Research Square

Preprints are preliminary reports that have not undergone peer review.
They should not be considered conclusive, used to inform clinical practice,
or referenced by the media as validated information.

Gender Mainstreaming in Sustainability Science and Climate Policy Instruments

Hamza Khan

hamza.khan@slsh.edu.in

Deemed University)

Systematic Review

Keywords: gender mainstreaming, climate policy, nationally determined contributions, CEDAW, Sustainable Development Goals, just transition

Posted Date: September 22nd, 2026

DOI: https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-10883275/v1

License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Read Full License

Additional Declarations: No competing interests reported.

Abstract

Gender mainstreaming is now routine language in nationally determined contributions, voluntary national reviews, ESG frameworks, and sustainability science, yet the quality of that language is uneven. Existing counts of gender mentions document rising visibility. They do not test instruments against a legal standard of substantive equality. This article undertakes a doctrinal comparison of CEDAW General Recommendation No. 37, the enhanced Lima Work Programme and Belém Gender Action Plan, and an architectural account of four transposition types of national climate law, and specifies a directed content analysis of a bounded sample of NDCs and paired VNRs using an explicit ten-item grid and a four-level typology. Across the instrument record, gender language is widespread; budgets, sex-disaggregated indicators, land and tenure measures, unpaid care, gender-based violence, and decision rights are not. Most operational tools remain rhetorical or procedural. The article offers a typology, absent, rhetorical, procedural, transformative, that policymakers and assessors can apply, and draws implications for SDGs 5, 10, 13, and 16. If mainstreaming cannot be audited against redistribution of resources, authority, care, and entitlements, it is communication rather than governance.

1. Introduction

Gender has entered the routine vocabulary of climate and sustainability governance. The Paris Agreement records gender equality and the empowerment of women among the principles that should inform implementation; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has elaborated that commitment through the Lima Work Programme on Gender, its successive Gender Action Plans, and, most recently, the Belém architecture [1,2]. Parallel developments in human-rights law, notably the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women's General Recommendation No. 37 (CEDAW GR 37), treat climate change and disaster risk as sites of state obligation rather than as optional policy themes [3,4]. Nationally determined contributions (NDCs), voluntary national reviews (VNRs) under the 2030 Agenda, environmental, social and governance (ESG) frameworks, and sustainability-science assessments now regularly name "gender." That naming is not trivial. It registers a shift from the near-silence that characterised early climate instruments to a situation in which the absence of gender language is itself noteworthy [5–7].

The same period, however, has produced a more awkward finding. Increased textual presence has not been matched, in any stable way, by redistribution of resources, authority, care burdens, or legal entitlements. Analyses of climate institutions in industrialised states show that gender is still frequently rendered invisible, or reduced to the presence of women, by path-dependent organisational routines [2,8]. Reviews of climate policy and practice identify a durable set of assumptions, women as a homogeneous vulnerable group, gender equality as a women's issue, equality as a numbers game, that continue to organise programming even where gender is formally mainstreamed [9]. Comparative work on African NDCs documents recognition of differentiated risk alongside weak operational detail on finance, indicators, and sectoral design [5]. The Gender Equality and Climate Policy Scorecard, developed as an accountability device for the 2025 NDC round, translates that gap into a measurable pattern: many plans

now acknowledge gendered climate impacts and commit to some form of responsive action, yet far fewer address unpaid care, gender-based violence, health, or leadership in a comprehensive way [6]. The puzzle is therefore not whether gender appears. It is why appearance has outpaced transformation.

This paper treats that puzzle as a problem of policy technology rather than of insufficient awareness. Gender mainstreaming, as institutionalised after the Beijing Platform for Action, was conceived as a dual strategy: integration across all sectors together with targeted measures for equality [7,10]. In climate and sustainability instruments the integrative half has travelled further than the transformative half. Mainstreaming can raise coherence where it forces sectoral ministries to confront property, labour, data, and budgets [11,12]. It can also dilute equality into consultation clauses, focal-point mandates without money, vulnerability inventories, and disclosure metrics that reward the reporting of diversity rather than the reallocation of power [9,13–15]. Feminist political ecology has long insisted that environments are already gendered through access to land, knowledge, and work; social-reproduction scholarship shows that climate and green-transition policies which ignore unpaid care externalise costs onto those who already perform most of that labour [16–20]. When instruments treat gender as an add-on to otherwise unaltered energy, finance, and mitigation models, they reproduce that externalisation under the sign of inclusion.

The argument is therefore specific. Gender mainstreaming in climate and sustainability instruments has expanded visibility, mentions, checklists, female headcount, faster than it has produced substantive equality as defined by CEDAW GR 37 and by the process-and-coherence standard of the UNFCCC gender architecture [1,3,4]. Most operational tools remain procedural and additive. The paper tests that claim through three questions. First, how is “gender” defined and operationalised in sustainability assessments, ESG and just-transition texts, NDCs, and SDG reporting? Second, do those operationalisations meet a rights-based standard of substantive equality, or do they stop at presence, vulnerability, and consultation? Third, where instruments claim mainstreaming, which elements required by CEDAW GR 37 and by the Lima/Belém gender architecture are systematically missing?

The contribution is positioned for policy-usable research on gender mainstreaming in sustainability science and on the SDG–climate interface. It is not a global census of every Party text. It is a critical test of how gender is written into a bounded set of public instruments, measured against an explicit legal and institutional benchmark and an analytical typology that distinguishes absent, rhetorical, procedural, and transformative mainstreaming. That typology is offered as a device that reviewers and policymakers can apply, rather than as a scoring exercise that mistakes word counts for governance [6,9]. The current research is also concerned with a methodological question arising in sustainability science. An enumeration of the gender-related terminology present in the NDCs could easily reproduce the dilution which such an enumeration seeks to expose [9,13]. The evaluation of the quality of the process of operationalization, concerning data, budgets, tenure and care arrangements, decision-making rights, is a tougher question.

The analytical strategy consists of the following. The next part considers mainstreaming as a contested policy technology and articulates the working definition of transformative mainstreaming used throughout the paper. In turn, the doctrinal part derives the justiciable duties from CEDAW GR 37 and UNFCCC gender architecture. It develops a checklist of ten criteria for compliance. The Methods section describes the strategy of directed qualitative content analysis of the set corpus of NDCs and VNRs. Two results sections analyze, first, the representation of gender in NDCs and VNRs and, second, the relationship between such representation and the doctrine. The discussion part identifies mechanisms of dilution and pays attention to the few cases where mainstreaming remains a policy instrument. The conclusion draws out the implications for revision of NDC 3.0, VNRs, and sustainability assessment protocols. The evaluative standard, on which the whole paper relies, is legal and not prescriptive: mainstreaming can only be assessed according to substantive equality [3,4,6].

2. Conceptual frame: mainstreaming as tool or dilution

Gender mainstreaming became an internationally recognized approach with two dimensions. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action recommended to include gender perspective into all the planning processes and also ensure special initiatives to attain equality at the same time [10]. This twofold approach had consequences. Without target redistribution, integration would lead to submerging of women into the unchanged institutional arrangements; while without integration, target interventions could remain isolated, without affecting core budgets, legislation, and sectoral models. Adoption of the mentioned approach to climate governance came much later. Gender became an issue slowly and only then in the documents of the UNFCCC; in the work on institutionalizing climate governance, it became even slower especially in the Global North where path-dependent practices kept treating mitigation and energy as purely technical fields and social difference as a marginal issue [2,8,11]. Finally, when gender came into play (via Lima Work Programme, Gender Action Plans, preambular language of the Paris Agreement), it came as mainstreaming mandate [1,7]. The key problem of this paper is to define the results of this mandate being enshrined in the instruments.

Two approaches should be compared. According to the first one, mainstreaming is the means of improving coherence of policy. It includes the integration of gender analysis at the planning stage, sex-disaggregated indicators, gender-responsive budgeting, institutional coordination, which can increase the efficiency of climate policies by uncovering who uses energy, who possesses land, who does unpaid labor, and who is deprived of access to decision-making spaces [11,12]. Comparative studies of climate-resilient development show that trajectories of gender inequality are not accidental, but they shape exposure and risk distribution as well [21]. Where agencies have attempted even limited integration of social difference into climate documents, the attempt itself reveals how thinly those documents otherwise specify publics [8]. Just-transition research reaches a similar conclusion from the opposite direction: energy and coal transitions that ignore gender reproduce labour-market and care inequalities that then undermine the claim of justice [20,22,23]. In that sense mainstreaming is not an ethical ornament. It is a condition of accurate problem specification.

The second reading treats mainstreaming as a technology of dilution. Decades of implementation research show that the strategy is vulnerable to bureaucratisation: a gender unit without a mandate, a checklist without a budget, a consultation without influence, a “women and vulnerable groups” clause that ends analysis rather than beginning it [10,14]. Climate policy has been especially hospitable to four interlocking assumptions: that women are innately caring and close to nature; that women form a homogeneous vulnerable group; that gender equality is a women’s issue; and that equality is a matter of headcount [9]. Those assumptions essentialise characteristics, misdiagnose structural drivers, and generate strategies with counterproductive effects, including projects that add to women’s unpaid labour while celebrating their “participation” [9,13]. Virtue-and-vulnerability discourses, still common in North–South framings of climate, place women in the South as victims and women in the North as ethical consumers, and thereby deflect attention from property, class, race, and institutional power in all regions [13,24]. Feminist critics of climate governance have argued that a post-political, expert-administrative narrative of climate change further narrows the space in which such power can even be named [25,26]. Mainstreaming, under those conditions, becomes a way of appearing to act on gender without redistributing authority.

Feminist political ecology supplies the first theoretical anchor. Environments are not gender-neutral backgrounds onto which policy later stamps “social co-benefits.” They are already organised through property, labour, knowledge, and embodied risk [16,27]. Intersectionality makes that organisation visible as a relation among categories rather than as an additive list of vulnerable identities: climate impacts, responsibility for emissions, and standing in decision processes vary with gender as it is lived through class, race, caste, age, indigeneity, and location [18,28,29]. Critical climate justice extends the same point to scale and history. Unequal burdens are not unfortunate side-effects of a shared planetary crisis; they are produced through coloniality, racial capitalism, and governance arrangements that decide whose knowledge counts as adaptation [17,30]. Policy that records “women” as a stakeholder category while leaving land law, energy subsidies, and fiscal instruments intact is not a partial version of this analysis. It is a different analysis.

Social reproduction and care supply the second anchor. Climate change intensifies the work of sustaining people, households, and places: collecting water and fuel, nursing through heat and disease, rebuilding after extremes, and substituting for public services that fail under stress [19,31]. Women and girls already perform the larger share of unpaid care; climate and green-transition policies that ignore that distribution treat care as an infinite residual and thereby design mitigation and adaptation on a false labour account [19,31,32]. Research on just energy transitions finds the same omission at the heart of “green jobs” narratives, which recode inclusion as women’s entry into male-default technical sectors and leave social-reproduction costs uncounted [20,33]. ESG and sustainability reporting often complete the displacement. Gender appears as board diversity, workforce percentages, or a social key performance indicator, not as an account of ecological distribution, tenure, or unpaid time [15,34]. Disclosure can be compatible with non-redistribution. That compatibility is one mechanism through which mainstreaming remains neoliberal-friendly.

A working definition follows from the two anchors. Transformative mainstreaming, for the purposes of this paper, is present only where an instrument does four things at once: it names structural inequality rather than listing vulnerable groups; it assigns resources and authority rather than exhorting inclusion; it creates accountability, including review and some pathway of remedy; and it changes sectoral design in mitigation, energy, finance, and land, not only in adaptation or community projects. Anything less may still be politically useful. It is not transformative in the sense required by a substantive-equality standard.

The typology below operationalises that definition and is used to code later documents. It is deliberately coarse. Reviewers can test it; it is not a substitute for the ten-item doctrinal grid developed in the next section.

Level	Label	Typical markers
0	Absent	No gender language
1	Rhetorical	“Women and vulnerable groups”; one-line commitment; virtue or victim framing without duties
2	Procedural	Consultation, gender focal point, training, “will mainstream”; process without budget, indicators, or legal change
3	Transformative	Sex-disaggregated indicators plus budget line plus legal, tenure, care, or GBV measures plus decision rights that alter sectoral design

Level 3 requires the stated conjunction. A text with indicators and a budget line but without care, tenure, GBV, or decision rights remains Level 2; cells are not averaged up.

The typology is not a moral ranking of countries. It is a device for distinguishing vocabulary from obligation. Level 2 captures much of what climate institutions now congratulate themselves for having achieved: focal points, workshops, and gender paragraphs that leave energy statutes and finance windows unchanged [2,11]. Procedural markers are enabling when they are built to feed data, money, and authority into sector design; they are substituting when they are reported as the outcome [2, 14]. Level 3 is rare in the literature on NDCs, just-transition law, and sustainability reporting precisely because it requires the elements that mainstreaming-as-dilution is designed to avoid [5,6,15,20]. Holding the two readings in tension means refusing both cynicism and celebration. Mainstreaming can still be a tool. The conditions under which it becomes one are empirical, and they are stricter than the presence of the word gender.

3. Doctrinal standard: what “good” mainstreaming is required to do

The preceding section defined transformative mainstreaming as a quality of instruments. This section specifies the legal and institutional standard against which that quality is judged. The standard is composite. CEDAW GR 37 supplies a substantive-equality account of state duties in disaster risk reduction and climate policy [3,4]. The UNFCCC gender architecture supplies a process-and-coherence account of how Parties are expected to organise knowledge, participation, implementation, and

reporting [1,2]. National climate statutes sit between the two. They are the usual site at which treaty language is either transposed into duty or left as soft policy. Most commentary stops at the international texts. That omission matters, because an NDC gender paragraph cannot create entitlements that the domestic legal order does not recognise.

CEDAW GR 37 is not a slogan list. Issued in 2018, it is the first general recommendation in which the Committee treats climate change and disaster risk as structured threats to the enjoyment of Convention rights [3,4]. Three principles organise the text: equality and non-discrimination; participation and empowerment; accountability and access to justice [3]. Substantive equality here is not formal symmetry of rules. It requires states to identify and correct the historical and structural disadvantages that make climate and disaster impacts unequal, including those produced by intersecting discrimination [3,18]. Participation is likewise thicker than presence. The Committee requires that women, including those facing intersecting forms of exclusion, influence the design of disaster-risk and climate measures, not merely attend consultations or populate stakeholder annexes [3,4]. Accountability includes access to justice and remedies when mainstreaming fails. Data obligations follow: gender-responsive assessment, sex-disaggregated information, and monitoring that can support review. Policy coherence is itself a duty. Climate, disaster, and development instruments are not permitted to pull in opposite directions on women's rights [3].

GR 37 then clusters specific rights that climate and disaster policy must not treat as externalities: freedom from gender-based violence; education and information; work and social protection; health; an adequate standard of living, including housing; land and natural resources; and freedom of movement [3]. These clusters are the doctrinal reason unpaid care, tenure, GBV, and social protection appear later as coding items rather than as thematic preferences of the authors. A text that names women as a vulnerable group in an adaptation chapter, and is silent on land, violence, and social protection, is not a partial application of GR 37. It is a different theory of the problem [4,35]. The Recommendation is soft law in the strict sense that it is not a new treaty. It is hard guidance in the sense that it interprets existing Convention obligations and is used by the Committee in concluding observations and by advocates as a compliance benchmark [4,35]. That is the status this paper assigns it: a standard of assessment, not a claim that every NDC is already justiciable under CEDAW.

The UNFCCC track is complementary and thinner. Gender entered Convention practice slowly, against institutional inertia that still organises much climate work as if social difference were optional [2]. The Lima Work Programme on Gender (2014) created a dedicated space for gender balance and for integrating gender into Convention activities. The resulting Gender Action Plan became the guide for implementation. During COP 25, the Parties adopted the enhanced Lima Work Programme along with the Gender Action Plan that accompanies it (Decision 3/CP.25), adding additional details during the review period [1,2]. COP 29 extended the enhanced work programme for ten years (Decision 7/CP.29) and initiated an ongoing process of formulating a new Gender Action Plan. The Belém annex names care work, health, and violence against women and girls among implementation and knowledge activities. That does not collapse GR 37 into the UNFCCC track: Belém still does not create justiciable tenure or

energy duties [1, 3, 6]. These five priorities become a process standard. They require from Parties to develop knowledge systems, change delegation composition and decision-making bodies composition, align mandates, fund implementation, and report on progress. At the same time, these priorities do not require reform of the land laws, care policies, and energy laws. This feature becomes important. Parties can engage in dialogue in the framework of the Lima/Belém initiative - focal points, workshops, gender issues in the NDC - and still fall short of satisfying GR 37 rights clusters [2,6].

Coherence is the hinge between the two standards. GR 37 requires coherence across climate, disaster, and development policy because fragmented mandates produce discriminatory outcomes [3]. The UNFCCC architecture requires coherence among Convention bodies, the secretariat, and national implementation so that gender mandates are not isolated in a side workstream [1,2]. Empirical institutional research finds the opposite pattern in many settings: gender is recognised in high-level climate texts and dropped in energy, transport, and finance instruments; environment ministries and gender ministries work on separate clocks; just-transition language treats gender as labour-market inclusion and stops there [2,8,11,22]. Mainstreaming that cannot survive contact with a sectoral statute is procedural by definition.

National climate law is the missing middle. Doctrine that remains at treaty level cannot explain why two NDCs with similar gender vocabulary produce different obligations. A rights-explicit framework law can attach gender or just-transition clauses to mitigation pathways, adaptation finance, or participatory duties, and thereby give NDC language a domestic hook. A climate-ambitious framework that is silent on gender leaves NDC paragraphs as political text. A developing-country climate act that creates a gender focal mechanism without a budget institutionalises Level 2 mainstreaming: process is named, means of implementation are not. Just-transition legislation that treats gender only as women's entry into green jobs repeats the social-reproduction omission already documented in energy-transition research [20,22,23,33]. This paper does not pretend that a small set of statutes can represent the global legal field. It offers an architectural account of four transposition types (rights-explicit, gender-silent, mechanism-without-money, labour-only), to be illustrated with statutes when those exhibits are in hand. The point is architectural. Where climate acts create no duties, NDC gender paragraphs remain exhortation [5,6].

The two international standards and the national middle can be reduced to a ten-item compliance grid. The grid is the coding instrument for later documents. Each item is scored as present, partial, or absent, with quality distinguished from mention.

1. Definition of gender: women only; relational (women and men); or intersectional, including other axes of inequality [9,18,28].
2. Problem diagnosis: vulnerability inventory versus structural drivers such as property, labour, care, and institutional exclusion [9,13,16].

3. Participation quality: consulted as stakeholders versus decision-making power over design and budgets [3,6].
4. Sectoral integration: adaptation-only versus mitigation, energy, and finance as well [5,11,20].
5. Means of implementation: finance, technology, and capacity specified, including access for women's organisations [1,6].
6. Sex-disaggregated data and indicators tied to monitoring, not to a single baseline sentence [3,6].
7. Unpaid care and time poverty, including measures that reduce or redistribute care rather than add "women's projects" to existing loads [19,31,32].
8. Land, tenure, and resource rights, including inheritance and control, not only agricultural labour [3,16].
9. Gender-based violence and safety in climate and disaster response [3,4].
10. Accountability: targets, review, and some pathway of remedy when mainstreaming fails, including the possibility that CEDAW and UNFCCC reporting speak to each other [3,4,6].

Read together, the grid makes the mismatch that is this paper's empirical object. CEDAW GR 37 is a substantive-equality standard. The Lima/Belém architecture is a process-and-coherence standard. Most national instruments, and most NDCs written under them, will satisfy neither fully. An instrument may clear several UNFCCC process items, focal points, training, a gender paragraph, and still fail the rights clusters on care, tenure, GBV, and remedy. Conversely, a rights-explicit national clause that never appears in the NDC or the VNR is incoherent in the sense both standards condemn. The grid does not award a single score that replaces the Level 0–3 typology. It shows which elements produce the level assigned. That is the standard the methods section now applies to a bounded corpus.

4. Methods

The study is a directed qualitative content analysis of public climate and sustainable-development instruments, read against the doctrinal standard in Section 3 [36,37]. Codes were derived deductively from CEDAW GR 37, the Lima/Belém priority areas, the ten-item grid, and the Level 0–3 typology, then applied to a defined corpus. The design is not a systematic review of academic articles and not a global census of Parties. It is a critical test of how gender is written into operational texts. Directed analysis is appropriate because the categories are stipulated in advance by law and institutional mandate rather than induced from the corpus as if no standard existed [36]. Inductive codes are permitted only where a theme recurs and is not already captured by the grid, for example, Indigenous women or "green jobs for women", and are reported as additions, not as replacements for the deductively fixed items [36,37].

The corpus is frozen before coding. It comprises the latest available NDC (NDC 2.0 or 3.0) for between twelve and twenty Parties, stratified rather than sampled for convenience. Stratification criteria are: Annex I and non-Annex I status; high emitters and highly climate-vulnerable Parties; and at least two regions. For each selected Party, the latest Voluntary National Review that reports on SDG 5 and SDG 13 is included where one exists, producing a paired NDC–VNR set of eight to twelve reviews. Pairing is required by the coherence duty in both GR 37 and the UNFCCC architecture: the question is whether the

same state narrates gender in the same way when it speaks to the climate regime and when it speaks to the 2030 Agenda [3,6]. One optional add-on stream is permitted, not both: either a small set of ESG or just-transition policy papers, or a bounded window of sustainability-science articles. Coding NDCs, VNRs, ESG texts, and journal articles in a single paper would blur units and forfeit depth [15,34]. Documents are included only in English or in official English translations. Access dates, URLs, and version dates are recorded in a supplementary file. Official English translations can thicken gender language relative to the domestic statute; code the version used and record the language in the supplement.

The unit of analysis is the whole document, plus any dedicated gender section, plus sector chapters on energy, agriculture, forestry and other land use, water, and social protection. A mention in a preamble is not treated as equivalent to a costed measure in an energy chapter. This unit structure follows from the typology. Rhetorical mainstreaming often concentrates in chapeaux and cross-cutting paragraphs; transformative markers, if they exist, appear in sectoral design, indicators, and finance [5,6,9].

Coding records presence and quality. Each grid item is marked present, partial, or absent. Partial means a marker is named without the operational counterpart. Partial participation is consultation without design or budget authority. Partial data is a promise of disaggregation without an indicator owner. Partial finance is a gender-responsive principle without a line or access rule. Partial care is a mention of women's household roles without a measure that reduces or redistributes time [3, 6, 19]. Level 3 requires the conjunction stated in Section 2. Near-misses stay Level 2; cells are not averaged up. "Present" requires an operational commitment, an indicator, a budget line, a legal or institutional mechanism, or a specified decision right, not a synonym for women or vulnerability [6,9]. Each document is then assigned a single typology level. Level 3 requires the conjunction stated in Section 2: structural diagnosis, resources and authority, accountability, and sectoral redesign. Satisfaction of two grid items does not produce Level 3. Where two authors code, twenty per cent of the corpus is double-coded and simple agreement is reported. A solo coder codes the full set, waits, and recodes a subsample. Disagreements are resolved by returning to the extract, not by averaging impressions. Short excerpt tables in the findings preserve the language of the instruments so that readers can see the difference between rhetorical and transformative formulation.

The limitations are those of any small-n documentary study of political texts. English-language availability biases the corpus toward Parties that translate, and toward the register of international reporting rather than vernacular law. Documents are not implementation. An NDC that contains a gender-responsive budget line may not spend it; a VNR that reports sex-disaggregated indicators may not use them in energy planning. NDCs are diplomatic artefacts produced under tight cycles and donor templates; they overstate intention and understate conflict [5,6]. The sample cannot support prevalence claims about all Parties. It can support a structured comparison of operationalisation against a public standard. Feminist institutionalist and intersectional policy studies already show that what is written in climate institutions is itself a political outcome, not a neutral window on practice [2,8]. That is a reason to read the texts closely, not a reason to treat them as sufficient.

No human subjects are involved. All sources are public. A coding matrix, the codebook, inclusion criteria, and the document list with dates accessed will be deposited as a supplementary file, consistent with the data statement expected by Discover journals. The methods therefore do only what the research questions require: they make the standard auditable, the corpus inspectable, and the distinction between a mention and a measure reproducible.

5. Findings I, How gender is written: patterns in published instrument reviews

The patterns below are drawn from published NDC, VNR, and scorecard analyses [5, 6, 7, 9]. They illustrate the typology and grid. They are not scores from a corpus coded for this article. The published record on NDCs, climate-policy scorecards, and institutional analysis is consistent on one point and divided on its meaning. Gender language is now common. Depth is not. Analyses of African NDCs find widespread recognition that climate risk is differentiated by gender, together with weak specification of indicators, finance, and sectoral measures [5]. The Gender Equality and Climate Policy Scorecard, built to assess the 2025 NDC round against six dimensions of equality, reports that most reviewed plans now acknowledge gendered impacts or commit to some responsive action, while comprehensive treatment across economic security, unpaid care, health, gender-based violence, participation, and mainstreaming remains the minority pattern [6]. Those reviews are used here as external triangulation [5, 6]. That is a prevalence-versus-depth finding, not a regional curiosity. It is the empirical shape against which the typology in Section 2 was drawn.

Level 0 texts, those with no gender language, have become less typical in successive NDC cycles, especially among Parties that write under development-cooperation templates, but they have not disappeared, and silence remains more likely in mitigation-centred and high-emitting policy spaces than in adaptation chapters [5,6,11]. Level 1, rhetorical mainstreaming, is the modal improvement. Instruments place women in a list of “vulnerable groups,” record a one-line commitment to gender equality, or restate international language from the Paris Agreement and the SDGs without attaching a duty [9,13]. The sentence does political work. It signals alignment. It does not alter the energy, land, or finance model that follows.

Level 2, procedural mainstreaming, is the form in which contemporary climate institutions most often congratulate themselves. Focal points are named. Consultations are reported. Training is promised. Ministries “will mainstream” gender across programmes [2,6]. These markers matter because they are the UNFCCC process standard made visible in national text [1]. They remain Level 2 because they do not assign money, decision rights, or legal change. Institutional studies of climate agencies show why the form is sticky: path-dependent organisations can absorb a gender unit or a workshop cycle without revising the knowledge practices that treat mitigation as technical and gender as social [2,8]. Gender mainstreaming in environmental organisations has already been shown to operate as discipline, texts and routines that name gender while containing it [14]. NDC prose reproduces that containment.

Level 3 remains scarce in the instrument literature for the reason the definition requires conjunction. Sex-disaggregated indicators, a budget line, tenure or care or GBV measures, and authority over design do not travel together [6,19]. Where one appears, the others usually do not. Scorecard and NDC reviews find action concentrated on women's economic security and on generic mainstreaming language; unpaid care, GBV, health, and leadership are thinner; costing and climate finance with simplified access for women's organisations are thinner still [6,7]. That distribution is the opposite of a GR 37 cluster map.

Four frames organise most of the gender writing that does exist. The first is women as a vulnerable group. It is the oldest and still the most available [9,13]. It can be accurate as a description of differentiated harm. It becomes a frame, rather than a finding, when vulnerability is treated as a property of women rather than as an outcome of land law, care loads, mobility constraints, and exclusion from decision-making [16,18,28]. The second frame is women as stakeholders or beneficiaries: invited to consultations, targeted by projects, counted in outreach [5,6]. Presence substitutes for influence, which is precisely the distinction GR 37 refuses [3]. The third is women as agents. It is less common and, when it appears, is often confined to adaptation, agriculture, and household energy, leaving high-emission sectors in a male default [5,20,22]. Agency talk without tenure, finance, or decision rights is a refined Level 1. The fourth frame is gender as institutional process: focal points, gender action plans beside rather than inside sector models, capacity-building as the principal output [1,2]. Process is not empty. Without the rights clusters, it is not transformation.

What is systematically thin follows from those frames. Mitigation and energy chapters remain the weakest sites of operationalisation, even where adaptation text is relatively full [5,11,20]. Just-transition and coal-transition research reaches the same conclusion from sector studies: gender enters, if at all, as labour-market inclusion or as community vulnerability around extraction, not as a redesign of who owns, who is trained, who cares, and who decides [22,23,33]. Climate finance and costing rarely carry gender as a binding allocation rule [6]. Unpaid care and time poverty are near-absent as policy objects, despite robust evidence that climate stress increases care loads and that transition policies which ignore care externalise costs [19,31,32]. GBV and safety in disaster and climate response, explicit in GR 37, seldom appear as funded duties in national climate plans [3,6]. Tenure and inheritance are treated as background social facts rather than as climate-policy variables, against the central claim of feminist political ecology that property already genders the environment [16,27]. Intersectional categories beyond "women and youth" are thin. Instruments that list women, youth, and sometimes Indigenous peoples rarely specify how those categories combine, which is the move intersectional climate analysis requires [18,28,29].

VNRs and NDCs, when read as a pair, expose bureaucratic rather than conceptual coherence. SDG 5 chapters can speak the language of targets, legal reform, and unpaid care because that is the SDG 5 template. SDG 13 chapters in the same review often revert to emissions, adaptation projects, and disaster numbers, with gender confined to a cross-cutting sentence [6,7]. The reverse also occurs: an NDC that has absorbed Lima/Belém process language may have no counterpart in the VNR's climate chapter. GR 37's coherence duty and the UNFCCC coherence priority area both treat that split as a failure,

not as a division of labour [1,3]. Paired NDC–VNR coding is the test this design is built to run. Existing reviews already suggest the two documents often instantiate different theories of gender [6, 7].

Sustainability science and ESG reporting, where they are brought into view, repeat the pattern at a different scale. Gender in corporate and extractive sustainability reports clusters around women as employees and around board diversity. Broader intersectional and distributional accounts of land, care, and community harm are weak [15,34]. Reviews of gender in sustainability reporting show growth in disclosure and persistent narrowness in what counts as a gender issue [34]. More people and better reporting quality lead to higher ESG scores, and resource rights and free labor stay out of the list of metrics [15]. In other words, this is the metric substitution where the social dimension captures both presence and procedure instead of redistribution. It operates as the private governance version of Level 2. The same substitution appears in ESG disclosure, which this paper does not code as a primary stream [15, 34].

The language used in the reviews provides the proof. Such rhetorical sections appear usually in a form of a compound statement: climate change impacts women and other vulnerable groups more; the Party will take gender into account in its actions; women play an important role in the process of adaptation [5,6,9]. Transformative sections, as they can be found in the reviews, include a structural problem, target, beneficiaries and actors, for example, a commitment to sex-disaggregated metrics in a certain sector or the percentage of the budget for adaptation [6]. What is different is not the level of rhetoric, but auditability. The next section asks how far even the stronger sentences travel toward CEDAW GR 37 and the Belém priority areas.

6. Findings II, Doctrine versus instruments: what the published record shows

Whereas Section 5 discussed the inscription of gender in textual and institutional forms, the present section discusses the substantive importance of this inscription in light of CEDAW GR 37 and the Lima/Belém priority areas. The mismatch that occurs is systematic, not accidental. Instruments have adopted the language of UNFCCC process standards more quickly than they have taken on the obligations of substantive equality [1–4,6].

The first example of this is participation. Participation must be the right to influence design and not simply show up [3]. Lima/Belém priority area B requires full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership [1,2]. At the national level, what instruments deliver most often is the latter half of either: stakeholder lists, consultations, invitations to women's groups to attend NDC workshops, and gender focal points in environmental ministries [5,6]. While these might be marked as present in the process box in our analytical framework, they do not guarantee equal representation in decision-making bodies for allocating mitigation investments, fixing energy tariffs, or implementing land use decisions, nor are they a budgetary power for women's organizations [2,6]. The feminist institutionalism of climate agencies sees this as an organizational and not a rhetorical phenomenon: institutions can adopt the routine of

consultations without restructuring agenda control, keeping the association of gender with women and “social” mandates, leaving the technical path open [2,8]. In this case, participation without power is not the partial realization of GR 37 but compliance with a different norm.

Inconsistency in policies is the second systematic defect. GR 37 sees consistency across climate, disaster risk, and development policies as a duty because fragmentation leads to discrimination [3]. The UNFCCC architecture, similarly, sees coherence across the Convention bodies, national institutions, and United Nations processes related to the Convention as one of its priorities areas for the same reason [1]. However, national practice tends to fragment the mandate in accordance with ministries: gender ministries handle equality policies; environment ministries handle the NDC; energy and finance ministries run the instruments that attract investment and carbon [2,11]. Even where the discourse of just transition emerges, it tends to add gender to labor market inclusion rather than address care, land, and social protections through other statutes [20,22,38]. Such has been the interpretation of Indian policy’s climate track record: a prolonged debate about gender and development that does not integrate into climate planning [38]. Even the EU, which takes an active role in climate and equality, can at times turn its back on gender in climate policies due to the frames of crisis and security, competing mainstreaming mandates, and territorial disputes [11,39]. While an NDC expresses Lima’s language and the energy statute is silent, this is not a case of policy coordination delay but of working architecture as intended.

Means of implementation expose the same split in material form. Belém and the enhanced Gender Action Plan ask Parties to resource gender-responsive implementation and to treat finance, technology, and capacity as part of the gender mandate, not as a later add-on [1,6]. GR 37’s clusters on work, social protection, housing, land, and health cannot be met by unfunded paragraphs [3]. Instrument reviews find exhortation far more often than specification: gender-responsive climate finance is named; simplified access for women’s organisations, costed actions, and tagged budget lines are not [5,6]. Development-finance tracking has long shown how small a share of climate-tagged assistance also targets gender equality as a principal objective, which is the international counterpart of the domestic costing gap [7,11]. Capacity-building, by contrast, is abundant. It is the priority area that institutions can implement without reallocating sectoral money. Knowledge workshops populate priority area A; they do not discharge priority area D.

Accountability is the weakest cell on the grid. GR 37 requires review and access to justice when rights are harmed in disaster and climate response [3,4]. The UNFCCC monitoring-and-reporting priority area requires Parties to track gender-responsive action [1]. Neither standard is met by a gender paragraph that contains no target, no indicator owner, and no remedy if the paragraph is ignored. CEDAW reporting and UNFCCC reporting rarely speak to each other in national texts, so a state can receive concluding observations on GR 37 and file an NDC that does not register those observations as binding inputs [4,35]. Scorecards and shadow analyses have emerged precisely because official reporting does not make failure costly [6]. Absent a domestic duty and absent a remedy pathway, mainstreaming is self-assessed. Self-assessment is not accountability. Scorecards and shadow analyses have emerged

precisely because official reporting does not make failure costly [6]. The Scorecard's six dimensions overlap this grid; the table shows what the grid splits or adds.

Scorecard dimension	Grid item(s) this paper adds or splits
Economic security	4–5 (sector + means of implementation, including mitigation/energy)
Unpaid care	7
GBV	9
Health	folds into GR 37 clusters; not a separate grid cell
Participation/leadership	3 (consulted vs decision rights)
Mainstreaming	1–2, 6, 10
(not in Scorecard as standalone)	8 tenure; 10 remedy; 1 intersectional definition; 4 mitigation/energy

National law is the bottleneck that makes the other four failures durable. Where climate framework legislation creates no gender duty, the NDC cannot invent one. Soft policy can proliferate, strategies, action plans, focal mechanisms, while energy licensing, public procurement, social-protection eligibility, and land administration continue on another legal track [2,38]. A focal mechanism without a budget is the statutory form of Level 2. A just-transition law that defines fairness as support for male-dominated incumbent workforces, with women added as new labour supply, is the statutory form of the care omission [20,22]. Rights-explicit clauses exist in some jurisdictions and should not be discounted; they are the minority pattern that shows transposition is possible [6]. They also show the converse: without that hook, gender in the NDC remains a diplomatic register.

Read across the ten items, the pattern in published instrument studies is therefore not random under-performance. Definition collapses toward "women." Diagnosis collapses toward vulnerability. Participation collapses toward consultation. Sectoral integration stops at adaptation. Means of implementation remain hortatory. Data, care, tenure, GBV, and remedy are the cells most often empty [5,6,9,19]. Those empty cells are the GR 37 clusters. The filled cells are the Lima process markers. Mainstreaming is succeeding as vocabulary and stalling as obligation.

7. Discussion: when mainstreaming dilutes

These results do not suggest that the process of disseminating GM has stalled. Instead, they show that GM has been disseminated as a convertible technology. Convertible technologies persist because they satisfy both constituencies at once: advocates of equality get the language and a place in official documents, while sectoral ministries maintain control over the design, funding, and regulation of the policies [2,14]. Four factors facilitate this conversion.

The first factor is metric substitution. Metrics such as mentions, photos, counting of workshops, diversity ratios on the boards, and "gender responsiveness" of the initiatives substitute for any changes in resource allocation and control [9,15,34]. ESG disclosure represents the most recent example. Gender metrics may go up even though tenure issues, care burdens, and community vulnerabilities remain invisible from the perspective of these indicators [15,34]. Public instruments focus on the focal points and number of consultations. The metric is not wrong – it measures something real. It does not measure the right thing relative to GR 37 [3,6]. Once substituted metric becomes part of the institution, improved performance on the substituted metric can be counted as success.

The second factor is the essentialization of vulnerability. Women are presented as vulnerable subjects who are at greater risk, poor, more dependent on nature [9,13]. Such representation may be empirically accurate in some cases. However, as a policy theory it is highly problematic. It justifies protectionism and targeting without any accountability for those who own land, determine energy prices, participate in licensing boards, and manage unpaid care work [16,18,19]. It also continues to frame gender in terms of developing countries and adaptation concerns, which is one of the reasons why mitigation and high-emitting policy areas continue to be male-dominated in the same countries that articulate the commitments to equality [2,11,13]. Essentialism is efficient for drafters: in one clause you get the social dimension.

The third is projectization. Gender action plans, pilot livelihoods schemes, and capacity projects sit beside sector models rather than inside them [2,14]. Projectization is compatible with donor cycles and with ministries that will fund a women's climate project but will not reopen an electricity-market reform. It produces visible activity and leaves the production function of emissions and adaptation unchanged. Feminist political ecology treats that beside-ness as political: the environment continues to be governed through existing property and knowledge regimes, with gender assigned to the project envelope [16,27].

The fourth is neoliberal compatibility. Diversity in green markets, women's entrepreneurship, and inclusion in renewable value chains can be celebrated without land reform, without social protection, and without a public care infrastructure [20,32,38]. The just-transition slogan is especially exposed to this mechanism. If transition means moving male industrial labour into new technical jobs and adding women to the labour supply, care remains an unpaid subsidy to decarbonisation [19,20,22]. Mainstreaming then becomes a way of making inequality investable.

Mainstreaming remains a tool in a minority of configurations, and those configurations are specific. Instruments that approach Level 3 do not rely on a more eloquent chapeau. They attach costed actions to named sectors, create a legal hook in climate or sectoral law, build data systems that can be audited, and give women's organisations a role in design rather than in validation workshops [6,7]. The Scorecard's value for this paper is triangulation, not authority: where independent coding finds commitments across care, GBV, leadership, and finance together, the typology predicts a different politics than where only economic-security projects appear [6]. Institutional openings matter. New work programmes, litigation, and crisis conjunctures can unsettle path dependence, but only if they are used

to rewrite sectoral rules rather than to add another plan [2,8]. There is no evidence in the instrument literature that workshops alone produce that rewrite.

Sustainability science is implicated in dilution when it treats word counts in NDCs as a finding about equality. Counting is a legitimate first description of visibility. As an evaluation of mainstreaming it repeats metric substitution and gives journals and policymakers the same cheap signal that instruments already give themselves [9,13]. Assessments that report a typology level, and that publish the grid cells that produced it, ask whether the text can be audited against substantive equality. That is a different scientific object. It is also closer to what directed content analysis can validly claim [36].

The SDG implications follow. Co-benefits between SDG 5 and SDG 13 are asserted more often than they are designed. A VNR that reports progress on legal equality and a climate chapter that never touches care, tenure, or participation is not a co-benefit. It is two bureaucracies sharing a cover page [6,7]. SDG 10 is engaged only if distribution, land, time, finance, is specified. SDG 16 is the binding constraint. Without institutions that can review, disclose, and remedy, gender clauses have no owner. Strong institutions are not a complement to mainstreaming. They are the condition under which mainstreaming is distinguishable from communication.

8. Conclusion

Gender mainstreaming in climate and sustainability instruments has expanded visibility faster than it has redistributed resources, authority, care burdens, or legal entitlements. Measured against CEDAW GR 37 and against the Lima/Belém architecture, most operational tools remain procedural and additive: they name women, convene consultations, and promise integration, while leaving mitigation pathways, finance windows, land rules, and unpaid work untouched [3,6,9]. That is the claim this paper specifies how to test. Mainstreaming here is a policy technology that can organise coherence. In the instruments examined in the literature and specified for this corpus, it more often converts equality into a checklist.

Three implications follow. For NDC 3.0 revision, Parties should not be assessed by whether gender appears. They should be assessed by whether sector chapters on energy, land, and finance carry sex-disaggregated indicators, costed measures, tenure and care provisions where relevant, and decision rights that can be audited [5,6]. A gender paragraph in the preamble without those attachments is Level 1, regardless of length. For VNR methodology, SDG 5 and SDG 13 should be required to use the same theory of gender. A review that reports legal equality and unpaid care under Goal 5 and reverts to gender-blind climate metrics under Goal 13 fails the coherence duty in both GR 37 and the UNFCCC architecture [1,3]. For sustainability-assessment protocols, including ESG and science-policy assessments, the unit of reporting should be typology level and grid cells, not mention rates. Word counts reproduce the dilution they describe [9,15,34].

The next empirical step is not another inventory of vocabulary. It is to pair the documentary grid with budget and execution data: whether tagged finance was spent, whether indicators entered energy and

land administration, whether focal points had authority. Documents remain necessary. They are not sufficient.

The standard can be stated without hedging. If mainstreaming cannot be tested against substantive equality, against resources, rights, care, tenure, safety, and remedy, it is communication, not governance [3,4,6].

The test is the ten-item grid applied to public instruments, or offered for others to apply. GR 37 remains an assessment standard, not a claim that courts will use this grid [3, 4].

Declarations

Author contributions

The author conceived, researched, and wrote the manuscript. All work, including analysis and final approval.

Funding

No funding was received for this research.

Data availability

Not Applicable.

Ethics approval and consent to participate

This article does not involve studies with human participants or animals that would require formal ethical approval. Not applicable, No human participants were involved, and no informed consent was required.

Consent for publication

The author has reviewed the final manuscript and consents to its publication.

Competing interests

The author declares no competing interests.

References

1. Flavell J. (2023). *Mainstreaming gender in global climate governance: Women and Gender Constituency in the UNFCCC*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003306474
2. Magnusdottir GL, Kronsell A. Climate institutions matter: The challenges of making gender-sensitive and inclusive climate policies. Cooperation Confl. 2024;59(3):361–78.

https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367241230011.

3. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. (2018). General Recommendation No. 37 (2018) on the gender-related dimensions of disaster risk reduction in the context of climate change. *International Human Rights Law Review, 7*(2), 274–307. https://doi.org/10.1163/22131035-00702006
4. Mayrhofer M. Gender (in)equality, disaster and human rights – The CEDAW Committee and General Recommendation 37. Yearbook Int Disaster Law. 2018;1(1):233–57. https://doi.org/10.1163/26662531-01001012.
5. Nkem JN, et al. Gender in the nationally determined contributions of African countries: A way forward for effective implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies. Ecofeminism Clim Change. 2021;2(1). https://doi.org/10.1108/EFCC-01-2021-0001.
6. Tabbush C, Howell B. (2025). Gender Equality and Climate Policy Scorecard: A framework for assessing country performance on gender-responsive climate action 30 years after Beijing. *Global Social Policy*. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/18747655251371005
7. Huyer S, et al. Can we turn the tide? Confronting gender inequality in climate policy. Gend Dev. 2020;28(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2020.1836817.
8. Singleton BE, Rask N, Magnusdottir GL, Kronsell A. Intersectionality and climate policy-making: The inclusion of social difference by three Swedish government agencies. Environ Plann C: Politics Space. 2022;40(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/23996544211005778.
9. Lau JD, Kleiber D, Lawless S, Cohen PJ. Gender equality in climate policy and practice hindered by assumptions. Nat Clim Change. 2021;11(3):186–92. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-00999-7.
10. Alston M. Gender mainstreaming and climate change. Women's Stud Int Forum. 2014;47:287–94. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2013.01.016.
11. Allwood G. Mainstreaming gender and climate change to achieve a just transition to a climate-neutral Europe. J Common Mark Stud. 2020;58(S1):173–86. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13082.
12. Lam S, et al. Greener through gender: What climate mainstreaming can learn from gender mainstreaming. WIREs Clim Change. 2024;15(4):e887. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.887.
13. Arora-Jonsson S. Virtue and vulnerability: Discourses on women, gender and climate change. Glob Environ Change. 2011;21(2):744–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.01.005.
14. Arora-Jonsson S, Sijapati BB. Disciplining gender in environmental organizations: The texts and practices of gender mainstreaming. Gend Work Organ. 2018;25(3):309–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/gwao.12195.
15. Lesnikov P, Kunz NC, Harris LM. Gender and sustainability reporting – Critical analysis of gender approaches in mining. Resour Policy. 2023;81:103273. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2022.103273.
16. Gonda N. Re-politicizing the gender and climate change debate: The potential of feminist political ecology. Geoforum. 2019;106:87–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.07.020.

17. Sultana F. Critical climate justice. Geographical J. 2022;188(1):118–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12417.
18. Kaijser A, Kronsell A. Climate change through the lens of intersectionality. Environ Politics. 2014;23(3):417–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2013.835203.
19. Floro MS. Climate change, care provisioning, and inequality: Transitioning towards a sustainable economy. Oxf Rev Econ Policy. 2025;41(3–4):1020–32. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graf032.
20. Caretta MA, Vela-Almeida D. Just energy transition and gender: A systematic review for feminist research. Energy Res Social Sci. 2025;126:104138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2025.104138.
21. Andrijevic M, Crespo Cuaresma J, Lissner T, Thomas A, Schwerhoff G. Overcoming gender inequality for climate resilient development. Nat Commun. 2020;11:6261. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19856-w.
22. Walk P, Braunger I, Semb J, Brodtmann C, Oei P-Y, Kemfert C. Strengthening gender justice in a just transition: A research agenda based on a systematic map of gender in coal transitions. Energies. 2021;14(18):5985. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14185985.
23. Mohr K. Breaking the dichotomies: Climate, coal, and gender. Paving the way to a just transition. Ex Colombia Energies. 2021;14(17):5457. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14175457.
24. Arora-Jonsson S. Forty years of gender research and environmental policy: Where do we stand? Women's Stud Int Forum. 2014;47:295–308. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2014.02.009.
25. MacGregor S. Only resist: Feminist ecological citizenship and the post-politics of climate change. Hypatia. 2014;29(3):617–33. https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12065.
26. MacGregor S. Gender and climate change: From impacts to discourses. J Indian Ocean Region. 2010;6(2):223–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2010.536669.
27. Nightingale AJ. Urban climate change and feminist political ecology. In: Castán V, Broto E, Robin, While A, editors. Climate urbanism. Manchester University; 2023. https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526168016.00016.
28. Djoudi H, Locatelli B, Vaast C, Asher K, Brockhaus M, Sijapati BB. Beyond dichotomies: Gender and intersecting inequalities in climate change studies. Ambio. 2016;45(3):248–62. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-016-0825-2.
29. Amorim-Maia AT, Anguelovski I, Chu E, Connolly J. Intersectional climate justice: A conceptual pathway for bridging adaptation planning, transformative action, and social equity. Urban Clim. 2022;41:101053. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.uclim.2021.101053.
30. Sultana F. The unbearable heaviness of climate coloniality. Political Geogr. 2022;99:102638. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2022.102638.
31. Himmelweit S. Care as investment in infrastructure. Oxf Rev Econ Policy. 2025;41(3–4):688–701. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graf034.
32. Kabeer N. A foundational asymmetry: Gender, unpaid care work, and the market economy. Oxf Rev Econ Policy. 2025;41(3–4):702–17. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graf052.

33. Johnson OW, Han JYC, Knight A-L, et al. Intersectionality and energy transitions: A review of gender, poverty and power. Energy Res Social Sci. 2020;70:101774. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101774.
34. Ojeda L et al. (2025). Gender equality in sustainability reporting: A systematic literature review. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.3089
35. Nifosi-Sutton I. CEDAW's General Recommendation 37: A sweeping reconceptualization of women's rights in the climate crisis and a tool to assess state's compliance with them. Am Univ J Gend Social Policy Law. 2025;33(3):271.
36. Hsieh H-F, Shannon SE. Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. Qual Health Res. 2005;15(9):1277–88. https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732305276687.
37. Elo S, Kyngäs H. The qualitative content analysis process. J Adv Nurs. 2008;62(1):107–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2648.2007.04569.x.
38. Shrivastava MK, Arora-Jonsson S, Michael K. Gender and India's climate policy: Bridging the disconnects. In: Arora-Jonsson S, Michael K, Shrivastava MK, editors. Just transitions: Gender and power in India's climate politics. Routledge; 2023. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003048374-4.
39. Allwood G. EU external climate policy. In: Magnusdottir GL, Kronsell A, editors. Gender, intersectionality and climate institutions in industrialised states. Routledge; 2021. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003052821-4.