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Sustainable Diaspora Diplomacy: The Diaspora Diplomacy Triangle (TOP) Model

FAZLICAN ALTUNTAS

3170389@students.wits.ac.za

University of the Witwatersrand

Article

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Abstract

The diaspora turned from a narrative of exile into a potent transnational variable in IR. This article asks under what conditions a diaspora organization becomes an institutionalized diplomatic intermediary between a root state and a host state, and explores whether sustainable diaspora diplomacy can be conceptualized through the Diaspora Diplomacy Triangle (TOP) model. Read through neoclassical realism, diasporas operate as relative power units and 'sub-main actors' within the state–society relationship rather than outside it. TOP specifies three reversible, policy-specific conditions—Threat, Offer, and Practice—and treats reciprocity and adaptation as what stabilizes practice, not as later stages. A structured comparison of Indian, Jewish-American, and Kurdish organizations illustrates these conditions and identifies the model's boundary. Because the illustrations rely on secondary sources and were not selected as matched cases, they refine concepts and generate propositions rather than test causal claims.

INTRODUCTION

Diplomacy has evolved from primordial dialogues between sovereign entities and dominant regional communities into a complex array of communicative frameworks within international relations. In the modern era the state has been solidified as the primary constituent of these frameworks, institutionalizing diplomacy through dedicated foreign-policy instruments. Diasporas have nonetheless emerged as significant transnational and subnational entities that increasingly attract diplomatic inquiry, though numerous diaspora groups exist globally, each shaped by distinct historical and sociopolitical origins, and their impact on the political agenda varies significantly.

Diaspora politics sits uneasily between state-centred accounts of diplomacy and approaches that emphasize transnational agency. States remain the primary legal representatives in international affairs, yet diaspora organizations may lobby, transmit information, mobilize resources, frame identity claims, and connect officials or publics across borders. Such activities do not automatically make a diaspora a diplomatic actor.

Classical paradigms of International Relations prioritize the structural struggle for power as the primary mechanism of state survival. Kenneth Waltz's Structural Realism examines the international system as an independent variable and privileges security and systemic balance over the concept of power itself (Waltz 1988). In Classical and Structural Realism, states are the main actors (Morgenthau 1978); the question of how intermediary actors such as diasporas exert influence within a system in which states are the main actors cannot be fully answered in terms of relative power capacity alone. It is at this point that Gideon Rose's neoclassical realism becomes noteworthy: power capabilities operate indirectly and in complex ways in foreign policy, and systemic pressures are mediated by relative, unit-level variables (Rose 1998). Small states can sometimes produce large effects asymmetrically—Qatar's liquefied natural gas capacity is one example—because of how resources and value-added influence are distributed and held across the international system. Neoclassical realism is useful precisely where such relative powers create a domino effect and where transnational and subnational units affect variables held to be necessary in the international system: it brings neglected perceptions of power, the diaspora among them, into view. The diaspora, perceived in this way, can be positioned as a sub-main actor between main-actor states and can help build sustainable diplomacy in the communication between diasporas and states.

Diaspora diplomacy is a new and multidimensional concept: a specialized sub-branch of diplomacy in which a country's transnational community contributes to relations with foreign governments, mainly but not only through bilateral ties. Both root states and host states produce political narratives targeting diasporas in order to conduct diplomacy; these narratives function as a strategic asset that establishes proximities between states and generates influence in international politics.

This article asks: under what conditions do diaspora organizations become institutionalized diplomatic intermediaries between a root state and a host state? It answers by developing the Threat–Offer–Practice (TOP) model. Threat captures a state-authored perception or official framing that restricts an organization's legitimate access. Offer captures credible institutional opportunities, rights, programmes, or consultation channels that an organization can use. Practice captures repeated and recognized participation in a bilateral policy process. These are not universal historical stages through which

every diaspora must pass; they are policy-specific and reversible conditions, and organizations connected to the same broader population may occupy different conditions simultaneously.

The outcome to be explained is institutionalized diaspora intermediation: repeated, recognized, and policy-relevant participation by a diaspora organization in communication or bargaining that connects a root state and a host state. 'Institutionalized' does not imply that the organization formally represents either state, or that its activity produces normatively desirable outcomes; it indicates continuity, access, and recognition beyond a single campaign. 'Sustainable diaspora diplomacy' is therefore treated as a possible empirical outcome—durable practice—not as an assumed good or an inevitable endpoint.

Diaspora diplomacy is typically pursued through two processes. The first nationalizes the diaspora in alignment with the root state, transforming a transnational issue into a national one and projecting it onto the international stage through public, cultural, or economic diplomacy; the diaspora is instrumentalized as a relative power in foreign policy (Brand 2006). India's diplomatic missions, for example, draw on their diaspora's presence to navigate complex markets and attract investment. The second process allows diasporas to operate on a global scale beyond mere instrumentalization by the state, participating in international organizations as transnational entities, acquiring dual citizenship, and building symbolic influence within the host state—a structural shift from a subnational or transnational role to a more prominent one.

This second process can generate dynamics that move beyond bilateral relations altogether. Stateless diasporas, or diasporas that do not depend on state assets, may attempt to establish a state or mobilize the international community independently, as the Armenian diaspora's sustained advocacy on the 1915 deportations and the Jewish diaspora's mobilization around the Balfour Declaration illustrate (Betts and Jones 2016; Moss 2021). At this stage, diaspora diplomacy may come to be perceived as a threat by both the state of origin and the state of residence, triggering security policies designed to contain it (Adamson 2006); hostile discourse—Islamophobia directed at Muslim diasporas, or sweeping claims against the Jewish diaspora because of its association with Israel—shows how diasporic identity can itself become the object of accusation.

Diaspora diplomacy is therefore often examined as a soft-power strategy, under the name of public diplomacy, precisely in order to keep this first process controlled. States that consider themselves to have an active diaspora try to communicate with it: in the Krishna Doctrine, India's Minister of External Affairs told a 2012 conference of ambassadors that expatriate welfare deserved as much attention as expatriate hardship, and one of the basic units of Türkiye's diaspora policy is the YTB (Presidential Decree No. 4, 2018). Yet the diaspora of each state of origin differs in its effectiveness in international law and international relations; states that take great powers as their example may neglect their own diasporas, on the mistaken assumption that diaspora importance is a function of numbers rather than of quality and impact.

Fiona McConnell and Elaine Ho are among the few authors who conceptualize diaspora diplomacy comprehensively and explain how it contributes to debates about the changing role of the state by highlighting the complex ways in which diasporas engage, and are engaged by, state, non-state, and international actors (Ho and McConnell 2019). In their account, a diaspora functions as a primary diplomatic agent through political representation and territoriality: it engages in high-level negotiations, interacts strategically with host societies, and projects the national identity of the country of origin, mobilizing lobbying efforts aimed at state actors and international organizations. The International Diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA), operating under the US Department of State's Office of Global Partnerships, illustrates this multifaceted quality by facilitating transnational networking among the Armenian, Greek, and Ukrainian diasporas (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Ho and McConnell ultimately posit that diaspora diplomacy is synthesized through the functional pillars of advocacy, mediation, representation, and communication (see also Tomiczek 2011).

Reframing Diaspora Diplomacy: The 'Sub-Main Actor' Conceptualization

Eytan Gilboa conceptualizes the institutionalization of diaspora diplomacy as the strategic use of foreign ministries and state apparatuses to cultivate a systematic relationship among the state of origin, diaspora communities, and domestic and

international interest groups, and crucially treats the diaspora as an autonomous actor rather than a mere instrument of the state (Gilboa 2022). Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth build a theoretical bridge between liberal and constructivist traditions, using the terms 'homeland' and 'hostland' (Shain and Barth 2003); this article instead uses 'root state' and 'host state' to describe the actor-based relation between state and diaspora. A second, largely separate body of work has specified how diaspora agency actually operates: Fiona Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou argue that incorporating diasporas into IR requires remapping the boundaries of state and national identity rather than adding one more non-state actor to an existing list (Adamson and Demetriou 2007); Francesco Ragazzi, and Alexandra Délano and Alan Gamlen, map the policy repertoires through which states classify, court, and discipline populations abroad (Ragazzi 2014; Délano and Gamlen 2014), while Alan Gamlen explains why dedicated diaspora institutions proliferated across the international system within a single generation (Gamlen 2019). Alonso and Mylonas disaggregates the diaspora and unpacks the state, showing that mobilization is driven by specific organizations and entrepreneurs rather than by populations (Alonso and Mylonas 2019); Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas establish migration diplomacy as a distinct arena of interstate bargaining over mobile populations (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019), and Adamson and Enze Han link diasporic geopolitics to the strategies of rising powers (Adamson and Han 2024). Together these works establish that diaspora actors can possess agency without the legal standing of states, and that such agency is organizationally specific, policy-specific, and reversible.

The contribution claimed here is narrower than a new field and more specific than a new label. The literature above explains a great deal about what states do to their populations abroad and about why particular organizations mobilize, but it does not specify the conjunction of conditions under which an organization becomes a recognized intermediary within one bilateral relationship—nor, equally important, the conditions under which it ceases to be one. Diaspora governance accounts for state repertoires without predicting organizational outcomes; migration diplomacy accounts for bargaining between states in which populations are the currency rather than the agent; transnational advocacy accounts for mobilization without requiring a root-state counterpart at all. TOP addresses this residual question: given a threat perception held by a named state, a credible institutional offer, and an organization with policy-relevant capacity, when does repeated and recognized participation follow, and when does it collapse? The answer is stated as falsifiable conditions applied to a single organization–policy–dyad, and the model should be judged by whether those conditions travel across dyads, not by whether the term 'diaspora diplomacy' is novel.

This study also places the diaspora within neoclassical realism as a relative-power element of the state and situates the concept within a more explicit legal framework for its institutionalization, distinguishing the diaspora from migrant, refugee, and asylum seeker without situating it between constructivist and liberal frameworks alone. By placing the diaspora within neoclassical realist theory as a relative power, it separates the limits of relative-power capacity from those of main actors by defining sub-main actors: rather than a fully independent entity, the diaspora is a 'sub-main actor' - a semi-dependent, semi-independent ontological category that diverges from the frameworks established by McConnell, Gilboa, and Shain. Three distinctions follow. Interdependent autonomy: the diaspora may exhibit autonomous agency over time, but its very definition is predicated on the identity bonds forged within the primary national context. The citizenship nexus: citizenship is the primary legal and psychological anchor of this bond, and the efficacy of transnational citizenship ties, coupled with identity consciousness, distinguishes the diaspora from conventional non-state actors. Structural permeability: unlike corporations or NGOs, a diaspora is fluid and permeable, retaining the potential to evolve into the primary social and political structure of a state over time—a capacity for national representation that other non-state actors lack.

The second section of this study establishes foundational definitions of diplomacy, foreign policy, and law; the third traces the evolution of the diaspora concept to resolve existing conceptual ambiguities; the fourth constructs a theoretical framework for diaspora diplomacy in which 'diaspora' is redefined within this specific diplomatic context; the fifth introduces the Diaspora Diplomacy Triangle Model in detail; the sixth applies the model through case studies of the Indian, Jewish, and Kurdish diasporas; and the seventh evaluates these cases and sets out assessments intended to guide future inquiry.

THE AMBIGUITY OF THE CONCEPT OF DIASPORA IN OFFICIAL DISCOURSE WITH DIPLOMACY

Etymologically, 'diplomacy' derives from the Greek *diploma*, a document of two joined metal plates once used as formal travel authorization—an origin that underscores the foundational role of formalized communication and official certification in diplomatic practice. The Oxford English Dictionary defines diplomacy as the management of international relations through negotiation and the adjustment of relations by ambassadors, and as the strategic, non-violent administration of international relations by state-mandated and accredited officials (Oxford English Dictionary, n.d.). For Harold Nicolson, diplomacy should describe the art of negotiation in international relations specifically, not foreign policy or international law as such (Nicolson 2001; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995): the negotiation in question is, of course, negotiation on a political issue. Diplomacy and foreign policy are accordingly distinct. Foreign policy encompasses the whole of a state's political action, reflex, and accumulated experience beyond its borders; diplomacy is the narrower component that establishes communication networks and mediates the implementation of that policy.

While diplomacy was long an exclusive component of the Westphalian nation-state, maturing alongside the institutionalization of modern foreign ministries, this state-centric monopoly is no longer sustainable in the globalized era. Diplomatic influence is increasingly exerted through decentralized institutions operating beyond traditional ministerial hierarchies, and defining diplomacy strictly as a state-conducted instrument executed solely by official envoys would produce an analytical reductionism that neglects the broader narrative of global diplomacy. Nicolson's 'art of negotiation' offers a broad framework, but it excludes actor-based relationships and diplomacy conducted through indirect interaction. Rather than distinguishing high from low politics, it is more useful to characterize international politics as expressible or inexpressible: negotiation cannot occur over what cannot be articulated, and creating a strong agenda within a limited time frame is what transforms a policy into diplomatic material—including through diaspora diplomacy. It is within this widened field that diaspora diplomacy develops as an actor and field of action operating at many levels of analysis.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND FOR DIASPORA

Diaspora has an ancient history and is treated with considerable variability across communities. The concept is said to date to the third century BC, appearing in the Septuagint's Greek translation of the Hebrew scriptures in place of *galout* (exile) and *golah* (exiles) (Dufoix 2022); other accounts trace its conceptual emergence to the sixth century BC and the Babylonian captivity of the Jewish population (Baumann 2000). Rogers Brubaker, surveying diaspora studies in 2005, found that a term appearing once or twice a year in dissertation research in the 1970s appeared thirteen times in the 1980s and 130 times in 2001, and objected that too many issues were being thrown into the category—what he called the 'diaspora' diaspora (Brubaker 2005). The multiplicity of definitions has hindered the differentiation of diaspora from adjacent concepts; in migration studies it has sometimes simply been treated as a category of migrant. Yet what distinguishes diasporas from national minorities and migrant communities (Macartney 1934) is the drive to preserve cultural characteristics together with high cohesion, effective organizational forms, social protection of members, and active self-organization. In Africa the term has additionally been applied to merchant diasporas and, more problematically, to ghettoized units such as criminal organizations or Roma communities—a proliferation that makes it necessary to establish criteria that keep the concept bounded.

Khachig Tölölyan, writing on the Armenian diaspora, separates dispersion from diaspora entirely: diaspora is only one type of dispersion, not the equivalent of complete disintegration or emigration, and researchers must first know a diaspora's people well—how they earn a living, organize social life, and participate in public and political life—before applying diaspora theory to them (Tölölyan 2012). The classical definition in diaspora studies, formulated by William Safran, holds that diasporas are dispersed from one country to two or more regions; preserve a collective memory, vision, and myth of the homeland; feel alienated because they believe they are not, or cannot be, fully accepted by the host society; expect or believe they ought eventually to return; hold a collective commitment to the homeland's security and well-being; and maintain contact with it, directly or indirectly (Safran 1991). Because the Jewish diaspora was the first to which these criteria were applied, Safran's terms became a dominant, monopolistic paradigm around a single defining nation. James Clifford rejected the Jewish case as a definitive model and admitted looser diaspora forms encompassing residence and mobility alike, holding that a symbolic homeland need not be fictionalized (Clifford 1994); Robin Cohen, reading Clifford critically, argued that Clifford's looser

definition brings diaspora too close to the category of migrant, and that the most essential features of a diaspora are instead a common culture, an identity consciousness, and a self-identity, alongside traumatic or purposive dispersal, collective memory and loyalty, and a distinctive creative life in tolerant host societies (Cohen 1996, 2001, 2007). Gabriel Sheffer defines diasporas within a still broader frame—Vietnamese and Koreans in Los Angeles, Palestinians in refugee camps, Turks in Berlin, Jews, Kurds, Greeks, Roma, Armenians, and more—united by a fundamentally strong homeland connection despite varying degrees of host-society integration (Sheffer 2003), while Michele Reis distinguishes classical from modern diasporas and holds that modern diasporas need not be formed by crisis; they may equally be formed by the opportunities of globalization (Reis 2004).

Realist, historical, and post-modernist interpretations have thus all been advanced to identify diasporas—essential steps toward establishing the diaspora as a diplomatic actor, but ones that leave unresolved the ambiguity of defining it as an instrument of diplomacy positioned within international relations and international law: a category stretched to cover ever more cases loses the attributes that allow it to discriminate among them (Sartori 1970; Collier and Mahon 1993; Goertz 2006). What runs through these accounts is a shared identity consciousness located outside the country's borders. The most appropriate definition of a diaspora for the analysis of diaspora diplomacy is therefore a transnational community of citizens who have a more or less common identity consciousness. It is their status as citizens—not the intensity of that identity consciousness alone—that allows transnational citizens to be treated as a relative element in international law, a relative power in foreign policy, and a sub-main actor in international relations.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND TOP MODEL

If diaspora diplomacy is defined through international relations and international law, it can find ground in official discourse. Read within neoclassical realist theory, the diaspora emerges as a relative-power element of states. The commitment to neoclassical realism here is specific rather than decorative. In the formulation of Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, systemic pressure reaches foreign policy only after passing through intervening variables located at the unit level: leader images, strategic culture, state–society relations, and domestic institutions (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009). The diaspora enters this scheme at the third of these variables. It is neither a systemic pressure nor a decision-maker, but part of the state–society relationship through which external pressure is translated into policy—which is precisely what the term sub-main actor is intended to capture, and why the diaspora cannot be treated as an independent variable in its own right. Diasporas without a state are therefore not included in the model built here for sustainable diaspora diplomacy: every diaspora is a relative power that can come to the fore through its subnational and transnational roles in the relationship between two states—a transnational relative power for the root state, and a subnational relative power for the host state.

Evaluated in terms of international law, however, the concept remains an area of great debate, and one of the biggest problems is the absence of an established concept for diaspora units in international relations. Concepts such as migrant, asylum seeker, and refugee have equivalents in international legal texts—Article 61 of Türkiye's Law on Foreigners and International Protection, for instance, defines a refugee through a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion (Law on Foreigners and International Protection, No. 6458, 2013) - but diaspora does not, because of its positioning within political discourse: associations with genocide claims, or with the depiction of diasporas as clandestine organizations, tend to reduce the use of the term in official discourse. Positioning diaspora diplomacy within international law, and countering that negative association, is precisely what the definition of a transnational citizen community with a common identity consciousness is meant to achieve. Under the principle of reciprocity, the mutual expansion or contraction of citizens' rights and gains can give the two states transnational and subnational areas of diplomatic expansion at the point of contact between the home and diasporic societies—a step toward the sustainability of diaspora diplomacy.

Two further concerns motivate treating diaspora diplomacy analytically rather than folding it into an existing category. First, when the state does not formally address diaspora diplomacy, this creates an opportunity for outside groups to influence

transnational citizens beyond the state's control; positive integration of the diaspora through the state of origin is therefore essential to minimizing foreign-policy threats. Second, framing diaspora diplomacy solely within public diplomacy risks denying the diaspora's active diplomatic role, since public diplomacy is a one-way, statist practice conducted through local NGOs and aimed at an entire foreign citizenry, whereas the diaspora is not only a soft power but sometimes a smart power—the combined use of soft and hard power. The diaspora is best understood as a sub-main actor precisely because it is transnational for the state of origin and subnational for the state of residence: it can bring transnational policies down to the national level, raise subnational policies to the national level, and draw a harmonious zigzag between the two by tightening the loosening springs when necessary. Absent this role, either threat diasporas or unilaterally instrumentalized and marginalized diasporas emerge, and diplomacy becomes correspondingly inefficient. Public diplomacy nonetheless significantly augments diaspora diplomacy by facilitating soft-power projection, generating strategic discourse, and mobilizing civic political agency; the two remain conceptually distinct, and diaspora diplomacy additionally requires a multilateral approach because its actors exist simultaneously within national, transnational, and subnational structures that defy monopolistic state scrutiny.

Diasporic consciousness—the identity consciousness formed between a diaspora's relationship with the state of origin and the state of residence—may register as a security threat in the state of origin or as a positive orientation within it. To sustain diaspora diplomacy through a sub-main actor, this consciousness must become transnational in relation to the state of origin and subnational in relation to the state of residence; a coherent consciousness of this kind is what prevents diasporas from becoming entrenched or from acting as a hegemonic force within society, and its most vital ground is citizenship consciousness, because citizenship most strongly translates a common identity into official discourse in both transnational and subnational settings. The Jewish diaspora, for example, has built one of the most comprehensive diasporic networks and consciousnesses among world diasporas, with a cohesion as a religious, historical, and national community that gives it a voice readily convertible into diplomatic material—illustrating how the strength of a diaspora depends partly on the grounds on which its shared identity consciousness rests.

Reciprocity in Diaspora Diplomacy

Reciprocity is recognized as an essential principle of international law, with an explicit or implicit place in the law of treaties, human rights law, the law of armed conflict, refugee law, and diplomatic law; states may in principle suspend or cancel the terms of an agreement in the event of a breach by the other party. Its association with diaspora diplomacy stems from the scale at which reciprocity determines the interaction between citizens at the point where inter-state agreements are cancelled or suspended: diasporas instrumentalized within this determination can more easily perceive and make sense of the policies they encounter, and can realize gains in rights alongside the citizens of the society they have joined. Reciprocity thus reveals how closely and dependently the rights and gains of transnational citizens are harmonized, at the end of adaptation, with those of the citizens of the new society. For the principle to be fully applied to diaspora diplomacy, it must operate through full international cooperation and equivalence in the joint agreements and practices that secure mutual citizen gains; the degree to which it does so reveals the clarity of the mutual-harmonization process and whether sustainable diaspora diplomacy is possible.

DIASPORA DIPLOMACY MODEL (TOP MODEL – THE DIASPORA DIPLOMACY TRIANGLE)

[Figure 1 near here]

Figure 1 presents the Diaspora Diplomacy Triangle discussed in this section. Stateless diasporas are not defined as diasporas suitable for sustainable diaspora diplomacy in this model, because such a diaspora is not yet capable of sustaining it and can only contribute to the population situated between host and root states; the capacity to exist as a sub-main actor is valid only where the diaspora has a state. In the triangle, states are the main actors in international relations and law. The red arrows indicate the policies of the root state—the state of origin of the citizens who constitute the root nation, such as Türkiye and the Turks, used here as the dominant national category that reveals a diasporic structure rather than as a racist discourse.

The diaspora is the community of citizens living outside the borders of the state of origin—transnational for the state of origin, subnational for the host state—that endeavours to preserve or carry its dominant identity in some way, and that plays the role of a sub-main actor in international relations. The host state directs its policies first to the host nation, the nation in contact with the diaspora, and the policies transmitted from the host society to the diaspora are what carry diplomatic value.

The diaspora thus becomes a structure situated between the policies of the two states. At the pointed end of the triangle is the Threat stage—a diaspora that is highly ideologized, marginalized, or uncontrolled, sometimes organized in gangs, ghettoized areas, or, in the most extreme cases, terrorist organizations, and kept at a distance because it is considered incapable of integration. The Offer stage is the second stage: both states make proposals to the diaspora—a labour contract, a long-term agreement to live under certain conditions, or an orientation determining the scale of participation in public and social life—that gauge the degree of consent to live in that society. The simultaneous emergence of multiple, non-consensual subcultural or class-specific publics within the same communication structures can diplomatically produce radicalization or exclusion at this stage; avoiding a relapse into Threat requires that diasporas move quickly and coherently from Offer toward Practice.

Diaspora units that pass the Offer stage move to Practice; if they cannot reach agreement there, they return to Threat. Practice is the stage at which the diaspora comes closest to the line between root and host state, to the extent that its role can be applied and implemented in policy, and through which diaspora diplomacy can be fully and harmoniously realized. The dependent variable is institutionalized diaspora practice, present when three criteria are jointly observed: (1) repeated participation rather than a single event; (2) recognition or access supplied by relevant state institutions; and (3) a demonstrable connection to a bilateral policy process. If (4) reciprocity is sufficiently observed, sustainable diaspora diplomacy can be said to exist. Table 1 summarizes these operational definitions.

Table 1
Operational Definitions of TOP Model

Condition	Actor whose conduct is coded	Observable indicators	Threshold	Expected implication
Threat	Root- or host-state institution	Official security framing; legal restriction; exclusion from consultation; surveillance or proscription directed at a named organization or category	At least one documented state measure or recurrent official framing that materially limits legitimate access	Raises the cost of engagement and reduces recognized intermediation; may coexist with informal mobilization
Offer	Root- or host-state institution	Citizenship or visa scheme; consultative body; grant; formal dialogue; electoral or administrative access; invitation to contribute expertise	Opportunity is public or documented, accessible to the relevant actor, and linked to a defined policy field	Creates a channel but does not guarantee uptake, representation, or influence
Practice	Diaspora organization and relevant state institutions	Repeated meetings; recognized advisory role; mediation; sustained advocacy tied to bilateral decision processes; implementation partnership	Evidence of recurrence, state recognition, and linkage to a bilateral policy process	Constitutes institutionalized intermediation, subject to reversal
Adaptation	Organization and state counterparts	Organizational learning; broadened coalition; compliance with changing rules; policy reframing	Adjustment sustains access across a meaningful political change	Stabilizes practice; not a fourth stage
Reciprocal benefit	State counterparts and organization	Each diaspora organization obtains a policy-relevant benefit, even if unequal	Benefits are identified separately and supported by evidence	Sustainable diaspora diplomacy

[Table near here]

The unit of analysis is the organization–policy–dyad. The relevant unit is not 'the Indian or Kurdish diaspora' in general, but a specified Indian-American or Kurdish-rooted organization or coalition acting on a defined issue in a bilateral relationship during a bounded period—a unit that permits within-diaspora variation and prevents the conduct of one actor from being generalized to millions of people. Threat, Offer, and Practice may coexist: a state can restrict one organization while consulting another, or offer cultural rights while securitizing a separate policy field, and a single organization can enjoy routine access on one issue while facing exclusion on another. TOP is therefore not a teleological sequence, and does not assume that every case begins with Threat, moves through Offer, and ends in Practice; arrows are reversible, and Offer can be bypassed where pre-existing institutions already supply access. The model combines a state-centred account of constraints with organizational agency: neoclassical realism is retained only as a partial bridge between external pressure and state response, and this formulation remains compatible with constructivist insights about identity and framing and with liberal accounts of domestic access.

How Diaspora Diplomacy Differs from Similar Fields

TOP does not claim that diaspora diplomacy is a wholly new field; its narrower contribution is to explain variation in the institutionalization of intermediary practice, against six adjacent perspectives each of which is stronger than TOP on its own terrain. Diaspora governance examines how states classify, court, protect, or discipline populations abroad but is not designed to predict which organization obtains recognition within a given dyad (Ragazzi 2014; Gamlen 2019). Transnational relations and transnational advocacy explain how non-state actors reach across borders and when domestic structures allow their claims to register, without requiring a root state as a party (Risse-Kappen 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Ethnic-interest-group and lobbying research focuses on influence within a host state (Shain 1994, 2007) and has produced a long argument over whether such influence is decisive at all (cf. Mearsheimer and Walt 2007). Kin-state scholarship examines states that claim populations beyond their borders as co-nationals (Waterbury 2010); paradiplomacy studies external action by sub-state governments, which possess a territorial jurisdiction diaspora organizations lack; and public diplomacy examines efforts to communicate with foreign publics (Rana 2013). Table 2 positions the TOP model against these six adjacent approaches.

Table 2
Positioning the TOP Model Related to Similar Approaches

Approach	Primary actor ontology	Relationship to states	Typical mechanism	Observable outcome	TOP's additional question
Diaspora politics	Heterogeneous organizations and networks	Autonomous, allied, contested, or regulated	Mobilization around identity, resources, or claims	Participation, remittances, lobbying, conflict support	When does participation become recognized bilateral intermediation?
Diaspora governance	Root- and host-state institutions	Diaspora as governed population, constituency, or partner	Citizenship, outreach, welfare, surveillance, incentives	Engagement or control infrastructure	Do state offers create accessible opportunities for specific organizations?
Transnationalism	Cross-border social fields and networks	State boundaries are crossed but remain consequential	Repeated movement of people, ideas, money, and practices	Durable transnational ties	When are ties converted into a policy role in a state dyad?
Ethnic lobbying	Interest groups in a host polity	Access through domestic institutions	Elections, advocacy, expertise, coalition-building	Host-state policy influence	Is the activity connected to and recognized within a bilateral process?
Public diplomacy	State and non-state communicators	Often state-led or state-supported	Communication, attraction, network-building	Reputation, audience engagement	Does communication generate repeated intermediary practice?
TOP model	Organization–policy–dyad	Conditional intermediary between state counterparts	Perception, opportunity, mobilization, access, recognition	Institutionalized and reversible diplomatic practice	Which configurations produce, stabilize, or disrupt intermediation?

[Table 2 near here]

What none of these addresses is the conjunction. Each isolates one vertex: the state's repertoire, the organization's mobilization, or the host state's openness. TOP specifies how a state-authored threat perception, an institutional opportunity, an organization's capacity, and interest overlap between two state counterparts combine—and, through Proposition 3, how that combination decomposes. Three consequences follow. First, the unit here is deliberately smaller than in the literatures above: not a state's diaspora policy or a population, but one organization acting on one policy within one dyad, which permits organizations connected to the same population to occupy different conditions simultaneously. Second, TOP predicts reversal as readily as consolidation, whereas the governance and advocacy literatures, oriented toward explaining engagement's emergence, rarely specify the conditions of its withdrawal. Third, the framework requires both state counterparts to be present in the explanation; accounts built on host-state opportunity structures alone can describe successful lobbying without ever asking whether the root state recognized the same actor.

In diaspora diplomacy, the agency of a diaspora organization is conditional, and the organization functions as a sub-main actor because its agency varies across policies, periods, and institutional settings; it is an intermediary when it carries information, preferences, resources, or access between relevant actors in the root and host states, a role that can coexist with advocacy or opposition and does not imply neutrality. Four distinctions follow: a diaspora population is not equivalent to a diaspora organization; a diaspora organization is not necessarily a lobbying organization; a lobbying organization is not automatically representative of a diaspora; and an armed organization, a civic association, a professional network, and a state

agency must not be treated as interchangeable merely because they invoke the same identity. TOP claims apply only when the actor and the policy field are specified.

Falsifications and Propositions about the Theory

Three rival explanations must be considered. Geopolitical alignment may independently produce the observed organization–policy–dyad outcome, with diaspora activity merely accompanying it; domestic party competition, electoral geography, or institutional openness may explain access without reference to a triangular relationship; and economic interdependence or state capacity may produce cooperation regardless of diaspora mobilization. Evidence for diaspora intermediation therefore requires process evidence connecting organizational action to a channel, deliberation, or implementation—not simply temporal correlation with a policy outcome (Bennett and Checkel 2015).

Proposition 1

(Access): the greater the institutional openness of the host state and the root state toward a specified organization, the more likely that a credible offer will be converted into repeated practice.

Proposition 2

(Capacity and legitimacy): organizational resources increase the probability of practice only when the organization possesses policy-relevant expertise, coalition capacity, and sufficient legitimacy among officials and at least part of the constituency it claims to represent.

Proposition 3

(Interest overlap): practice is more likely to endure when the organization's policy objective overlaps with interests recognized by both state counterparts; where overlap exists with only one state, advocacy may persist but the TOP process remains fragile.

The framework would be weakened if diaspora organizations repeatedly achieved institutionalized and sustainable practice despite persistent exclusion by both state counterparts and in the absence of alternative access channels; if generous and accessible offers routinely produced practice without organizational capacity; or if practice endured across major changes in access and interest overlap without adaptation. Such observations would indicate that TOP's proposed conditions are unnecessary or poorly specified.

Neutrality and Scope of Theory

TOP applies most directly where two recognized states and identifiable diaspora organizations exist; it is less directly applicable to stateless diasporas, contested states (Koinova 2021), diffuse cultural networks, purely humanitarian associations, or clandestine actors, which are not thereby excluded from diaspora studies but may simply lack one vertex of the triangular mechanism. The framework makes no normative assumption that practice is peaceful, democratic, representative, or beneficial; these qualities require separate evaluation. 'Threat' is coded as a perception or policy of a named state actor, never as an inherent characteristic of a community—this is securitization in the sense developed by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998): analytically, a threat exists when an authorized actor successfully frames an issue as existential, not when a community possesses some intrinsic property. Coding threat as the act of a named state actor is therefore a methodological commitment, and it is what allows the same framework to describe securitizing and desecuritizing moves without endorsing either; researchers must accordingly distinguish civic organizations from armed groups, and official claims from independently verified conduct.

RESEARCH DESIGN, PURPOSE AND CASE SELECTION

A seminal RAND Corporation study from the early 2000s found that the end of the Cold War brought a significant decline in direct state sponsorship for insurgent movements, making diasporas a critical structural variable in the financial and political sustainment of such conflicts—underscoring the diaspora's capacity to function as a sub-main actor filling the power vacuum

left by traditional state actors (RAND Corporation 2001). This is a theory-building study using a structured, focused comparison; it does not offer a comprehensive historical account or a definitive test of diaspora influence. The three illustrations were selected for variation on conditions central to TOP: the existence of an internationally recognized root state, the degree of institutional access in the host state, organizational plurality, and the continuity of practice (Seawright and Gerring 2008; Koinova and Tsourapas 2018). Indian-American and Jewish-American organizations represent relatively favourable settings for institutional access, although neither community is unitary. The Kurdish illustration is a difficult, boundary case, because the population is stateless, organizationally heterogeneous, and connected to multiple host states and origin jurisdictions; the comparison is intentionally asymmetrical in this respect, and the analysis uses the Kurdish case to identify a scope condition rather than concealing the problem. 'Case' below therefore means an illustrative configuration, not an exhaustive representation of a population. The analysis synthesizes peer-reviewed diaspora scholarship, major monographs, and selected institutional and legal documents; because the source base is largely secondary, the cases illustrate plausibility and refine concepts rather than establish causal effects, and the seven questions below are formulated so that they can subsequently be converted into explicit process-tracing tests (Bennett and Checkel 2015):

1. What is the organization–policy–dyad and time frame?
2. Which state actor, if any, articulated a threat perception or imposed a restriction?
3. What credible offer or access channel existed?
4. Which organization mobilized, and what resources or claims did it deploy?
5. What repeated and recognized practice can be observed?
6. Which geopolitical, economic, or domestic-political alternative explanations compete with a diaspora-centred account?
7. What counter-evidence or within-group variation limits the inference?

Ethical Reflexivity

The selected cases concern contested identities and security narratives. Analytical categories can reproduce official securitization when state descriptions are reported as objective facts. The study therefore attributes perceptions to specific actors, avoids collective labels as explanations, and does not infer the views of a population from a prominent organization. Comparing unequal cases also creates a risk of treating statehood or institutional access as a normative measure of political maturity; state recognition is used here only as a scope condition for triangular diplomacy, not as a judgment about the legitimacy of stateless claims.

Case I: The Kurdish-Based Diaspora Organization (Threat, Offer, Practice)

The relationship between a root state and its diaspora is rarely static, and Türkiye's own diaspora policy has produced and hardened divisions within the population it addresses, so that organizations invoking the same origin may occupy different conditions at the same moment (Adamson 2019; Aksel 2019). Using the Turkish-Kurdish context, one can observe a dynamic, zigzag pattern across three phases. Threat: certain diaspora elements—terror-affiliated structures in Europe, for instance—are identified by the state as direct security threats because of ideological separatism (Adamson 2020). Offer: during periods such as the 'Resolution Process,' the state extends a strategic offer of cooperation intended to move the diaspora from an antagonistic stance to a participatory one. Practice: when threat perceptions diminish, these groups gain practical political representation, such as forming political parties and entering parliament; but if Practice collapses, the dynamic reverts to Offer or Threat in a new iteration.

To move beyond this volatile cycle toward sustainable diaspora diplomacy, the model identifies Adaptation as a stabilizing condition, achieved through institutionalization—moving from a security-based lens to a legal-political framework in which the state provides tangible benefits to its diaspora citizens on a firm legal foundation of reciprocity. In the Kurdish case, the relevant offers include the right to speak Kurdish, education in the mother tongue, legal protections, and economic incentives; the model's expectation is that sustainable diaspora diplomacy becomes more likely when Practice is stabilized through

Adaptation and underpinned by a legal reciprocity framework that treats the diaspora as a strategic asset rather than a security variable—an expectation that the present illustration can suggest but not test.

In practice, however, the Kurdish case did not develop into a successful phase of diaspora diplomacy in Türkiye: Practice was insufficient, and the institutionalized Offer phase gave way to a reversion toward Threat as armed attacks continued and Türkiye abandoned the resolution process. The case therefore resembles transnational advocacy or conflict-related diaspora politics more than institutionalized diaspora diplomacy, and mobilization directed against the root state rather than mediated through it falls outside the triangular mechanism by design. Kurdish-rooted and Turkish-rooted associations in Germany and Sweden have in fact maintained distinct channels to host-state institutions and homeland actors for decades (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Baser 2015), which is why the case must be read as within-diaspora variation rather than as the conduct of a single actor. European-Turkish relations are additionally shaped by migration governance, security cooperation, EU institutions, domestic party politics, and regional conflict—factors that can generate both access and restriction independently of diaspora organizations.

Case II: The Jewish Diaspora in the United States (Threat, Offer, Practice)

The relevant unit is not 'the Jewish diaspora' as a unified subject but specific Jewish-American civic, advocacy, religious, philanthropic, and policy organizations operating within the Israel–US dyad after 1948; organizations differ over Israeli governments, territorial policy, conflict, partisanship, and the appropriate relationship between American Jewish identity and Israel (Waxman 2016; Sasson 2014). Historical antisemitism, immigration restriction, and exclusion are essential context, but cannot be converted into a single TOP stage stretching from nineteenth-century migration to contemporary diplomacy; threat coding requires a bounded actor and an official measure, and the Balfour Declaration concerned British policy before Israel's establishment, so it cannot serve as evidence of an American offer within the later dyad. The pluralist institutions of the United States provide advocacy organizations with electoral, associational, and legislative access, and Israel has developed institutional relationships with parts of the Jewish diaspora; these opportunities support mobilization without implying that any one organization represents all Jewish Americans, since resources, expertise, coalition-building, and networks vary considerably among organizations.

Repeated contact among organizations, legislators, executive agencies, and Israeli institutions is consistent with institutionalized practice for specific actors, but it would be analytically inappropriate to infer that a unitary 'Jewish lobby' decisively causes US policy (cf. Mearsheimer and Walt 2007): US-Israel relations are also shaped by strategic alignment, executive preferences, Congress, party competition, public opinion, evangelical Christian mobilization, defence cooperation, regional security, and bureaucratic politics, and the extensively documented internal argument among American Jewish organizations over Israeli policy is itself the strongest available counter-evidence to any account treating the community as a single actor (Waxman 2016). TOP's claim in this case is narrower: some organizations have achieved durable access and join recurrently in policy communication within the dyad, while whether they alter a particular decision requires issue-specific process tracing. This case supports the concept of Practice but also shows that institutionalization and policy control are distinct outcomes.

Case III: The Indian Diaspora in the United Kingdom and the United States (Threat, Offer, Practice)

The Threat stage of the Indian diaspora was situated primarily in the mid-twentieth century, when these transnational populations were conceptualized either as a strategic loss or as a latent threat to the root state; from the perspective of the host state, particularly the United Kingdom, the diaspora was marginalized as a 'foreign other.' Between 1960 and 1980 the migration of a highly educated demographic produced a brain-drain crisis, and the Indian government often perceived emigration as a loss of human capital or even national disloyalty. As migration increased, India's soft power grew more stable, and the expansion of the Indian diaspora into the Gulf states, Singapore, the US, and the UK gradually transformed it into an instrument of that soft power (Mohan 2003).

India's regional preoccupations with China, Pakistan, and the great powers long led it to neglect the diaspora's strategic potential, delaying the move to the Offer stage. The 1991 economic liberalization reforms catalyzed a shift from Threat toward a strategic Offer, even though the Indian diaspora in the United States records an overall assimilation-index score lower than the average of contemporary immigrant cohorts, combining strong economic assimilation with pronounced cultural divergence (Vigdor 2008); strategic policy accordingly shifted toward economic and technological synergy over cultural homogenization. To leverage the diaspora's financial and intellectual capital, the Indian government institutionalized the Person of Indian Origin (PIO) and Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) statuses (Kapur 2010; Chakravorty, Kapur, and Singh 2017): a reciprocity-based incentive structure in which the diaspora received private property rights and visa-free entry in exchange for the repatriation of technology and capital, while its growing socio-economic weight in hubs such as Silicon Valley reinforced its credibility as a high-value interlocutor for both states.

In Practice, the Indian diaspora has become a pivotal sub-main actor facilitating bilateral diplomatic channels: mobilized through institutions such as the US-India Business Council, it has lobbied actively on issues including the US–India civil nuclear agreement. Two mechanisms should be distinguished. The first is material—diaspora networks measurably shape cross-border investment, giving the Offer stage's reciprocity structure an observable payoff (Leblang 2010; Bermeo and Leblang 2015). The second is strategic—the reorientation of Indian foreign policy over the past decade has made diaspora engagement an explicit instrument of statecraft (Hall 2019). Diaspora organizations have also publicly supported several of India's foreign-policy objectives, including its bid for permanent UN Security Council membership, and the Congressional Caucus on India, founded in 1993, functions as one further diasporic power tool; the presence of this transnational community is plausibly one of the factors US policymakers weigh in bilateral relations, alongside strategic and economic considerations. Among the three illustrations, this case comes closest to sustainable diaspora diplomacy, in which the diaspora functions not merely as a population but as a channel of strategic projection; however, the available secondary evidence does not allow the diaspora's contribution to be separated from the broader US–India strategic convergence. Table 3 summarizes the three cases against the TOP model's conditions.

Table 3
Comparative Analysis of Diaspora Cases via the TOP Model

Configuration	Threat/restriction	Offer/opportunity	Evidence of practice	Principal rival explanation	Inference
Indian-American organizations, India–US policy	Earlier developmental ambivalence; limited evidence of organization-specific security restriction	Post-1991 engagement, PIO/OCI, business and policy channels	Recurrent consultation and advocacy in selected economic/strategic issues	Strategic convergence, economic growth, executive policy	In Offer–Practice stage
Jewish-American organizations, Israel–US policy	Historical exclusion is context; must be bounded by actor and period	Open associational/legislative channels and institutional ties with Israel	Durable access and recurrent policy advocacy by multiple, competing organizations	Alliance politics, parties, public opinion, security and bureaucratic interests	Institutionalized Practice stage
Selected Kurdish organizations, European–Turkish policy	Organization-specific security framing and legal restriction coexist with lawful civic activity	Host-state participation channels; limited evidence of a bilateral diaspora-specific offer	Advocacy and access exist, but triangular recognition is uneven	EU–Türkiye relations, migration, security, regional conflict, domestic politics	In Threat–Offer stage

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new datasets were generated or analysed during the current study. This is a conceptual and comparative theoretical study that draws exclusively on previously published, publicly available secondary sources (peer-reviewed literature and government and institutional documents), all of which are cited in the reference list.

[Table 3 near here]

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Diaspora Diplomacy Triangle treats the diaspora as a dynamic zigzag that creates a public sphere and an international political space between two states, and as a relative-power element within neoclassical realist theory, while still holding that states remain the leading actors in international relations. Identifying the policy instruments of diasporas that have reached the Practice stage makes it possible to trace the transnational citizen presence of the state of origin within the state of residence across cultural, economic, military, and migration domains, and separate bilateral case studies can map how reciprocity strengthens sustainable diaspora diplomacy in practice.

As the cases show, the root state appears to play an important role. The Jewish and Indian diasporas' transition to Practice was facilitated by Israel's and India's engagement, respectively, in Offer phases with their host countries, helping to turn a population-based entity into a functional channel of diplomacy: Jewish organizations affected Israeli interests directly, while Indian diaspora success and Indian government projects raised the diaspora's prestige and opened strategic-cooperation channels. In the Kurdish case, by contrast, the absence of a Kurdish state and episodes of armed separatism produced a zigzag between Threat and Offer; by the time Practice was reached, a security-centric perception within the root state constrained the diaspora's ability to act as a cohesive sub-actor. In these illustrations, a diaspora's transition to Practice appears to depend on its capacity to maintain consensual engagement with both host and root states, which in turn opens the way to Adaptation—a capacity that, in the Kurdish illustration, was limited by persistent, unresolved threat perceptions in the root state. These are interpretive readings of secondary evidence rather than causal findings.

This study contributes to the emerging field of diaspora diplomacy by using case analysis to examine the evolutionary stages, structural models, and diplomatic orientations inherent in state-diaspora relations, conceptualizing the diaspora as a sub-state actor and relative force in foreign policy, and proposing a theoretical framework in which sustainability is expected to depend on the strategic integration of reciprocity and adaptation mechanisms. It asked when diaspora organizations become institutionalized diplomatic intermediaries between a root state and a host state, and answered at the level of an organization–policy–dyad: Threat is a documented state perception or restriction, Offer a credible and accessible policy opportunity, and Practice repeated, recognized participation connected to a bilateral process. The conditions are non-teleological, may coexist, and are reversible; Adaptation and reciprocal benefit stabilize practice rather than constitute a later stage. An organization that lobbies is not necessarily representative, access does not prove influence, and a policy outcome cannot be attributed to diaspora action without process evidence—distinctions that enable comparison while avoiding collective and security-centred generalizations.

The structured illustrations provide qualified support for the framework. Indian-American and Jewish-American organizations show how policy expertise, pluralist access, and state recognition can support recurrent practice, while powerful geopolitical and domestic explanations caution against claims of decisive diaspora control; the Kurdish illustration exposes a boundary of the triangular model and invites a networked extension rather than presenting an incomplete version of state-anchored diaspora diplomacy. The study's limitations follow from its largely secondary source base: it does not include a systematically coded corpus of government documents, interviews, meeting records, or organizational archives, and the cases are not matched dyads with comparable periods. The analysis therefore develops concepts and propositions rather than estimating causal effects; future research should construct policy-specific datasets, compare organizations within the same diaspora, trace unsuccessful offers, and test whether the Threat–Offer–Practice configuration, stabilized by Adaptation, predicts durable practice across a larger sample.

Limitations of the Study

Several further limitations should be stated explicitly. First, the three cases were selected purposively for variation on the model's conditions, not through a systematic or random procedure; they are illustrations of plausibility, and the findings cannot be generalized to all diasporas or to other root–host dyads. Second, the evidence is drawn from published English- and Turkish-language secondary literature and publicly available official documents; no interviews, archival research, or original coding were undertaken, so the classification of each case into Threat, Offer, or Practice reflects the author's interpretive reading of that literature and has not been checked through inter-coder reliability. Third, the cases cover different periods and policy fields, which limits the strength of cross-case comparison and means that differences between them may reflect timing and context as much as the conditions specified by the model. To illustrate, Kurdish case does not include the current conflict resolution process in Türkiye; it attributes to the past period practiced. Fourth, the model's scope is restricted to state-anchored diasporas acting within a root state–host state triangle; stateless and networked diasporas fall outside it, as the Kurdish illustration shows. Fifth, the neoclassical realist lens foregrounds state perceptions and relative power and may therefore underweight identity-based, normative, or economic drivers of diaspora engagement. Finally, the Kurdish case concerns a politically sensitive and securitized context; although threat is attributed to named state actors rather than to communities, the available sources themselves reflect contested official and advocacy positions. The TOP model should therefore be read as a framework for generating testable propositions rather than as a validated explanatory theory.

Diaspora diplomacy is best understood neither as an automatic extension of state power nor as inherently autonomous transnational action, but as a conditional relationship produced where state perceptions, institutional opportunities, organizational capacities, and policy interests meet. By specifying those conditions—and the circumstances in which they fail—TOP offers a more cautious and testable foundation for comparative research, and connects to the wider question of diasporic geopolitics and the strategies of rising powers (Adamson and Han 2024): if diaspora engagement is becoming a standard instrument of states seeking to revise their position in the international order, then the conditions under which it institutionalizes, and fails to, are a question about the mechanics of influence in world politics rather than a marginal problem in migration studies. A shared sense of identity matters in diaspora diplomacy. Still, the analysis should rest on the relative-power dynamic between root and host state rather than on identity alone. Because diasporas are sub-actors with a permeable

structure between the two states, generating different perceptions of power through their transnational and subnational influence, this study proposes that their prospects for sustainable diaspora diplomacy are strongest where they are recognized in international and domestic law and governed by reciprocity and the bond of citizenship—a proposition that remains to be tested. Transnational citizenship is therefore closely connected to the concept of diaspora: without a bond of citizenship, the shared identity of a diaspora is less likely to acquire official status or to develop into a diplomatic relationship beyond collective memory.

Epilogue: This study proposes a conceptual framework suggesting that sustainable diaspora diplomacy may become achievable when the diaspora, acting as a sub-main actor in an institutionalized intermediary role, is linked with transnational citizenship status under international law, and when this relationship is evaluated at the level of organization–policy relations. The framework is offered as a set of testable propositions rather than as a comprehensive or confirmed theory.

Declarations

COMPETING INTERESTS

The author declares no competing interests.

ETHICAL APPROVAL

This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by the author. Ethical approval was therefore not required.

INFORMED CONSENT

This article does not contain any studies with human participants performed by the author. Informed consent was therefore not required.

Author Contribution

This research paper has been written fully by the corresponding author (FAZLICAN ALTUNTAS)

Data Availability

Data availability statementThe following statement has been entered under 'Declarations' in the submission system and appears, with identical wording, in the manuscript:Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new datasets were generated or analysed during the current study. This is a conceptual and comparative theoretical study that draws exclusively on previously published, publicly available secondary sources (peer-reviewed literature and government and institutional documents), all of which are cited in the reference list.

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Figures




Figure 1

The Diaspora Diplomacy Triangle