

Beyond Political Dynasties: The Modalities of Non-Dynastic Candidates Winning 2024 Banten Province Regional Head Elections

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Abstract

This research aims to analyze the Modalities of Non-Dynastic Candidates Who Won the 2024 Banten Provincial Election. This study employs a qualitative research design with an interpretive-descriptive approach. NVivo 12 Plus software is used for data analysis and management. The findings of this study indicate that Andra Soni's victory in the 2024 Banten Regional Election cannot be explained deterministically solely through personal popularity factors or symbolic closeness to the national center of power. Conversely, the results of this study indicate that this victory was the product of the convergence and conversion of three types of capital: social capital, political capital, and economic capital, which worked simultaneously, structurally, and mutually reinforcing. In the contest against Airin Rachmi Diany, who represents the political dynasty of Ratu Atut Chosiyah, Andra Soni successfully presented a non-dynastic political model based on collective networks, institutionalization of power, and relatively accountable resource management. The implications of this research are to enrich the literature on regional elections and dynastic politics in Indonesia through empirical evidence that social capital based on collective networks and institutional political capital can outperform dynastic capital, even when the dynasty has historical, symbolic, and proximity advantages to the national center of power.

INTRODUCTION

Following the presidential and legislative elections, the General Election Commission (KPU) will hold simultaneous regional head elections (Pilkada) on Wednesday, November 27, 2024, in 37 provinces, 415 districts, and 93 cities across Indonesia. The Pilkada itself is held to elect regional heads at the provincial, district/city levels (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2024). Regional elections are regulated by Law (UU) Number 6 of 2020 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors. The implementation of regional elections is regulated by the General Election Commission (KPU) and assisted by the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu). The stages of the 2024 Regional Head Elections are outlined in the General Election Commission Regulation (PKPU) Number 2 of 2024, which concerns the Stages and Schedule for the Election of Governors and Deputy Governors, Regents and Deputy Regents, as well as Mayors and Deputy Mayors in 2024.

In the context of the Regional Head Elections in Banten Province, the General Election Commission (KPU) has determined two candidate pairs for the 2024 Banten Governor and Deputy Governor Election: Airin Rachmi Diany-Ade Sumardi, supported by the Golkar Party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the National Awakening Party (PKN), the Labor Party, the Crescent and Star Party (PBB), the Gelora Party, and the Ummat Party; and Andra Soni-Dimyati Natakusuma, supported by the NasDem Party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the National Mandate Party (PAN), the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Gerindra Party, the United Development Party (PPP), the Democratic Party, the Garuda Party, and the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) (Joniansyah, 2024).

An interesting empirical phenomenon occurred in the Banten Provincial election: a candidate who is part of a political dynasty, Airin Rachmi Diany, lost to the non-dynastic candidate, Andra Soni (Table 1) (Amana, 2024). However, in electability surveys conducted by several institutions (Indikator, LSI, and Litbang Kompas) before the regional elections were held, Airin Rachmi Diany was the highest with an average score of 60-70% compared to Andra Soni, who only scored 30-40% (CNNIndonesia, 2024). In fact, a Kompas Research and Development (Litbang) electability survey conducted in mid-July (4 months before the regional elections) showed a stark contrast. This is because Andra Soni was recorded as having no electability in Banten at that time. Meanwhile, Airin was recorded as having the highest electability at 38.3 percent (CNNIndonesia, 2024).

Furthermore, the accusation that Airin Rachmi Diany is part of a political dynasty in Banten is often linked to her family connections. This is because Airin Rachmi Diany is the wife of Tubagus Chaeri Wardana, also known as Wawan, who is the younger brother of Ratu Atut. Ratu Atut Chosiah was the former Governor of Banten, serving for two terms (2007–2014) before being implicated in a corruption case. Meanwhile, Wawan and Ratu Atut are the sons of the Banten champion named Chasan Sochib. Chasan Sochib's name has been prominent since the New Order era. This is because since 1967, Chasan Sochib has been a supplier of logistical needs for the Siliwangi Division of the army. Additionally, Chasan Sochib was also designated as an informal leader affiliated with the Golkar party(Arief, 2024).

Table 1. Banten Regional Election Vote Count 2024

No	Candidate	Vote
1	Airin Rachmi Diany-Ade Sumardi	2.449.183
2	Andra Soni-Dimyati	3.102.501
3	Suara Tidak Sah	356.492
Total		5.908.176

Source: (KPU RI, 2024)

The candidate pair for governor and deputy governor number 1, Airin Rachmi Diany and Ade Sumardi, have been confirmed to have lost the 2024 Banten gubernatorial election (Table 1). Airin-Ade garnered only 2,449,183 votes, or 44.12%. Meanwhile, candidate pair number 2, Andra Soni-Dimyati Natakusumah, led with 3,102,501 votes, representing 55.8% of voters. This is the result of the vote tabulation for the 2024 Banten gubernatorial election conducted by the Banten KPU on Saturday (December 7, 2024). Voter turnout in the 2024 Banten gubernatorial election reached 66.05%. This figure represents an increase compared to the 2017 Banten regional election, which recorded 62.02% (KPU RI, 2024). The defeat of Airin Rachmi Diany-Ade Sumardi also signifies the downfall of the Atut Dynasty, which has dominated Banten politics for the past few decades (Mantalean, 2025).

This phenomenon is unusual because political trends indicate that the political dynasty capital possessed by candidates in electoral processes tends to lead to victory. This is confirmed by research Dal Bó et al., (2009) Documenting dynastic patterns in the US Congress provides strong evidence that family ties increase the chances of obtaining a political seat. The transmission of political capital through access to resources, networks, and reputation creates an electoral advantage for political families. Similarly, research by Mendoza et al., (2016, 2022); Querubin, (2016) Explains political dynasties in the Philippines. Incumbent victories significantly increase the probability of family members (next generation/relatives) winning office in the future. Causal evidence that dynastic capital helps reproduce political power. Then, the prevalence of political dynasties in the Philippines and its relationship to economic structures (wealth, poverty) highlights that economic wealth/capital and business networks often reinforce family electoral advantages.

Based on the findings of previous research, this study aims to fill the knowledge gap by hypothesizing that the political dynasty's capital in electoral contests can be overcome by other dimensions, namely a combination of social, political, and economic capital. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the Modality of Non-Dynastic Candidates Who Won in the 2024 Banten Provincial Regional Head Election.

LITERATURE REVIEW: Modality in Political Contestation

Regional head elections are a procedural and substantial democratic process where people/figures are chosen, and victory is determined by the highest number of votes at the regional level (Syafei & Darajati, 2020). In a democracy, all citizens have equal opportunities to run for regional head, with considerable freedom to form political organizations, express their political aspirations, and compete for elected public office positions. However, on an empirical level, these opportunities are actually different for each person because the capital possessed by each individual in direct regional elections is, in reality, varied (Baharuddin & Purwaningsih, 2017).

The main assets that candidates must possess to participate in the direct local elections are social capital, political capital, and economic capital. The candidate pair for regional head has a high chance of being elected if they have accumulated more than one asset. The more assets the candidate pair can accumulate, the higher their chances of being elected as regional head will be. The chance of a candidate pair being elected is part of a complex process, so it cannot be said to be the result of just one factor or a specific modality (Baharuddin & Purwaningsih, 2017).

Bourdieu & Richardson, (1986), define social capital as "the actual and potential resources possessed by an individual derived from institutionalized social networks and sustained through mutual recognition and acquaintance (membership in social groups), which provide their members with various forms of collective support." The social capital is interconnected, encompassing economic, cultural, and other forms of social capital. Then, political capital can be understood as a type of currency used to mobilize voters, achieve policy reforms, or reach other political goals (Szűcs & Strömberg, 2006). Meanwhile, according to Casey, (2008) political capital is the utilization of all types of capital possessed by a political actor or a political institution to produce beneficial political

actions or strengthen the position of the political actor or institution in question. Similarly, according to Field, (2016) political capital is the utilization of all types of capital possessed by a political actor or a political institution to produce beneficial political actions or strengthen the position of the political actor or institution in question. Political capital refers to an individual's power to act politically, which is generated through participation in interactive political processes (Sørensen & Torfing, 2003).

Furthermore, economic capital holds significant meaning as the "driver" and "lubricant" of the political machinery in use. For example, during an election campaign, a large amount of money is needed to finance various expenses, such as printing posters, banners, and advertisements, as well as other miscellaneous costs. Even economic capital can be a major prerequisite when the candidate does not come from the party that nominated them (Yun, 2021).

METHODS

Research Types and Approaches

This research employs a qualitative research design with an interpretive-descriptive approach (Creswell, 2016). This research uses a qualitative research design with an interpretive-descriptive approach. The choice of this method is based on the research objective of analyzing the modalities of non-dynastic candidates who won the 2024 Banten Provincial Election. The interpretive paradigm allows researchers to understand social and political reality as something constructed through the perceptions, interactions, and contextual interests of the actors (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2013). This research also uses a case study approach. The case study for this research is the 2024 Banten Provincial Election. The case study approach is suitable for exploring complex political phenomena in real-life contexts.

Data Sources and Collection

This research primarily relies on qualitative data obtained from primary and secondary sources. Primary data was collected through publicly available statements reported by reputable online news media, such as [kompas.com](#) (10 news articles), [cnnindonesia.com](#) (8 news articles), [liputan6.com](#) (6 news articles), [tempo.co](#) (10 news articles), [detiknews.com](#) (7 news articles), [tvonenews.com](#) (4 news articles), [republika.com](#) (4 news articles), and [antaranews.com](#) (6 news articles). The selection of this news content is based on its relevance to the research topic being studied. Meanwhile, the reason for choosing that online news channel is that it is a major mainstream media outlet in Indonesia. Then, secondary data were obtained from Official documents of the candidate pairs, reports, and databases of the General Election Commission (KPU) regarding candidate registration and election results, as well as relevant journal articles. These materials serve to triangulate the data, making it valid and unbiased.

Data Analysis

This research uses NVivo 12 Plus software for data analysis. The data analyzed using NVivo 12 Plus come from both primary and secondary data sources. NVivo 12 plus is an application used to process and analyze qualitative data more effectively and efficiently (Edhlund & McDougall, 2018). The features used in Nvivo 12 Plus in this study are crosstab query, project maps, and word frequency. The analysis process uses NVivo 12 Plus. First, news data is collected and downloaded using the ncapture feature in the Chrome extension. Second, the downloaded data is then imported into the NVivo 12 Plus software. Third, nodes and cases are created in NVivo 12 Plus. Fourth, data coding is done manually using the created nodes and cases. Then, the analysis was performed using the cross-query feature. Fifth, the word frequency feature, main map, and project map are used from the available data. Sixth, the analysis results, presented in the form of visualizations, are downloaded and included in the manuscript.

RESULTS

Social Capital: Social Interaction and Social Networks

In the context of the 2024 Banten Regional Head Election, the competition between Andra Soni and Airin Rachmi Diany can be understood as a contest between network-based social capital and political dynasty-based social capital. Airin represents the political dynasty of Queen Atut Chosiyah, which has dominated the power structure in Banten for over two decades. Conversely, Andra Soni emerged as a non-dynastic figure who relied on the accumulation of social capital from the grassroots, primarily through social networks and community organizations. The research data in Figure 1 shows that the social network relationship variable supports Andra Soni's social capital at 66%, while direct social interaction with the community contributes 33%. This composition confirms that

Andra's success does not primarily rely on individual personal relationships, but rather on the ability to consolidate a broad and organized collective network.

The social interaction variable describes the intensity and quality of the direct relationship between Andra Soni and the people of Banten. A value of 33% indicates that, although not a dominant factor, this dimension still plays a significant role in building Andra's social legitimacy as a "people's person." Andra Soni is widely known as a local politician who rose from the grassroots, with a track record as the Speaker of the Banten Regional People's Representative Council, and frequently visits villages and rural areas to gather people's aspirations. This approach fosters social trust, particularly among voters who are disillusioned with elite politics and dynastic symbols. Andra's personal narrative as an "ordinary citizen" with a long political journey became symbolic capital that strengthened this social interaction (Rifa'i, 2024). However, quantitatively, the contribution of this social interaction is relatively limited compared to the network's overall strength. This is understandable because the Banten Regional Head Election covers a large area with a large number of voters, so face-to-face interaction has limitations in reach and effectiveness.

Meanwhile, the social network relationship variable holds the most dominant position with a value of 66%. This finding suggests that Andra Soni's social capital is both structural and institutional, rather than merely personal and relational. The social networks in question include relationships with mass organizations, village head organizations, political party networks, volunteers, and local power centers that operate simultaneously. Andra Soni received widespread support from the network of village heads and the Association of Village Government (Apdesi) in several strategic regions in Banten. Andra's presence in official village head forums and open support from some village actors indicate that this network functions as an agent of political mobilization at the grassroots level (Ridho, 2024).

Additionally, the network of mass organizations and volunteers consolidated through the party machine of the Indonesia Maju Coalition (KIM) Plus strengthens the reach of Andra's campaign. The support of the national elite, especially President Prabowo Subianto and Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, not only served as a symbolic endorsement but also activated the long-established socio-political networks in Banten (Tempo.co, 2024). The dominance of the social network variable (66%) explains why the Airin dynasty's strength is no longer adequate. Political dynasties tend to rely on exclusive social capital that circulates within family circles and the old elite. Meanwhile, Andra Soni successfully built inclusive and fragmented social capital, reaching villages, mass organizations, volunteers, and even cross-ideological party networks. Quick count and real count data, showing Andra Soni's victory in the range of 55–57%, confirm the effectiveness of this strategy, even though Airin's initial electability was much higher in pre-election surveys (CNNIndonesia, 2024). Thus, the findings of this study indicate that the shift in voter preferences in Banten is more influenced by social network activity than by loyalty to political dynasties.

Overall, the research findings indicate that Andra Soni's social capital in the 2024 Banten Regional Head Election is network-centric, with a dominant portion of relationships with mass organizations and social networks (66%), supplemented by direct social interaction with the community (33%). This combination resulted in an effective model of political mobilization that challenged and even overthrew the long-established political dynasty in Banten. This finding also confirms that, in the context of contemporary Indonesian local politics, network-based social capital can outperform dynastic social capital, particularly when supported by power fragmentation and shifting voter preferences.

Political Capital: Political Experience, Support from Political Elites, Campaign Team, and Campaign Strategy

Andra Soni's political capital in the 2024 Banten Regional Election is formed from the accumulation of political experience, support from political elites, the strength of his campaign team, and an integrated and effective campaign strategy. Although Andra Soni was not initially recorded as having a significant electability rate compared to Airin Rachmi Diany as a representative of the Banten political dynasty in various surveys, the data network in Figure 2 shows that Andra Soni has a strong political capital foundation and is working structurally. This political capital is not merely personalistic, but is inherent in his position and role within formal political institutions and a broad network of power, both at the regional and national levels.

From a political experience perspective, Andra Soni has a relatively long and strategic track record within the government and political party structures. Before running as a gubernatorial candidate, he served as the Chairman of the Banten Province Gerindra Party Regional Executive Board (DPD) and also as the Chairman of the Banten Province Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) for the 2019–2024 term (Pertivi, 2024). This position gives Andra Soni political and administrative legitimacy as an actor who understands the dynamics of local government and the mechanisms of political decision-making. The data network in Figure 2 illustrates a direct connection between Andra Soni's political experience and members and leaders of the legislative body in Banten,

thereby strengthening his ability to build cross-regional political consolidation. This experience became a valuable asset for building trust among the elite and voters, while also distinguishing him from the "newcomer" narrative often associated with him.

Regarding the aspect of political elite support, the research findings indicate that Andra Soni received firm and coordinated support from both national and local elites. The data network in Figure 2 shows nodes of political elite support connected to various supporting parties, such as Gerindra, PKS, Demokrat, NasDem, PAN, PKB, PSI, PPP, and Golkar. Empirically, political elite support operates on two levels: first, the national elite, particularly the President of the Republic of Indonesia and also the General Chairman of Gerindra, Prabowo Subianto (Fraksigerindra.id, 2024). Prabowo's open endorsement—through campaign videos and direct statements—created what many observers refer to as the Prabowo Effect. This support provides both symbolic legitimacy and a strong political signal to the party machine and voters. The support of President Prabowo Subianto as Chairman of the Gerindra Party was the most significant factor in building Andra Soni's symbolic and political legitimacy. Prabowo's endorsement not only served as moral support but also as a political signal to the party machinery and local actors to work to the fullest extent. Second, party elites and local elites, such as Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, are said to have played an active role in consolidating the DPRD network and party structure down to the grassroots level. Dasco was even identified as the political mentor of Andra Soni and a central figure in driving the machinery of the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (KIM) Plus in Banten. The role of strategic elites, such as Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, in consolidating party and legislative networks in Banten demonstrates that elite support for Andra Soni is active and operational, rather than merely a political formality (Tempo.co, 2024).

Next, from the campaign team's perspective, the research findings indicate that Andra Soni's winning structure was designed in a hybrid manner, combining the strengths of both the party team and the non-party team. In the data network shown in Figure 2, the campaign team serves as the central node connecting the political coalition team and non-partisan teams, including volunteers and public figures. The appointment of Raffi Ahmad as the Head of the Winning Team strengthens the popularity and political communication dimensions of Andra Soni, especially in reaching non-partisan and young voters (Gerindra.id, 2024). Empirically, the presence of Raffi Ahmad as the Head of the Winning Team is a significant finding. Raffi serves as a vote mobilizer through his popularity and media appeal, and as a bridge between the political elite and non-partisan voters. Successful teams not only play a role in mobilizing votes but also in maintaining coalition solidarity and ensuring consistency in political work from the beginning to election day. This synergy between the party structure, volunteers, and public figures creates significant electoral momentum on the ground.

Regarding the campaign strategy aspect, the research findings indicate that Andra Soni implemented an integrated campaign strategy across ground, air, and digital approaches. The data network in Figure 2 illustrates the interconnectedness between the campaign strategy and the use of digital media, positioning and branding, canvassing, and collaboration with public figures and artists. This strategy enables Andra Soni's political message to reach various voter segments effectively. Positioning Andra Soni as a representation of change and an alternative to the dominance of the Banten political dynasty, although not always presented confrontationally, proved capable of building resonance amidst public fatigue with kinship politics. Optimizing party machinery and social networks at the grassroots level, particularly in the lead-up to election day, is a crucial factor in converting political capital into tangible electoral support.

Overall, the research findings confirm that Andra Soni's victory in the 2024 Banten Regional Election was the result of an accumulation of political capital that worked systematically and reinforced each other. Political experience provides institutional legitimacy, support from political elites offers structural and symbolic power, a successful campaign team ensures effective collective mobilization, and the campaign strategy converts all of this capital into voter votes. In the context of the fight against the political dynasty of Airin Rachmi Diany, Andra Soni's political capital proved capable of matching and even surpassing the dynasty's kinship and popularity capital, simultaneously marking a shift in the political power configuration in Banten Province.

Economic Capital: Campaign Funds

The research findings indicate that Andra Soni's economic capital in the 2024 Banten Regional Election, specifically regarding campaign funds, is distributed and structured, rather than relying on a single dominant source, as is common for candidates representing political dynasties. Based on the data network and coding results, the composition of Andra Soni's campaign funds consists of 41 percent candidate contributions, 25 percent individual contributions, and 33 percent contributions from non-governmental business entities. This pattern suggests that Andra Soni's economic capital is not entirely dependent on the financial

strength of his family or local oligarchic networks. Instead, it is built through a combination of personal sources, contributions from supporters, and legitimate business networks that are formally reported within the campaign fund reporting mechanism (Figure 3).

Empirically, the news reports compiled in the document indicate that the campaign fund report submitted by Andra Soni–Dimiyati to the Banten Provincial KPU reflects the candidates' level of financial independence. The candidate's contribution of 41 percent came from Andra Soni's personal funds, which were used to finance the initial stages of the campaign, including consolidating party structures, campaign props, and logistics for political activity. Several media outlets noted that Andra Soni openly stated his commitment to self-funding and accountable campaign financing to avoid dependence on large donors who could potentially create conflicts of interest after the election. This attitude stands in stark contrast to the image of dynastic political funding in Banten, which has long been synonymous with the dominance of family capital and closed business networks.

The individual contribution of 25 percent also shows significant empirical findings. According to reports, this funding is provided by sympathizers, volunteers, and supporters of Andra Soni, who are spread across various districts and cities in Banten. Media reports an increase in individual donations following President Prabowo Subianto's declaration of support, which boosted public confidence in Andra Soni's chances of winning. This individual contribution is not only financially valuable but also reflects a form of political support based on trust and voluntary participation, which strengthens the candidate's electoral legitimacy outside the elite structure.

Meanwhile, the contribution of non-governmental business entities, which reached 33 percent, indicates that Andra Soni was able to access a vast economic network without relying on it as a source of campaign capital dominance. The news in the document confirms that contributions from business entities were made in accordance with the provisions of the laws and regulations regarding campaign funds and were officially recorded in the report to the KPU. There is no indication that any particular business entity is the primary contributor or holds a hegemonic position in campaign financing. This pattern demonstrates a deliberate strategy to maintain the balance of power between the candidate and economic actors, ensuring that economic capital serves as campaign support rather than a tool for political control after victory.

In the context of the fight against Airin Rachmi Diany, a representative of the Banten political dynasty, these empirical findings reveal fundamental differences, such as economic capital. If political dynasties generally rely on the accumulation of family-based economic capital and old business networks, then Andra Soni built his campaign fund through a more plural and accountable distribution of resources. The media also noted that Andra Soni's campaign strategy did not focus on high-cost politics but rather on optimizing party machinery, volunteers, and segmented campaigns, allowing for efficient management of funding needs.

Overall, the research findings confirm that Andra Soni's economic capital, in terms of campaign funds, is not dominant but plays a strategic role as supporting capital that complements political and social capital. The relatively balanced distribution of funding sources between candidates, individuals, and non-governmental business entities indicates an adaptive campaign financing practice oriented toward political sustainability. In countering the political dynasty of Airin Rachmi Diany, Andra Soni's economic capital was not used to challenge the dynasty's financial strength directly, but rather to strengthen political legitimacy and ensure the effectiveness of electoral mobilization in a measured and transparent manner.

DISCUSSION

The research findings on Andra Soni's social capital strengthen the theoretical argument that social capital in local politics is no longer solely determined by genealogical proximity or political dynasties, but rather by the ability of political actors to build and manage broad, cross-group social networks. From the perspective of social capital theory Putnam, (1994) Social capital comprises trust, norms, and networks that facilitate collective action. The dominance of the social network relationship variable at 66% in the case of Andra Soni suggests that the social capital at work is structural and institutional, rather than merely interpersonal.

This result aligns with the concept of bridging social capital, which is social capital that connects different social groups, whether ideologically, organizationally, or geographically (Leonard, 2004). Andra Soni successfully consolidated a network of village heads, mass organizations, volunteers, and cross-ideological party structures within the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (KIM) Plus. This pattern fundamentally differs from the social capital bonding that typically forms the basis of political dynasties, as exemplified by Airin Rachmi Diany, a representative of the Ratu Atut Chosiyah dynasty. Political dynasties often rely on exclusive networks centered around family circles, the old elite, and traditional loyalists, making them less adaptable to shifts in voter preferences. In the context of Banten, Andra Soni's victory shows that voters are not entirely bound by historical loyalty to the dynasty, but are increasingly considering the effectiveness of mobilization networks and the representation of local interests.

In the realm of political capital, the research findings suggest that Andra Soni's victory cannot be attributed solely to a personalistic approach or individual charisma. Conversely, Andra Soni's political capital is institutional and institutionalized, as reflected in his political experience, elite support, campaign team, and interconnected campaign strategies. Within a theoretical framework Bourdieu & Richardson, (1986) Political capital is the result of converting various forms of capital—social, symbolic, and institutional—into a form that is legitimized within the arena of power. Andra Soni's political experience as the Speaker of the Banten Regional People's Representative Council and the Chairman of the Banten Province Gerindra Party Regional Leadership Council provides what Ocasio et al., (2020) Calls institutional political capital, which is trust and legitimacy derived from formal positions within the power structure. This finding aligns with research Ghosh, (2023) Showing that non-dynastic actors with strong institutional experience have a greater chance of challenging the old elite, especially when they can consolidate cross-party and local elite support.

The support of the political elite, particularly the endorsement by President Prabowo Subianto, demonstrates the functioning of what is known as the elite cueing effect. National elite support not only influences voter perception but also simultaneously mobilizes the party machinery and local power networks. This finding is consistent with the study by Samuels & Shugart, (2010) which confirms that support from top elites can shift the balance of power in subnational electoral contests, especially in political systems that are still heavily reliant on party structures and patronage.

One important finding that enriches the discussion of this research is the political paradox that emerged in the 2024 Banten Regional Election, namely the position of Airin Rachmi Diany as the Head of Prabowo Subianto's Campaign Team in Banten Province and also a cadre of the Golkar Party, the main party supporting Prabowo in the 2024 Presidential Election. Theoretically, this position should give Airin a significant electoral advantage through what is called the coattail effect, which is the president's coattail effect that can increase the chances of regional head candidates who are on the same political axis as the elected president (Hanan & Irvani, 2022). However, the research findings actually show that this symbolic advantage did not automatically translate into electoral victory for Airin in the Banten Regional Head Election.

This phenomenon indicates a deconsolidation of national elite support at the local level. Although Airin is formally part of Prabowo's strategic circle for winning in Banten, decisive political support actually accumulated around Andra Soni, the central cadre of the Gerindra Party, President Prabowo's party. From the perspective of elite cueing theory, voters and local political actors tend to follow the clearest, most consistent, and most hierarchical political signals (Gilens & Murakawa, 2002). Prabowo's direct and explicit support for Andra Soni sends a stronger political signal than Airin's position as the organizational and temporary campaign team leader.

Additionally, within the theoretical framework of political capital Bourdieu & Richardson, (1986) The president's symbolic legitimacy is not neutral; rather, it is inherent in the structural relationship between the president and the institutions. Although Golkar is Prabowo's supporting party, Prabowo's historical and ideological relationship with Gerindra is far stronger and more institutionalized. This makes Prabowo's symbolic capital easier to convert into electoral political capital when channeled through the party's core cadre, namely Andra Soni, compared to through coalition party cadres like Airin. In other words, the president's symbolic capital undergoes a process of selective conversion in the local political arena.

This finding also highlights the limitations of political dynasty strategies in leveraging national elite networks. Airin, as a representative of the dynasty of Queen Atut Chosiyah, relies on a combination of kinship capital, the Golkar network, and proximity to the national center of power. However, this network is exclusive and elitist, making it less effective in building inclusive grassroots political mobilization. Conversely, Andra Soni was able to combine national elite support with more fluid and cross-group local socio-political networks, resulting in more effective bridging social capital.

From the perspective of previous research on dynastic politics in Indonesia, this finding expands the argument that political dynasties are not always able to monopolize the effects of presidential support or national coalitions. Aspinall & Sukmajati, (2016) show that dynasties tend to succeed when they can harmoniously combine family capital with party structures and local social networks. In the case of Banten, Airin's position between Golkar and Prabowo actually created political ambiguity. At the same time, Andra Soni presented a more precise and more consistent line of support from the center to the regions. Thus, this elaboration reinforces the main finding of the research that Andra Soni's victory in the 2024 Banten Regional Election cannot be explained solely by his closeness to President Prabowo, but by his ability to convert the president's support into an effective social, political, and organizational network. Conversely, Airin's position as the head of Prabowo's campaign team in Banten and a Golkar cadre actually highlights the limitations of dynastic capital when facing a new power configuration that is more fragmented and network-based.

Then, the hybrid success team structure, which combines party teams and non-party figures like Raffi Ahmad, demonstrates adaptation to the changing landscape of modern campaigning. This aligns with research Bonneau & Cann, (2015); Semetko & Tworzecki, (2017) That emphasizes the importance of campaign personalization and the role of popular figures in reaching non-partisan voters. In this context, Raffi Ahmad serves as a political broker, bridging the gap between the political elite and young, apolitical voters, thereby broadening Andra Soni's support base. The findings regarding Andra Soni's economic capital enrich the discourse on the relationship between campaign funds and electoral victory. Economic capital is a dominant factor in Indonesian local politics, especially in the context of high-cost politics and oligarchy (Aspinall, 2014a, 2014b). However, the results of this study indicate that Andra Soni's economic capital is not hegemonic, but rather distributed and functions as supporting capital.

The relatively balanced composition of campaign funds, with contributions from candidates (41%), individuals (25%), and non-governmental business entities (33%), reflects more plural and accountable funding practices. This pattern aligns with the findings of Mietzner, (2015) This shows that excessive reliance on a single funding source can actually weaken a candidate's bargaining position after the election. In the case of Andra Soni, the candidate's financial independence strengthens political autonomy and reduces the risk of capture by specific economic interests. Compared to political dynasties that generally rely on the accumulation of family-based economic capital and old business networks, Andra Soni's funding model points to a new direction in Indonesian local politics. Economic capital is no longer a tool of domination, but rather an instrument to support the effectiveness of mobilizing social and political capital. This finding explains that the amount of funds does not always determine electoral victory, but by the candidate's ability to strategically and efficiently convert those funds.

Overall, this discussion suggests that Andra Soni's victory in the 2024 Banten Regional Election can be understood as the result of the convergence of three types of capital—social, political, and economic—working simultaneously and reinforcing each other. This finding makes a theoretical contribution by demonstrating that in the context of contemporary Indonesian local politics, social capital based on collective networks and institutional political capital can outperform dynastic capital, even when the dynasty has historical and symbolic advantages. This research also confirms that the dynamics of local power are increasingly determined by the ability of non-dynastic actors to build broad coalitions, strategically leverage elite support, and manage economic resources in a transparent and accountable manner. Thus, this study not only enriches the literature on local elections and political dynasties but also provides empirical evidence of the transformation of local political contestation patterns in Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

This research argues that Andra Soni's victory in the 2024 Banten Regional Election cannot be explained deterministically solely through factors of personal popularity or symbolic closeness to the national center of power. Conversely, the results of this study indicate that this victory was the product of the convergence and conversion of three types of capital: social capital, political capital, and economic capital, which worked simultaneously, structurally, and mutually reinforcing. In the contest against Airin Rachmi Diany, who represents the political dynasty of Ratu Atut Chosiyah, Andra Soni successfully presented a non-dynastic political model based on collective networks, institutionalization of power, and relatively accountable resource management. The implications of this research are to make a theoretical contribution by enriching the literature on regional elections and dynastic politics in Indonesia through empirical evidence that social capital based on collective networks and institutional political capital can outperform dynastic capital, even when the dynasty has historical, symbolic advantages, and proximity to the national center of power.

Nevertheless, this study has some limitations. First, this research focuses on a single case of regional elections, so generalizing the findings to other regional contexts requires caution. Second, the analysis of social and political capital heavily relies on news data and identified actor networks, thus failing to fully capture the informal and latent dimensions of local power relations. Third, this research has not conducted in-depth measurements of voter behavior at the individual level through surveys or voter interviews. Hence, the findings emphasize the elite side and network structure more. Therefore, the recommendations for further research are first, to conduct a comparative study across regions to test whether the non-dynastic network-based winning pattern also occurs in other areas with different socio-political characteristics; and second, to combine network analysis approaches with voter behavior surveys to understand the mechanism of converting capital into electoral choices at a more micro level.

Declarations

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Ethics approval and consent to participate

This study did not involve direct participation, intervention, or interaction with human participants. The study relied exclusively on publicly available secondary data, including online news reports, official election documents, candidate documents, and publicly accessible academic literature. Therefore, ethical approval and informed consent were not required for this study.

Consent for publication

Not applicable. This study does not report individual-level data obtained directly from human participants or any personally identifiable information collected for research purposes.

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Author Contribution

DS: Main Manuscript

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Figures




Figure 1

Social Capital




Figure 2

Political Capital Network




Figure 3

Economic Capital