Denmark	Policy Attitude	Build Roads	0.46	0.10	0.08	0.11
O&R 2024	Denmark	Policy Attitude	CCTV Surveillance	0.64	-0.13	-0.15	-0.11
O&R 2024	Denmark	Policy Attitude	Cut Culture Spending	0.31	0.10	0.08	0.11
O&R 2024	Denmark	Policy Attitude	Privatize Elderly Care	0.35	0.10	0.08	0.12
O&R 2024	Netherlands	Policy Attitude	Asylum Centres	0.12	0.25	0.24	0.26
O&R 2024	Netherlands	Policy Attitude	Build Roads	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29
O&R 2024	Netherlands	Policy Attitude	CCTV Surveillance	0.55	0.00	-0.01	0.01
O&R 2024	Netherlands	Policy Attitude	Cut Culture Spending	0.29	0.14	0.13	0.15
O&R 2024	Netherlands	Policy Attitude	Privatize Elderly Care	0.80	-0.18	-0.19	-0.17
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude	Compulsory Voting	0.61	-0.19	-0.22	-0.16
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude	European Army	0.61	-0.05	-0.08	-0.03
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude	Forbid High-Pollution Cars	0.69	-0.12	-0.15	-0.09
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude	Mandatory Retirement 67	0.91	-0.16	-0.20	-0.13
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude	No Involuntary Expulsions	0.69	-0.21	-0.24	-0.18
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude	Publish Politician Income	0.91	-0.11	-0.14	-0.09
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude	Restrict Right to Strike	0.59	0.03	0.01	0.05
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude	Tax Company Cars	0.66	-0.16	-0.19	-0.13
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude	Compulsory Voting	0.57	-0.06	-0.09	-0.03
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude	European Army	0.49	0.06	0.03	0.09
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude	Forbid High-Pollution Cars	0.67	-0.06	-0.09	-0.03
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude	Mandatory Retirement 67	0.81	-0.12	-0.16	-0.08
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude	No Involuntary Expulsions	0.65	-0.05	-0.08	-0.02
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude	Publish Politician Income	0.82	-0.02	-0.05	0.00
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude	Restrict Right to Strike	0.56	-0.02	-0.04	0.01
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude	Tax Company Cars	0.59	-0.06	-0.09	-0.03
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude	Allow Euthanasia	0.85	-0.19	-0.22	-0.17
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude	Build Oil Pipelines	0.69	-0.15	-0.19	-0.11
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude	Carbon Tax	0.48	0.04	0.00	0.08
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude	Guaranteed Annual Income	0.75	-0.31	-0.36	-0.26
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude	Increase CPP Retirement Age	0.15	0.12	0.08	0.16
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude	Increase Consumption Tax	0.16	0.06	0.02	0.10
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude	Increase Immigration	0.38	0.07	0.03	0.11
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude	Powers to Combat Terrorism	0.58	-0.10	-0.15	-0.06

Table SM.5: Issue-Level Perceptual Error Estimates (*continued*)

Source	Country	Task Type	Issue	Actual	Error	Lower	Upper
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	Deportation of Asylum Seekers	0.91	-0.17	-0.21	-0.13
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	Driving Restrictions in Cities	0.46	-0.11	-0.17	-0.05
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	Dual Citizenship	0.36	0.02	-0.03	0.08
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	Full-Time Child Care	0.80	-0.14	-0.19	-0.08
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	Gender Equality in Economy	0.35	0.07	0.02	0.13
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	Income Redistribution	0.72	-0.17	-0.22	-0.11
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	Increase EU Cooperation	0.81	-0.29	-0.35	-0.23
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	Increase Retirement Age	0.21	0.12	0.06	0.18
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	Increase Tax on Wealthy	0.78	-0.15	-0.20	-0.10
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	Increase Video Surveillance	0.74	-0.20	-0.25	-0.14
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	More Federal Referendums	0.79	-0.24	-0.30	-0.18
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	More Severe Youth Justice	0.93	-0.24	-0.30	-0.19
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	No Further EU Expansion	0.73	-0.17	-0.24	-0.09
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	Organ Donation Opt-Out	0.63	-0.21	-0.27	-0.15
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	Reduce Voting Age	0.24	0.22	0.15	0.29
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude	Tax High-Emission Activities	0.67	-0.20	-0.26	-0.14
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Allow wolf hunts	0.43	0.04	0.01	0.07
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Babyklappe at hospitals	0.71	-0.18	-0.21	-0.15
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Buy new fighter jets	0.36	0.13	0.11	0.16
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Cantonal health insurance	0.57	-0.12	-0.15	-0.09
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Close unused defense facilities	0.28	0.17	0.14	0.20
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Federal internet voting	0.75	-0.26	-0.29	-0.23
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Freedom to choose electricity	0.75	-0.27	-0.30	-0.24
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Increase pension age	0.22	0.20	0.17	0.23
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Increase tax on wealthy	0.80	-0.32	-0.35	-0.30
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Integrate asylum-seekers	0.33	0.07	0.04	0.10
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Jobs reserved for residents	0.64	-0.10	-0.13	-0.06
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Non-citizen voting rights	0.50	-0.09	-0.12	-0.06
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Only well-educated immigrants	0.35	0.16	0.13	0.18
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Prevent unauthorized protests	0.64	-0.08	-0.11	-0.05
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Protect elderly from dismissal	0.92	-0.31	-0.34	-0.28
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Punish sexual harrassment	0.89	-0.28	-0.31	-0.25
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Same-sex couples adopt	0.55	-0.12	-0.15	-0.09
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Split-income marriage tax	0.53	0.00	-0.03	0.02
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Compulsory Voting	0.62	-0.12	-0.16	-0.09
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	European Army	0.63	-0.01	-0.04	0.02
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Forbid High-Pollution Cars	0.70	-0.11	-0.14	-0.09
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Mandatory Retirement 67	0.91	-0.18	-0.21	-0.15
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	No Involuntary Expulsions	0.69	-0.14	-0.17	-0.10

Table SM.5: Issue-Level Perceptual Error Estimates (*continued*)

Source	Country	Task Type	Issue	Actual	Error	Lower	Upper
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Publish Politician Income	0.94	-0.21	-0.24	-0.18
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Restrict Right to Strike	0.58	0.01	-0.02	0.04
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Tax Company Cars	0.71	-0.21	-0.25	-0.18
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Compulsory Voting	0.65	0.02	-0.01	0.05
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	European Army	0.53	0.07	0.04	0.11
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Forbid High-Pollution Cars	0.73	-0.07	-0.10	-0.04
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Mandatory Retirement 67	0.83	-0.10	-0.14	-0.05
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	No Involuntary Expulsions	0.72	-0.01	-0.05	0.02
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Publish Politician Income	0.87	-0.12	-0.16	-0.08
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Restrict Right to Strike	0.56	-0.05	-0.09	-0.01
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Tax Company Cars	0.69	-0.09	-0.12	-0.05
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Allow Euthanasia	0.86	-0.19	-0.23	-0.16
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Build Oil Pipelines	0.72	-0.13	-0.16	-0.09
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Carbon Tax	0.49	0.05	0.01	0.09
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Guaranteed Annual Income	0.73	-0.23	-0.28	-0.19
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Increase CPP Retirement Age	0.16	0.09	0.04	0.14
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Increase Consumption Tax	0.15	0.12	0.06	0.18
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Increase Immigration	0.38	0.18	0.15	0.22
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Powers to Combat Terrorism	0.56	-0.10	-0.15	-0.05
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Deportation of Asylum Seekers	0.92	-0.18	-0.24	-0.12
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Driving Restrictions in Cities	0.50	-0.16	-0.24	-0.09
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Dual Citizenship	0.33	0.10	0.04	0.17
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Full-Time Child Care	0.82	-0.18	-0.25	-0.11

Table SM.5: Issue-Level Perceptual Error Estimates (*continued*)

Source	Country	Task Type	Issue	Actual	Error	Lower	Upper
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Gender Equality in Economy	0.36	0.07	-0.01	0.15
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Income Redistribution	0.68	-0.12	-0.19	-0.05
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Increase EU Cooperation	0.84	-0.20	-0.26	-0.14
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Increase Retirement Age	0.17	0.21	0.13	0.29
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Increase Tax on Wealthy	0.77	-0.27	-0.34	-0.19
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Increase Video Surveillance	0.77	-0.23	-0.32	-0.15
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	More Federal Referendums	0.81	-0.25	-0.33	-0.18
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	More Severe Youth Justice	0.94	-0.26	-0.33	-0.19
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	No Further EU Expansion	0.78	-0.12	-0.19	-0.06
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Organ Donation Opt-Out	0.61	-0.16	-0.23	-0.10
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Reduce Voting Age	0.21	0.25	0.15	0.34
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Tax High-Emission Activities	0.63	-0.15	-0.20	-0.09
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Allow wolf hunts	0.47	-0.02	-0.05	0.01
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Babyklappe at hospitals	0.75	-0.18	-0.22	-0.14
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Buy new fighter jets	0.46	0.08	0.04	0.11
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Cantonal health insurance	0.60	-0.08	-0.12	-0.05
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Close unused defense facilities	0.36	0.14	0.10	0.18
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Federal internet voting	0.66	-0.08	-0.11	-0.05
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Freedom to choose electricity	0.71	-0.19	-0.23	-0.15
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Increase pension age	0.29	0.14	0.10	0.18
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Increase tax on wealthy	0.73	-0.18	-0.21	-0.14
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Integrate asylum-seekers	0.44	0.12	0.08	0.16
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Jobs reserved for residents	0.54	-0.06	-0.09	-0.02

Table SM.5: Issue-Level Perceptual Error Estimates (*continued*)

Source	Country	Task Type	Issue	Actual	Error	Lower	Upper
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Non-citizen voting rights	0.50	0.04	0.00	0.08
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Only well-educated immigrants	0.34	0.14	0.10	0.17
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Prevent unauthorized protests	0.65	-0.09	-0.13	-0.06
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Protect elderly from dismissal	0.90	-0.24	-0.27	-0.21
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Punish sexual harrassment	0.86	-0.19	-0.22	-0.16
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Same-sex couples adopt	0.58	-0.04	-0.07	0.00
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Attitude (Own Party)	Split-income marriage tax	0.65	-0.02	-0.06	0.01
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Salience	Compulsory Voting	0.15	0.14	0.12	0.17
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Salience	European Army	0.22	0.20	0.17	0.23
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Salience	Forbid High-Pollution Cars	0.11	0.17	0.15	0.20
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Salience	Mandatory Retirement 67	0.04	0.13	0.10	0.15
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Salience	No Involuntary Expulsions	0.12	0.14	0.11	0.16
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Salience	Publish Politician Income	0.07	0.15	0.12	0.18
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Salience	Restrict Right to Strike	0.12	0.15	0.13	0.17
POLPOP	Belgium (FL)	Policy Salience	Tax Company Cars	0.16	0.15	0.12	0.18
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Salience	Compulsory Voting	0.06	0.28	0.25	0.31
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Salience	European Army	0.17	0.26	0.23	0.29
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Salience	Forbid High-Pollution Cars	0.08	0.24	0.21	0.28
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Salience	Mandatory Retirement 67	0.03	0.20	0.16	0.23
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Salience	No Involuntary Expulsions	0.11	0.20	0.16	0.23
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Salience	Publish Politician Income	0.07	0.17	0.13	0.21
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Salience	Restrict Right to Strike	0.07	0.22	0.19	0.25
POLPOP	Belgium (WAL)	Policy Salience	Tax Company Cars	0.15	0.19	0.16	0.22
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Salience	Allow Euthanasia	0.13	0.17	0.13	0.22
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Salience	Build Oil Pipelines	0.17	0.13	0.09	0.17
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Salience	Carbon Tax	0.13	0.17	0.13	0.21
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Salience	Guaranteed Annual Income	0.12	0.34	0.29	0.39
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Salience	Increase CPP Retirement Age	0.08	0.23	0.18	0.29
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Salience	Increase Consumption Tax	0.10	0.12	0.07	0.16
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Salience	Increase Immigration	0.14	0.16	0.12	0.20
POLPOP	Canada	Policy Salience	Powers to Combat Terrorism	0.14	0.22	0.18	0.27
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	Deportation of Asylum Seekers	0.09	0.10	0.05	0.15
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	Driving Restrictions in Cities	0.10	0.15	0.10	0.21
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	Dual Citizenship	0.12	0.20	0.14	0.26
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	Full-Time Child Care	0.13	0.20	0.13	0.27
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	Gender Equality in Economy	0.18	0.13	0.07	0.19
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	Income Redistribution	0.13	0.17	0.11	0.23
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	Increase EU Cooperation	0.13	0.25	0.19	0.30

Table SM.5: Issue-Level Perceptual Error Estimates (*continued*)

Source	Country	Task Type	Issue	Actual	Error	Lower	Upper
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	Increase Retirement Age	0.05	0.17	0.13	0.22
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	Increase Tax on Wealthy	0.11	0.12	0.09	0.16
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	Increase Video Surveillance	0.08	0.23	0.18	0.29
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	More Federal Referendums	0.13	0.26	0.19	0.33
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	More Severe Youth Justice	0.08	0.15	0.11	0.19
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	No Further EU Expansion	0.21	0.15	0.07	0.22
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	Organ Donation Opt-Out	0.13	0.29	0.22	0.36
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	Reduce Voting Age	0.10	0.25	0.20	0.31
POLPOP	Germany	Policy Salience	Tax High-Emission Activities	0.13	0.24	0.17	0.30
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Allow wolf hunts	0.11	0.25	0.22	0.28
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Babyklappe at hospitals	0.11	0.25	0.22	0.29
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Buy new fighter jets	0.10	0.22	0.20	0.25
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Cantonal health insurance	0.16	0.16	0.13	0.19
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Close unused defense facilities	0.22	0.27	0.23	0.30
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Federal internet voting	0.08	0.31	0.29	0.34
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Freedom to choose electricity	0.22	0.19	0.16	0.23
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Increase pension age	0.04	0.23	0.20	0.26
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Increase tax on wealthy	0.07	0.21	0.18	0.24
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Integrate asylum-seekers	0.13	0.14	0.11	0.17
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Jobs reserved for residents	0.07	0.23	0.20	0.26
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Non-citizen voting rights	0.05	0.22	0.19	0.25
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Only well-educated immigrants	0.11	0.19	0.16	0.22
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Prevent unauthorized protests	0.10	0.20	0.17	0.23
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Protect elderly from dismissal	0.06	0.20	0.17	0.23
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Punish sexual harrassment	0.05	0.23	0.20	0.26
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Same-sex couples adopt	0.13	0.19	0.16	0.22
POLPOP	Switzerland	Policy Salience	Split-income marriage tax	0.21	0.14	0.12	0.17
Pereira 2021	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Horned-cow initiative	0.41	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04
Pereira 2021	Switzerland	Policy Attitude	Swiss constitution primacy	0.38	0.06	0.06	0.07
Thal 2023	United States	Demographics	College Debt	0.54	0.18	0.17	0.19
Thal 2023	United States	Demographics	Financial Insecurity	0.43	0.00	-0.01	0.02
Thal 2023	United States	Demographics	Unaffordable Healthcare	0.30	0.16	0.15	0.18

SM.3 Robustness: Subset Analysis

A central claim in our analysis is that the midpoint hedging phenomenon is *domain-general*: it should appear consistently across countries, level of government, task types, the ideological direction of policy statements (cf. 2; 14), and data source. Figure SM.1 thus reports γ and δ from the midpoint hedging model estimated separately within each of these subsets of the full sample. We also provide full parameter estimates and credible intervals in Table SM.6 below.

Our results are highly consistent across subsets. The estimated prior δ sits near the midpoint of the scale (generally around 0.43–0.56) in every country except the United States, and the weighting parameter γ falls between 0.28–0.45 in every country except the United States as well, indicating that politicians consistently (and strongly) weight their estimates toward the moderate prior. These estimates are similarly stable across left-wing and right-wing policy statements, across local and regional/national politicians, and across the various data sources employed in the study.

We note two important patterns that depart from this general pattern of consistency. First, our estimated γ is larger for demographic tasks than for policy attitudes or policy salience. This is consistent with our interpretation of the model in terms of Bayesian rescaling toward a moderate prior: demographic characteristics are often objective features of a constituency, and politicians might reasonably have clearer information about those characteristics (e.g. commuting patterns, home ownership rates, racial diversity) than about constituents’ policy attitudes or salience. This increased information would predict greater weight on task-specific information and lower weight on the prior, which we observe.

Second, estimates from Thal (13), the only American study included in our models (recall that Broockman and Skovron (2) is included in our aggregate results, but not in the individual-level model), depart from the broader pattern with much larger δ and γ parameters. Closer inspection reveals that these estimates are driven almost entirely by a single task: Thal’s college debt item shows extreme overestimation (the actual value is about 54% on average, and politicians’ estimates are much higher). Because this item sits near the middle of the overall scale, and because just three tasks are available for American politicians, it exerts disproportionate influence on the rescaling parameters. Note that when this single item is removed (see “excl. eduloan” in both Figure SM.1 and Table SM.6), the results from the United States fall back into alignment with the general pattern.

Overall, then, with the exception of the “College Loans” task in Thal (13), our sub-




Figure SM.1: **Subset Analysis.** Parameters (γ and δ) from uncertainty-based rescaling model estimated in subsets of the full dataset: distinct country, policy items written in a left-wing or right-wing direction, level of government of politician respondent, data source, and perceptual task type.

set analysis supports the domain-general claim we make in the main text: the rescaling pattern is not a feature of a particular country's politics or interest group landscape, a particular response to questions of a certain ideological orientation, a specific research team's question structure or survey method, or a specific level of government. Instead, it appears consistently in available data, whenever politicians are asked to estimate propor-

tions about their constituents.

SM.4 Full Model Results

Table SM.6 provides parameter estimates and 95% credible intervals for the overall model reported in the main text, along with the subset models reported in Figure SM.1. Note that each row is drawn from a separate model. Available sample sizes for each model are reported in the final column.

Table SM.6: Model Results

Model Subset	DELTA			GAMMA			N
	LWR CI	Median	UPR CI	LWR CI	Median	UPR CI	
Overall	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.34	0.35	0.35	70470
Subset by Country							
Belgium	0.52	0.52	0.53	0.43	0.45	0.46	7845
Canada	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.33	0.34	0.35	24772
Denmark	0.49	0.50	0.52	0.24	0.28	0.32	2705
Germany	0.43	0.45	0.46	0.33	0.36	0.38	1868
Netherlands	0.55	0.56	0.56	0.27	0.28	0.30	7765
Switzerland	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.42	0.43	0.44	21815
US (excl. eduloan)	0.45	0.46	0.47	0.00	0.05	0.13	2471
United States	0.66	0.69	0.73	0.52	0.58	0.63	3700
Subset by Statement Type							
Left-Wing Statement	0.46	0.46	0.47	0.36	0.37	0.38	33773
Right-Wing Statement	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.31	0.32	0.33	20608
Subset by Politician Type							
Local	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.29	0.30	0.30	37837
National/Regional	0.52	0.52	0.53	0.43	0.44	0.45	25972
Subset by Source							
CMB	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.34	0.35	22961
Eisner et al. 2026	0.50	0.52	0.53	0.51	0.53	0.55	7675
Otjes & Rasmussen 2024	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.27	0.29	0.30	10470
POLPOP	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.38	0.38	0.39	20090
Pereira 2021	0.41	0.42	0.42	0.33	0.37	0.41	5574
Thal 2023	0.66	0.69	0.73	0.52	0.58	0.63	3700
Thal 2023 (excl. eduloan)	0.45	0.46	0.47	0.00	0.05	0.13	2471
Subset by Task Type							
Demographics	0.62	0.63	0.65	0.47	0.48	0.50	7523
Demographics (excl. eduloan)	0.55	0.56	0.57	0.43	0.45	0.46	6294
Policy Attitude	0.47	0.48	0.48	0.30	0.31	0.32	35390
Policy Attitude (Own Party)	0.49	0.50	0.51	0.52	0.53	0.55	14391
Policy Salience	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.27	0.28	0.28	13166

SM.5 Robustness: A Mechanical Effect?

An alternative explanation of the phenomenon we describe in the main paper, which we attribute to uncertainty-based rescaling, is a simple mechanical effect of error truncation. For example, if the actual level of a particular constituent characteristic is 0%, politicians' error will either be zero (exactly correct by selecting zero) or an overestimate, since it is impossible to underestimate the actual value in this setting. The same will be true, in reverse, for constituent characteristics at 100%. As a consequence, we would expect to see overestimation of very small values and underestimation of very large values, even if politicians' errors are in fact randomly distributed around the true value. Could the pattern that we observe in the main text originate in this simple mechanical truncation process?

In Figure SM.2, we use simulation data to show that the answer is no. In each panel in Figure SM.2, we simulate politician error as pure random noise around the true value, varying the level of random noise from modest average absolute error levels (5%) to extremely high average absolute error levels (30%). For reference, observed average absolute error in our data is 21% and ranges from 12% (Pereira) to 24% (Canadian Municipal Barometer) across our data sources. In each panel, we plot the pattern of error we would expect from the purely mechanical random-noise model in gray, and the actual pattern of politicians' perceptual error in red.

We find that the mechanical model does not fit the pattern in the data: at low levels of absolute error, a mechanical mechanism truncates politicians' error only at the extremes, and even at levels of absolute error far above what we observe in the data, the mechanical mechanism generates a more linear pattern of error. In either case, the mechanical mechanism does not match the s-shaped pattern with over-estimates and under-estimates even quite close to the midpoint of the scale – the pattern we would expect from the rescaling process that is familiar in cognitive research on perception of proportions.




Figure SM.2: **Robustness Test: Mechanical Truncation Effects.** Simulated pattern (in gray) if politician error is randomly distributed around the true value but mechanically truncated at the extremes, with actual pattern of binned politician error in dark red. Each panel is a level of mean absolute error, ranging from 5% (politicians' perceptions tightly clustered around the true value) to 30% (politicians' perceptions very loosely clustered around the true value). For reference, politicians' MAE in our data is 21%.

SM.6 Midpoint Hedging and Projection

For more than eight decades, a single variable has emerged again and again as the single strongest – and often the sole significant – predictor of politicians’ perceptions of their constituents’ attitudes: politicians’ own position on the same issue (37; 38; 39; 40). As we note in the main text, this persistent finding is very much in keeping with our overall argument, since social projection is a general tendency observed across many domains of social life (41).

Here, we leverage the disciplinary consensus on the importance of projection for politicians’ perceptions to add substance to our interpretation of the importance of midpoint hedging. If politicians’ own attitudes are widely accepted as a foundational predictor of politicians’ perceptions, and if midpoint hedging explains a similar proportion of variation in politicians’ error, this lends further support to our argument that midpoint hedging ought to be added to social projection as a foundational predictor of politicians’ perceptions of constituents.

To test this claim, we fit four models:

- Baseline model: in this model, all politicians simply predict 0.5 (the midpoint) for every issue. This provides a minimal baseline against which we can compare the other models.
- Midpoint hedging model: this model is identical to the model in the main text, but restricted to politicians’ perceptions of constituents’ policy attitudes (both all constituents and own party), since these are the only perceptions to which the projection mechanism applies.
- Projection model: a simple bivariate OLS model in which politicians’ perceptions are predicted by their own attitude on the policy: $y_{ik} = \alpha + \beta_1 x_{ik}^{self} + \epsilon_{ik}$. Notice that this is not a model of projection *bias*, which is a politician’s tendency to perceive constituents as closer to themselves than they actually are. This model captures both congruence (politicians are often correct in projecting their attitudes onto constituents) *and* projection bias, thus representing a maximal test of the extent to which politicians’ own attitudes predict their perceptions.
- Midpoint and Projection model: this model modifies the midpoint hedging model by simply adding a term for politicians’ own views, allowing us to measure the performance of a model incorporating both midpoint hedging and social projection.

Having fit the four models (48,063 perceptions from 10,662 politicians), we calculated R^2 for each of the models and report the results in Table SM.7. We find that a constant 50% guess explains 5% of the variance in politicians’ error, midpoint hedging explains 22%, projection explains 23%, and both mechanisms together explain 31%. If we follow a Shapley approach, allocating the jointly-explained variance evenly between the two mechanisms, midpoint hedging accounts for 15% of the variance in politicians’ perceptual error and projection 16%.

Substantively, then, the midpoint hedging model explains roughly the same proportion of variation in politicians’ error as the projection model, reinforcing our view that researchers’ baseline expectation concerning politicians’ perceptions of constituents should be that those perceptions are shaped by at least *two* foundational domain-general processes: midpoint hedging and social projection.

Table SM.7: Explained Variance in Politicians’ Error: Midpoint Hedging vs. Projection

Model	Variance Explained
Baseline (everyone guesses 50%)	0.047
Midpoint hedging	0.222
Projection	0.233
Both mechanisms	0.305

This exercise also helps to confirm that midpoint hedging operates independently of social projection in shaping politicians’ perceptions. In our combined model, we find that accounting for politicians’ own opinions does not diminish the midpoint hedging tendency. In the combined model, the weighting parameter γ falls from 0.397 [0.389, 0.405] when hedging is modelled alone to 0.286 once projection is included, a reduction of 0.11 that is precisely estimated and consistent across every posterior draw. In other words, politicians place *less* weight on the actual value, not more, once their own views are taken into account. The estimated prior δ in the combined model is 0.502 [0.499, 0.505], almost exactly the midpoint of the scale. Moreover, projection remains large and precisely estimated in the same model: holding the actual value constant, a politician who strongly supports a policy perceives roughly 20 percentage points more public support than one who strongly opposes it. Neither mechanism explains the other away, and each adds explanatory power to a model already containing the other.

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