Research Square

Preprints are preliminary reports that have not undergone peer review.
They should not be considered conclusive, used to inform clinical practice,
or referenced by the media as validated information.

Evaluating the Generation and Detection of Arabic-Based Phishing Attacks Using LLMs

Amir Abdulhameed AlAmeeri

alamiri.amir@gmail.com

Zayed University

Mohammad Amin Kuhail

Zayed University

Research Article

Keywords:

Posted Date: September 28th, 2026

DOI: https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-10979307/v1

License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Read Full License

Additional Declarations: No competing interests reported.

Evaluating the Generation and Detection of Arabic-Based Phishing Attacks Using LLMs

Amir Abdulhameed AlAmeeri[1,*], Mohammad Amin Kuhail[2]
[1]College of Technological Innovation, Zayed University, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
[2]College of Technological Innovation, Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
*Corresponding author: alamiri.amir@gmail.com
Contributing author: Mohammad.Kuhail@zu.ac.ae

Abstract
Phishing remains the most prevalent form of cybercrime globally, and large language models (LLMs) have removed the human-authorship constraint that historically limited its scale and sophistication. Arabic-language phishing has received comparatively limited empirical attention to date, despite the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region's exposure to cyber-attacks and Arabic's distinct morphology, script, and cultural communication norms. This study presents an empirical evaluation of LLM-based generation and detection of Arabic-language phishing emails. Three LLMs (ChatGPT, Claude and Falcon AI) generated a dataset of 290 Arabic email scenarios. Detection was evaluated using three LLM classifiers (Gemini, DeepSeek and Mistral) and 45 human participants, with both evaluator groups providing written justifications for thematic analysis. All three generating models produced convincing Arabic phishing content, each exhibiting a distinct social engineering strategy; Falcon AI's Gulf-specific institutional framing proved hardest for humans to detect despite its smaller parameter count. LLM-based detection substantially outperformed human detection: Gemini achieved 100% accuracy, DeepSeek 96.6%, and Mistral 66.9%, against a human mean accuracy of 68.0% (SD = 17.3%), with more than one in five LLM-generated phishing emails evading human recognition. Reasoning analysis revealed that LLM evaluators relied on categorical indicators while human participants depended on sender-address scrutiny, exposing a structural detection blind spot. These findings offer the first empirical evidence on Arabic-language LLM-driven phishing and inform culturally grounded cybersecurity defenses for the Gulf region.

1. Introduction
Phishing is a form of social engineering cyberattack in which a malicious actor impersonates a trusted entity to deceive recipients into disclosing sensitive

credentials, authorizing fraudulent transactions, or executing harmful actions . It remains the most prevalent and operationally consequential form of cybercrime globally, with the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center reporting phishing as the top complaint type in 2024 and attributing over USD 12 billion in cumulative losses to phishing-related attacks between 2020 and 2024 .

Large language models (LLMs) have fundamentally altered the phishing threat landscape. By enabling the generation of linguistically fluent, contextually persuasive, and highly personalized phishing content at negligible cost and effort, LLMs have removed the primary constraint that historically limited the scale and quality of phishing attacks: the need for skilled human authorship . The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the political and economic union comprising Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, has emerged as a high-priority target for cybercrime, with organizations in the UAE and Saudi Arabia disproportionately affected by regional cyber-attacks . Arabic presents a uniquely challenging context for phishing research due to its morphological richness, right-to-left script, significant dialectal variation spanning Modern Standard Arabic and regional colloquial forms, and culturally specific communication norms that English-trained NLP frameworks are poorly equipped to handle .

A growing body of research has examined LLM-enabled phishing in English-language contexts, establishing that commercial LLMs can successfully generate convincing phishing emails , and that LLM-based classifiers substantially outperform both traditional NLP detectors and unaided human reviewers in identifying phishing content . However this literature is characterized by a critical limitation: it is conducted almost exclusively on English-language content. Arabic, however, has received comparatively little empirical attention in the phishing literature to date, based on the literature reviewed for this study. Prior Arabic-specific detection work has relied on classical machine-learning methods applied to small datasets , and while LLM-based detection has been extended to Turkish , limited studies have evaluated LLM-based generation or detection of Arabic phishing. Whether the generation effectiveness and detection performance documented in the English-language literature transfer to Arabic remains an entirely open empirical question.

This study addresses that gap through the first empirical evaluation of LLM-based generation and detection of Arabic-language phishing emails. Three LLMs (ChatGPT GPT-5.2 Instant, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Falcon AI falcon-h1-1.5b-deep-instruct, were used to construct a dataset of 290 Arabic email scenarios (150 phishing, 140 non-phishing). Detection was evaluated by three LLM classifiers (Gemini 3 Flash, DeepSeek V3.2, Mistral-large-2407) and 45 human participants in a structured survey. Both evaluator groups provided written justifications enabling thematic analysis of their reasoning strategies. The study is guided by three central questions: whether LLMs can effectively generate convincing Arabic-language phishing emails; whether LLMs can reliably detect Arabic phishing

generated by other LLMs; and how LLM-based detection compares to human detection in terms of accuracy, error profile, and reasoning strategy.

2. Related Work

2.1 Phishing Generation

The capacity of LLMs to generate convincing phishing content has been documented across a range of attack vectors, target languages, and threat models. Begou et al. provided one of the earliest empirical demonstrations that a commercial LLM could be prompted, through iterative jailbreak-style prompting, to produce a complete phishing operation: a cloned target website, credential-harvesting code, code obfuscation, automated hosting deployment, domain registration, and reverse-proxy integration. Their work established that the technical barrier to mounting a functional phishing campaign had fallen to the level of conversational prompting rather than specialist web-development or social-engineering skill.

Roy et al. extended this line of inquiry by systematically testing four commercially available LLMs (ChatGPT-3.5, GPT-4, Claude, and Bard) under a range of adversarial prompting strategies, finding that all four could be induced to generate functional phishing websites and emails convincingly imitating well-known brands, and that the models differed in the prompting effort required to bypass their respective safety guardrails.

Heiding et al. compared phishing emails generated automatically by GPT-4 against emails manually constructed using the V-Triad, a rule-based heuristic framework for exploiting cognitive biases, and against a combination of the two. In a controlled trial, generic control emails achieved a 19-28% click-through rate, GPT-4-generated emails alone achieved 30-44%, the V-Triad alone achieved 69–79%, and the combination of GPT-4 and the V-Triad achieved 43–81%. This result is notable because unguided LLM generation underperformed a carefully engineered human heuristic framework in this trial, while the combination of the two produced the most consistently dangerous content; LLM generation should accordingly not be treated as an automatic upper bound on deception effectiveness independent of how it is prompted.

A study by Heiding et al. , using a fully automated pipeline that gathered target information and produced personalized spear-phishing content with no human intervention, found that AI-automated emails achieved a 54% click-through rate among 101 participants; statistically on par with emails written by human communications experts (also 54%), and well above a 12% control baseline. This is a meaningfully different finding from Heiding et al. findings : automated LLM-driven spear phishing matched expert human performance rather than exceeding it. A claim that LLM-generated phishing "outperforms professional human attackers" is not supported by either Heiding et al. study and should not be made without this qualification.

Qi et al. introduced SpearBot, a generative-critique architecture in which one LLM instance generates spear-phishing content while a second LLM instance, acting as an adversarial critic, evaluates and returns the draft for refinement. Iterating this loop produced 1,000 spear-phishing emails spanning ten attack categories that achieved high bypass rates against a panel of automated phishing defenders and were independently judged by human reviewers as highly readable and deceptive; evidence that iterative, feedback-driven generation meaningfully outperforms single-pass prompting.

These studies establish that LLMs lower the technical barrier to producing linguistically fluent, operationally convincing phishing content across web and email. They also show that generation effectiveness is highly sensitive to prompting strategy, iterative refinement, and the specific heuristic techniques applied alongside the model; a single, unqualified claim that "LLM-generated phishing is more dangerous than human-crafted phishing" oversimplifies a more conditional set of findings.

2.2 Phishing Detection

Prior to the emergence of LLMs, phishing detection relied on engineered lexical and structural features fed into conventional classifiers. Salloum et al. systematically reviewed NLP-based approaches to phishing email detection and confirmed that feature-engineered methods substantially outperformed rule-based and blacklist approaches, while also documenting that virtually all evaluated datasets were English-language, with almost negligible coverage of Arabic or other morphologically complex languages.

LLM-based detection has since displaced classical approaches as the performance frontier. Zhang et al. benchmarked twelve LLMs on a combined dataset of human-written and AI-generated phishing and legitimate emails, finding that the open-source Llama-3-8B-Instruct model achieved the highest overall F1-score, outperforming larger proprietary models including GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet. Their study established three findings directly relevant to this study: model scale is not a reliable predictor of detection performance; instruction-based prompting alone, without fine-tuning, can achieve robust detection on structured datasets; and AI-generated legitimate emails are systematically harder to distinguish from phishing.

A consistent limitation documented across LLM-based detection studies is the trade-off between sensitivity to phishing signals and false positive rates on legitimate institutional content. Siemerink et al. confirmed that higher-performing models produce fewer false positives on non-phishing content that resembles phishing in register, while less capable models exhibit excessive threat-sensitivity that flags legitimate correspondence, a finding replicated in this study's comparison of Gemini, DeepSeek, and Mistral. Zhou and Liu further demonstrated that prompting LLMs to produce chain-of-thought reasoning before emitting a classification label improves both accuracy and interpretability,

providing methodological grounding for the design choice in the present study of eliciting written justifications alongside classification decisions.

Detection research in non-English contexts remains sparse. Alsuwaylimi proposed a hybrid machine-learning approach for Arabic phishing email detection using genetic algorithm-based feature selection, producing one of the few Arabic-specific detection studies in the literature, but relying on classical classifiers rather than LLM-based semantic analysis. Körpe et al. applied LLM-based detection to Turkish phishing emails through fine-tuned language models, achieving accuracy of 98.3% and confirming that LLM transfer-learning approaches generalize to non-English languages when language-specific models and labeled datasets are available. Two more recent studies extend Arabic phishing research toward generative AI but stop short of LLM-based detection. Ghabban constructed a 418-email Arabic dataset combining human-written phishing emails with ChatGPT-generated phishing emails and trained a hybrid BiLSTM-GRU-Random Forest model to distinguish AI-authored from human-authored phishing text, reporting 98.81% accuracy; the task is authorship attribution between two phishing subclasses rather than phishing-versus-legitimate classification, and detection relies on classical ML/DL architectures rather than LLM-based evaluators. Alotaibi et al. fine-tuned GPT-3.5-turbo to generate synthetic Arabic smishing messages, augmented the resulting corpus with Conditional WGAN embeddings, and evaluated it using classical machine learning (logistic regression, random forest, SVM) and deep learning (CNN, BERT) classifiers, again without LLM-based detection or a human-evaluator comparison. This body of work confirms growing research interest in Arabic and non-English phishing, yet no published work upon performing this study evaluates LLM-based detection of Arabic phishing content, whether human- or LLM-generated, and none compares LLM-based against human detection performance on a shared Arabic dataset.

2.3 Research Gaps

Three gaps in the literature reviewed above motivate the present study.

1. Language and cultural coverage. The literature reviewed remains overwhelmingly English-language, and the small number of Arabic-specific studies that have recently emerged evaluate generation or detection in isolation, using classical machine learning or deep learning classifiers, and none incorporates LLM-based detection or a human-participant comparison. Whether the generation and detection effectiveness reported for LLM-based approaches in the English-language literature transfers to Arabic.

2. Dataset availability. No published benchmark dataset of Arabic-language phishing and non-phishing content, generated and labeled across multiple LLMs, was found at the time of writing this study. This absence limits the field's ability to evaluate, reproduce, or compare detection approaches in non-English settings

and represents a structural barrier to cumulative progress on multilingual phishing research.

3. Outcome-only evaluation. The literature reviewed above is overwhelmingly outcome-focused: studies report accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-scores but rarely examine the reasoning underlying classification decisions for either human or LLM evaluators. Few studies elicit or analyze written justifications alongside classification labels, leaving open questions about which drive correct and incorrect detections, and whether these reasoning strategies differ meaningfully across languages or institutional contexts.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research Design

This study employed a comparative mixed-methods design to examine the generation and detection of Arabic-language phishing emails. The study comprised three phases. First, three LLMs generated simulated phishing and legitimate email scenarios in Arabic. Second, three independent LLM evaluators classified the complete scenario dataset. Third, human participants classified randomized subsets of the same scenarios. Quantitative analyses assessed detection performance, while inductive thematic analysis examined the written justifications produced by the LLM evaluators and human participants. The findings from the quantitative and qualitative analyses were subsequently integrated to compare the cues, reasoning strategies, and error patterns underlying human and LLM-based detection.

3.2 Generation of the Arabic Email Dataset

3.2.1 Generator Model Selection

The dataset was generated using ChatGPT (GPT-5.2 Instant), Claude (Sonnet 4.6), and Falcon AI (falcon-h1-1.5b-deep-instruct). ChatGPT and Claude were selected to facilitate comparison with prior research in which models from these families have been used to generate or evaluate phishing content . Falcon AI was selected because it was developed by the Technology Innovation Institute in Abu Dhabi and was trained on multilingual data that include substantial Arabic-language content . Its inclusion allowed the study to explore whether a Gulf-developed multilingual model produced Arabic phishing scenarios that differed from those generated by widely deployed commercial models.

JAIS and K2 Think were initially considered because of their Arabic-language capabilities. However, both were excluded after persistent connection and session failures prevented stable and reproducible data generation.

3.2.2 Standardized Prompt and Output Structure

Each generator received the same initial base prompt. The prompt stated the academic purpose of the task, required harmless simulated content, prohibited active malicious links or executable material, and requested 50 phishing and 50

legitimate scenarios in Arabic. For each scenario, the models were instructed to provide a scenario identifier, class label, contextual description, sender email address, subject line, email body, and a description of the phishing red flags. The standardized base prompt was as follows:

> *"I am working on my master's thesis titled "Evaluating the generation and detection of Arabic-based phishing attacks using LLMs." I need to generate datasets to use in my experiment. For this dataset, the LLM needs to generate 50 unique phishing and 50 unique legitimate scenarios. Both phishing and legitimate scenarios need to be in Arabic. The phishing scenarios are simulated and have no harmful links or ill intent; they are to be used to determine whether humans and other LLMs can detect which scenarios are phishing and which are legitimate. I will be measuring your effectiveness in generating simulated scenarios (50 phishing and 50 legitimate). The scenarios must be unique; do not repeat any scenarios. Provide all generated scenarios in an Excel file. Use separate columns, with each scenario including a scenario ID, type, context, email body, sender email address, subject line, and red flags."*

Scenario themes were intentionally left unconstrained. This allowed each model to determine the topical range of its outputs and enabled the study to examine generative diversity without imposing a researcher-defined taxonomy. The explicit research framing and safety constraints were consistent with prior studies that used transparent academic framing when eliciting simulated phishing content from safety-aligned LLMs.

The *type* field supplied the reference label for each scenario. The *red flags* field was used only during post-generation quality checking; neither field was shown to the LLM evaluators or human participants during the detection phases. Detectors therefore received only the information required to judge the scenario itself: its context, sender address, subject line, and email body.

3.2.3 Generation Procedure and Prompt Refinement

Although the initial prompt was standardized, the models differed in their compliance and output stability. Model-specific follow-up prompts were therefore used when a model returned placeholders, duplicate records, incomplete outputs, or refusals. These follow-up prompts clarified the original requirements but did not change the requested class balance, language, output fields, or safety constraints. All prompt iterations and outputs were retained to support procedural transparency.

Claude completed the requested generation task in one session. ChatGPT required 13 prompt iterations before producing a complete set because earlier responses contained placeholders, duplicated scenarios, or refusals. Falcon AI generated 50 phishing and 40 legitimate scenarios. Further attempts did not yield the remaining 10 legitimate scenarios because of repeated session timeouts and prompt-processing failures. The final dataset contained 290 scenarios: 150 phishing and 140 legitimate emails.

Table 1- Composition of the generated Arabic-language email dataset

Generator model	Phishing	Legitimate	Total
ChatGPT (GPT-5.2 Instant)	50	50	100
Claude (Sonnet 4.6)	50	50	100
Falcon AI (falcon-h1-1.5b-deep-instruct)	50	40	90
Total	150	140	290

3.2.4 Post-Generation Quality Checks

Before the detection study, the generated records were reviewed for completeness, Arabic-language content, duplicate scenarios, placeholder text, active links, consistency between the assigned label and email content, and adherence to the required data fields. Incomplete, duplicated, or otherwise non-compliant outputs were excluded or regenerated. The final 290 records constituted the fixed dataset used in both detection phases.

3.3 LLM-Based Detection

3.3.1 Evaluator Selection

Gemini 3 Flash, DeepSeek V3.2, and Mistral Large 2407 were selected as independent evaluators. None had participated in dataset generation, thereby preventing direct overlap between generator and detector roles. Gemini was included because models from the Gemini family have performed strongly in prior phishing-detection evaluations . DeepSeek V3.2 was selected to represent a frontier open-weight reasoning model released under a permissive (MIT) license , while Mistral Large 2407 provided an additional open-weight model family, released under Mistral's non-commercial Research License, with a distinct architecture and training lineage . Together, the evaluators provided variation in provider, model family, and deployment approach.

3.3.2 Detection Procedure

Each evaluator independently classified all 290 scenarios as either *phishing* or *legitimate* and provided a written justification for every classification. The same detection prompt, input fields, scenario order, and response format were used for all three models. The reference label and generator-provided red-flags field were withheld. Thus, each evaluator produced 290 classifications, yielding 870 LLM classification decisions in total.

Table 2- Model access dates, access method, and parameter settings for the generator and evaluator models

Role	Model	Access Date	Access Method	Parameter Settings
Generator	ChatGPT (GPT 5.2-instant)	February 21, 2026	Web Interface	Default
Generator	Claude (Sonnet 4.6)	February 21, 2026	Desktop Application	Default
Generator	Falcon AI (falcon-h1-1.5b-deep-instruct)	February 21, 2026	Web Interface	Default
Evaluator	Gemini 3 Flash	March 25, 2026	Web Interface	Default
Evaluator	DeepSeek V3.2	March 25, 2026	Web Interface	Default
Evaluator	Mistral Large 2407	March 26, 2026	Web Interface	Default

Table 2 reports the access date, access method, and parameter configuration used for each generator and evaluator model. Default platform parameters were used throughout; no sampling, temperature, or other generation parameters were manually altered for either the generation or detection phase. Default parameters were retained intentionally rather than tuned, to observe each model's unmodified generation and detection behavior without researcher-introduced bias; this approach avoids conflating model-intrinsic capability with the effects of manual parameter optimization.

3.4 Human Detection Study

3.4.1 Participants and Recruitment

A non-probability convenience sampling strategy was used. Participants were recruited through the researchers' personal and professional networks and through social media. Participation was voluntary, and informed consent was obtained before the survey began. Fifty-five individuals initially participated. Ten records were excluded because the participant completed fewer than all 10 scenario classifications or supplied near-identical justifications across the full set of responses, indicating insufficient engagement. The final analytic sample comprised 45 participants.

The final convenience sample included participants with varied demographic and professional backgrounds. Twenty-six participants identified as female (57.8%) and 19 as male (42.2%). Participants were distributed across five age categories, with those aged 26–35 years forming the largest group. Educational attainment ranged from high school to postgraduate education, with bachelor's degree

holders constituting the largest category. Professional backgrounds included information technology, finance, telecommunications and security, engineering, and other fields. Although this diversity supported exploratory comparisons across participant characteristics, the non-probability sampling approach limits the representativeness and generalizability of the findings. Full sample characteristics are reported in Tables 3-6.

Table 3- Participant Demographics (Gender)

Gender	**n**	**%**
Female	26	57.8%
Male	19	42.2%

Table 4- Participant Demographics (Age Bracket)

Age Bracket	**n**	**%**
18-25	10	22.2%
26-35	16	35.6%
36-45	14	31.1%
46-55	3	6.7%
56+	2	4.4%

Table 5- Participant Demographics (Education Level)

Education Level	**n**	**%**
Bachelor's Degree	27	60.0%
Graduate Degree	17	37.8%
High School Degree	1	2.2%

Table 6- Participant Demographics (Profession)

Profession	**n**	**%**
Management	9	20.0%
IT/Technical	9	20.0%
Government	8	17.8%
Healthcare	3	6.7%
Finance	2	4.4%
Engineering	2	4.4%
Student	2	4.4%
Cultural Speaker	1	2.2%
Tourism	1	2.2%
Communication	1	2.2%
Programs Associate	1	2.2%
Office Manager	1	2.2%
Engineering Sales	1	2.2%
Tour Guide	1	2.2%

Telecom & Security	1	2.2%
Education	1	2.2%
PE	1	2.2%

3.4.2 Survey Procedure

The study was administered through an online structured survey. Each participant viewed a randomized subset of 10 scenarios drawn from the 290-scenario dataset. Every subset contained five phishing and five legitimate scenarios. The class label and red-flags field were hidden, while the scenario context, sender address, subject line, and email body were displayed.

For each scenario, participants selected one of three responses: *phishing*, *legitimate*, or *not sure*. They then provided a written justification for their decision. The *not sure* option was included to capture genuine uncertainty and distinguish uncertainty from an active misclassification. The design yielded 450 human classification responses (45 participants × 10 scenarios). Figure 1 shows an example survey item.




Fig. 1 Example of survey question

3.5 Data Analysis

No dedicated statistical or qualitative-analysis software (e.g., SPSS, R, NVivo) was used. All quantitative calculations and qualitative coding were performed directly by the researcher with the assistance of Claude (Anthropic).

3.5.1 Quantitative Analysis

The generator-assigned class, verified during the quality-checking stage, served as the reference label. For both LLM and human classifications, a phishing scenario classified as phishing was coded as a true positive, a legitimate scenario classified as legitimate as a true negative, a legitimate scenario classified as phishing as a false positive, and a phishing scenario classified as legitimate as a false negative. Accuracy, phishing recall (sensitivity), legitimate-email recall (specificity), false-positive rate, and false-negative rate were calculated, together with 95% binomial confidence intervals. Human *not sure* responses were retained as a separate uncertainty category and counted as non-correct responses when overall accuracy was calculated; they were not recoded as either false positives or false negatives.

Because the three LLM evaluators classified the same 290 scenarios, differences in their classification accuracy were assessed using Cochran's Q test. Where the omnibus test was significant, pairwise McNemar tests with Holm correction were used for follow-up comparisons.

Human classification responses were nested within both participants and scenarios. Accordingly, demographic differences in the probability of a correct response were examined using mixed-effects logistic regression rather than treating the 450 observations as independent. Response correctness was entered as the binary outcome, demographic characteristics were entered as fixed effects, and participant and scenario identifiers were included as random intercepts. Given the final sample size, demographic predictors were examined in separate models to avoid overfitting. Descriptive statistics were also calculated for *not sure* responses to characterize uncertainty across participant groups and scenario types.

3.5.2 Qualitative Analysis of Written Justifications

The written justifications supplied by the LLM evaluators and human participants were analyzed using inductive thematic analysis following the phases described by Braun and Clarke : familiarization with the data, initial coding, development of candidate themes, review and refinement of themes, theme definition and naming, and production of the final account. Human and LLM justifications were coded separately so that patterns specific to each evaluator type were not obscured during initial analysis. Coding focused on the cues invoked, the reasoning used to connect those cues to a classification, expressions of uncertainty, culturally or linguistically specific judgments, and explanations associated with correct and incorrect decisions.

Thematic coding was conducted by a single coder (the researcher); no second coder was used, and no formal inter-rater reliability statistic was calculated.

After the two sets of themes had been finalized, a cross-evaluator comparison matrix was used to identify shared reasoning patterns, cues used predominantly by humans or LLMs, and recurring sources of false-positive and false-negative decisions. This integration connected the qualitative explanations with the quantitative performance results and supported comparison of the complementary strengths and limitations of human and LLM-based detection.

4. Results

4.1 Generation Results

Dataset Output

The generation phase produced a consolidated dataset of 290 Arabic-language email scenarios: 150 phishing and 140 non-phishing. All three models successfully generated Arabic phishing content, confirming that none of the safety alignment mechanisms employed by any model prevented phishing generation when academic framing was applied.

Thematic Content of Generated Scenarios

As no thematic taxonomy was imposed in the generation prompt, attack themes and social engineering strategies emerged organically from each model's generative behavior. Thematic analysis of the generated phishing scenarios reveals that each generator employed a qualitatively distinct social engineering strategy.

ChatGPT's phishing scenarios were predominantly structured around deadline-based urgency and account restriction threats, framing recipients as subject to imminent account suspension, unauthorized access, or service termination unless immediate action was taken. This strategy exploits time pressure and loss aversion, consistent with the urgency-based social engineering patterns documented in the phishing literature .



السلام عليكم،تم رصد نشاط غير اعتيادي على منصة الخدمات.يرجى الرد لتأكيد هويتك.في حال عدم الاستجابة قبل 19/04/2026 قد يتم تقييد الوصول مؤقتاً.فريق الدعم
السلام عليكم،تنبيه بخصوص حسابك على الخدمة الإلكترونية.الرجاء تحديث المعلومات لتجنب التعليق.في حال عدم الاستجابة قبل 22/04/2026 قد يتم تقييد الوصول مؤقتاً.فريق الدعم
السلام عليكم،تنبيه بخصوص حسابك على منصة الخدمات.يرجى تأكيد الحساب في أقرب وقت.في حال عدم الاستجابة قبل 04/04/2026 قد يتم تقييد الوصول مؤقتاً.فريق الدعم
السلام عليكم،تحديث عاجل مطلوب على الملف الوظيفي.الرجاء تحديث المعلومات لتجنب التعليق.في حال عدم الاستجابة قبل 06/03/2026 قد يتم تقييد الوصول مؤقتاً.فريق الدعم
السلام عليكم،مراجعة فورية مطلوبة على الملف الوظيفي.يرجى تأكيد بياناتك خلال 24 ساعة.في حال عدم الاستجابة قبل 27/03/2026 قد يتم تقييد الوصول مؤقتاً.فريق الدعم

Fig. 2 ChatGPT example of phishing scenario

Claude's phishing scenarios emphasized financial consequences and legal intimidation, presenting recipients with threats of outstanding payments, legal proceedings, or regulatory non-compliance. This strategy differs from ChatGPT's approach in that it targets institutional rather than personal accountability, reflecting a distinct internal model of persuasive Arabic professional communication.

عزيزنا العميل

استدعاء قضائي - مخالفة

المرجع: 543790

إجراء عاجل مطلوب خلال 24-48 ساعة

المطلوب:
- تأكيد معلوماتك
- تحديث البيانات
- دفع الرسوم

[رابط-التحقق]

في حال عدم الاستجابة سيتم اتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية

شرطة

Fig. 3 Claude example of phishing

Falcon AI's phishing scenarios were characterized by the impersonation of specific, named Gulf financial institutions, framing requests around account verification, transaction authorization, and security confirmation within an authentic Gulf institutional register. Unlike ChatGPT and Claude, which impersonated generic organizational archetypes, Falcon AI produced scenario content embedded in Gulf-specific institutional and cultural context, a distinction directly attributable to its Arabic-focused regional training data .

"مرحبًا، من مصرف الراجحي، لنساعدك في تحديث بياناتك المصرفية، يرجى الضغط على الرابط أدناه."
"مرحبًا، من مصرف السلام، يبدو أن هناك خطأ في بطاقتك. يرجى إدخال رمز التحقق الجديد الذي أرسلنا لك."
"مرحبًا، من مصرف الأمل، لنساعدك في تأكيد حسابك. يرجى إدخال المعلومات أدناه."
"مرحبًا، من مصرف الراجحي، لنساعدك في تحديث بياناتك المصرفية، يرجى الضغط على الرابط أدناه."
"مرحبًا، من مصرف السلام، يبدو أن هناك خطأ في بطاقتك. يرجى إدخال رمز التحقق الجديد."

Fig. 4 Falcon AI example of phishing

Non-phishing scenarios across all three generators simulated routine professional correspondence, including HR notifications, departmental announcements, meeting requests, and service updates, calibrated to replicate the register and formatting conventions of legitimate Gulf organizational communication.

4.2 Detection Results

4.2.1 LLM-Based Detection

Detection performance was measured using four metrics. True Positives (TP), True Negatives (TN), False Positives (FP), False Negatives (FN). These four metrics were used in place of accuracy alone to distinguish between the two error

types, which carry different practical consequences. Accuracy was calculated using the formula:

$$Accuracy = \frac{TP+TN}{TP+TN+FP+FN}\ x\ 100 \quad (1)$$

Table 7 presents the detection performance of all three LLM evaluators across the full 290-scenario dataset

Table 7- LLM Evaluator Detection Matrix by Generating Model

LLM Evaluator	**Generating Model**	**True Positive (TP)**	**True Negative (TN)**	**False Positive (FP)**	**False Negative (FN)**	**TP+TN (Correct)**	**Accuracy**
Gemini 3 Flash	ChatGPT GPT-5.2 Instant	50	50	0	0	100	100%
	Claude Sonnet 4.6	50	50	0	0	100	100%
	Falcon AI falcon-h1-1.5b-deep-instruct	50	40	0	0	90	100%
	Overall	150	140	0	0	290	100%
DeepSeek V3.2	ChatGPT GPT-5.2 Instant	50	50	0	0	100	100%
	Claude Sonnet 4.6	50	50	0	0	100	100%
	Falcon AI falcon-h1-1.5b-deep-instruct	50	30	10	0	80	88.9%
	Overall	150	130	10	0	280	96.6%
Mistral-large-2407	ChatGPT GPT-5.2 Instant	50	0	50	0	50	50.0%

	Claude Sonnet 4.6	50	44	6	0	94	94.0%
	Falcon AI falcon-h1-1.5b-deep-instruct	50	0	40	0	50	55.6%
	Overall	150	44	96	0	194	66.9%

All three evaluators produced zero false negatives, meaning no phishing scenario was missed by any LLM evaluator. Performance differences were driven entirely by false positive rates on non-phishing content. Gemini achieved perfect accuracy across both classes. DeepSeek correctly classified 92.9% of non-phishing scenarios, generating 10 false positives. Mistral correctly identified all phishing but falsely flagged 96 of 140 non-phishing scenarios as phishing, indicating that its classification behavior was dominated by threat sensitivity rather than balanced semantic evaluation, consistent with the model-dependent false positive patterns documented by Siemerink et al. .

Thematic analysis of written justifications revealed distinct reasoning strategies across evaluators. Gemini applied two fixed templates across all 150 phishing decisions, each citing urgency language, institutional impersonation, and credential requests. DeepSeek produced contextually adaptive justifications varying by scenario, and was the only evaluator to explicitly identify Gulf-regional thematic familiarity as a detection signal. Mistral applied generic, indiscriminate reasoning across both content types, consistent with its elevated false positive rate.

4.2.2 Human Detection

A convenience sample of 45 participants was recruited via personal and professional networks. Recruitment aimed to capture demographic diversity across the sample to support generalizability of detection performance findings.Each participant was presented with 10 randomly assigned scenarios (5 phishing and 5 non-phishing) producing 450 total classification responses: 225 phishing and 225 non-phishing.

Table 8- Human Detection Performance Across 450 Responses (45 Participants x 10 Scenarios Each; Phishing responses = 225, Non-Phishing responses = 225

Metric	**Value**
Mean overall accuracy	68.0% (SD=17.3%)
TP	175 (77.8%)
TN	131 (58.2%)
FP	94 (41.8%)

FN	50 (22.2%)

Table 9- Human Detection Accuracy by Generating Model ($\chi^2(2) = 22.72, p < .001$)

Generating Model	**Detection Accuracy**	**95% CI**
Claude (Sonnet 4.6)	83.6%	76.2%-89.0%
ChatGPT (GPT-5.2 Instant)	65.4%	58.4%-71.9%
Falcon AI (falcon-h1-1.5b-deep-instruct)	56.7%	48.3%-64.8%

Table 10- Human Detection Accuracy by Profession ($\chi^2(16) = 35.43, p = .004$)

Profession	**n**	**Mean Accuracy**
Finance	2	85.0%
Tour Guide	1	80.0%
Telecom & Security	1	80.0%
Education	1	80.0%
PE	1	80.0%
Management	9	75.6%
IT/Technical	9	75.6%
Student	2	75.0%
Tourism	1	70.0%
Healthcare	3	63.3%
Government	8	60.0%
Communication	1	60.0%
Office Manager	1	60.0%
Cultural Speaker	1	50.0%
Engineering	2	50.0%
Engineering Sales	1	30.0%
Programs Associate	1	20.0%

Human participants achieved a mean accuracy of 68.0% (SD = 17.3%), substantially below Gemini and DeepSeek, and comparable to Mistral. The phishing miss rate of 22.2% confirms that more than one in five LLM-generated Arabic phishing emails evaded human detection. The false positive rate of 41.8% on non-phishing content indicates that LLM-generated professional Arabic correspondence was realistic enough to generate genuine recipient uncertainty.
Detection accuracy varied significantly by the generating model ($\chi^2(2) = 22.72$, $p < .001$), with Falcon AI-generated content proving hardest to detect despite originating from the smallest model. Profession was the sole significant demographic predictor of detection accuracy ($\chi^2(16) = 35.43$, $p = .004$); age, gender, and education level were non-significant (all $p > .05$).

Thematic analysis of participant justifications identified outcome-specific reasoning patterns. Correct phishing identifications (TP) were driven by multi-cue reasoning: suspicious sender address, urgency language, and requests for personal information identified in combination. False negatives were dominated by the absence of identifiable red flags rather than any specific persuasion success; participants reported a default positive impression in the absence of triggering cues, consistent with the susceptibility mechanism documented by Siemerink et al. and Malloy et al. . False positives were driven almost entirely by sender address non-conformity to Gulf institutional domain norms, accounting for 57.4% of false positive justifications.

5. Discussion and Practical Implications

5.1 Discussion

5.1.1 Generation Effectiveness

All three LLMs successfully generated Arabic phishing content despite their safety alignment mechanisms, confirming that academic framing is an effective and replicable generation strategy, consistent with Roy et al. and Heiding et al. . Each model produced a qualitatively distinct social engineering strategy without thematic instruction, suggesting that each model's internal representation of persuasive Arabic professional communication differs based on its training data.

The most unexpected finding is the inverse relationship between model scale and deception effectiveness. Falcon AI, the smallest model at 1.5 billion parameters, produced the hardest-to-detect phishing (human detection rate: 56.7%), outperforming Claude (83.6%) and ChatGPT (65.4%). This challenges the premise that larger models constitute the greater threat . In the Arabic context, regional linguistic calibration appears to be a stronger driver of deception than model scale. The dominant false negative justification confirms that generation succeeded not by overcoming detection heuristics but by producing content so contextually authentic that heuristics were never activated, consistent with Siemerink et al. and Malloy et al. .

5.1.2 Human Detection

Human participants achieved a mean accuracy of 68.0% (SD = 17.3%), substantially below Gemini and DeepSeek, and comparable to Mistral. The 22.2% phishing miss rate extends to Arabic the human susceptibility rates documented in English-language contexts . Profession was the sole significant demographic predictor ($\chi^2(16) = 35.43$, $p = .004$), while education level was non-significant, confirming that domain-specific professional experience, not academic qualification, determines detection capability, consistent with Bethany et al. .

The complementary error profiles of LLM and human classifiers are the most practically significant cross-evaluator finding: LLMs produced zero false negatives with variable false positive rates, while humans produced a 22.2% false negative rate and a 41.8% false positive rate. These structurally different failure modes suggest that a hybrid detection architecture, where LLM-based detection

combined with human review of flagged edge cases, would outperform either approach independently .

5.2 Practical Implications

The findings of this study carry concrete implications for organizations, security practitioners, and policymakers operating in Arabic-speaking and Gulf-regional contexts.

Threat modeling must account for regionally trained models. Falcon AI, the smallest model tested, produced the most deceptive Arabic phishing content, challenging threat models that prioritize frontier-scale commercial LLMs as the primary generative risk. Gulf-regional organizations should extend their threat modeling to smaller, regionally trained Arabic-capable models, whose institutional register and cultural familiarity can make them a more effective phishing vector than generic large-scale models.

LLM-based detection is viable for Arabic phishing, but model selection is critical. Gemini and DeepSeek achieved near-perfect accuracy without fine-tuning, whereas Mistral's 68.6% false-positive rate on non-phishing content disqualifies it for standalone deployment. Organizations should weight false-positive performance on legitimate correspondence as heavily as detection rate; a model that maximizes sensitivity at the cost of specificity produces operationally unacceptable false-alarm volumes.

A hybrid human-LLM architecture is recommended. LLM evaluators produced zero false negatives, while humans missed 22.2% of phishing scenarios and produced a 41.8% false-positive rate that LLMs avoided. These complementary error profiles support an architecture in which LLM detection serves as an automated first-pass filter, with human review reserved for flagged edge cases, consistent with hybrid design principles in the detection literature .

Security-awareness training should be profession-targeted and content-specific. Profession, not education level, predicted human detection accuracy, so generic awareness programs are misaligned with the risk profile observed here. Training should prioritize non-technical and non-finance staff, incorporate LLM-generated Arabic phishing examples specifically, since conventional templates offer limited protection against LLM-generated content , and explicitly teach the multi-cue reasoning strategy (cross-referencing sender address, urgency language, and request content) used by high-accuracy participants.

Sender-address validation is the highest-priority technical countermeasure. Suspicious sender formatting was the dominant cue in 57.4% of false-positive responses, making DMARC, DKIM, and SPF enforcement the most immediately actionable defense against both the human false-positive burden and the residual detection gap in LLM-generated non-phishing content. Domain verification against authentic GCC institutional registries is a targeted, cost-effective complement to semantic analysis.

The 290-scenario dataset fills a gap: no public benchmark of LLM-generated Arabic phishing and non-phishing content existed previously. Releasing it publicly would support future Arabic NLP phishing research, model benchmarking, and training-data development.

6. Study Limitations

Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the findings of this study.

Single-coder qualitative analysis. The thematic analysis of written justifications was conducted by a single coder without a second, independent coder to establish formal inter-rater reliability. All coding decisions therefore reflect one researcher's interpretive judgment, and the possibility of coder-specific bias in theme identification cannot be ruled out. Future replications should incorporate multiple independent coders with a reported agreement statistic (e.g., Cohen's kappa).

Human sample size. The 45-participant sample was sufficient for the analyses conducted but limits the power of demographic subgroup comparisons; the gender difference in accuracy (male 73.2% vs. female 64.2%) approached but did not reach significance ($p = .057$), and profession-level subgroups varied in size. These findings should be treated as indicative, pending replication with a larger, more balanced sample.

Reduced email context. Evaluators assessed only the email body, subject line, and sender address, whereas real-world recipients also have header metadata, DKIM/SPF authentication results, and native client rendering available; detection rates reported here are plausibly an underestimate of naturalistic performance on this basis.

Survey artificiality. Participants knew they were evaluating emails for phishing, which may have inflated accuracy relative to the unprimed conditions of real attacks (a Hawthorne effect; [6], and the scenarios were less personalized than typical real-world spear-phishing, which may incorporate recipient names, organizational roles, or other contextual details unavailable in a controlled design. On this basis, detection rates should be read as an upper bound; together with the context limitation above, these two effects bound plausible naturalistic performance rather than resolve it.

Batch LLM evaluation design. All 290 scenarios were submitted to each LLM evaluator in a single batch rather than through independent per-scenario prompts, which risks within-context anchoring: a model may fix a classification template early in the batch and apply it uniformly. Gemini's use of exactly two fixed templates across all scenarios, and the concentration of Mistral's and DeepSeek's false positives within specific model-generated subsets, are consistent with this

effect. Per-scenario evaluation would yield a more reliable estimate of standalone model capability.

Falcon AI dataset asymmetry. Falcon AI produced 50 phishing but only 40 non-phishing scenarios due to a persistent server error, limiting comparability of its non-phishing generation quality against ChatGPT and Claude.

Modern Standard Arabic only. The dataset uses Modern Standard Arabic exclusively; Gulf-regional phishing in practice frequently employs colloquial dialect, mixed Arabic-English, and Arabizi, and whether these findings generalize to dialectal content remains untested.
Model stochasticity and versioning. LLM outputs are stochastic and providers periodically update their systems, so these findings reflect one snapshot of model behavior; inference parameters and model versions are reported in the methodology to support reproducibility within this constraint.

7. Conclusion

This study addressed a critical gap in the phishing research literature: the near-total absence of empirical evidence on LLM-based generation and detection of Arabic-language phishing content. Three commercially available LLMs: ChatGPT GPT-5.2 Instant, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Falcon AI falcon-h1-1.5b-deep-instruct, were used to construct a dataset of 290 Arabic email scenarios, which were subsequently evaluated by three LLM classifiers (Gemini, DeepSeek, and Mistral) and 45 human participants. The study examined both the effectiveness of phishing generation and detection, and the reasoning strategies applied by both evaluator groups, producing the first empirical Arabic-language evidence across all five of its research questions.

The generation findings establish that LLM-generated Arabic phishing is an active and accessible threat. All three generating models successfully produced Arabic phishing content despite their respective safety alignment mechanisms, confirming that academic framing is a replicable generation strategy. The most novel generation finding is that regional linguistic calibration is a stronger driver of Arabic phishing deception effectiveness than model scale: Falcon AI, the smallest model at 1.5 billion parameters, produced the hardest-to-detect phishing scenarios (human detection rate: 56.7%), while Claude, the largest, produced the most detectable (83.6%). LLM-generated Arabic phishing succeeded not by overcoming human detection heuristics but by producing content sufficiently fluent and contextually authentic that heuristics were never activated.

The detection findings demonstrate that LLM-based semantic classification substantially outperforms human detection on Arabic phishing. All three LLM evaluators achieved zero false negatives across 290 scenarios, the first

demonstration of this result in an Arabic-language context, while human participants missed 22.2% of phishing scenarios and produced a 41.8% false positive rate on non-phishing content. Profession was the sole significant demographic predictor of human detection accuracy. The complementary error profiles of LLM and human classifiers where LLMs failing on false positives, humans failing on false negatives, constitute the most practically significant cross-evaluator finding of the study, motivating a hybrid detection architecture that neither approach alone can provide. DeepSeek's explicit identification of Gulf-regional thematic familiarity as a detection signal is the only culturally specific LLM reasoning theme documented in the phishing detection literature to date.

These findings contribute three concrete outputs to the field: the first empirical evidence on LLM phishing generation and detection effectiveness in Arabic, a publicly available 290-scenario Arabic phishing dataset spanning three generating models, and a set of evidence-based recommendations for Arabic-language phishing defense and security awareness practice in GCC organizations. Future work should extend these findings to dialectal Arabic and Arabizi, evaluate purpose-built Arabic models including JAIS, deploy LLM-generated Arabic phishing in naturalistic organizational settings to obtain field-valid deception rates, and develop standardized Arabic phishing benchmarks that can support reproducible evaluation across models and methodologies.

8. Declarations

8.1 Funding

This research received no external funding.

8.2 Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

8.3 Ethics Approval and Consent to Participate

All phishing emails used in this study were simulated exclusively for research purposes. The generation prompt prohibited active malicious links and executable content, and the finalized dataset was checked to confirm that no such material was present. All experimental protocols involving human participants were approved by the Research Ethics Committee of Zayed University (approval number ZU26_079_S) and were carried out in accordance with the relevant institutional guidelines and regulations. All participants were provided with information about the study and gave informed consent before taking part.

8.4 Consent for Publication

Not applicable. This manuscript does not contain any individual person’s identifiable data (e.g., images, videos, or directly attributable quotations); all human participant data are reported in anonymized, aggregated form.

8.5 Data Availability

The complete 290-scenario Arabic-language email dataset, together with the LLM evaluator and human participant classification data generated and analyzed

during this study, is publicly available in the GitHub repository cited in reference [26].

8.6 Materials Availability

The prompts and procedures used to generate and evaluate the Arabic-language email dataset are fully described in the Methodology section (Section 3). The finalized dataset is available in the repository cited under Data availability [26].

8.7 Code Availability

No dedicated statistical or qualitative-analysis software was developed for this study; all quantitative calculations and thematic coding were performed manually by the authors following the procedures described in Section 3.5. No custom analysis code is therefore available.

8.8 Author Contributions

A.A.A. conceived and designed the study, generated and curated the dataset, performed the formal analysis, and wrote the original draft. M.A.K. supervised the research and reviewed and edited the manuscript. Both authors read and approved the final manuscript.

References

[1] Tharani, J.S., Arachchilage, N.A. (2020) Understanding phishers' strategies of mimicking uniform resource locators to leverage phishing attacks: a machine learning approach. *Security & Privacy*, 3(5), e120. https://doi.org/10.1002/spy2.120

[2] Federal Bureau of Investigation (2024) *Internet Crime Report 2024*. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center, Washington, DC

[3] Roy, S., Thota, P., Naragam, K., Nilizadeh, S. (2024) From chatbots to phishbots? Phishing scam generation in commercial large language models. In: *IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*

[4] Begou, N., Vinoy, J., Duda, A., Korczyński, M. (2023) Exploring the dark side of AI: advanced phishing attack design and deployment using ChatGPT. In: *2023 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)*

[5] Salloum, S., Gaber, T., Vadera, S., Shaalan, K. (2022) A systematic literature review on phishing email detection using natural language processing techniques. *IEEE Access*, 10, 65703–65727

[6] Heiding, F., Schneier, B., Vishwanath, A., Bernstein, J., Park, P.S. (2024) Devising and detecting phishing emails using large language models. *IEEE Access*

[7] Qi, Q., Luo, Y., Xu, Y., Guo, W., Fang, Y. (2025) SpearBot: leveraging large language models in a generative-critique framework for spear-phishing email generation. *Information Fusion*

[8] Zhang, J., Wu, P., London, J., Tenney, D. (2025) Benchmarking and evaluating large language models in phishing detection for small and midsize enterprises: a comprehensive analysis. *IEEE Access*

[9] Siemerink, A., Jansen, S., Labunets, K. (2025) The dual-edged sword of large language models in phishing. In: *Secure IT Systems (NordSec 2024)*

[10] Alsuwaylimi, A. (2024) Enhancing Arabic phishing email detection: a hybrid machine learning based on genetic algorithm feature selection. *International Journal of Advanced Computer Science & Applications*, 15(8). https://doi.org/10.14569/IJACSA.2024.0150832

[11] Körpe, H., Akıncı, H., Çelik, B., Erdem, Ö., Gülserliler, E., Bahtiyar, Ş. (2025) A lightweight approach for phishing email detection in Turkish with LLMs. In: International Conference on Mobile Web and Intelligent Information Systems. Springer Nature, Cham, pp 189–200. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-02060-4_13

[12] Heiding, F., Lermen, S., Kao, A., Schneier, B., Vishwanath, A. (2024) Evaluating large language models' capability to launch fully automated spear phishing campaigns: validated on human subjects. *arXiv* preprint

[13] Zhou, B., Liu, J. (2025) Generative phishing URL detection based on large language model. In: *6th International Seminar on Artificial Intelligence, Networking and Information Technology (AINIT)*

[14] Liu, A., Feng, B., Xue, B., Wang, B., Wu, B., Lu, C., et al. (2025) *DeepSeek-V3 technical report*. arXiv preprint

[15] Ghabban, F. (2026) A novel hybrid machine and deep learning model for detecting Arabic phishing emails. *Journal of Computer Science*, 22(1), 171–184. https://doi.org/10.3844/jcssp.2026.171.184

[16] Alotaibi, A., Almasre, M., Surougi, H., Alkhozae, M., Alghanmi, N. (2026) Self-consistency and graph-based filtering to enhance synthetic Arabic SMS generation for smishing detection. *Journal of Applied Data Sciences*, 7(1), 357–383. https://doi.org/10.47738/jads.v7i1.1033

[17] Technology Innovation Institute (n.d.) *Introducing TII's Falcon perception*. https://falconllm.tii.ae/. Accessed 2026

[18] Zuo, J., Velikanov, M., Chahed, I., Belkada, Y., Rhayem, D.E., Kunsch, G., et al. (2025) *Falcon-H1: a family of hybrid-head language models redefining efficiency and performance*. arXiv preprint

[19] Hua, J., Wang, P., Lutchkus, P. (2024) How effective are large language models in detecting phishing. *Issues in Information Systems*, 25(3), 327–341

[20] Ji, F., Kim, D. (2025) How can we effectively use LLMs for phishing detection? *arXiv* preprint

[21] Jiang, A.Q., Sablayrolles, A., Mensch, A., Bamford, C., Chaplot, D.S., de las Casas, D., et al. (2023) *Mistral 7B*. arXiv preprint

[22] Braun, V., Clarke, V. (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3(2), 77–101. https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa

[23] Almazrouei, E., Alobeidli, H., Alshamsi, A., Cappelli, A., Cojocaru, R., Debbah, M., et al. (2023) *The Falcon series of open language models*. arXiv preprint. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2311.16867

[24] Malloy, T., Ferreira, M.J., Fang, F., Gonzalez, C. (2025) Training users against human and GPT-4 generated social engineering attacks. In: *HCI for Cybersecurity, Privacy and Trust*

[25] Bethany, M., Galiopoulos, A., Bethany, E., Karkevandi, M.B. (2025) Lateral phishing with large language models: a large organization comparative study. *IEEE Access*, 60684–60701

[26] AlAmeeri, A. (2026) *LLM-ZUthesis* [Data set]. GitHub. https://github.com/ioedvhsd/LLM-ZUthesis/