

Appendix

Table A1: Timeline of Elections Relative to the Reform

Year	Election Type	Election Wave	Group
1998	Parliamentary	Pre 3	Treatment
1998	Local council	Pre 3	Control
2001	Parliamentary	Pre 2	Treatment
2002	Local council	Pre 2	Control
2004	Parliamentary	Pre 1	Treatment
2005*	Local council	Pre 1	Control
2008	Parliamentary	Post 1	Treatment
2009*	Local council	Post 1	Control
2012	Parliamentary	Post 2	Treatment
2014	Local council	Post 2	Control
2016	Parliamentary	Post 3	Treatment
2018	Local council	Post 3	Control

Notes: Given that local elections in 2006 were held only in Taipei and Kaohsiung, and those in 2010 only in Taipei, Kaohsiung, New Taipei, Tainan, and Taichung, I recode these elections as part of the 2005 and 2009 local election cycles to maintain consistency in the research design.




Figure A1: Main DiD Estimates with Two-Way Clustering




Figure A2: Number of Seats in Parliamentary and Local Elections Before the Reform




Figure A3: Pre-trend Tests for Heterogeneous Effects by Pre-Reform Electoral Competitiveness

Notes: The figure plots difference-in-differences estimates for each wave relative to the reform, with pre_1 as the baseline. High competitiveness denotes villages where the pre-reform KMT–DPP vote-share gap falls below the median; low competitiveness denotes villages at or above the median. 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by constituency.




Figure A4: Pre-trend Tests for Heterogeneous Effects by Pre-Reform Small-Party Presence

Notes: The figure plots difference-in-differences estimates for each wave relative to the reform, with pre_1 as the baseline. High small-party presence denotes villages where at least one small-party candidate won a seat prior to the reform; low small-party presence denotes villages with no such representation. 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by constituency.

Table A2: Heterogeneous Effects by Pre-Reform Electoral Conditions

	<i>Dependent Variable: SF Ratio</i>	
	(1)	(2)
Treatment (Parliamentary)	0.026 (0.025)	0.014 (0.033)
Post $\times$ Parliamentary	-0.512*** (0.038)	-0.289*** (0.048)
Treatment $\times$ Pre-Reform Electoral Competitiveness	-0.021 (0.105)	
Post $\times$ Pre-Reform Electoral Competitiveness	0.121 (0.070)	
DiD $\times$ Pre-Reform Electoral Competitiveness	0.556*** (0.132)	
Treatment $\times$ Pre-Reform Small-Party Presence		0.007 (0.021)
Post $\times$ Pre-Reform Small-Party Presence		0.005 (0.015)
DiD $\times$ Pre-Reform Small-Party Presence		-0.094** (0.030)
Village FE	YES	YES
Election Cycle FE	YES	YES
Observations	75,347	75,347
R ²	0.485	0.487
Within R ²	0.276	0.279

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by constituency. The post-reform indicator and time-invariant baseline variables (Pre-Reform Electoral Competitiveness and Pre-Reform Small-Party Presence) are absorbed by village and election-cycle fixed effects and therefore omitted due to collinearity.

Table A3: Difference-in-Differences Results with Pre-Reform Controls and Subsamples

	<i>Dependent Variable: SF Ratio</i>		
	(1) Full sample	(2) TSU/PFP nomination	(3) All Small-party nomination
	w/ Pre-Reform Controls	w/ Pre-Reform Controls	w/ Pre-Reform Controls
Treatment (Parliamentary)	0.021 (0.016)	−0.054 (0.069)	−0.027 (0.025)
Post × Parliamentary	−0.408*** (0.026)	−0.309*** (0.071)	−0.345*** (0.049)
Village FE	YES	YES	YES
Election Cycle FE	YES	YES	YES
Observations	75,347	14,735	38,403
R ²	0.478	0.489	0.535
Within R ²	0.267	0.127	0.172

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by constituency. Column (1) reports the baseline difference-in-differences specification. Column (2) restricts the sample to constituencies in which TSU/PFP nomination status is fixed before and after the reform. Column (3) restricts the sample to constituencies in which overall small-party nomination status is fixed before and after the reform. The post-reform indicator and time-invariant baseline variables (Pre-Reform Electoral Competitiveness and Pre-Reform Small-Party Presence) are absorbed by village and election-cycle fixed effects and therefore omitted due to collinearity.

Table A4: Additional Check for PR Ballot Effect

	<i>Dependent Variable: SF Ratio</i>	
	Magnitude-Reduced vs. Unchanged	Unchanged Constituencies
Post $\times$ Seat Reduced or not	-0.388*** (0.050)	
Post		-0.028 (0.020)
Village FE	YES	YES
Election Cycle FE	YES	NO
Observations	41,339	2,392
R ²	0.669	0.251
Within R ²	0.028	0.002

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by constituency. Both specifications include only parliamentary elections.




Figure A5: Results of Panel Jackknife Regressions




Figure A6: Sensitivity to Omitted Variable Bias: Benchmarking Against Pre-Reform Electoral Competitiveness

Notes: This figure reports an omitted variable bias contour plot from the sensitivity analysis. The plot benchmarks robustness against pre-reform electoral competitiveness, defined as the average pre-reform KMT–DPP vote-share gap at the village level (averaged across pre-reform elections). Both the treatment interaction and the outcome are residualized with respect to district fixed effects. The benchmark covariate lies close to the origin, implying that an unobserved confounder would need to be substantially stronger than pre-reform competitiveness to overturn the estimated DiD effect.