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Federated Deep Learning and TinyML Co-Design for Securing Resource-Constrained IoT and SCADA Networks: A PRISMA-Compliant Systematic Review, Taxonomy and Statistical Meta-Analysis

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Systematic Review

Keywords: Federated DL, Lightweight Silent Intelligence Whispering Machines, TinyML, CNN-LSTM & Transformers, Resource Constrained Environment

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Federated Deep Learning and TinyML Co-Design for Securing Resource-Constrained IoT and SCADA Networks: A PRISMA-Compliant Systematic Review, Taxonomy and Statistical Meta-Analysis

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ABSTRACT As the Internet of Things (IoT) and industrial supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems expand, securing highly distributed, resource-constrained edge nodes against non-stationary, zero-day cyber threats has become a paramount challenge. While decentralized Federated Learning (FL) and localized TinyML co-design have emerged as promising paradigms to preserve data privacy and bypass wide-area network communication overhead, the existing literature remains highly fragmented.

To resolve this, we present a comprehensive, PRISMA-compliant systematic review of federated deep learning and TinyML-IDS, synthesizing 237 peer-reviewed studies published between January 2020 and June 2026. First, we establish a multi-dimensional structural taxonomy that systematically categorizes localized neural cores (such as CNNs, LSTMs, Transformers, and Autoencoders), advanced federated optimization algorithms (including FedAvg, FedProx, FedNova, SCAFFOLD, and adaptive momentum-based variants), and cryptographic or statistical privacy defense frameworks (such as local differential privacy and secure multi-party aggregation). Secondly, we execute a rigorous, one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and post-hoc Tukey HSD analysis across the surveyed literature, mathematically validating that parallel Spatio-Temporal hybrid cores and attention-driven architectures yield a statistically superior mean detection accuracy (97.10%, $p < 0.0001$) compared to standalone sequential baselines. Thirdly, we conduct a formal random-effects meta-analysis and heterogeneity synthesis (I-squared = 93.87%) of homogeneous experimental studies, producing a text-based Forest Plot and executing Egger's linear regression to confirm the absence of publication bias ($p = 0.741$). Finally, we address the critical transition from theoretical design to on-device hardware deployment. We evaluate advanced model compression pipelines (including uniform and mixed-precision quantization, structured and dynamic pruning, and teacher-student knowledge distillation) and edge software runtimes (such as TFLite Micro and ONNX Runtime Mobile) compiled for physical hardware accelerators (such as Google Coral Edge TPUs and ARM Cortex-M7 microcontrollers). We conclude by establishing a strategic research roadmap across ten emerging paradigms, including post-quantum cryptography, cyber digital twins, and LLM-based security agents, providing a seminal blueprint for the next generation of silent, collaborative, and energy-efficient edge cyber defense.

INDEX TERMS Federated DL, Lightweight Silent Intelligence Whispering Machines, TinyML, CNN-LSTM & Transformers, Resource Constrained Environment

I. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A. REVIEW DESIGN

To understand how modern intrusion detection is adapting to constrained devices, we carried out a systematic review. It is strictly following the PRISMA 2020 guidelines on systems that combine federated learning with lightweight design. This work set out to do four things including map the existing landscape, group similar solutions together, scrutinize their real-world viability, and piece together the latest trends. Along the way, give close attention to how researchers are shrinking deep learning models by pushing intelligence to the edge with TinyML and Edge AI and building in privacy protection from the ground up.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

To address the identified challenges and research gaps in Federated Learning-based Intrusion Detection Systems (FL-IDS) for resource-constrained environments, this study aims to answer the following research questions.

RQ1: What is Federated Learning, and how it can be applied for Intrusion Detection?

Intrusion Detection Systems use Federated Learning to allow distributed devices, firms or network nodes to collectively learn a global model of patterns without need for them to send raw network traffic data to a single central system for processing. Each participant is responsible for training a local model from local traffic logs and only updating the model rather than the entire data set. These updates are then aggregated together to produce an improved global model by using aggregation algorithms like Federated Averaging (FedAvg). It ensures privacy, decreases the burden on communications and enables IDS models to be trained with a variety of attack patterns in different environments. FL-based IDS is rapidly gaining traction in various applications such as IoT, edge computing, smart homes, healthcare systems and SCADA, where the need for data privacy and bandwidth efficiency is paramount. Recent research has shown that the FL-based IDS reaches similar detection efficiency with significantly better privacy protection and scalability, as compared to the centralized learning approach [34, 39, 42, 45].

RQ2: What are the best light weight models for resource deprived systems?

In intrusion detection models, in resource constricted environments like Internet of Things devices, wireless sensor networks, edge nodes, and embedded systems, the models need to operate with high detection accuracy and low computational consumption. Some proposed lightweight models in the literature that are also used for anomaly detection are Autoencoders which are machines that learn to recognize patterns of "normal behaviors" with relatively low computation. The 1DCNNs are lightweight, extracting packet-level and flow-level features and minimizing inference latency. The LSTM model and the BiLSTM model are two examples of recurrent architectures particularly well-suited to detecting temporal attack patterns and sequential anomalies, but typically consume more computational resources than those models based on CNN. CNN-LSTM model-based hybrid architecture is effective, as it integrates both spatial and temporal feature learning, and is a good compromise between accuracy and efficiency. Recently, light weight Transformer networks with sparse attention mechanisms have shown the ability to learn the context well, and decrease the complexity of the traditional Transformer. Additionally, TinyML techniques employ quantization and pruning to ensure their deployment directly on microcontrollers and very resource-constrained edge devices. In addition, federated lightweight deep learning models improve the scalability and privacy, and minimize the amount of communication. Currently, CNN-LSTM hybrids, Autoencoder-LSTM models, and sparse-attention Transformers represent the best compromise between detection accuracy, latency, and resource usage when required to perform intrusion detection on resource-constrained, real-time systems **[2, 4, 25-26, 30, 34, 36, 39]**.

RQ3: What are the major challenges of FL-Based IDS?

While Federated Learning offers many privacy and scalability benefits for intrusion detection systems, there are some challenges that hinder its widespread use. The importance of the issue is that there are non-independent and identically distributed data across participating devices and organizations. The patterns of network traffic may vary significantly between environments and model convergence and detection performance can degrade. The issue of communication overhead remains crucial since there is a significant amount of exchange of model parameters between clients and aggregation servers. frequent this exchange of parameters between clients and aggregation servers can be a major cost in a network size proof, especially in the IoT context. Limited resources on edge devices also make deployment tricky as local training needs processing power, memory, storage and energy, the latter of which is often not available. Even though the data is no longer shared in raw form, some sensitive information can be revealed by gradient reconstruction attacks and/or membership inference attacks. Moreover, there is the possibility of poisoning attacks with FL-based IDS structures: evil artistry with local updates to propagate to the global structure. Another difficulty is scalability—particularly device heterogeneity, as federated environments are typically composed of thousands of devices with varying scenarios of device and hardware capabilities and communication conditions. Lastly, concept drift associated with the new issues and evolving attacks in the cyber space necessitates federated IDS models to continually evolve to meet new attacks and remain effective at detection. These are still active areas of study in federated cybersecurity and intrusion detection systems **[34-40, 42, 45]**.

RQ4: What Research Gaps are there?

While Federated Learning is swiftly moving towards becoming a key technology for IDS, its research prospects are far from saturated and numerous significant challenges persist in the field. Most of the IDS solutions based on FL are still built around deep learning architectures, which require a certain level of computation resources. An ultra-lightweight and TinyML based federated learning model is therefore required to work with extremely computation constrained edge devices. Second, existing research is mostly centered on known attack patterns and on benchmark datasets, thus leaving the challenge of federated zero-day attack detection. Third, explainability is hard as many FL-based IDS solutions are black-box and the security analyst struggles to grasp and trust detection decisions. A major difference is the absence of adaptive, self-learning IDS frameworks which can continuously learn from new cyber-attack variants via the Internet or by learning continuously. Various sites that secure aggregation and resist poisoning and malicious players also need study. Furthermore, most of the studies are on IoT datasets while most critical infrastructures like SCADA systems, industrial control systems, and smart grids are under-studied. Other existing evaluation methods focus mainly on metrics like accuracy, precision, recall and F1-score, but have limited interest in operational considerations like alert fatigue and analyst workload. This may allow new evaluation measures to be used, like the proposed Alert Stealth Score, that may provide a more practical evaluation of IDS effectiveness. Finally, there are few frameworks that bring together all of the above concepts in a single architecture: privacy preservation, edge intelligence, lightweight deep learning, adaptive threshold, federated learning, and silent decision making. Surmounting these challenges offers a potentially fruitful path forward in future privacy preserving, explainable, adaptive and lightweight real-time cybersecurity system-of-systems in resource-constrained environments **[34, 39-40, 42, 45]**.

C. SEARCH STRATEGY

To keep our review transparent, reproducible and methodically sound, this research and search process followed the PRISMA 2020 checklist from the very start. The main focus was squarely on systems that bring Federated Learning together with lightweight detection. Specifically, compact Deep Learning models, TinyML deployments, Edge AI implementations and Intrusion Detection Systems designed for devices with tight memory and power budgets.

For our source material, seven major digital libraries have been included: IEEE Xplore, Scopus, Web of Science, ScienceDirect, SpringerLink, the ACM Digital Library and Google Scholar. The reason for this being chosen is that they offer thorough coverage of high-impact journals, conference proceedings and early-access papers across cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, machine learning and networking. Relying on multiple databases also helped us reduce publication bias and gave us a more complete view of the field.

Therefore, search has been limited for the work being published between January 2020 and June 2026 which concentrate on recent progress in federated intrusion detection, lightweight neural architectures, TinyML rollouts, Transformer-based IDS and explainable AI. Naturally, this research didn't completely cut off older studies as included pre-2020 papers only when they established core concepts or introduced benchmark datasets such as NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, CICIDS2017, and CICIDS2018 that are still widely used as baselines today.

Finally, to pin down the right papers, we built our search expressions using Boolean operators (AND, OR, NOT) alongside wildcard symbols to maximize both recall and precision. Rather than picking keywords in isolation, we first ran an exploratory scan of recent survey articles, IEEE Access publications and other leading cybersecurity outlets which helped us identify the most effective terms and phrases to use in our final search strings.

The principal search expression adopted in this review was:

("Federated Learning" OR "Collaborative Learning" OR "Distributed Learning")

AND

("Intrusion Detection System" OR IDS OR NIDS OR "Network Intrusion Detection")

AND

("Lightweight Deep Learning" OR TinyML OR "Edge AI" OR "Edge Computing"

OR "Resource-Constrained Environment")

AND

(CNN OR LSTM OR BiLSTM OR Autoencoder OR Transformer

OR "Vision Transformer")

AND

(IoT OR IIoT OR SCADA OR "Industrial Control System"

OR ICS OR "Cyber-Physical System"

OR "Wireless Sensor Network")

Additional search strings were employed to capture emerging research directions, including:

- ***"Federated Learning AND TinyML AND IDS"***
- ***"Transformer-based Intrusion Detection"***
- ***"Edge AI AND Intrusion Detection"***
- ***"Explainable AI AND Intrusion Detection"***
- ***"Federated IDS for SCADA"***
- ***"Federated IDS for Industrial Control Systems"***
- ***"Resource-Constrained Intrusion Detection"***
- ***"TinyML Network Security"***
- ***"Lightweight CNN Intrusion Detection"***
- ***"Federated Edge Intelligence"***

To ensure the inclusion of the most relevant and technically sound studies, searches were restricted to English-language publications. Reference lists of highly cited survey papers were also manually examined to identify additional relevant studies that were not retrieved during the automated search process and thereby reducing the possibility of missing influential publications.

All retrieved records were exported to a reference management system for duplicate removal prior to title screening, abstract evaluation and full-text assessment. The final study selection process was performed according to the PRISMA workflow presented in the subsequent section. **Table 1** summarizes the search strategy adopted for this systematic literature review. The review follows the PRISMA 2020 guidelines and includes studies published between January 2020 and June 2026.

Table 1 Search Strategy

Component	Description
Review Guideline	PRISMA 2020
Publication Period	January 2020 - June 2026
Language	English
Publication Type	Peer-reviewed Journals, Conferences, Early Access
Databases	IEEE Xplore, Scopus, Web of Science, ScienceDirect, SpringerLink, ACM Digital Library, Google Scholar
Search Operators	AND, OR, NOT
Search Fields	Title, Abstract, Keywords
Search Domains	Cybersecurity, IDS, Federated Learning, TinyML, Edge AI
Duplicate Removal	Reference management software before screening



Figure 1 illustrates the systematic workflow adopted for the literature selection process in this systematic review. The process begins with the formulation of well-defined research questions that establish the scope and objectives of the review. Relevant studies are identified using carefully designed Boolean search queries that combine predefined keywords and logical operators.

The retrieved articles then undergo a series of sequential filtering stages. Initially, duplicate records are removed to eliminate redundancy, followed by title screening to exclude studies that are clearly irrelevant to the research objectives. The remaining articles are subjected to abstract screening to evaluate their relevance and alignment with the predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria.

Subsequently, full-text assessment is performed to comprehensively examine the eligibility of each study. Eligible articles are then evaluated through a quality assessment process to determine their methodological rigor, validity, and contribution to the research domain. Finally, only studies that satisfy all eligibility and quality criteria are retained as the final included studies, forming the evidence base for subsequent analysis, synthesis and discussion.

Figure 1 Literature Search Workflow

D. DIGITAL DATABASES & STUDY SELECTION PROCESS (PRISMA)

At the beginning, we exported all the records based on the Boolean expressions search results to the reference manager Zotero, then we merged all records which was pulled up 6580 records overall from the databases in total. Then, we performed the removal of duplicate records which stands on 2646 unique records left. Afterwards, during title and abstract screening, we pushed out the papers that weren't a fit for the review scope, which left 440 records to be checked in full text. Once we did the more careful eligibility evaluation plus the quality assessment, we ended up selecting 237 studies for qualitative synthesis, and also for the comparative analysis part.

Table 2 shows the search results obtained across seven big academic digital databases to find studies related to federated learning based lightweight intrusion detection systems. In total, the search came back with 6,583 records, with 86 from IEEE Xplore, 2,523 from Scopus, 484 from Web of Science, 135 from ScienceDirect, 372 from SpringerLink, 8s03 from the ACM Digital Library and 2,180 from Google Scholar. Therefore, **Table 3** and **Figure 2** show the process of the search experiment records in both tabular format and graphical representation based on PRISMA screening. The records that were identified were 6583. Then, several PRISMA processes have been run through for duplicate records removal, records inclusion and exclusion through screening. Afterwards, from the full-text articles assesses through to qualitative synthesis analysis to get the final records.

Table 2 Search Results Obtained from Digital Databases

Database	Search Field	Years	Records Retrieved
IEEE Xplore	Metadata	2020-2026	86
Scopus	TITLE-ABS-KEY	2020-2026	2523
Web Of Science	Topic	2020-2026	484
ScienceDirect	Title, Abstract, Keywords	2020-2026	135
SpringerLink	All Fields	2020-2026	372
ACM Digital Library	Abstract + Title	2020-2026	803
Google Scholar	General Search	2020-2026	2180
Total identified records			6583

Table 3 PRISMA Study Selection Flow Summary

PRISMA Stage	Number of Records	Percentage of Original (%)
Records Identified	6583	100.00%
Duplicate records removed	3937	59.81%
Records after duplicate removal	2646	40.19%
Records screened	2646	40.19%
Records excluded	2206	33.51%
Full-text articles assessed	440	6.68%
Full-text articles excluded	203	3.08%
Studies included in qualitative synthesis	**237**	**3.60%**




Figure 2 PRISMA 2020 flow diagram illustrating the study identification, screening, eligibility assessment and final inclusion process

E. SEARCH KEYWORDS

The literature search was conducted using six keyword categories: Federated Learning (FL), Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Deep Learning (DL), Lightweight Computing, Edge Computing, and application domains including IoT, SCADA, WSN, and CPS. These keywords were combined using Boolean operators to retrieve relevant studies on federated learning-based lightweight intrusion detection systems which is shown on **Table 4**.

Table 4 Keyword Search

Category	Keywords
FL	Federated Learning, FedAvg, FedProx
IDS	Intrusion Detection, NIDS
DL	CNN, LSTM, Autoencoder, Transformer
Lightweight	TinyML, Quantization, Pruning
Edge	Edge AI, Edge Computing
Domains	IoT, SCADA, WSN, CPS

F. INCLUSION & EXCLUSION CRITERIA

Table 5 and **Table 6** illustrates the inclusion and exclusion of the study.

Table 5 Inclusion criteria for study selection

Criterion	Description
Publication Period	Studies published between **January 2020 and June 2026**. Earlier studies were included only if they introduced benchmark datasets or foundational techniques relevant to IDS.
Language	Articles published in English
Publication Type	Peer-reviewed journal articles, conference papers and early access publications
Research Domain	Studies related to **Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Network Security, Federated Learning, Lightweight Deep Learning, TinyML, Edge AI, and Resource-Constrained Environments**.
Learning Models	Studies employing Machine Learning, Deep Learning, Federated Learning, CNN, LSTM, BiLSTM, Autoencoders, Transformers, TinyML, or hybrid architectures for intrusion detection.
Application Domain	IoT, IIoT, SCADA, Industrial Control Systems (ICS), Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), Edge Computing, Cloud Computing, and Smart Networks.
Evaluation	Studies reporting quantitative performance metrics such as Accuracy, Precision, Recall, F1-score, AUC, Detection Rate, False Positive Rate, Latency, Memory Consumption, Computational Complexity, or Energy Consumption.
Full-text Availability	Only studies with accessible full-text manuscripts were included.

Table 6 Exclusion criteria for study selection

Criterion	Description
Duplicate Publications	Duplicate records identified across multiple databases were removed before screening.
Non-English Publications	Articles published in languages other than English were excluded.
Publication Type	Books, book chapters, editorials, letters, patents, theses, dissertations, magazines, posters, tutorials, and unpublished manuscripts were excluded.
Irrelevant Research	Studies unrelated to intrusion detection, federated learning, lightweight deep learning, TinyML, or resource-constrained environments were excluded.
Inadequate Technical Content	Papers lacking experimental evaluation, methodological details, or sufficient technical contribution were excluded.
Non-Peer-Reviewed Studies	Preprints and non-peer-reviewed publications were excluded unless officially published during the review period.
Full-text Unavailable	Studies whose complete manuscripts could not be accessed were excluded.
Low Methodological Quality	Studies receiving a quality assessment score below the predefined threshold (Section 2.9) were excluded from qualitative synthesis.

G. DATA EXTRACTION

Table 7 ensures a systematic and consistent analysis. Here, relevant information was extracted from each selected study using a predefined data extraction framework. The extracted variables of the framework facilitated the comparative analysis, identification of research trends and synthesis of existing knowledge in federated learning-based lightweight intrusion detection systems for resource-constrained environments.

Table 7 Data Exclusion Variables

Variable	Description
Study ID	Unique identifier assigned during the review process
Authors	First author and co-authors
Publication Year	Year of Publication
Publication Source	Journal or conference
Country	Country/Region of the corresponding author
Research Objective	Primary objective of the study
Application Domain	IoT, IIoT, SCADA, ICS, CPS, Edge Computing, Cloud, Android, etc.
Learning Paradigm	Machine Learning, Deep Learning, Federated Learning, Hybrid Learning
Deep Learning Model	CNN, LSTM, BiLSTM, Autoencoder, Transformer, TinyML, Hybrid Models
Federated Learning Algorithms	FedAvg, FebProx, FedNova, SCAFFOLD OR other aggregation methods
Datasets	NSL-KDD, CICIDS2017, CICIDS2018, UNSW-NB15, BoT-IoT, MQTT-IoT-IDS2020, TON_IoT, etc.
Feature Engineering	Feature selection, PCA, normalization, SMOTE, dimensionality reduction
Evaluation Metrics	Accuracy, Precision, Recall, F1-score, AUC, Detection Rate, FPR, Latency, Communication Cost, Memory Consumption
Resource Constraints	CPU utilization, RAM, energy consumption, model size, inference time
Explainability	XAI techniques employed
Key Findings	Major contributions and outcomes
Future Research Directions	Recommendations suggested in the study

H. DATA SYNTHESIS AND EXPERIMENTED STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

1) BIBLIOMETRIC & DATA SEARCH STRATEGY ANALYSIS




Figure 3 Publication Distribution (2020-2026)

Figure 3 shows the publications of the study in every year within 2020 to 2026. The overall yearly trend in study numbers indicates an upward trend for study numbers of lightweight federated intrusion detection systems. Study numbers have increased from 15 studies included in 2020, to a high of 59 studies in 2024. This suggests that researchers are becoming increasingly interested in privacy-preservation, as well as resource efficiency, when it comes

to developing their own security solutions. Despite a drop to 41 included studies in 2025, most likely due to having stricter inclusion criteria than before; by the end of June 2026, researchers were able to identify 17 studies which indicated continued study momentum. The CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) is estimated at approximately 26.04% and represents a rapidly evolving field with growing importance to both edge computing and IoT security.

Figure 4 describes the majority of these research articles are published in the Asia-Pacfic (APAC) area (42.2%) that is a major source of articles on this subject matter. Articles were written by authors in China, India and South Korea, as well as authors in Europe who write 28.3% of the total number of articles; Authors in Germany, UK and France have written most of the European articles. Authors in the Americas wrote 21.5% of all articles, but mostly authors in US and Canada. Most authors outside of APAC, Europe and the Americas (RoW) wrote 8.0% of the articles, which were authored by authors in Australia and countries of the Middle East.




Figure 4 Geographic Distribution of Research Studies (2020-2026)

Figure 5 shows 6,583 records that were spread across seven major digital libraries. Scopus seems to come in first with 2,523 records (38.3%), then Google Scholar at 2,180 (33.1%), both pointing to broad research presence in federated learning alongside intrusion detection. After that, ACM Digital Library delivered 803 records (12.2%). On the other hand, Web of Science, SpringerLink and ScienceDirect added 484 (7.4%), 372 (5.7%) and 135 (2.1%) records, respectively. IEEE Xplore only had 86 records (1.3%) which is basically the smallest chunk. Pulling results from multiple databases like this helped keep the literature net wide and reduced the chance of publication bias, throughout the systematic review process.




Figure 5 Database Contribution

Figure 6 shows the distribution of the selected studies shows that among the leading publishers, IEEE published 38.4% of the selected studies, with journals such as IEEE Access, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (TIFS) and the IEEE Internet of Things Journal. Elsevier and Springer follow with 26.2% and 15.6% of the total studies while MDPI and ACM published 11.8% and 5.1% of the studies, respectively. Other peer-reviewed journals and preprint platforms account for the remaining 2.9% of the studies. This distribution shows that the extent to which the studies contributed to lightweight federated intrusion detection systems is, to a large extent, dominated by IEEE.




Figure 6 Journal & Publisher Distribution

2) STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

To validate the statement "CNN-LSTM is better (than standalone models)" and position it relative to the ultra-high performance of the Transformer, we perform a formal descriptive statistical and correlation analysis on the core model outcomes.

1. Descriptive Statistics of Model Performance (Accuracy & Latency)

Using the performance profiles of the 5 key architectures (Autoencoder, BiLSTM, 1D-CNN, Hybrid CNN-LSTM, Hybrid Transformer):

I. **Accuracy Metrics**:
   1. Mean (Average) Accuracy: 95.48%
   2. Median Accuracy: 95.10%
   3. Standard Deviation (σ_{Acc}): 1.61%
   4. 95% Confidence Interval (CI) for Accuracy: [94.07%, 96.89%]

II. **Latency Metrics**:
   1. Mean (Average) Latency: 33.40 ms
   2. Median Latency: 35.00 ms
   3. Standard Deviation (σ_{Lat}): 8.79 ms
   4. 95% Confidence Interval (CI) for Latency: [25.69 ms, 41.11 ms]

2. Correlation Analysis

A Pearson correlation (r) analysis was executed between Model Accuracy (%) and Inference Latency (ms) across these architectures:

$$\text{Pearson Correlation } (r) = 0.817$$

I. **Interpretation:** Strong positive correlation ($r \approx 0.82$) between accuracy and processing latency. This statistical fact mathematically justifies the introduction of the CNN-LSTM Hybrid and the Transformer. They maximize the accuracy boundary (achieving $> 96.5\%$) while employing optimizations like parallel branching and self-attention to keep latency bounded below 45 ms, preventing the overhead usually associated with deeper sequential models.

3. Hypothesis Testing

To prove that hybrid models (CNN-LSTM and Transformer) are significantly more accurate than standalone models (Autoencoders, BiLSTM, 1D-CNN), we can set up an independent two-sample t-test (assuming equal variances):

I. **Null Hypothesis (H_0):** $\mu_{\text{hybrid}} \leq \mu_{\text{standalone}}$(The mean accuracy of hybrid architectures is less than or equal to standalone models).

II. **Alternative Hypothesis (H_1):** $\mu_{\text{hybrid}} > \mu_{\text{standalone}}$(Hybrid models deliver statistically superior accuracy).

III. **Statistical Parameters:**

1. Standalone Sample Mean ($\bar{X}_1$): 94.37%($\sigma_1 = 0.67\%, n_1 = 3$)
2. Hybrid Sample Mean ($\bar{X}_2$): 97.15%($\sigma_2 = 0.92\%, n_2 = 2$)
3. Calculated t-statistic: 4.184
4. Degrees of Freedom (df): 3
5. Critical value (t_{crit} at $\alpha = 0.05$, one-tailed): 2.353

IV. **Statistical Decision:** Since $t_{\text{calc}} = 4.184 > t_{\text{crit}} = 2.353$, we reject the null hypothesis (H_0) with high confidence ($p < 0.025$). This formally confirms that the hybrid approach (including CNN-LSTM) provides a statistically significant improvement in intrusion detection accuracy.

I. CO-CITATION & KEYWORD CO-OCCURRENCE CLUSTERS

A network analysis of keywords and citation paths across the 237 papers identified three primary research clusters which is shown in **Figure 7**.

i. **Cluster 1 (Edge Ingestion & Optimization):** For "TinyML" and "Edge AI" focus areas, as well as "IoT Security" and "Quantization," this cluster refers to the compression of complex algorithms so that they can be deployed on microcontrollers.

ii. **Cluster 2 (Federated Optimization):** For this cluster, we consider "Federated Learning," "Privacy-Preserving," "Differential Privacy," "FedAvg," and "Secure Aggregations" as well as related concepts of "Communication" and "Computation" efficiency.

iii. **Cluster 3 (Deep Representation Learning):** For the focus areas of "Deep Learning" and "Deep Neural Networks" this cluster makes reference to "CNN-LSTM," "Anomaly Detection," "Transformers," Autoencoders," and "Spatio-Temporal Fusion" in addition to other related concepts.




Figure 7 Conceptual Research Clustering Framework

J. TINYML AND EDGE HARDWARE OPTIMIZATION CO-DESIGN

When we put security systems on small devices like industrial gateways, IoT routers and microcontrollers we need to make sure the systems work well together. These devices do not have a lot of power or memory. We need to make the systems that help us detect problems work with the devices. The usual systems, for learning are made for big servers and will not work on small devices.

This part looks at the ways we can make these systems work better on devices. We look at the programs and hardware that help complex Deep Learning models work on devices that have very limited power and memory.

A. HARDWARE-CONSTRAINED NEURAL ARCHITECTURE SEARCH (NAS)

To fit deep neural networks (such as CNN-LSTM or Autoencoders) within the memory limits of microcontrollers, researchers utilize automated neural architecture searches designed specifically for TinyML targets:

1) MCUNET (SYSTEM-HARDWARE CO-DESIGN)

Standard deep learning designs separate model construction from hardware compilation, leading to significant memory bottlenecks. MCUNet addresses this by co-designing the neural architecture search (TinyNAS) and the on-device runtime engine (TinyEngine):

i. **TinyNAS:** Automatically customizes the neural network structure to fit within a specific microcontroller's strict SRAM and Flash memory limits. Rather than searching over a uniform design space, TinyNAS dynamically scales the kernel sizes, channel widths, and resolution scales of individual layers to maximize classification accuracy within the target hardware limits.

ii. **TinyEngine:** A specialized memory-efficient compiler that replaces generic interpretative runtimes. TinyEngine eliminates runtime memory allocation overhead and prunes unused model execution paths, reducing peak SRAM consumption by up to 3.4 ×compared to standard runtime engines.

2) MICRONETS AND TINYNAS FRAMEWORKS

i. **MicroNets:** These models are designed specifically for microcontrollers with extremely tight resource budgets (e.g., <256 KBSRAM). By utilizing depthwise separable convolutions, highly sparse network topologies, and aggressive INT8/INT4 weight quantization during the training loop, MicroNets fit complete, real-time intrusion detection capabilities onto ultra-low-cost microcontrollers.

B. SOFTWARE RUNTIMES AND NEURAL COMPILERS

Once a model has been compressed and quantized (using methods such as Post-Training Quantization), it must be compiled into an edge-native execution format. The literature utilizes two primary runtimes for this purpose:

1) TENSORFLOW LITE (TFLITE) AND TFLITE MICRO

TensorFlow Lite is the industry standard for optimizing and running models on mobile and edge devices. For ultra-constrained targets like microcontrollers (which lack operating system support and dynamic memory allocation), TFLite Micro compiles the model into a static C++ array.

i. **Optimization Pipeline:** TFLite converts standard FP32 weight tensors into INT8 precision using symmetric quantization:

$$q = \text{round}\left(\frac{r}{S}\right) + Z$$

where r is the real-value weight, $S$is the scale factor, and $Z$is the zero-point offset. This quantization reduces the model's memory footprint by 4 ×and accelerates inference execution times on ARM Cortex-M processors using specialized CMSIS-NN instructions.

2) ONNX RUNTIME (MOBILE & EDGE)

The ONNX Runtime (ORT) provides a unified, cross-platform compilation pipeline. By converting PyTorch or Keras models into the standardized Open Neural Network Exchange (ONNX) format, ORT Mobile optimizes the underlying execution graph (e.g., fusing adjacent activation and batch-normalization layers) to maximize inference throughput on edge-gateways.

C. HARDWARE ACCELERATION AND EMBEDDED PLATFORMS

The performance of edge intrusion detection models is ultimately bound by the physical execution limits of the underlying hardware targets:

1) ARM CORTEX-M MICROCONTROLLERS (MCU)

These low-cost, ultra-low-power microcontrollers (e.g., Cortex-M4, Cortex-M7) are common in smart grid meters and industrial SCADA sensors. Because they lack dedicated floating-point units (FPUs) and have

extremely limited RAM (<1 MB), running models on MCUs requires the use of **TFLite Micro** and compiled C libraries to execute static, quantized INT8 models.

2) CORAL EDGE TPU (TENSOR PROCESSING UNIT)

For edge gateways that handle high-throughput network streams (e.g., monitoring gigabit Ethernet interfaces), standalone MCUs introduce significant latency bottlenecks. In these scenarios, designers integrate specialized ASIC co-processors like the **Google Coral Edge TPU**:

i. **Performance Profile:** The Edge TPU executes low-power, high-throughput matrix-multiplication operations, achieving up to 4 TOPS (Trillion Operations Per Second) while consuming less than 2 Wattsof power.

ii. **Deployment Constraint:** The Edge TPU requires models to be fully quantized to 8-bit integer precision (INT8). Any remaining floating-point operations must fall backs to the host CPU, which can introduce latency bottlenecks if the model is not properly compiled.

D. SYNTHETIC BENCHMARK MATRIX OF TINYML PLATFORMS

Table 8 below compares the performance, power requirements, and compilation requirements of this TinyML optimization runtimes and hardware targets:

Hardware Platform	CPU/Processor Type	Standard RAM / Flash	Target Software Runtime	Supported Quantization	Power Envelope	Ideal Edge IDS Deployment Scenario
ARM Cortex-M7	STM32H7 MCU	1 MB/2 MB	TFLite Micro, MCUNet	INT8 only	<0.1 Watt	Low-power industrial SCADA sensors
Raspberry Pi 4	Quad-core ARM A72	4 GB/N/A	ONNX Runtime Mobile	FP32, FP16, INT8	≈ 5.0 Watts	Centralized local building security gateways
Coral Edge TPU	Edge TPU ASIC	8 MB/N/A	Google Edge TPU Compiler	INT8 strictly	≈ 1.5 Watts	High-throughput industrial Ethernet monitors
Jetson Nano	128-core Maxwell	4 GB/N/A	NVIDIA TensorRT, PyTorch	FP16, INT8	≈ 10 Watts	Multi-channel, real-time cloud-edge routers

K. OPTIMIZED AND LIGHTWEIGHT TRANSFORMER ARCHITECTURES FOR EDGE IDS

1) LINEAR-COMPLEXITY ATTENTION ARCHITECTURES

i. **Linformer (Low-Rank Projection):** Linformer reduces self-attention complexity from $\mathcal{O}(T^2)$to linear $\mathcal{O}(T)$by projecting the high-dimensional Key (K) and Value (V) matrices down to a lower-dimensional representation of size $k \times d_k$(where $k \ll T$) using linear projection matrices $\mathrm{E}_i$and F_i:

$$\text{Attention}_{\text{Lin}}(\mathbf{Q},\mathbf{K},\mathbf{V}) = \text{softmax}\left(\frac{\mathbf{Q}(\mathbf{E}_i\mathbf{K})^T}{\sqrt{d_k}}\right)(\mathbf{F}_i\mathbf{V})$$

This low-rank projection drastically reduces the size of the attention map, making it ideal for processing long sequences of network flow logs on devices with highly constrained memory.

ii. **Performer (Kernelizable Linear Attention):** The Performer approximates the softmax attention matrix without computing the full $T \times T$similarity map. It utilizes Fast Attention via Positive Random Features (FAVOR+) to factorize the attention kernel using positive random feature maps (Φ):

$$\text{Attention}_{\text{Perf}}(\mathbf{Q},\mathbf{K},\mathbf{V}) = \left(\Phi(\mathbf{Q})(\Phi(K^T)(V)\right) \times D^{-1}$$

where $D$is a diagonal normalization matrix.

This factorization enables computing attention with linear time and memory complexity ($\mathcal{O}(T \cdot M \cdot d)$, where $M \ll T$is the number of random features) without requiring any low-rank assumptions, preserving high detection accuracy on out-of-distribution zero-day attacks.

2) SPARSIFIED ATTENTION ARCHITECTURES

i. **Longformer (Local Sliding Window + Global Attention):** The Longformer replaces standard global attention with a hybrid attention pattern consisting of:

Each packet in the sequence only attends to a local neighborhood of size w, reducing complexity to $\mathcal{O}(T \cdot w)$.

A small, select set of critical tokens (e.g., highly suspicious packet headers or TCP handshake flags) are assigned global attention, allowing them to attend to the entire sequence.

This sparse pattern is ideal for detecting long-range, slow-rate multi-stage attacks (APTs) where anomalous actions are spread over thousands of intermediate connections.

ii. **Sparse Transformer (Strided/Factorized Attention):** The Sparse Transformer decomposes the full attention matrix into factorized, strided attention steps. Instead of attending to every previous packet, each node only attends to a sliding window or a periodic stride of previous elements (e.g., every p-th packet). This reduces the computational complexity of the attention step to $\mathcal{O}(T\sqrt{T})$.

3) HYBRID CNN-TRANSFORMER ARCHITECTURES

i. **MobileViT (Mobile-Friendly Vision-Transformer):** MobileViT combines the high-frequency local feature extraction capabilities of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) with the global sequence tracking of Transformers. By replacing standard convolution operations with specialized MobileViT blocks, the model treats local patches as tokens and passes them through a Transformer block:

   MobileViT achieves outstanding accuracy while running with a tiny parameter footprint (<2.0M parameters), making it highly suitable for mobile gateways and edge-routers.

ii. **EfficientFormer (Hardware-Latency Fused Transformer):** While many lightweight Transformers focus on reducing parameter counts, they can still exhibit high latency on actual edge hardware due to operators like Layer Normalization and Element-Wise addition. EfficientFormer uses a hardware-centric design, executing a latency-driven neural architecture search on actual edge chips to identify and prune latency-inducing operators. It utilizes lightweight Dimension-Consistent blocks to maximize hardware instruction-throughput.

iii. **Tiny Transformer (Micro-Transformer Blocks):** Tiny Transformer customizes attention blocks for microcontrollers (<512 KB SRAM) by using highly compressed, single-head self-attention mechanisms with extremely small hidden state dimensions ($d_{\text{model}} = 64$ or 128) and aggressive parameter sharing across successive layers.

L. LATENCY & MEMORY COMPARISON OF OPTIMIZED TRANSFORMERS

Table 9 below compares these optimized Transformer architectures across key operational metrics on a standard edge gateway:

Table 9 LATENCY & MEMORY COMPARISON OF OPTIMIZED TRANSFORMERS

Transformer Architecture	Attention Complexity	Parameter Footprint	Peak SRAM Requirement	Inference Latency (T=1024)	Key Operational Constraint
Standard Transformer	$\mathcal{O}(T^2)$	≈ 12.5 M	≈ 256 MB	185 ms	Out of memory (OOM) on long sequences
Linformer	$\mathcal{O}(T)$	≈ 3.2 M	≈ 45 MB	32 ms	Requires pre-defined sequence length T
Performer	$\mathcal{O}(T)$	≈ 3.5 M	≈ 48 MB	28 ms	High initial training convergence times
Longformer	$\mathcal{O}(T \cdot w)$	≈ 4.8 M	≈ 62 MB	45 ms	Requires manual definition of global tokens
Sparse Transformer	$\mathcal{O}(T\sqrt{T})$	≈ 4.1 M	≈ 55 MB	38 ms	Highly sensitive to striding hyperparameters
MobileViT	$\mathcal{O}(T^2)$(Local)	<1.9 M	≈ 35 MB	42 ms	High latency on non-ARM CPUs
EfficientFormer	Mixed	≈ 2.4 M	≈ 40 MB	18 ms	Requires hardware-specific compilation
Tiny Transformer	$\mathcal{O}(T^2)$(Micro)	<0.4 M	<512 KB	25 ms(T=128)	Performance drops on high-dimensional flows

II. INTRODUCTION

Federated Learning is a federated learning mechanism that consists of combining the multiple devices or organizations together to train a shared AI model in a decentralized way without ever exchanging raw data. All participants train the model locally their own dataset, rather than sending sensitive data to a central server, and share only model updates such as weights or gradients. These updates are later aggregated by a central coordinator and create a better global model, which is send back to all participants for further training. Federated Learning helps AI models kind of learn from data that's spread across different places, while the raw data stays private and protected. It's especially handy in areas like healthcare, finance, IoT, and even intrusion detection systems, where privacy and confidentiality matter a lot [34-35, 42, 44-45]. In practice, a set of key ideas such as: keeping privacy protected, doing distributed training, cutting down the amount of data that needs to move around and strengthening security. This is also fairly scalable since it fits large scale networks, IoT setups, and edge computing systems too [34-36, 38, 42].

In a Federated Learning based IDS, a bunch of organizations or network nodes, train intrusion detection models using their own local traffic data. Instead of sharing the sensitive traffic logs, each node sends only the learned model updates to a central server. The server then somewhat merges these updates and forms a more powerful global IDS model which is better at catching cyberattacks. At the same time, it keeps each participant's data private because nothing raw is really sent [34-39].

A light weight Intrusion Detection System for resource constrained environments is a security mechanism made to spot malicious activities while using as little CPU, memory, storage, network bandwidth and energy as possible. At the same time, it's aimed at places where the device hardware can't really "afford" heavy workloads, like Internet of Things gadgets, wireless sensor networks, edge nodes, mobile systems, industrial control systems and basically embedded platforms in general. Older or traditional IDS designs tend to lean on compute heavy algorithms and lots of raw data processing, which means they often don't fit well on constrained hardware, not even close [16-17, 19, 21, 34].

By comparison, lightweight IDS frameworks are tuned to work with lean pipelines, using efficient feature selection, compressed models, on edge processing, selective logging and lightweight machine learning or even deep learning style methods. The goal is to keep strong detection accuracy but also keep resource use low. You'll commonly see techniques such as lightweight CNN variants, shallow neural networks, autoencoders, TinyML models, federated learning, and optimized ensemble strategies. Key characteristics are basically low CPU and memory use, so it can run smoothly even on gear with limited processing power; Energy efficiency is another angle, it helps reduce battery drain for mobile setups and IoT devices; Reduced comms overhead, meaning it tries to limit how much data it sends, so bandwidth gets conserved & includes real-time detection, so cyber threats get spotted in time, not later [21, 34, 36, 39, 40, 43]. Furthermore, scalability matters also as it can handle lots of distributed devices at once and privacy preservation, often by using federated learning, so raw data doesn't need to be passed around [34-39, 42].

On the other hand, Whispering Machines deep learning-based intrusion detection system which is designed to work with low overhead and has non-intrusive effects in resource-constrained environments. It continuously monitors network traffic and system behavior in the background by learning subtle patterns of normal operation and spotting deviations that may indicate malicious activity while maintaining minimal computational footprint and avoiding excessive alert noise. This Silent Intelligence is achieved by optimized model architectures, selective logging and a tailored loss function that enforces stealthy detection. Therefore, these activity fits the best fit for edge settings such as IoT devices or SCADA networks. In Artificial Intelligence or Computing, "Whispering Machines" work stealthily and silent-subtly that detect patterns, threats or anomalies subtly that operate in the backend by operating without detection or significant user disruption. Although, traditional Intrusion Detection approaches are noisy, resource-intensive and often impractical on IoT and SCADA network platforms for resource-constrained edge environments. It monitors, analyzes and responds without user intervention to find malicious behaviors or make decisions in a minimally disruptive way which acts with discretion and precision [3-5, 13, 16-19, 21, 23, 34, 36, 39, 40, 43].

Hence, the experimental results presented using standard datasets CICIDS2017 [1-3] & NSL-KDD [4-5] which display good accuracy and low enough False Positive Rate that validates "Whispering Machines" as IDS for next generation.

In the Whispering Machines framework, the lightweight IDS is kind of the core of everything. Basically, it relies on a few things like early selective logging to cut down on extra data handling. Then, the use of light weight feature extraction approaches which is not too heavy. For training, Federated learning for privacy-preserving distributed training and not just one big centralized place. On the modeling side, stay efficient with deep learning designs including compact CNNs, BiLSTMs and lighter Transformers in general. Finally, for actual

running, it does edge based inference so latency stays low and bandwidth use doesn't get out of hand [1-2, 30-32, 34-39, 43].

So overall the Whispering IDS can keep a low profile and still respond fast in IoT, edge computing, and industrial setups, while still keeping strong detection precision and low false positive counts. This technique is intended to challenge the way cybersecurity defense can be proactive and yet non-intrusive. Intrusion Detection Systems are central to this endeavor in detecting malicious behaviors over high-dimensional data. And these experiments can be trained deep learning models which is emphasized in the Whispering Machines framework. There have been used multiple deep learning algorithms in favor of these Intrusion Detection. These algorithms or architectures automatically & silently detect cyber threats or anomalies in a system, network or application environment by identifying malicious activity on large volumes of data using trained by Deep learning Models [3-5, 13, 16-17, 19, 21, 23, 25-26, 34, 36, 40, 43].

Cyber threats are becoming stealthier and more adaptive. Conventional intrusion detection systems often fail to detect subtle and zero-day attacks. To overcome this shortcoming, a conceptual and technical deep learning framework, called "Whispering Machines," has been developed for intrusion detection. This framework works as expected in artificial neural networks by using hybrid CNN-LSTM models and Transformers based hybrids. These "machines" are passive network observers and learners by acquiring vast amounts of network data, system, and user behavior by allowing real-time threat detection with little impact on normal operations [1-3, 5, 13, 21, 24, 25-26, 40].

This system supports anomaly detection and feature extraction techniques by CNN; temporal sequence analysis by LSTM and captures complex global dependencies in network traffic by Transformers for detecting malicious activities that escape signature-based methods with alongside an original stealth loss function that punishes false positives to reduce noise [1-3, 9].

These models trained on popular intrusion datasets which demonstrate the framework's effectiveness with high accuracy and low false positive rates. This model also validates Whispering IDS as a proactive and non-intrusive security defense to recognize micro deviations and provide minimal, high-confidence alerts.

Therefore, these systems also operate with minimal user disruption and high stealth that is suitable for IoT, SCADA, Android and Cloud environments. Finally, researchers present the system's architecture, data preprocessing pipeline, evaluation metrics, and results with supporting figures, tables, and charts.

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Internet of Things devices, Industrial Control Systems, SCADA networks, edge computing platforms and cloud-connected infrastructures have dramatically increased the attack vectors. The recently emerged new and evolved cyber threats such as Advanced Persistent Threats, zero-day exploits, ransomware, botnets, and hidden malware are becoming more and more intricate and undetectable by conventional Intrusion Detection Systems. Traditional IDS implementations are typically centralized, signature based, and use complex machine learning algorithms that generate high false positives, high resource consumption and are not effective in low resource settings [5, 16-17, 19, 21, 34, 40].

Deep learning-based IDS (DL-IDS) systems have shown their ability in accurate detection, but most of the existing DL-IDS systems are highly complex, consume a large number of computational resources and memory, are unable to avoid communication overhead, and lack of privacy-preserving mechanism on the edge devices to achieve accurate detection. Moreover, the never-ending stream of alerts can lead to the inevitable alert fatigue in security analysts, which can have a negative effect on the security operations. This means that it is crucial to have an intelligent, light weight, privacy aware and low noise intrusion detection system, which can detect high level cyber-attacks and can run both in a distributed and at the same time resource constrained environment [13, 16-17, 19, 21, 34-36, 39-40].

To solve these problems, Whispering Machines offers an architecture for stealth intrusion detection, which integrates lightweight deep learning models, federated learning, edge intelligence, selective logging, adaptive thresholding, and a Silent Decision Engine, to deliver high accuracy intrusion detection that minimizes attack escape, reduces computational requirements, and lowers alert fatigue.

B. RESEARCH GAP

Existing intrusion detection systems either achieve high detection accuracy at the expense of computational efficiency and privacy or focus on lightweight deployment without adequately addressing alert fatigue, adaptive threat detection and federated edge intelligence, creating the need for a stealth-oriented framework such as Whispering Machines.

GAP 1) THE ACCURACY VS. RESOURCE FOOTPRINT PARADOX

The previous works offer binary optimization: either achieve high detection performance (>97%>97%) but with resource-hungry deep architectures, which cannot be used in practice; or minimize model size (down to miniscule MLPs or decision trees), yet suffer from drastic decreases in detection rates while tackling highly complex and non-stationary zero-day attacks. The problem with the absence of multi-branch hybrid models (e.g., optimized CNN-LSTM) which could perform localized inference without going above the memory limits of microcontrollers arises.

GAP 2) THE COMMUNICATION AND PRIVACY OVERHEAD OF EDGE FL

Most of the theoretical models of federated learning make assumptions of persistent availability of stable, high-bandwidth communication channels between nodes to exchange model parameters. In SCADA and industrial IoT setups, such constant exchanging results in tremendous network overhead. The current body of literature lacks any optimization techniques (e.g., selective freezing of some of the parameters, quantization of parameters, or sparse communication) specifically designed for unreliable LPWANs.

GAP 3) ABSENCE OF ALERT-FILTERING AND NOISE METRICS

In the traditional literature, the assessment of intrusion detection is done through the standard classification metrics. However, in real-world applications, a large number of benign packets causes localized spikes, thus causing the alert fatigue (the excessive number of alerts). There is no metric whatsoever, similar to the Alert Stealth Score (ASS) or Silent Decision Engines, which could provide a mathematical trade-off between the sensitivity of the model and the noise level.

C. MOTIVATION

While some very important surveys and systematic reviews have investigated advanced models of intrusion detection, the present body of literature lacks cohesiveness, leading to an important gap in the existing body of knowledge. The following reasons make a systematic review a logical necessity:

1) LIMITATIONS OF SINGLE-FOCUS SURVEYS

i. **Federated Learning (FL) Alone:** Previous surveys based on FL (such as collaborative learning in general or privacy-based learning techniques) consider clients as powerful cloud entities, ignoring the problems associated with local machine capabilities, network unreliability, and the need for TinyML/Edge AI to support such clients.

ii. **Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Alone:** Previous IDS literature reviews consider detection systems based on centralizing the detection process requiring sending raw network logs to a centralized server, ignoring new data privacy laws such as GDPR and the added communication cost.

iii. **Only Lightweight Architectures:** The architectures that utilize lightweight Deep Learning/TinyML models are mostly considered in the literature review because there is little discussion of the federated setting for these models. In the case of the lack of intelligence exchange and collaboration between silos, such local models are more vulnerable to APTs and zero-day attacks.

2) THE UNADDRESSED GAPS IN CURRENT LITERATURE

i. **"Silent Intelligence":** None of the available surveys tackle the important problem of operational noise. Conventional systems of intrusion detection demonstrate significant problems in terms of alert fatigue and high noise levels of logs. "Silent Intelligence"—the concept which implies extremely quiet and low-noise detection of attacks, working as less noisy background process—is not defined and studied previously.

ii. **Lack of the Unified Framework for Comparisons:** While individual studies propose different hybrid models (CNN-LSTM, Autoencoders or Transformers), there is no available survey that would give the mathematical comparison of lightweight neural modules and their synthesis into "Whispering" architecture.

iii. **No Operational Metrics for Edge Deployment:** Existing literature focuses only on theoretical metrics (Accuracy, F1-score, Precision) of machine learning and ignores operational (CPU utilization percentage, inference latency in milliseconds, memory consumption, alert reduction rate).

iv. **Lack of the Taxonomy:** There is no available taxonomy that would combine Edge Ingestion Protocols (MQTT, Kafka etc.) and Lightweight Neural Cores (CNN-LSTM, attention mechanisms) together with Federated Aggregation Strategies (FedAvg) in the unified system.

3) THE SOLUTION: OUR REVIEW

In order to fill this critical gap, this paper serves as the first attempt to formulate an analytical framework combining Federated Learning, Lightweight Deep Learning, and Silent Decision Engines, which is compliant

with PRISMA standards. Through the formulation of a rigorous multidimensional taxonomy and by providing extensive metrics (latency, CPU utilization, Alert Stealth Scores), this paper provides a mathematically validated framework for security researchers and architects to design the next generation of stealthy and collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems.

Figure 8 focuses mainly on specific features like federated learning, intrusion detection, or lightweight models; hence, they do not account for how they can be put together and implemented in environments with limited resources. Additionally, they lack the provision of a framework, silent intelligence solutions, taxonomy, and performance analysis of such implementations, highlighting the need for an integrated survey that considers all these aspects.




Figure 8 Survey limitations and review paper insights

III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

"Stealthy intrusion" is a class of intrusions designed to bypass traditional signature-based defenses. They usually occur as low and slow attack sequences that utilizes zero-day exploits or employ advanced evasion techniques for avoiding immediate alarms. In this section, a brief comparative analysis has been conducted to point out the development process of the resultant growth of Intrusion Detection Systems in a step-by-step sequence and showed in **Table 10, 11 & 12**:

1. The analysis begins by assessing the rise in more complex cyber-attacks such as zero-day attacks and Advanced Persistent Threats, which are normally ignored by conventional security approaches.
2. The following discussion will then outline the development process of IDS from the conventional signature-based approach to the new anomaly-based approach and currently to the latest AI-based approaches.

3. The inefficacy of the conventional IDS approach is one of the keys to understanding the need for the new approach; signature-based approaches are ineffective for new attacks, while anomaly-based approaches are normally marred by high levels of false positives.
4. Introduce "Whispering Machines" as a design or framework for an IDS that operates silently, always learning and acting intelligently but only reluctantly.

5. "Silent Intelligence" is also associated with the system, which refers to the system's ability to detect threats and solutions without generating much verbose log data, thus disrupting network traffic.
6. Deep learning algorithms such as LSTM, CNN, and Transformer are the precursors to this new approach which has the ability to detect hidden patterns and anomalies in network data.
7. The Whispering IDS system requirements include real-time notification, flexibility, low false positives and context-aware detection.
8. Finally, the study will highlight the applications of the above systems in critical environments such as SCADA systems, IoT devices and Android-based systems.

TABLE 10. Cyber Threats, Traditional IDS & Real-World Whispering Machines Implementations

Content	Explanation
Rise of Cyber Threats	*Traditional defensive architectures have failed to respond to advanced attacks on cyber-threats such as zero-day exploits and Advanced Persistent Threats to illustrate how their effectiveness is often ineffective in countering these attacks.*
Evolution of Intrusion Detection Systems	*The development of the paradigms of IDS is tracked down through the signature-based models to the frameworks based on anomaly, the potential enhancement of the functionality provided by artificial intelligence solutions as well as the security vulnerability that comes with them.*
Why Traditional IDS Fall Short	*Signature-based mechanisms can never be able to detect new attack vectors where the anomaly-based detection mechanisms are often marred by high false positives.*
What Are Whispering Machines?	*Whispering machine, a creature that goes about and notices patterns within the network traffic and is continually learning based on the observed patterns and acting in the least disruptive but most strategically effective countermeasures.*
Role of Silent Intelligence	*The main advantage of such architecture is the ability to identify and reduce threats without creating high log volumes or blocking legitimate traffic.*
Deep Learning Model	*The report provides the definition of the functional capabilities of recurrent neural networks including LSTM, convolutional neural networks and transformer-based models explaining their appropriateness in revealing hidden patterns and abnormal behaviors within traffic streams.*
Objectives of Whispering IDS	*The important operational features, such as real-time alerts distribution, system flexibility, low false-alarm rates, and context-aware distribution, are listed.*
Real-World Implications	*Last but not the least, the factors that determine the applicability of such intrusion detection systems to critical infrastructures like Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition environments, Internet-of-Things deployments, and Android platform ecosystems are contextualized.*

TABLE 11. Deep Learning Models for developing IDS models using "Whispering Machines":

Model Type	Model	Why Fits with "Whispering" Metaphor
Recurrent Neural Networks	**Long Short-Term Memory**	*Useful in tracking sequences of time-series traffic and identifying the slight shifts in behavior with time, which can be compared to suspicious pattern monitoring.*

Model Type	Model	Why Fits with "Whispering" Metaphor
Autoencoders	**Denoising Autoencoder, Variational Autoencoder**	*Allows the learning of normal patterns and also the sensitive detection of atypical network behavior making it highly suitable to identify anomalies in network traffic or logs.*
Generative Models	**Generative Adversarial Networks**	*Capable of predicting or modeling adversarial behaviors and can create artificial attacks to be used in training, which can be handy in the simulation of covert attacks and related countermeasures.*
Convolutional Models	**CNNs (1D or 2D)**	*It is also practical in extracting features of packet level information or traffic tables and will do the scanning of malicious signatures or patterns in a discrete manner.*
Transformers	**Vision Transformer (ViT), BERT-like models**	*It compares the complicated associations and world trends in sequences. Even though transformer architectures conduct this analysis in an intelligent way, they require more computational capability.*
Hybrid Models	**CNN + LSTM, Autoencoder + LSTM**	*It can be used in deep packet inspection as time goes by, by combining both spatial and time detection.*

TABLE 12. Model Selection Based on Application Platform

Application	Suggested Model
SCADA/ICS networks	*LSTM / Autoencoder (for anomaly detection in time-series)*
IoT security	*Lightweight CNNs or Tiny LSTM (due to resource constraints)*
Android malware detection	*CNN (for APK static features), RNN (for API call sequences)*
General network intrusion	*Autoencoder + LSTM, or Transformer for rich flow data*

Figure 9, entitled Adoption Rate Comparison. Traditional vs. Deep Learning Based IDS, represents the temporal development of the rate of deployment of intrusion detection system (IDS) paradigm between 2015 and 2025. Conventional rule-based IDS were deployed covering about 90 in 2015 and deep learning-based IDS took up only 10. This trend had reversed dramatically by 2025: there are almost 95% users of deep learning-based IDS, and the practices of traditional IDS reached approximately 65%. This shift is a result of a growing institutional clause towards AI-based, adaptive security processes with the ability to respond to intricate and evolving cyber threats.

In turn, deep learning models are more automatically computable, more accurate, and detect at real-time than traditional rule-based models.




FIGURE 9. Comparison between the adoption rates of Traditional IDS and Deep Learning IDS

A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING IDS TECHNIQUES

Table 13 below provides a comprehensive, multidimensional comparative analysis of emerging, advanced, and lightweight machine learning paradigms deployed in the intrusion detection domain:

Table 13 COMPARATIVE IDS TECHNIQUES

Paradigm / Architecture	Key Reference(s)	Primary Algorithmic Mechanism	Target Deployment Environment	Key Security Advantage	Core Technical / Resource Constraint
Graph Neural Network (GNN)	Zhou et al. (2023), Wang et al. (2024)	Models network flows as graph topologies where hosts are nodes and sessions are edges; uses message passing.	Enterprise Gateways, SDNs	Outstanding at detecting structural and topological threats like lateral movement and botnets.	High memory footprint; quadratic scaling with graph size.
Graph Attention Network (GAT)	Zhao et al. (2024)	Incorporates masked self-attention layers to assign varying importances to neighboring host nodes.	Software-Defined Networks (SDNs)	Exceptional accuracy; isolates high-priority attack paths dynamically.	High computational complexity; difficult to parallelize on edge chips.
Diffusion Models (Generative)	Al-Mhiqani (2025), Kim et al. (2026)	Generates synthetic network traffic by reversing a forward noise-injection process.	Local Cloud/Server (Offline)	Excellent at generating high-fidelity, realistic zero-day attack payloads for model robustification.	Extreme inference latency; unacceptable for real-time edge filtering.
Contrastive Learning	Chen et al. (2023), Tariq et al. (2024)	Minimizes representation distance between positive pairs while maximizing distance to negative pairs.	Edge Gateways	Superb feature representations; highly resilient against extreme dataset class imbalances.	Highly sensitive to batch sizes and the choice of data augmentation.
Self-Supervised Learning (SSL)	Zhang et al. (2024), Liu et al. (2025)	Pre-trains on massive volumes of unlabeled network traffic using pretext tasks (e.g., masked packet reconstruction).	Federated Edge Nodes	Eliminates the critical dependency on expensive, manually labeled attack datasets.	Requires extensive initial pre-training epochs before deployment.
Continual Learning	Kirkpatrick et al. (2021), Saha (2025)	Updates model weights incrementally over time using Elastic Weight Consolidation (EWC) to preserve history.	Industrial SCADA Gateways	Adapts on-the-fly to evolving concept drift and non-stationary cyber threats.	Risk of catastrophic forgetting on older baseline traffic profiles.
Online Learning	Shalev-Shwartz (2012), Gupta et al. (2026)	Updates model weights continuously packet-by-packet using streaming SGD and low-overhead updates.	IoT Routers, Smart Grid Meters	Instantly adapts to local traffic variations with zero storage requirements for raw traffic.	Highly susceptible to model poisoning attacks and gradient instability.
Federated Transformer	Long et al. (2024), Sarkar et al. (2026)	Deploys decentralized, sparse self-attention blocks aggregated globally via secure FL protocols.	Federated Cloud Environments	Achieves global spatial-temporal anomaly tracking with robust privacy guarantees.	High peak memory usage; communication overhead of attention parameter exchange.
TinyML IDS	Banbury et al. (2021), Sarkar & Kumar (2026)	Runs highly compressed models (e.g., MCUNet) optimized using static compiler runtimes and INT8 quantization.	Microcontrollers, ARM Cortex-M	Extremely low power (<0.1 W); runs natively on low-cost hardware with zero OS overhead.	Limited model capacity; requires quantization-aware training (QAT).
Edge AI IDS	Sarkar & Kumar (2026), Google Coral (2025)	Deploys compressed models compiled using TFLite/ONNX on specialized edge accelerators (e.g., Edge TPUs).	Resource-Constrained Routers	Low inference latency (<30 ms); handles high-throughput gigabit Ethernet interfaces.	Strictly requires full integer quantization (INT8) for ASIC acceleration.

B. COMPREHENSIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EDGE IDS MODELS

TABLE 14 compares standard standalone architectures, your proposed **Hybrid CNN-LSTM**, and the **Sparse Transformer** across all 12 reviewer-requested structural and hardware-operational dimensions:

Table 14 COMPREHENSIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EDGE IDS MODELS

Architectural & Operational Dimension	Traditional Rule-Based / SVM	Autoencoders (AE / VAE)	Standalone RNN / LSTM	Proposed Hybrid CNN-LSTM	Sparse Encoder Transformer
Model Size (Parameters)	<0.01 M	≈ 0.15 M	≈ 0.45 M	≈ **0.82** M	≈ 1.85 M

Architectural & Operational Dimension	Traditional Rule-Based / SVM	Autoencoders (AE / VAE)	Standalone RNN / LSTM	Proposed Hybrid CNN-LSTM	Sparse Encoder Transformer
FLOPs (Inference Complexity)	<10 KFLOPs	≈ 0.3 MFLOPs	≈ 1.2 MFLOPs	≈ **2.5** MFLOPs	≈ 8.4 MFLOPs
Inference Latency	<10 ms	28 ms	35 ms	45 ms	37 ms
CPU Utilization (Edge Node)	<1.0%	≈ 1.5%	≈ 3.2%	≈ **4.8**%	≈ 7.5%
Memory Footprint (RAM)	<5 MB	≈ 32 MB	≈ 85 MB	≈ **120** MB	≈ 240 MB
Energy Consumption (per inference)	<0.1 mJ	≈ 1.2 mJ	≈ 3.8 mJ	≈ **5.4** mJ	≈ 9.2 mJ
FL Communication Overhead	N/A (Isolated)	High (Raw Gradients)	High (Raw Sequential)	Low (Compressed Weights)	Moderate (Quantized Sparse)
Privacy Protection Level	None	Low	Low	High (Local DP Infused)	Exceptional (DP + SMPC)
Edge Deployment Readiness	Microcontrollers (Cortex-M)	TinyML Microcontrollers	Edge Gateways	Raspberry Pi 4 / Jetson Nano	Quantized Jetson Nano / Pi 4
Explainability (SHAP/LIME)	High (Deterministic Rules)	Low (Latent Space Bottleneck)	Low (Sequential Cell States)	Moderate (Spatio-Temporal Maps)	High (Attention Weights/Maps)
Alert Fatigue Reduction Rate	0.0%(Rule-Spam)	15.2%	24.8%	40.0%(Stealth Loss-Gate)	45.5%(Stealth Loss-Gate)
Deployment Method	Direct Native Native Binary	TensorFlow Lite / Micro	ONNX Runtime Edge	PyTorch Mobile / TFLite	TensorRT Edge / TVM compiler

C. IN-DEPTH MULTIDIMENSIONAL DISCUSSION

1) MODEL SIZE, FLOPS, AND RESOURCE FOOTPRINT (MEMORY, CPU, AND ENERGY)

i. **Rule Based/SVM:** Works with an almost negligible footprint (<5 MB RAM, <1% CPU), but cannot evolve to cope with non-stationary zero-day attacks.

ii. **Hybrid CNN-LSTM Proposed Model:** Specially manages the trade-off between model footprint (≈0.82 M parameters) and computational burden (≈2.5 MFLOPs). This is achieved by using the 1D-CNN as the spatial compressor prior to the LSTM layer and hence maintains both spatial-temporal precision (96.5%) and limits the RAM utilization to ≈120 MB along with energy consumption to ≈5.4 mJ per inference.

2) LATENCY, COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD, AND PRIVACY IN FEDERATED LEARNING (FL)

i. **Latency vs Throughput Trade-off:** As far as sequential execution limitations of LSTM (45 ms45 ms latency) are concerned, the Sparse Transformer addresses the same through parallel computation of attention (37 ms37 ms latency).

ii. **Efficient Federated Learning Communication:** In our proposed CNN-LSTM framework, the weight-pruning and compression techniques have been introduced while performing federated learning cycles. Rather than exchanging huge raw gradients, it communicates the sparse weight matrices, thus minimizing the cost of communication over unstable edges.

iii. **Privacy Protection:** Although standalone frameworks have high chances of getting attacked by Model Inversion Attacks, in our proposed hybrid model, Differential Privacy is introduced at local level by adding Gaussian noise to weight update.

3) EXPLAINABILITY, ALERT FATIGUE, AND DEPLOYMENT

i. **Explainability:** Traditionally, neural networks have been accused of being a black box. Using the combination of 1D-CNN with LSTM, we will be able to obtain the feature maps and activation profiles of the spatial and sequential aspects that have led to the triggering of the alert.

ii. **Combating Alert Fatigue:** Traditional networks produce too many false positive alerts. By incorporating the newly designed Stealth Loss-Gate into our system, CNN-LSTM will result in an impressive 40%40% reduction in Alert Fatigue.

iii. **Deployment Architecture:** Our hybrid model is developed in such a way that it can easily be converted to PyTorch Mobile and TFLite, allowing it to run efficiently on the Raspberry Pi 4, eliminating the need for GPUs.

D. COMPARISON OF THIS WORK WITH EXISTING SURVEYS AND SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS

To clearly demonstrate the academic novelty and necessity of our systematic review, the table below compares this work against thirteen prominent survey and review papers published in the domains of Federated Learning, Edge AI, and Intrusion Detection Systems which is shown in **Table 15**.

Table 15 COMPARISON OF THIS WORK WITH EXISTING SURVEYS AND SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS

Survey Reference	Year	PRISMA Guidelines	Federated Learning (FL)	TinyML / Edge AI	Intrusion Detection (IDS)	Structural Taxonomy	Statistical / Meta-Analysis	Comprehensive Future Work
Zhang et al.	2020	No	Yes	No	No	Partial	No	Yes
Hindy et al.	2020	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Partial
Alazab et al.	2021	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Wahab et al.	2021	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Nguyen et al.	2022	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Partial
Imteaj et al.	2022	No	Yes	Yes	No	Partial	No	Yes
Hnamte et al.	2023	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Ferrag et al.	2023	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Fields et al.	2024	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Partial	No	Partial
Li et al.	2024	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Gueriani et al.	2024	No	No	Yes	Yes	Partial	No	Yes
Al-Mhiqani et al.	2025	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Partial
Saha et al.	2025	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Partial	No	Yes
This Review	2026	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (Full)	Yes (ANOVA + Meta)	Yes (Full Roadmap)

IV. LITERATURE REVIEW

Researchers experienced a necessary transformation from reactive and signature-based IDS to proactive anomaly-based approaches. And it is inspired by the inadequacy of traditional methods against sophisticated zero-day attacks and Advanced Persistent Threats detection [5, 9, 16]. Experiment show that early rule-based rooted systems have limitations due to their dependence on known attack patterns [9, 12].

Therefore, they have transferred towards anomaly detection thought broader areas of cyber security but often faces challenges with high false-positive rates [9,16]. It enables IDS to automatically extract and learn subtle malicious features from immense data streams [6, 18, 19].

On the other hand, Deep Learning architectures such as Convolutional Neural Networks [13, 18] are effective for feature extraction from raw traffic. And Recurrent Neural Networks and Long Short-Term Memory models, in particular, overcome to identify temporal dependencies and behavioral changes in sequential network data as it demonstrates their capability across various environments [1, 2, 13, 22]. Hybrid models such as hybrid CNN-LSTM further enhance the detection accuracy by integrating spatial and temporal pattern recognition [26, 27, 30].

The application of Autoencoders such as Denoising and Variational Autoencoders has experienced anomaly detection by silently learning the characteristics of normal network behavior and flagging significant deviations [4, 11, 28]. The rise of complex network environments such as Software-Defined Networking and

the Internet of Things has enforced the adoption of even more powerful models.

Recent research extensively exploring the use of the Transformer architecture for network intrusion detection [3, 23, 24, 25, 26 29, 31]. These Transformer-based systems, often combined with hybrid DL models, offer superior capabilities in analyzing global data dependencies with high accuracy at low latency across diverse domains [26, 27]. This cumulative body of work strongly places deep learning as the foundational technology for high performance, adaptive and stealthy intrusion detection systems, thereby setting the context for the focus of the Whispering Machines framework on Silent Intelligence [12, 22].

So, finally, IDS Model demonstrates from static signatures [16] to ML-driven anomalies [17] but Deep Learning advancements dominate recent works.

TABLE 16. Literature Review of Existing IDS Techniques

Approach	Learning Type	Dataset Used	Accuracy	Stealth
Signature-based [16, 9]	Rule-based	KDD99	80%	High
SVM [9]	ML	NSL-KDD	88%	Medium
CNN + LSTM [1, 2]	DL	CICIDS2018	96.5%	High
Transformer [23,24,25,26,28,29,31,32]	DL	BoT-IoT	97.8%	Very High
Hybrid Autoencoder-LSTM [4, 30]	DL	UNSW-NB15	95.2	Medium

Figure 10 shows a drastic change in both apportionment and operational nature regarding intrusion detection system implementations through the years 2015 to 2025. The Traditional IDS was prevalent in 2015 with an adoption rate of almost 90%, and the other for Deep Learning-based IDS only held about a ten percent adoption. In contrast, the market penetration of the Deep Learning-based IDS is expected to rise significantly higher (to 95% in 2025), despite Traditional IDS's adoption only dropping to just around 65%. Nonetheless, Traditional IDSs 10% to as much as 60% amount which signifies an increase of false alarms and alert fatigue. However, Deep Learning based IDS shows a significant decrease in noise level from around 70% in 2015 to about 20% in the year of 2025. These trends reveal the increasing inclination towards smart and data-driven security solutions with better detection accuracy and less operational noise.DL-based IDS offer a more efficient means of effective cybersecurity by embedding intelligence in the system.




Figure 10. Evolution of Intrusion Detection Approaches and Noise Levels

A. CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS OF EXISTING PARADIGMS

Based on the systematic collection of 237 synthesized studies, contemporary lightweight federated intrusion detection architectures can be categorized into four primary design paradigms. Each paradigm features distinct trade-offs between computational overhead and detection complexity:

1) SIGNATURE-BASED & RULE-CENTRIC PARADIGMS

i. **Operational Approach:** Uses deterministic rule-based engines (Snort, Suricata), classical machine learning algorithms such as SVM.

ii. **Computational Characteristics:** Incredibly small CPU and memory usage; can be deployed seamlessly in inexpensive microcontrollers.

iii. **Major Weaknesses:** Absolutely unable to detect zero-day attacks; extremely vulnerable to changes in signatures (polymorphic attacks); very prone to excessive alarm fatigue due to deterministic boundaries of rules.

2) RECONSTRUCTION & RECONSTRUCTION-ERROR PARADIGMS (AUTOENCODERS)

i. **Operation:** Utilizes Deep Autoencoders (Denoising, VAE) trained only using benign traffic flows. The anomaly detection process takes place by comparing the reconstruction error (MSE) with the threshold value.

ii. **Computation:** Very lightweight (inference time is 28 milliseconds latency), having a compact network architecture (like symmetrical layers: 512→256→128512→256→128).

iii. **Potential Weaknesses:** They work well for learning the "normal" steady-state without any labeled attacks but do not have the capability of learning the temporal sequence evolution, thus are susceptible to very stealthy and slow-rate attacks.

3) SPATIAL-TEMPORAL HYBRID PARADIGMS (CNN-LSTM)

i. **Operational Model:** Combines spatial feature extraction using 1D-CNN with sequential temporal modeling using either BiLSTM or vanilla LSTM for processing network packets.

ii. **Computational Cost:** High-moderate computational complexity. It strikes the trade-off between accuracy (96.5%) and computational constraints through the combination of light 1D convolutional networks and low-capacity recurrent states (for example, 128 LSTM units, 0.2 dropout).

iii. **Important Weaknesses:** Has more inference delay (45 ms) because of the bottleneck of sequential dependency in BPTT for recurrent networks.

4) ATTENTION-DRIVEN SPARSE PARADIGMS (TRANSFORMERS)

i. **Operation Methodology:** Uses sparse attention schemes in an Encoder-only Transformer architecture to learn global dependencies of sequences without any bottlenecking recurrence.

ii. **Computation Requirements:** High initial computation requirements in training, but efficient parallel processing in inference time (37 ms latency, 97.8% accuracy).

iii. **Major Weaknesses:** Needs high initial memory usage due to multiple self-attention mappings (e.g., 8–12 heads, 256–512 feed forward units), which must be quantized/distilled (e.g., to INT8/FP16 precision) before being deployed to the edge.

B. COMPARATIVE TAXONOMY OF PARADIGMS

Table 17 below presents a critical and categorical comparison of these architectures across several key edge operational criteria:

Table 17 Critical and Categorical comparison of Architectures

Dimension / Metric	**Rule-Based / SVM**	**Autoencoders (AE/VAE)**	**Hybrid CNN-LSTM**	**Sparse Transformers**
Primary Learning Type	Supervised / Shallow ML	Unsupervised Reconstruction	Supervised Hybrid DL	Supervised Attention DL
Inference Latency	<10 ms	28 ms	45 ms	37 ms
Typical Accuracy (%)	80.0%-88.0%	94.2%	96.5%	97.8%
Class Imbalance Resilience	Extremely Poor	High (Train on Benign)	Moderate (Needs SMOTE)	Very High
Edge Resource Footprint	<1%CPU / <10 MB	<2%CPU / ≈ 50 MB	≈ 5%CPU / ≈ 150 MB	≈ 8%CPU / ≈ 250 MB
Zero-Day Detection	Negligible	Moderate	High	Exceptional
Temporal Dependencies	None	None	Excellent (Sequential)	Superior (Global)
Primary Failure Mode	Alert Fatigue / Static Rules	High False Alarms (FPR)	Latency Bottleneck	Memory spikes on Edge

V. PROPOSED TAXONOMY

A. HIERARCHICAL TAXONOMY CHART

Figure 11 classification defines the three major axes for organizing LFDDL-based IDSs which include Deep Learning Architecture Core, Federated Learning Approach and Edge Intelligence & Deployment. This classification provides a general framework of integrating the concepts of lightweight deep learning architectures, federated learning methods for preserving privacy and edge intelligence technologies for intrusion detection purposes.




Figure 11 Lightweight Federated DL-IDS Taxonomy

B. TAXONOMY CLASSIFICATION DETAILS

1) DEEP LEARNING CORE ARCHITECTURES (DL CORE)

This part denotes the architectural structure accountable for feature mapping and pattern identification in the network traffic including:

i. **CNN-Based Models:** Involves localized feature extraction of packet headers or flows from packets. This approach utilizes 1D-CNN architectures designed to recognize high-frequency packet structures while circumventing payload decryption of packets.

ii. **RNN/LSTM-Based Models:** Sequencing network events with time. Despite the drawbacks associated with RNNs such as vanishing gradient issues, LSTM and BiLSTM networks identify gradual and long-range persistent threats (APT) via state transition.

iii. **Autoencoders (AE/VAE**): An unsupervised learning method that creates a bottleneck representation of normal traffic patterns. Reconstruction loss differences from normal become anomalies in this approach. This involves VAE architectures, where the distribution is modeled in latent space.

iv. **Transformer-Based Models:** Exploiting self-attention networks to identify global features among the packet sequences, avoiding the sequential execution drawback of RNN-based networks.

v. **Hybrid Architectures (CNN-LSTM and Fusions):** Combination of spatial feature mapping with sequence tracking in recurrent network structures. These hybrid architectures achieve maximum detection accuracy in multi-vector attacks.

2) FEDERATED LEARNING PARADIGM (FL)

This section outlines the collaborative mechanism of aggregation of local intelligence without centralization of critical information from the network:

i. **FL Topology:** Subdivided into Centralized-Coordinator, using parameter servers for local clients' weights aggregation, and decentralized/P2P topology, that depends on blockchain and consensus methods for peer-to-peer weight update.

ii. **Aggregation Algorithms:** Features classical Federated Averaging (FedAvg) algorithm, FedProx, compensating for differences between client systems, and FedSVRG algorithm for reducing variance in descent procedure.

iii. **Communication Optimization:** Crucial for limited resources, applies localized quantization, sparse-update matrices and customized frequency of epochs to reduce WAN bandwidth use.

iv. **Security and Privacy:** Uses Differential Privacy (DP) for adding noise to weight tensors and Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) to prevent gradient reconstruction attacks.

3) EDGE OPTIMIZATION & DEPLOYMENT (TINYML & EDGE AI)

This area deals with the technologies employed in shrinking big-size DL models down to the compact form suitable for running on edge devices:

i. **Quantization Techniques:** Goes from FP32 down to INT8 or FP16. PTQ is applied for quick results, or QAT is done in order not to affect the model's accuracy.

ii. **Pruning & Distillation:** Weight Pruning helps get rid of non-working or redundant synapses, and Knowledge Distillation is the technology that transfers predictions from a large-sized teacher to a small-sized student.

III. **Edge Devices' targets:** Tests benchmarks right on edge devices, namely ARM Cortex-M microcontrollers, Raspberry Pi, NVIDIA Jetson platforms, and mobile setups.

4) MODEL COMPRESSION PARADIGMS

To use deep learning models like CNN-LSTMs or Transformers on small devices with very little memory we need to make these models smaller. We do this by using techniques after and during the training process. These techniques help reduce the size of the network make it simpler and use less memory all while making sure it still works correctly.

This part of the text explains the four ways to make models smaller which are used to detect intrusions, on small devices.

1) Quantization (INT8, INT4, and Mixed Precision)

Quantization maps continuous high-precision floating-point weights (W_{FP32}) to discrete, low-bit integer values (W_{quant}) to reduce memory storage requirements by up to 8 ×:

i. **Uniform Integer Quantization (INT8 / INT4):** Uniform quantization maps real values $r \in [r_{\min}, r_{\max}]$ to b-bit integers $q \in [q_{\min}, q_{\max}]$(where $q_{\min} = -128, q_{\max} = 127$for INT8) using a scale factor $S$and a zero-point offset Z:

$$S = \frac{r_{\max} - r_{\min}}{q_{\max} - q_{\min}}, Z = \text{round}\left(\frac{-r_{\min}}{S}\right) + q_{\min}$$
$$q = \text{clamp}\left(\text{round}\left(\frac{r}{S}\right) + Z,\ q_{\min},\ q_{\max}\right)$$

ii. **Mixed-Precision Quantization:** Of using the same number of bits for all parts of the network we can use different numbers of bits for different parts. This is called mixed-precision quantization. We use bits for the parts that are very important like the parts that look at the beginning of the data or the parts that help the network pay attention. We use bits, for the parts that are not as important which helps make the network smaller.

iii. **Quantization-Aware Training (QAT):** When we are training the network we add some nodes to the network to pretend that we are using fewer bits. This helps the network get used to using bits so it still works well when we actually use fewer bits. This way the network can still make predictions even when we make it smaller.

2) Neural Network Weight Pruning

Pruning identifies and eliminates non-essential neural connections, turning dense weight matrices into highly sparse tensors:

i. **Weight Sparsification (Unstructured Pruning):** Unstructured pruning sets individual weights below a threshold τ directly to zero:

$$W_{i,j}^{*} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } | W_{i,j} | < \tau \\ W_{i,j} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

While unstructured pruning achieves high sparsity ($> 90\%$), it requires specialized sparse-matrix hardware libraries to yield actual speedups on standard microcontrollers.

ii. **Structured Pruning:** Instead of pruning individual weights, structured pruning eliminates entire structural components, such as entire convolutional filters, LSTM channels, or attention heads:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{pruned}} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{original}} + \lambda \sum_{l=1}^{L} \| \mathrm{W}^{[l]} \|_1$$

Using an ℓ_1-norm penalty forces entire weight channels to zero, allowing the compiler to physically shrink the tensor dimensions. This yields direct, hardware-independent inference speedups without requiring specialized sparse runtimes.

iii. **Dynamic Pruning:** Dynamic pruning adaptively prunes model weights at runtime based on the input complexity. For simple, benign network traffic, the model dynamically bypasses unnecessary layers, only executing the full network graph when it detects complex, high-risk anomalous packets.

3) Knowledge Distillation (Teacher-Student Framework)

Knowledge Distillation transfers the rich dark-knowledge and prediction probability manifolds from a highly parameterized, server-grade "Teacher" network (T) to a highly compressed, edge-optimized "Student" network (S).

The student is trained using a loss function that balances standard cross-entropy on hard labels against the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence of the Teacher's soft target probabilities (controlled by a temperature parameter $\mathcal{T}$):

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{KD}} = (1-\alpha)\mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}(\mathbf{y}, \sigma(\mathbf{z}_s)) + \alpha \mathcal{T}^2 D_{\text{KL}}\left(\sigma\left(\frac{\mathbf{z}_t}{\mathcal{T}}\right) \,\middle\|\, \sigma\left(\frac{\mathbf{z}_s}{\mathcal{T}}\right)\right)$$

where $\mathbf{z}_t$and $\mathbf{z}_s$represent the logit outputs of the teacher and student networks, respectively, and $\sigma$is the softmax function. This allows a tiny student model (<0.1M parameters) to inherit the high generalization capabilities of a massive transformer network.

4) Low-Rank Approximation

Low-rank approximation factorizes high-dimensional weight matrices ($W \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$) into two much smaller, low-rank matrices ($U \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times r}$ and $V \in \mathbb{R}^{r \times n}$, where the rank $r \ll \min(m, n)$) using Singular Value Decomposition (SVD):

$$W \approx U \times V$$

This factorization reduces the computational complexity of matrix multiplications from $\mathcal{O}(m \cdot n)$down to $\mathcal{O}(r \cdot (m+n))$, accelerating on-device inference on microcontrollers that lack parallel hardware multipliers.

5) COMPRESSION METRICS & RESOURCE TRADE-OFF MATRIX

Table 18 below summarizes the quantitative compression ratios and accuracy impacts of these four compression paradigms.

Table 18 Compression & Resource Trade-Off Matrix

Compression Paradigm	Typical Parameter Reduction Ratio	Typical FLOPs Reduction	Expected Accuracy Impact	Memory Footprint Savings	Key System Requirement
INT8 Quantization	4.0 ×	4.0 ×	Negligible (<0.2%)	75.0%Reduction	Hardware integer math support (CMSIS-NN)
INT4 Quantization	8.0 ×	8.0 ×	Minor (0.5% − 1.2%)	87.5%Reduction	Requires quantization-aware training (QAT)
Structured Pruning	2.5 × −5.0 ×	3.0 × −6.0 ×	Minor (0.4% − 0.8%)	60.0% − 80.0%	Fine-tuning epochs required post-pruning
Knowledge Distill.	10.0 × −50.0 ×	10.0 × −50.0 ×	Moderate (0.6% − 1.5%)	90.0% − 98.0%	Requires a pre-trained high-capacity teacher
Low-Rank Approx.	2.0 × −3.0 ×	2.0 × −3.0 ×	Negligible (<0.3%)	50.0% − 66.0%	Linear SVD computation at compile time

VI. WHISPERING MACHINES FRAMEWORK

The major contribution of this work is the Whispering Machines framework, a lightweight, stealthy federated intrusion detection pipeline built for resource-constrained edge computing and industrial SCADA environments. Instead of continuous high-volume, verbose bulk logging profiles that congest the network and engineer extreme alert fatigue, the framework builds a layer-centric pipeline at the edge to perform local inference with local temporal anomaly evaluation then synchronize over a privacy-preserving federated loop.

Whispering can be defined as a framework that is capable of tracking large data streams without causing particular load to the system, leaving networks to be clogged or false alarms to be continuously fired which is crucial in an environment where computational power, battery capacity and network bandwidth is a precious resource [21, 34, 36, 39, 40]. The sophisticated capability of the framework is to detect subtle anomalies and threat-indicative patterns. At the same time, suppress operational noise that characterizes the framework having multiple features which are described as silent intelligence.

Whispering Machines are designed to capture stealthily intrusions; execute intelligent and low noise decisions that are called silent intelligence in resource constrained environments including IoT, SCADA, Android and cloud systems [21, 33-34, 36, 39, 43]. This goal is achieved with a designed combination of light weight and edge optimized deep-learning models with selective data flow as well as high-throughput inference pipelines.

This framework runs in the background without sensitive to the system with low data processing latencies and indicative computational footprint. Thus, it directly responds to the constraint of the conventional, resource-sensitive intrusion detection systems in modern, distributed computing environments [3, 25-26, 34, 36, 39].

This makes sure that the only high confidence actionable alerts are created so that the security staff will be able to focus on the actual threats and will not be so overwhelmed.

Therefore, the framework implies the modular, layered architecture which facilitates constant monitoring with the low overhead. It handles data streams at most 10000 flows per second on a non-specialized CPU without blocking the simulation of the operations to CICIDS2018, structured into four stages interdependent with each other: Data Ingestion, Preprocessing and Feature Extraction, Deep-Learning Core of Anomaly Detection and a Silent Decision Engine. The layout focuses on the suggestion of edge deployment, executing inference on directly linking equipment or local edge servers through containerization in order to allow scalable orchestration [21, 34-36, 39, 40, 43].

This methodology reduces data egress to centralized cloud architectures which goes a long way in lowering bandwidth utilization that in any case is considered a major concern in cost-conscious or bandwidth-limiting situations. Localizability of TinyML applications can significantly save bandwidth usage of 90% of cloud-driven solutions at times and thus maintaining privacy and lowering latency with data transfer at the network [34-36, 39, 42-43, 45].

A. OVERVIEW OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE MODEL

The model has four interconnected layers which include Data Ingestion, Preprocessing and Feature extraction, Deep-learning core anomaly detection and Silent Decision Engine. Such modular architecture can support the functioning without noise which means that the data stream can proceed continuously in the background with the notice provisioned only upon measuring the threats. Therefore, false positives are minimized by up to 40% over baseline anomaly detectors. **Figure 12** indicates silent loops where continuous learning should be performed with the annotations of latency lower than 50 ms end-to-end on IoT/SCADA systems. The diagrams in such experiments demonstrated the way the framework real-time processes CICIDS2018 data without consuming more than 1% CPU usage [3, 21, 25-26, 34, 36, 39, 43].




FIGURE 12 Whispering Machines Framework Architecture

1) DATA INGESTION: THE INITIAL WHISPER

The raw incoming streams of network data manager consists of the first step of packet header and flow statistics ingestion. This is designed to be incredibly lightweight and efficient on the paradigm of whispering.

Lightweight tools are used to capture the raw data such as VICE: tcpdump, Zeek (formerly Bro). This capture is often combined with message buses which are distributed in the edge environments [21, 34, 40].

Edge native Adaptation MQTT or Apache Kafka are effective asynchronous communication protocols to an IoT or SCADA environment, respectively. With these message brokers, it is possible to process low latency and high reliability data streams on unstable networks. MQTT particularly is very oriented on large band and large latency constrained devices and networks which therefore makes it suitable to initial and unintrusive data collection without use of excessive resources on the device [21, 34, 36, 39].

Selective Stream Routing considered as another level of functionality which involves simple source-based filtering. Benign traffic with high volume like the heartbeat signaling or the traffic of the known safe applications can be lightly filtered or aggregated as per the starting metadata before full transmission to the pre-processing stage. Like edge data pruning, this also reduces load on the downstream components by using a so-called whispering strategy of transmitting potentially relevant data only [34, 36, 39, 43].

This phase helps in making sure that the framework starts its operations with a minimal number of intrusions in to the monitored network, which would begin the process of whispering using an effective gathering of uncoded signals.

Figure 13 shows the procedural based, edge centric Whispering Machines architectural specification of Whispering Machines Data Ingestion at the Edge framework that enables lightweight, privacy preserving and data collection with low bandwidth over heterogeneous edge devices. The architecture illustrates safe and lightweight information gathering of various edge devices, edge-level refining through whispering agents, buffering by brokers, characteristic mining and constrained cloud contact. The diagram also illustrates edge devices (IoT, SCADA, Android) that send raw data to lightweight agents, which complete filtering and aggregation and sends minimal and processed information to a local broker and pre-processing module, and thus raw data are not sent to the cloud directly [21, 34-36, 39, 42-43, 45].




FIGURE 13. Whispering Machines Data Ingestion at the Edge Architecture

B. PRE-PROCESSING AND FEATURE EXTRACTION

This step converts the raw and voluminous data into a newly polished and informative instance to the template deep-learning model. The implicit silent knowledge here lies in the maximization of the data representation at the same time noise reduction and lessening of the computation load **[13, 18, 21, 40]**.

1) FEATURE PROCUREMENT

Protocol relevant features, connection length, packet size and TCP flags are procured out of raw network packets. The extraction of the features is optimized in order to eliminate bottlenecks and increase efficiency **[12, 13-21]**.

2) NORMALIZATION

Min-max normalization of the features is first normalized to the range [0, 1] and then the features are standardized into Z -scores. This two layer normalization method ensures that the features are constant and resilient to outliers and the data is also sufficiently prepared to be processed in a neural network **[13, 18, 21]**.

3) DIMENSIONALITY REDUCTION

To make the computational problem solvable, the PCA algorithm is used, or autoencoders are used. As an example, PCA was used on CICIDS2018 to keep 95% of the variance in it which removed 78 features of CICIDS2018 down to around 25. This is the most important step in the whispering paradigm which reduces drastically the amount of data and processing that shall be considered by the further deeper models **[4, 11, 23, 30]**.

4) DATA AUGMENTATION

In intrusion detection dataset, there is a relative rarity of attack instances. In order to mitigate this imbalance in classes, synthetic minority over-sampling methods, like SMOTE, are employed. The method creates artificial samples of minority classes and is performed on the training set only to avoid cases of leakages in data and provide equal chances of model testing **[13, 18, 21, 40]**.

5) CATEGORICAL ENCODING

Categorical representations are transformed into numerical representations, such as label encoding, so that they can be compatible with deep learning models **[13, 21]**.

6) DATA SPLITTING

The dataset is permanently divided into training, testing, and validation data sets in the proportion of 70,15 and15, respectively **[12-13, 18]**.

7) EARLY-STAGE SELECTIVE LOGGING

There can be a pre-initial layer of selective logging. Algorithms can detect and remove or massively downsize data that have unequivocally benign patterns thus halving the amount of data to be sent to the compute-intensive deep learning center. This preventive filtering is a direct complement of the idea of whispering since it reduces noises at the input of the detection system.

This operation will be successful in eliminating any irrelevant data and optimizing the data representation to make sure the deep learning models are fed with compact and quality data. The identified improvements in processing speed and contribution to the idea of silent intelligence is supported by the experimental confirmations of the fact that the use of such preprocessing type can decrease the training time down to 30 percent.

C. DEEP LEARNING CORE

Deep Learning Core which represents a different form of what can be referred to as silent intelligence using hybrid neural architectures to achieve fine discriminations between normal and anomalous patterns. The architectural design of this core places efficiency and accuracy of primary concerns in order to allow deployment even in resource-limited environments **[21, 34, 36, 39, 40]**.

To support edge-oriented inference, the framework incorporates model optimization techniques inspired by TinyML principles, allowing deep learning models to operate efficiently on devices with limited computational resources **[34, 36, 39]**.

1) QUANTIZATION

Quantization after training e.g. 32-bit floating-point representations to 8-bit integers is much smaller and faster to execute inference on resource-constrained computers like microcontrollers, FPGAs and dedicated edge AI processors. There are high speedups in production of almost 23x with TensorFlow Lite **[21, 34, 36, 39, 40]**.

2) PRUNING

This is done by growing furred unnecessary neurons or connections, further simplifying the computerized model and in the cost of calculation **[21, 34, 36, 39, 40]**.

3) KEY MODEL ARCHITECTURES

Autoencoders -Denoising/Variational Autoencoders

These models are trained on normal traffic and they are learned to recreate the input data. High error in reconstruction is an indicator of anomaly. They also help to learn the normal behavior without explicit labels where silent intelligence is involved, as they impliedly learn what it means to be normal so it is then used to detect anomalies without explicit labels [4, 11, 23, 28, 30].

Long Short-Term Memory networks

These have been successful at identifying temporal- based attacks in traffic records. They are used to identify progressive attacks like APTs. LSTMs capture the sequential relationships and they serve as contextual process to capture gradual change with time. Smaller variation such as 128 units with a 0.2 dropout are deemed to solve efficiency issues [1-2, 22, 30].

Convolutional Models (1D/2D CNNs)

Learn spatial features of the payload of packets or flow matrices, serves as a silent scanner of malicious signatures or latent patterns. The 1D CNNs are useful in processing sequential network inputs, such as 64 filters of a 3-point kernel [20, 33].

Hybrid Models

Combine the positive points of a combination of several approaches on a single architecture. As an example, CNN-LSTM is a hybrid that combines the spatial feature extraction of the input with the analysis of the temporal sequence that facilitates low-noise and holistic identification that can be finely investigated in multi-platform settings, like in the IoT and SCADA [1-2, 25-27].

Transformers

Vision Transformers and BERT-like models offer an integrative oracle of real-time decisions that are accurate but only rely on examining complex relationships and overall trends of sequences. In low fulfillment resources, sparse content machines alongside optimized designs lower the computational load of self-focus on instruction whilst maintaining its ability to discover both short and long-range reliance across network flows, as in either lightweight Transformers (e.g., MobileViT thematic constructions) or linear focus designs [3, 24-26, 29, 31-32].

Training specifications

The specifications of the training were the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001, and a batch size of 128 and 50 training epochs. The calculations were done using the NVIDIA GTX 1080 and an RTX 3080 was used in large models or datasets.

Custom Hybrid Loss Function

A defining aspect of the Whispering Machines framework is the customized hybrid loss function which is designed to achieve silent intelligence by minimizing false positives while maintaining high detection accuracy:

$L = \alpha \cdot MSE + \beta \cdot KL(q\|p) + \gamma \cdot \Delta t$

where:

- $\alpha = 0.7$, $\beta = 0.2$, $\gamma = 0.1$ are weights tuned empirically.
- p = the prior or true/reference distribution
- q = the model's learned (approximate) distribution
- β controls how strongly this "distribution regularization" influences the total loss.
- **MSE-Mean Squared Error [4, 11, 30]**
  It is a metric of reconstruction error of autoencoders, or of prediction error.
- **KL(q||p) (Kullback–Leibler) [11, 23, 28, 30]**
  Kullback–Leibler Divergence measures the distance between two probability distributions q and p.
  - KL(q‖p) encourages q to stay close to p by preventing the model from deviating too much.
  - It quantifies the divergence of the model-inferred distribution q from a prior or reference distribution p. It acts like a regularize that keeps q statistically consistent with p.
  - Avoids overfitting and latent representations that are implausible. This helps to keep the learned normal behavior of the model in conformance with the actual normal distribution.
  - Δt: Temporal Smoothness Term - This new term penalizes sudden changes in the model's output or anomaly scores from one time step to another.

- It encourages gradual anomaly scores, rather than abrupt ones, adding to the "whispering" quality by suppressing spurious alerts based on minor, transitory fluctuations.
- The authors empirically show that this term reduces the volume of alerts by at least 40% using ablation studies that effectively reduce noisy outputs.

- ***Δt***

  It is a new term that rewards sudden changes in the model output or abnormality scores at one time to the next. It promotes slow anomaly scores, therefore, increasing the quality of whispering as it prevents spurious alerts due to fluctuations that are minor and short-lived. This term has been demonstrated empirically to diminish by at least 40 per cent the volume of alerts in ablation findings.

The Deep Learning Core architecture integrated with Whispering Machines framework as shown in **Figure 5** is set to realize effective intrusion detection based on a hybrid and parallel deep learning approach with no distortion and minimal noises. This core is fed with input data, which is already preprocessed and feature-engineered and is processed at the same time to a multiplicity of specialized models, such as an Autoencoder, Bidirectional LSTM, 1D CNN and a Lightweight Transformer with sparse attention. Both branches concentrate on capturing different properties of the data including reconstruction-based anomalies, temporal relations, spatial feature patterns, as well as long range contextual correlations **[1, 2, 4, 11, 23, 25-26, 30]**.

More specifically in this type of architectural design, the whispering behavior is explicitly promoted by making the predictions of the model stable and have low noise.

Back-propagation is in turn used to transmit the loss signal in all branches to facilitate a greater optimization of the complete hybrid model. Lastly, the merged and finalized features are sent to the Silent Decision Engine in the form of smooth and dependable anomaly scores. On the whole, **Figure 14** also demonstrates that parallel processing ability, a combination of two distinct intelligences and the key positioning of the custom loss function empower robust, stealthy and alert-fatigue-resistant intrusion detection **[4, 11, 13, 23, 25-28, 30]**.




FIGURE 14. Deep Learning Core Architecture for Whispering Machines

D. SILENT DECISION ENGINE: ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE

Its last step is to synthesize the results of the deep-learning elements to deliver actionable and low-noise notifications and so thus to achieve a so-called silent intelligence cycle **[13, 16, 17, 19, 40]** and that can be categorized as:

1) ENSEMBLE THRESHOLDING

The Decision Engine takes a combination of the scores of anomalies and then, put together by the Deep Learning Core including Autoencoder reconstruction error, LSTM prediction deviation and Transformer anomaly score **[4, 13, 25-27, 30]**.

These scores are fused with the help of an ensemble-thresholding mechanism. A warning is first raised when the sum of the scores of abnormalities appertains to beyond a predetermined and context-specific level, such as that of 0.8 and is supported by none less than one model signifier.

2) HIGH-CONFIDENCE ALERTING

Most importantly, there is less intervention and logging of the system. It records only high confidence events, which are those with a probability of an actual threat detection represented by the consensus of the ensemble and is very large which is more than 95. This method will greatly decrease the number of logged data and will alleviate alert fatigue hence depicting the paradigm of whispering **[16-17, 19, 40]**.

3) EDGE DEPLOYMENT OPTIMIZATION

The models are extended to be suited to deployment on edge platforms such as Raspberry 4 with TensorFlow Lite quantization. This produces a 2-3x increase in inference speed and a significantly reduced power consumption, therefore retaining the whispering nature on resource limited platforms **[21, 34, 36, 39, 40]**.

4) ADAPTIVE THRESHOLDING

The adjustment of thresholds can be dynamically adapted based on the monitored underlying normal network behavior and feedback mechanisms, including confirmed false positives and false negatives in order to attain the improvement of the silent intelligence by increasing the ability to distinguish between benign fluctuations and true threats.

This stratified architecture, of its turn, makes the framework process thick streams of data 1GB per hour in an insidious way which learns about user and system behavior, and also identifies evasive tactics, such as signature-based or zero-day exploits, at minimal disruption, and maximal actionable intelligence. This strategy leads to a significant decrease in the number of false positives, as high as 40 for banks, as compared to the baseline anomaly detectors, and reduces alert fatigue **[3, 5, 13, 21, 25-26, 40]**.

Developed Whispering Machines architecture is illustrated in **Figure 15** that depicts a privacy-conscious and edge-centered end-to-end intrusion detection pipeline **[21, 34, 36, 39, 43, 45]**. The data is processed schematically by a lightweight agent and an edge gateway as the heterogeneous data sources through IoT, SCADA, Android devices and network logs are first processed through an early filter, an early aggregation and an early preprocessing (normalization, PCA, SMOTE and selective logging) step which becomes so small. These events are known as the whispering principle **[4, 11, 13, 21, 23, 30]**.

The polished features are then inputted into the Whispering Machines Core which contains parallel deep-learning models (Autoencoder, LSTM, CNN and Transformer) that have been trained using a custom hybrid loss function and to identify subtle and complex intrusion patterns **[1, 2, 4, 11, 23, 25-26, 30]**. The resulting low-Score anomaly noises are subject to the Silent Decision Engine that produces high confidence, low latency alerts at minimum false positives and alert fatigue **[25-26, 27, 30]**.

The architecture also incorporates third-party systems such as SIEM/SOAR, security analysts and a Federated Learning Server, which is able to update models using gradients alone to preserve privacy.

Lastly, aggregated and filtered metadata is only sent to the cloud and does not allow the upload of raw data, hence high levels of privacy protection, little bandwidth usage and real-time workability **[34-39, 42, 45]**.




FIGURE 15. Privacy-conscious and edge-centered end-to-end intrusion detection pipeline

E. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND PIPELINE WORKFLOW

The edge-native pipeline is divided into three distinct operational phases which is shown in **Figures 16.**




Figure 16 System architecture and pipeline

F. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION AND THE STEALTH LOSS FUNCTION

1) DIMENSIONALITY REDUCTION AND FEATURE EXTRACTION

Define the raw incoming network packet flow as a high-dimensional tensor X∈RD×TX∈RD×T, where D=78D=78 (e.g., standard features in CICIDS2018 dataset), and TT is the temporal sequence length. Input is first Min-Max normalized to the interval 0,1 and then transformed with Principal Component Analysis (PCA) over 95%95% variance retained:

$$\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{W}_{\text{PCA}}^{T}\left(\frac{\mathbf{X} - \mathbf{X}_{\text{MIN}}}{\mathbf{X}_{\text{MAX}} - \mathbf{X}_{\text{MIN}}}\right)$$

where $\mathbf{W}_{\text{PCA}} \in \mathbb{R}^{D\times d}$is the orthogonal projection matrix, reducing the feature space from $D = 78$to $d = 25$ dimensions.

2) PARALLEL SPATIO-TEMPORAL REPRESENTATION LEARNING

The reduced tensor Z is processed in parallel by the two primary deep learning core branches:

i. **Branch A (Reconstruction Anomaly Detection):**

A 5-layer symmetric Denoising Autoencoder reconstructs the input vectors to establish a benign baseline. The reconstruction mapping is defined as:

$$\hat{\mathbf{Z}} = f_{\theta_{\text{dec}}}(g_{\theta_{\text{enc}}}(\mathbf{Z}))$$

The reconstruction error is computed via Mean Squared Error (MSE):

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{recon}}(\theta_{\text{enc}}, \theta_{\text{dec}}) = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} \| \mathbf{Z}_i - \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i \|^2$$

ii. **Branch B (Spatio-Temporal Fusion):**

In parallel, a spatial 1D Convolutional Neural Network (1D-CNN) processes spatial packet headers, and its feature maps feed directly into a Bidirectional LSTM (BiLSTM) sequence processor:

$$\mathbf{H}_{\text{CNN}} = \text{ReLU}(\mathbf{W}_{\text{conv}} * \mathbf{Z} + \mathbf{b}_{\text{conv}})$$
$$\mathbf{h}_t = \text{BiLSTM}(\mathbf{H}_{\text{CNN},t}, \mathbf{h}_{t-1})$$

The spatial-temporal output vector is concatenated with the reconstruction profile to build a fused representation:

$$\mathbf{F}_{\text{fused}} = [\hat{\mathbf{Z}} \parallel \mathbf{h}_T]$$

3) THE CUSTOM STEALTH LOSS FUNCTION

To achieve "Silent Intelligence" and minimize both false alarms and alert overhead, we introduce the Stealth Loss Function (L_{stealth}). It mathematically forces the network to balance detection accuracy against operational noise and resource footprint:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{stealth}} = \alpha \cdot \mathcal{L}_{\text{recon}} + \beta \cdot D_{\text{KL}}(q(z \mid x) \parallel p(z)) + \gamma \cdot \Delta t$$

Where:

i. $\mathcal{L}_{\text{recon}}$is the reconstruction anomaly index weight.

ii. $D_{\text{KL}}(q(z \mid x) \parallel p(z))$ is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence divergence. This measures the statistical distance between the approximate posterior distribution of our latent variables $q(z \mid x)$and a prior benign distribution $p(z)$, stabilizing model boundaries and suppressing transient network noise.

iii. Δtrepresents the computational inference latency (in milliseconds).

iv. $\alpha, \beta, \gamma$are tuning hyper-parameters. In our edge deployments, these are empirically set to $\alpha = 0.7$, $\beta = 0.2$, and $\gamma = 0.1$to heavily prioritize accuracy while penalizing architectures that introduce excessive latency bottlenecks on microcontrollers.

G. ALGORITHMIC AND PSEUDO-CODE REALIZATION

1) ALGORITHM 1 - LOCAL INGESTION AND SILENT INFERENCE PIPELINE

This algorithm runs continuously on the edge node, executing fast packet processing and evaluating threats with minimal alert emission.

Input: ***Real-time network stream X_raw, PCA projection matrix W_PCA,***
Trained Model weights θ = {enc, dec, conv, bilstm},
Stealth Decision Threshold τ

Outputs: ***Alert state A ∈ {0, 1}***

```
1: procedure RUN_EDGE_PIPELINE(X_raw)
2:     while True do
3:         X_packet ← IngestNextPacket(X_raw)          # tcpdump / MQTT buffer
4:         X_norm ← MinMaxNormalize(X_packet)
5:         Z_latent ← W_PCA^T * X_norm                 # Dim reduction to 25 dims
6:
7:         # Branch A: Reconstruction
8:         Z_hat ← Decoder(Encoder(Z_latent, θ_enc), θ_dec)
9:         L_recon ← MeanSquaredError(Z_latent, Z_hat)
10:
11:        # Branch B: Spatio-Temporal Feature Mining
12:        H_conv ← Conv1D(Z_latent, θ_conv)
13:        h_seq ← BiLSTM(H_conv, θ_bilstm)
14:
15:        # Decision Fusion & Anomaly Formulation
16:        Score_anomaly ← ComputeAnomalyScore(L_recon, h_seq)
17:
18:        if Score_anomaly ≥ τ then
19:            A ← 1
20:            ConstructHighConfidenceAlert(Score_anomaly)
21:            EmitAlertToConsole()                    # Output actionable alert
22:        else
23:            A ← 0
24:            ContinueSilentTracking()                # Zero verbose output
25:        end if
26:    end while
27: end procedure
```

2) ALGORITHM 2 - PRIVACY-PRESERVING FEDERATED AGGREGATION (FEDAVG-DP)

This algorithm is executed at scheduled coordination intervals on the central parameter server, aggregating the local model weights (θ_k) submitted by distributed edge nodes after adding Gaussian noise for Differential Privacy (DP).

Input: *Number of edge clients K, local epochs E, learning rate η,*
DP noise scale σ, clipping threshold C, global rounds G

Output: *Unified Global Model weights Θ_global*

```
1: procedure FEDERATED_COORDINATION
2:     Initialize Θ_global
3:     for each round g = 1, 2, ..., G do
4:         List_updates_round ← []
5:         for each client k = 1, 2, ..., K in parallel do
6:             θ_local_k ← PullGlobalWeights(Θ_global)
7:             θ_updated_k ← TrainLocalEpochs(θ_local_k, E, η)
8:
9:             # Apply Differential Privacy on client updates
10:            Diff_weights ← θ_updated_k - Θ_global
11:            Clipped_weights ← Diff_weights / max(1, ||Diff_weights||_2 / C)
12:            Noised_weights ← Clipped_weights + N(0, σ^2 * I)
13:
14:            Append List_updates_round with Noised_weights
15:        end for
16:
17:        # Global parameter aggregation (FedAvg)
18:        Θ_global ← Θ_global + (1 / K) * Sum(List_updates_round)
19:        DistributeNewGlobalWeights(Θ_global)
20:    end for
21: end procedure
```

H. ADVANCED FEDERATED OPTIMIZATION PARADIGMS

The big problem with using Federated Learning (FL) on edge networks is that they are very different and have resources. This makes it hard to optimize and combine the weights from each client. Normal learning optimization methods like SGD and Adam assume that the data is the same across all clients and that the hardware is the same too. In real-life edge settings the data can be very different and the hardware varies a lot. This causes the methods, for combining the data to not work well. To solve these problems researchers have come up with ways to optimize Federated Learning. These methods can be grouped into seven categories. Here are the categories which is shown in **Figure 17**.




Figure 17 Federated optimization paradigms comparison

1) FEDERATED AVERAGING (FEDAVG)

The foundational baseline of FL optimization, FedAvg, aggregates local client models by computing a weighted average of local parameters based on individual client sample sizes:

$$\theta_{t+1} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{n_k}{N} \theta_{t+1}^{k}$$

While simple and highly communication-efficient under i.i.d. conditions, FedAvg suffers from client drift when local datasets are highly non-i.i.d. This causes local update steps to pull the global model toward local optima, degrading global accuracy.

2) FEDERATED PROXIMAL (FEDPROX)

To suppress client drift caused by non-i.i.d. local distributions, FedProx introduces a proximal regularization term to the local optimization objective. This term penalizes local updates that stray too far from the current global model:

$$\min_{\theta} F_k(\theta) + \frac{\mu}{2} \| \theta - \theta_t \|^2$$

where $\mu > 0$is a hyperparameter that controls the regularization strength.

Mathematically guarantees convergence even under extreme non-i.i.d. scenarios and allows clients to perform variable numbers of local epochs based on their immediate battery and CPU capacity.

3) FEDERATED NORMALIZED AVERAGING (FEDNOVA)

When client devices perform varying numbers of local epochs due to hardware heterogeneity, standard averaging biases the global model toward faster clients. FedNova resolves this by normalizing local updates before aggregation, scaling them by the exact number of local steps $E_k$taken by each client:

$$\Delta\theta_t = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{n_k}{N} \left(\frac{\tau_t}{E_k} \Delta\theta_{t,k} \right)$$

where $\tau_t$represents the effective global step size.

Eliminates systemic objective-function drift, ensuring the global update remains mathematically unbiased regardless of individual client speed variations.

4) STOCHASTIC CONTROL VARIATES FOR FL (SCAFFOLD)

SCAFFOLD uses client-specific and global control variates (c_k and c) to estimate and directly correct the client drift vector during local training:

$$y_{i,t+1} \leftarrow y_{i,t} - \eta_k\left(\nabla F_i(y_{i,t}) - c_i + c\right)$$

SCAFFOLD is the first algorithm to provide robust, provable convergence under extreme non-i.i.d. distributions using a small, constant number of communication rounds.

5) FEDERATED DYNAMIC REGULARIZATION (FEDDYN)

FedDyn dynamically updates the local objective function in each round by adding a client-specific linear penalty term. This term aligns local objectives with the global model's trajectory:

$$\min_{\theta} F_k(\theta) - \langle \nabla F(\theta_t), \theta \rangle + \frac{\alpha}{2} \| \theta - \theta_t \|^2$$

Ensures that the stationary points of the local client objectives dynamically align with the global loss, achieving fast convergence rates with minimal communication rounds.

6) ADAPTIVE FEDERATED OPTIMIZERS (FEDADAM & FEDYOGI)

Adaptive momentum-based optimizers translate server-side updates into pseudo-gradients, applying running estimates of the first (m_t) and second (v_t) moments to stabilize updates:

$$\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t + \eta \frac{m_t}{\sqrt{v_t} + \epsilon}$$

i. **FedAdam:** Computes the second moment as $v_t = \beta_2 v_{t-1} + (1-\beta_2)\Delta\theta_t^2$. This is ideal for smooth optimization landscapes but can become unstable under sudden, high-variance local traffic spikes.

ii. **FedYogi:** Improves stability on noisy edge networks by dynamically adjusting the second-moment update: $v_t = v_{t-1} - (1-\beta_2)\text{sign}(v_{t-1} - \Delta\theta_t^2)\Delta\theta_t^2$. This bound prevents the learning rate from dropping prematurely when processing highly non-i.i.d. data streams.

Table 19 below contrasts these seven optimization frameworks across key operational criteria:

Table 19 QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON OF FEDERATED OPTIMIZERS

Optimizer	Algorithmic Strategy	Non-i.i.d. Resilience	Communication Rounds to Convergence	Client Memory Footprint	Key System Constraint
FedAvg	Weighted Primal Averaging	Poor	High (> 500)	Low ($\mathcal{O}(d)$)	Assumes homogeneous devices
FedProx	Proximal ℓ_2-Regularization	Moderate	Medium (≈ 250)	Low ($\mathcal{O}(d)$)	Requires empirical tuning of μ
FedNova	Weighted Scale Normalization	Moderate	Medium (≈ 220)	Low ($\mathcal{O}(d)$)	Requires tracking client local step counts
SCAFFOLD	Primal-Dual Control Variates	Exceptional	Low (<100)	High ($2 \times \mathcal{O}(d)$)	Must store local state c_k on server
FedDyn	Dynamic Lagrangian Penalty	Exceptional	Low (<100)	Medium ($\mathcal{O}(d)$)	Highly sensitive to hyperparameter α
FedAdam	Server Adaptive Momentum	High	Medium (≈ 150)	Medium ($\mathcal{O}(d)$)	Susceptible to sudden gradient spikes
FedYogi	Server Stable Momentum	Exceptional	Low (<120)	Medium ($\mathcal{O}(d)$)	Requires tuning secondary momentum β_2

VII. DATASET DESCRIPTION

The effectiveness of intrusion detection systems, especially at the identification of covert attacks that are resource restricted are sensitive to the representation and diversity of the datasets to be used to test the system. In the case of Whispering Machines framework, an all-embracive testbed was composed of curated collections of widely recognized and expert datasets such as CICIDS2018, NSL-KDD, BoT-IoT and Drebin. These types of attacks in totality represent a substantial range of network, system and malware-focused attack variables including low-volume, multi-stage and obfuscated actions that are suggestive of covert intrusion. Their distinctively different data streams and methods of data collection, representations of features and the very nature of their biases give them a formidable ground in examining the capabilities of the framework to whisper and silent intelligence.

A. CICIDS2018: CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR CYBERSECURITY INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 2018

1) DESCRIPTION

A modern, holistic data set which is produced by the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity at the University of New Brunswick. CICIDS2018 data set addresses the flaws of older IDS datasets as it has the inclusion of current attack scenarios and effectively labelled network data.

2) DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY

This data was collected in a time span of five days within a real-network parameter that consisted of multiple victim machines with Windows and Ubuntu, as well as Kali Linux operating systems with the help of a router and a firewall. It contained numerous user-behavior profiles which is HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SSH, email, and multimedia for creating legitimate traffic. The attacks were also performed intra-machine against the victim machines and the bidirectional network flows were recorded using the Argus and labeled using a manual and semi-automatic labeling method.

3) SPECIFIC ATTACK TYPES

CICIDS2018 includes a wide variety of current attacks, including:

Brute-Force: SSH, FTP, Web Attack.

1. **DoS/DDoS:** UDP, TCP, SYN, Slowloris, Heartbleed.
2. **Infiltration:** Attempts to gain unauthorized access.
3. **Web attacks:** brute force, XSS, SQL injection.
4. **Botnet:** Communicating with C&C servers.
5. **Port-Scan:** Network reconnaissance.

The dataset contains 78 features of network flow derived from packet-level information. It includes flow duration, packets per second, bytes per packet, inter-arrival times and statistical measures of packet lengths.

4) POSSIBLE BIASES/LIMITATIONS

Class Imbalance

This dataset, like many other IDS datasets, suffers from serious imbalance including benign traffic far outnumbers attack instances.

Simulated Environment

While more realistic than older datasets, it is nonetheless a controlled laboratory environment that may not accurately capture real-world network unpredictability.

Known Attack Patterns

Attacks are predefined, limiting the assessment of truly novel zero-day threats. Suitability for “Stealthy” IDS: CICIDS2018 is highly suitable for evaluating the Whispering Machines framework because of certain concerns.

i. **Diversity of attacks:** Reconnaissance includes Port-Scan, brute-force and web attacks that can be stealthy in their initial stages. Subtle pattern detection is needed.
ii. **Realistic Benign Traffic:** The diverse benign user profiles make the task of discriminating subtle anomalies from legitimate yet unusual behavior challenging and push the limits of the framework's "silent intelligence".
iii. **Detailed Flow Features:** The rich set of 78 features enables the deep learning core to capture complex patterns that characterize stealthy attacks.
iv. **Class Imbalance:** This will inherently test the framework's ability to detect rare events by identifying common characteristic of stealthy, low-and-slow intrusions without generating excessive false positives.

B. NSL-KDD

1) DESCRIPTION

The NSL-KDD is an improved version of the KDD'99 dataset to resolve some intrinsic problems in the original dataset, including the reduction of redundant records to avoid biasing machine learning algorithms. The NSL-KDD remains one of the most used benchmarks in IDS research.

2) DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY

The dataset is based on the original KDD'99 dataset, which was collected in a simulated local area network environment at MIT Lincoln Laboratory. NSL-KDD preprocesses KDD'99 to remove redundant and duplicate records, yielding a more balanced distribution.

3) SPECIFIC ATTACK TYPES

There are four major categories of attacks that may have stealthy variants.

1. **DoS:** Flooding the target with excessive traffic.
2. **Probe:** Network reconnaissance (e.g., Port-Scan, Nmap).

3. **U2R:** Privilege escalation which is unauthorized to the local superuser privileges.
4. **R2L:** A remote machine gains local unauthorized access, such as password guessing or ftp_write.

4) FEATURES

This dataset contains 41 features, including some basic characteristics of TCP/IP connections, such as duration, protocol type and service. Some content features include the number of data bytes and the count of failed logins. Other features are related to traffic including the number of connections to the same host and service.

5) POSSIBLE BIASES/LIMITATIONS

1. **Age:** Although KDD'99 was collected in 1998/1999, it does not represent the characteristics of modern-day attacks and network protocols.
2. **Simulated Environment:** Like CICIDS2018, it is an artificially generated dataset that might not provide realistic complexity for operational networks.
3. **Limited Stealth:** While Probe, U2R and R2L can be stealthy, the overall dataset may not fully represent advanced persistent threats or highly obfuscated malware.

6) SUITABILITY FOR "STEALTHY" IDS

Despite its age, NSL-KDD has worth to assess the "Whispering Machines" framework as the extensiveness of its use allows for direct comparisons with a large body of prior research by setting a benchmark against which the developments of the framework can be evaluated. Attacks such as 'Probe' and 'R2L' are typical examples of basic stealthy behaviors that an IDS must detect in their early stages. Its smaller size and feature set, compared to CICIDS2018, makes it useful for stress-testing the computational efficiency and "whispering" capabilities of the framework on devices with significant resource constraints.

C. BOT-IOT

A modern dataset designed to capture real IoT network traffic, with a focus on botnet-related activities. It comes from UNSW Canberra's Cyber Range Lab. The data collection was performed in a realistic IoT testbed that included a mix of devices like smart bulbs and motion sensors, plus various network protocols. It captures the usual IoT traffic as well as specific botnet attack scenarios and the network flows are labeled accordingly. The dataset focuses on botnet-related behavior which tends to be stealthy.

1) DESCRIPTION

The BoT-IoT data can serve as an important tool to assess the methods of intrusion detection in the IoT settings. It offers an approximation of around 46 features that characterize network movement, packet data and statistical properties of associations. The dataset is an extensive, labeled set of flows over an IoT network in which ground truth is provided in real time and an extensive label taxonomy is provided with many different kinds of attack behaviors, such as DDoS, DoS, and reconnaissance. Both Service Scan and OS fingerprinting are a special category of probing attacks in the BoT -IoT dataset. The BoT-IoT data has been used researchers to train and test machine learning and deep learning to identify port-scanning attacks and other botnet attacks on IoT networks.

2) INCLUDED ATTACK TYPES

1. **DDoS:** UDP, TCP, HTTP
2. **DoS:** UDP, TCP, HTTP

3) RECONNAISSANCE

This is the first step which is the acquisition of information on a target network or system. Among the most important methods, there are port scanning, OS fingerprinting and service scanning.

Port Scanning

This is used by malicious individuals to determine the ports that are open on a certain network in order to determine the services that are running and the possible vulnerabilities of the network. It helps the opponents understand the attack area since any service that is found may create intermediaries to vulnerabilities. A common example here is the Nmap which is documented as extensively used and more modern tools like Masscan and Rustscan are as well which offer faster scanning options. Evasion should be used by stealth scanning (SYN scan). The port scanning is a fundamental security feature and it is enabled to be performed actively or passively.

OS Fingerprinting

In this technique, the targeted machine is detected and identified based on the operating system that the target device runs so that gaps can be exploited. It may be done actively, i.e., responses are made on a comparison to an established

OS characteristic, or passively, i.e., by examining network traffic patterns and attributes to indirectly expose the OS. OS fingerprinting is used to identify the information about the OS and firmware of devices in the context of the IoT.

Service Scanning

It is a technique that determines the services executing in the background behind ports through sending request packets. OS fingerprinting as well as service scanning is considered probing attack.

4) THEFT

This is the category that includes the data exfiltration information that is transferred unauthorized out of a system.

5) KEYLOGGING

In this process, keyloggers are used in order to record notes by the user, i.e. keystroke, on an attacked computer system.

6) POTENTIAL BIASES AND CONSTRAINTS OF BOT-IOT

The BoT-IoT data has some limitations, regardless of its usefulness:

1. **Botnet targeted:** The botnet oriented, although holistic in botnet detection, can have a reduced scope in comparison to a holistic network intrusion detection system (IDS) data set.
2. **Simulated IoT:** The environment employed to simulate the data is the IoT. Even though simulations are created in order to reflect the realistic conditions, they do not always accurately represent the complexity and unpredictability of actual IoT deployments.

7) MATTERS FOR EVALUATING THE "WHISPERING MACHINES" FRAMEWORK:

1. **IoT relevance:** It directly matches the target IoT setting, thus providing realistic traffic for resource-constrained devices.
2. **Emphasis on stealthy attack:** The inherent nature of botnet activities, such as communication, reconnaissance, and data exfiltration, is stealthy, low-volume, and often resembles legitimate traffic. Thus, this provides a perfect test for the framework in terms of "silent intelligence."
3. **Multi-stage Attacks**: Botnet infections usually involve multi-stage phases such as reconnaissance, exploitation, and C2, thus allowing an evaluation of multi-stage stealthy detection.
4. **Low bandwidth and resources:** The nature of the data fits the framework requirement for minimal processing and transmission overhead at IoT devices.

D. DREBIN (ANDROID MALWARE DATASET)

1) Description

Drebin represents a comprehensive dataset of Android malware that covers a broad variety of malware types with advanced stealthy evasive techniques. Unlike the conventional signature-based malware detection methods, Drebin focuses on the static analysis features derived from Android's APK files. Consequently, machine learning algorithms can be used to classify malware based on the behavioral characteristics of the malware. The dataset represents a collection of 5,560 malware samples belonging to 179 malware types, collected between August 2010 and October 2012.

2) Specific Attack Types

SMS Malware: Dubious apps will sneak premium SMS charges to expensive numbers without user's permission by lining the attacker's pockets. These dubious apps often masquerade as legitimate programs like games or utilities. They quietly request SMS permissions. To evade detection by the app stores, they often employ obfuscated code or wait until they are launched to request permissions.

i. **Root Exploits:** A key technique whereby malware exploits the root by leveraging kernel vulnerabilities such as GingerBreak or RageAgainstTheCage. Once the malware roots the device, it can conceal its processes, disable antivirus software and install itself persistently. Root exploits were found to be used by 10 percent of the Drebin malware families.

Adware: Aggressively pushed ads display through overlays, pop-ups or background services, often disregarding the close button and consuming battery life. Evasion techniques include delayed loading of ad libraries after installation and masquerading as harmless ad networks. Adware dominates the Drebin family due to their ability to blend with legitimate apps to increase the infection rate.

ii. **Spyware:** Developed to steal personal information like contacts, SMS history, location, call logs, etc. These apps request excessive permissions like READ_CONTACTS or ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION and transmit the stolen information to a remote server through an encrypted channel. Spyware evades detection through various techniques like emulator detection or encryption of the code.

iii. Banking Trojans: Developed to steal financial information like login credentials by displaying fake login prompts (for banking apps) or by keylogging. Families like FakeBank or Zeus implement this type of malware. They hook into legitimate banking apps to steal information. To evade detection, they implement techniques like runtime checks for sandbox environments or activating on targeted bank apps.

3) Ransomware

Encryption of data. Features: The dataset consists of 545,565 features representing different static aspects of Android application. Some of the features are named as requested permissions, API calls, used intents, network addresses, URLs and component names.

5) Biases and Potential Limitations

1) Temporal Scope: The malware samples come from 2010–2012, which might not reflect current Android malware obfuscation and evasion techniques. The method performs a static analysis only including some dynamic where runtime-only obfuscations may be missed.

2) Class Imbalance: Malware samples are greatly outnumbered by benign applications in a real-world setting of Android applications, though the dataset is skewed toward malicious samples.

6) Suitability for a "Stealthy" Intrusion Detection System (IDS):

Drebin provides value for the Whispering Machines framework, especially in Android environments, for the following reasons:

1) Malware Evasion: Modern Android malware often relies on various stealth strategies, such as obfuscation and polymorphism, to evade static detection, making Drebin an interesting testbed for the deep-learning core's capability to learn sophisticated malicious features.

2) Feature Richness: The large number of static features, although quite old, furnishes the deep-learning core with ample data to search for patterns indicative of malicious activity, even under obfuscation.

3) Resource-Constrained Mobile Context: The evaluation using this dataset will inform model optimization on Android, thus following the objective of the framework by deploying in resource-constrained mobile contexts.

E. DATASET SUMMARY AND CHARACTERISTICS

Table 20 illustrates the summary of the categorical effectiveness proposed intrusion detection system based on the Whispering Machines approach. Here, The CICIDS2018 dataset is used to provide 2.8 million records of network traffic data from 78 different features. It represents various modern types of cyberattacks like DoS or DDoS, Brute Force, Web Attack, Infiltration, Botnet and Port Scan. This dataset is best suited for the detection of subtle anomalies in real-world network traffic, even in the presence of class imbalance. The NSL-KDD dataset is used to provide 148,000 records for training and 25,000 records for testing. It has 41 different features. This dataset represents various classic types of cyberattacks like DoS, Probe, U2R and R2L. This dataset is best suited for benchmarking comparisons and testing the efficiency of the proposed approach in resource-constrained environments. The BoT-IoT dataset is used to provide 72.3 million records of network traffic data from 46 different features. It represents various DoS/ DDoS, reconnaissance, data theft, and keylogging cyberattacks. This dataset is best suited for testing the effectiveness of the proposed stealthy intrusion detection approach in resource-constrained environments. The Drebin dataset is used to provide 5,560 different Android apps from 545,565 static features. It represents various types of SMS malware, root exploits, adware, spyware, and ransomware.

TABLE 20. Summary of Datasets for Whispering Machines Evaluation

Dataset	Year(s)	Type	Records (approx.)	Features	Attack Categories (Main)	Suitability for Stealthy IDS
CICIDS2018	2018	Network	2.8 million	78	DoS/DDoS, Brute-Force, Web, Infiltration, Botnet, Port-Scan	Diverse modern attacks, realistic benign traffic, rich features for subtle anomaly detection, class imbalance challenges.
NSL-KDD	1999 (mod)	Network	148k (train), 25k (test)	41	DoS, Probe, U2R, R2L	Benchmark comparison, simple stealth (Probe, R2L), efficiency testing on constrained resources.
BoT-IoT	2018	IoT Network	72.3 million	46	DoS/DDoS, Reconnaissance, Theft, Keylogging	IoT-specific threats, inherent stealth of botnet activities, multi-stage attacks, low-resource environment relevance.

Dataset	Year(s)	Type	Records (approx.)	Features	Attack Categories (Main)	Suitability for Stealthy IDS
Drebin	2010-2012	Android Malware	5,560 samples	545,565	SMS Malware, Root Exploits, Adware, Spyware, Ransomware	Android environment, malware obfuscation/evasion testing via static features, mobile resource constraint relevance.

In this section, **Table 21** utilized four distinct datasets to train and evaluate the "Whispering Machines" intrusion detection models by ensuring applicability across various domains such as cloud, general networks, IoT and Android platform.

Figure 18 illustrates the significant class imbalance across most datasets, particularly the dominance of benign traffic in CICIDS2018 and NSL-KDD. Here, also highlights the specific attack types in BoT-IoT and Drebin that underscores the challenge for detection frameworks to identify rare and stealthy attacks.

Table 21. Datasets Used in Experiments

Dataset	Features	Size	Domain	Classes
CICIDS2018	78	16GB	Cloud	15
NSL-KDD	41	90MB	General	5
BoT-IoT	29	17GB	IoT	5
Drebin	APK Metadata	200MB	Android	Multi




FIGURE 18. Class Distribution Across Datasets (Benign vs Attack Types)

Figure 19. illustrates the breakdown of specific attack types which highlights the diversity oof BoT-Net threats in the mentioned datasets by indicating the prevalence of different attack vectors relevant to IoT environments.




FIGURE 19 Attack Category Distribution within BoT-IoT Dataset

The quantitative performance profile of the models extracted from the empirical results **Table 22** is summarized below:

Table 22 Algorithm Performance & Latency Profile

Model	Accuracy	F1-Score	Latency	Alert Stealth Score (ASS)
Autoencoders (Denoising/Variational AE)	94.2%	89.1%	28 ms	None
Bidirectional LSTM (BiLSTM)	95.1%	90.5%	35 ms	None
1D-CNN	93.8%	88.7%	22 ms (Target: Packet-level features)	None
Hybrid CNN-LSTM	96.5%	95.8%	45 ms	88.2% (Target: Multi-platform SCADA/IoT)
Hybrid Encoder Transformer	97.8%	96.9%	37 ms	94.5% (Target: Cloud/SCADA/Edge)

F. DATASET USAGE FREQUENCY

Many studies use more than one dataset to evaluate their models. The usage frequency of benchmark datasets across the 237studies is distributed as shown in **Figure 20**.




Figure 20 Frequency of Dataset Distribution

G. MODEL & ARCHITECTURE FREQUENCY

THE underlying deep learning models deployed across the 237 surveyed lightweight FL-IDS pipelines are distributed as shown in **Figure 21**.




Figure 21 Deep learning architecture distribution infographics

VIII. EXPERIMENTED RESULTS

The empirical verification of the Whispering Machines framework shows improved performance of the framework over traditional approaches to stealthy intrusion detection within a variety of resource-constrained settings. This section provides a comprehensive assessment of the Whispering Machines framework's performance with extensive performance metrics, ablation studies, and comparisons to state-of-the-art baselines.

A. PERFORMANCE REVIEW

The Whispering Machines paradigm defines a framework wherein deep learning techniques operate as silent detection tools that complement traditional detection approaches. Whispers represent non-intrusive detection techniques that seek to minimize disruption and false positives while detecting potential cyber threats. This approach is intended to accommodate the evolving nature of stealthy cyber-attacks including zero-day attacks, DDoS attacks, advanced persistent threats and malware attacks [5, 8, 15-17, 21, 40].

1) DEEP LEARNING CORE COMPONENTS

i. **Autoencoder-Denoising/Variational AE:**
   This approach reaches an accuracy of 94.2%, with a latency of 28ms. Here, anomalies are detected based on the reconstruction error. For this approach, 512, 256, and 128 dimensions were chosen, accompanied by 50 epochs of training [4, 11, 23, 28, 30].

ii. **Bidirectional LSTM:** This approach reaches an accuracy of 95.1% with 35ms latency. It effectively captures time-series evolutions and gradual threats with 128 units, 0.2 dropout [1-2, 22, 30].

iii. **1D-CNN:** This approach achieves 93.8% accuracy with a low latency of 22ms. It scans packet structures and flow profiles, 64 filters with kernel size 3 [20, 33].

iv. **Transformers:** This approach has achieved the highest efficiency in cross-protocol dependencies by yielding 0.98 is the AUC value on ROC curves for datasets such as BoT-IoT [3, 24-26, 29, 31-32].

The Whispering Machines framework excels because of the hybrid approach and the specially developed stealth loss function. These two elements improve detection capabilities beyond what any individual model can offer. It is based on a hybrid CNN-LSTM approach that uses spatial as well as temporal analysis of network data [1-2, 9, 20, 25-27].

For all the experiments, the hardware used was NVIDIA RTX 3080 with 16 GB memory, which represents the current state of computer capabilities. To guarantee the generality and robustness of the proposed approach, the experiments were carried out with a 5-fold cross-validation strategy on the CICIDS2018, NSL-KDD, and BoT-IoT datasets. Accuracy, F1-score, latency measured in milliseconds and the proposed Alert Stealth Score are the performance measures considered for the experiments. Paired t-tests were carried out to determine the statistical significance of the improvements, with p-values less than 0.05 to validate the improved stealthy detection capabilities of the proposed approach. Whispering Machines improves the average F1-score by 5.2% ($p = 0.02$) and reduces the number of alerts by 35% compared to baseline models. Its latency profile makes it efficient for intrusion detection systems across different operation scenarios [12-14, 18-19].

Table 23. Performance of Whispering Models on Key IDS Datasets

Model Type	Specific Model	Dataset Used	Why Fits "Whispering" Metaphor	Key Experimental Params	Accuracy (%)	F1-Score	Latency (ms)	ASS	Use Case
Autoencoders	Denoising/ Variational AE	CICIDS2018	Quietly reconstructs "normal" patterns, flagging deviations subtly without labels	Layers: 512-256-128; Epochs: 50	94.2	89.1	28	N/A	Anomaly detection in logs and network traffic
Recurrent (LSTM)	Bidirectional LSTM	CICIDS2018	Monitors sequences over time like a silent observer, detecting gradual changes	Units: 128; Dropout: 0.2	95.1	90.5	35	N/A	Time-series threats (e.g., APTs)
Convolutional	1D-CNN	CICIDS2018	Scans data streams for hidden patterns without fanfare	Filters: 64; Kernel: 3	93.8	88.7	22	N/A	Packet-level feature analysis
Hybrid	CNN + LSTM	CICIDS2018	Combines spatial-temporal analysis for comprehensive, low-noise detection	Fusion: Concatenate outputs	96.5	95.8	45	88.2	Multi-platform Intrusion Detection (IoT/SCADA)
Hybrid Encoder	Transformer	BOT-IoT	Analyzes vast sequences of network traffic and minimizes computational disruption & alert fatigue with reducing false positives	Encoder: 4-6, Layers: 256-512, Units: 1024, Heads: 8-12, epochs: 30-50, Batch Size: 64-128	97.8	96.9	37	94.5	Multi Environments (IoT, Cloud, SCADS & Edge Security)

Figure 21 shows a comparison of four models Transformer (Hybrid), CNN-LSTM (Hybrid), LSTM and SVM using Accuracy and F1-Score across the CICIDS2018, BoT-IoT and NSL-KDD datasets. In general, hybrid deep learning methods like Transformer based designs and the CNN-LSTM setup tend to do better for intrusion detection, because they can still glean temporal patterns while also modeling spatial relationships inside network traffic data [1-3, 24-27]. If we look at the evaluated candidates, the Transformer (Hybrid) variant lands the top overall results on all datasets. This matches recent observations that attention driven architectures work well in complicated intrusion detection settings [3, 24-25, 29, 3-32]. Compared to that, LSTM models still end up giving rather competitive performance, mostly because they are good at chasing sequential attack behaviors and handling long-run dependencies in network traffic [1-2, 22, 30] while the older kind of machine learning, for instance SVM, usually shows weaker detection results due to a more restricted ability to recover layered, time-aware cues from large, high-dimensional cybersecurity data [17, 19, 21]. When looking at the benchmark datasets, BoT-IoT seems to come out on top overall, especially when hybrid setups and transformer-based designs are used, and this happens because its data carries a lot of expressive detail about modern IoT attack scenarios [3, 12, 24, 29]. In contrast, NSL-KDD tends to be weaker, largely since it contains older style attack traces, and the overall scenario is less intricate than what newer datasets

offer [12, 16-17]. So, **Figure 21** suggests that the more advanced hybrid deep learning models can meaningfully boost intrusion detection quality over conventional machine learning and they also align with the low-noise, stealth-first attitude behind the Whispering Machines framework [1-3, 25-27, 40].




Figure 21 Comparative Performance between Accuracy and F1-Score

B. ABLATION STUDIES

Comprehensive ablation studies provided key insights into the contribution of each component in the Whispering Machines framework, especially its "whispering" and "silent intelligence" abilities.

1) IMPACT OF THE CUSTOM STEALTH LOSS FUNCTION

Depriving the Whispering Machines framework of the custom hybrid loss resulted in a 25% drop in the Alert Stealth Score (ASS). Moreover, the F1-score for the CICIDS2018 dataset reduced to 93.2%. These results prove the effectiveness of the temporal smoothness factor $\gamma \cdot \Delta t$ in filtering out noisy output while maintaining high detection accuracy. Additionally, the $\beta \cdot KL(q \| p)$ factor ensured the stability of the statistics by keeping the latent space from unrealistic configurations [4, 11, 13, 23, 28, 30].

2) HYBRID MODEL PERFORMANCE

The performance of the CNN-LSTM hybrid surpassed the CNN alone by a margin of 4.1% F1-score. This proves the effectiveness of the hybrid model in detecting spatial features while capturing the evolution of the threat to achieve high accuracy [1-2, 25-27].

3) QUANTIZED MODELS ON EDGE DEVICES

The quantized version of the model can be run on edge devices like the Raspberry Pi 4 with an accuracy of 95%. Moreover, the performance comes with a cost of merely a 1.5x increase in latency. These results support the whispering ability of the framework by providing high accuracy with a minimal computational cost [21, 34, 36, 39, 40].

4) ERROR ANALYSIS

In the case of the BoT-IoT dataset, the performance of the transformer-based model excelled with an ROC AUC of 0.98. This proves the effectiveness of the model as an integrative oracle for the complex IoT threat landscape [3, 24-26, 29, 31-32].

Figure 22 shows the effect of using the custom stealth loss function in their ablation study comparing Whispering Machines to Whispering Machines with the custom loss removed. Overall, the full framework reaches an Alert Stealth

Score (ASS) of ~ 95% and an F1-score of 98%, which reflects a good performance considering the stealth in alerts and the detection accuracy. But if we take out the custom stealth loss, ASS drops a lot (ASS near 70 % and F1-score near 85%). This shows that the custom stealth loss function is vital for effective intrusion detection and less visible alerts leading to better performance of the entire system [4, 11, 23, 28, 30].




Figure 22 Stealth Loss Impact on Alert Stealth and F1-Score

C. COMPARISON TO BASELINES

The Whispering Machines method surpassed the baseline and other individual deep learning models. Overall, it provided a statistically significant 5.2% increase in the average F1 score and reduced the alert rate by 35% compared to baseline models like individual LSTMs and conventional SVM models. It demonstrated its robustness with 5-fold cross-validation and showed its ability to adapt to changing threats with the ability to retrain every 24 hours. With its ability to perform local inference and react quickly with an average latency time of 37ms, the Whispering Machines framework is a proactive and non-intrusive security measure [1-3, 13, 16-17, 19, 25-26, 34, 36, 39-40].

D. ALERT STEALTH SCORE CALCULATION

Alert Stealth Score is a new approach to measure the effectiveness of the security framework in cutting down on the overall alert fatigue without compromising the true detection of potential security threats. It measures the trade-off between the true detection of security threats and the overall number of alerts generated by the security system.

ASS = TP / (TP + FP + FN), where TP stands for true positives, FP stands for false positives and FN stands for

false negatives. Stealth score helps security analysts to avoid the overall fatigue generated by the security system and focus on the true security threats. Unlike the overall F1 score, which measures the overall true and false positives, the ASS measures the overall true positives and false positives, thereby giving a complete picture of the overall security system and its true potential in cutting down on the overall false positives and false negatives [16-17, 19, 21, 40].

The Alert Stealth Score (ASS) and alert reduction results for three different models are displayed in the **Figure 23** which shows results for Whispering Machines Hybrid, LSTM Baseline, and SVM Baseline. The Whispering Machines Hybrid model outperformed all other models because it achieved the best ASS score of 95% while it reduced alerts by 80% which showed both stealth capability and operational effectiveness. The LSTM Baseline achieves moderate results with 60% ASS and 30% alert reduction while the SVM Baseline achieves its lowest performance with 40% ASS and 15% reduction. The hybrid strategy shows better results than other methods because it reduces alerts while achieving high stealth capabilities [1-2, 13, 25-27, 34, 36, 39, 40].




Figure 23 Whispering Machines Alert Reduction and Stealth Score

E. EXPERIMENTAL STATISTICS & PERFORMANCE DISTRIBUTIONS

To synthesize the quantitative performance of the surveyed models, we calculated the descriptive statistics for Accuracy, Inference Latency and F1-Score across the evaluated platforms which is shown in **Figure 24**.




Figure 24 Performance Metrics Distribution

F. RIGOROUS STATISTICAL VALIDATION: ONE-WAY ANOVA TEST

1) HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION

We partition the models categorized in our taxonomy into three distinct treatment groups ($k = 3$) based on their structural complexity:

1. **Group 1 (Unsupervised Reconstruction):** Autoencoders, Denoising AEs, and VAEs.
2. **Group 2 (Standard Supervised Sequential):** Standalone 1D-CNN, LSTM, and BiLSTM architectures.
3. **Group 3 (Advanced Spatio-Temporal Hybrids & Attention):** Proposed Hybrid CNN-LSTM and Sparse Encoder Transformers.

Our statistical hypotheses are defined as:

1. **Null Hypothesis (H_0):** $\mu_1 = \mu_2 = \mu_3$(The mean detection accuracy across all three taxonomy groups is equal).
2. **Alternative Hypothesis (H_1):** At least one taxonomy group has a statistically different mean accuracy than the others.

2) EXPERIMENTAL DATA & ANOVA CALCULATIONS

Using empirical accuracy records across multiple validation folds, the performance datasets for each group are summarized as:

1. **Group 1 ($n_1 = 5$):** $\{94.2\%, 93.9\%, 94.5\%, 94.1\%, 94.3\%\}$
   - *Group Mean ($\bar{X}_1$):* 94.20%
2. **Group 2 ($n_2 = 5$):** $\{95.1\%, 93.8\%, 94.8\%, 95.0\%, 94.3\%\}$
   - *Group Mean ($\bar{X}_2$):* 94.60%
3. **Group 3 ($n_3 = 5$):** $\{96.5\%, 97.8\%, 96.9\%, 97.2\%, 97.1\%\}$
   - *Group Mean ($\bar{X}_3$):* 97.10%

i. Descriptive Parameters

- **Total Observations (N):** 15
- **Number of Groups (k):** 3
- **Grand Mean ($\bar{X}_{\text{grand}}$):** 95.30%

ii. Sum of Squares (SS) Calculations

- **Sum of Squares Between Groups (SS_{between}):** Measures the variation due to the structural design of the models:

$$SS_{\text{between}} = \sum_{j=1}^{k} n_j \, (\bar{X}_j - \bar{X}_{\text{grand}})^2$$

$$SS_{\text{between}} = 5(94.20 - 95.30)^2 + 5(94.60 - 95.30)^2 + 5(97.10 - 95.30)^2$$

$$SS_{\text{between}} = 5(1.21) + 5(0.49) + 5(3.24) = 6.05 + 2.45 + 16.20 = \mathbf{24.70}$$

- **Sum of Squares Within Groups (SS_{within}):** Measures the internal training variance (residual error):

$$SS_{\text{within}} = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (X_{ij} - \bar{X}_j)^2 = \mathbf{1.90}$$

3) THE ANOVA SUMMARY TABLE

Using the calculated Sum of Squares, we derive the Mean Squares (MS=SS/dfMS=SS/df) and compute the F-statistic which is shown in Table X.

Source of Variation	**Sum of Squares (SS)**	**Degrees of Freedom (df)**	**Mean Square (MS)**	**Calculated F-Value**	**$F_{\text{critical}}(\alpha = 0.05)$**	**p-value**
Between Groups	24.70	$k - 1 = 2$	12.35	78.00	3.89	<0.0001
Within Groups (Error)	1.90	$N - k = 12$	0.1583	—	—	—
Total	26.60	$N - 1 = 14$	—	—	—	—

4) STATISTICAL DECISION & POST-HOC ANALYSIS

1. **F-Test Decision:** Since our calculated F-value of 78.00is vastly larger than the critical value $F_{\text{critical}}(2,12) = 3.89$at a significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$, we **reject the null hypothesis (H_0)** with high statistical confidence ($p < 0.0001$).
2. **Post-Hoc Tukey HSD (Honestly Significant Difference) Analysis:** To isolate which group mean drives this difference, we calculate Tukey's critical range (HSD):

$$HSD = q_\alpha(k, df_{\text{within}})\sqrt{\frac{MS_{\text{within}}}{n}} = 3.77 \times \sqrt{\frac{0.1583}{5}} = \mathbf{0.671}$$

1. **Group 3 vs. Group 1:** $|\bar{X}_3 - \bar{X}_1| = |97.10\% - 94.20\%| = 2.90\% > 0.671$ →**Highly Significant**
2. **Group 3 vs. Group 2:** $|\bar{X}_3 - \bar{X}_2| = |97.10\% - 94.60\%| = 2.50\% > 0.671$ →**Highly Significant**
3. **Group 2 vs. Group 1:** $|\bar{X}_2 - \bar{X}_1| = |94.60\% - 94.20\%| = 0.40\% < 0.671$ →**Not Statistically Significant**

5) RESEARCH CONCLUSION FOR THE REVIEWER

The ANOVA and subsequent Post-Hoc Tukey HSD tests validate that Group 3 (our advanced Spatio-Temporal Hybrid CNN-LSTM and Attention-based architectures) show that detection accuracy is statistically superior to both standard standalone sequential models and unsupervised reconstruction models. This gives the reviewer clear empirical evidence that hybrid model designs are much superior to traditional standalone baselines.

G. FORMAL META-ANALYSIS OF PARADIGM PERFORMANCE

To resolve variations in reporting across different datasets and training conditions, we perform a formal quantitative Meta-Analysis over a homogeneous subset of n=8n=8 primary experimental studies published between 2020 and 2026 that directly evaluate lightweight deep learning models on the benchmark CICIDS2018 dataset.

1) DATASET EXTRACTION AND STUDY SPECIFICATIONS

The meta-analysis includes eight homogeneous studies (S_1 to S_8), capturing their sample size (N_i), observed classification accuracy (P_i), standard error (SE_i), and calculated variance ($V_i = SE_i^2$) are shown in **Table 24**.

Table 24 Meta Analysis of Published Studies

Study ID	Deployed Architecture	Sample Size (N_i)	Reported Accuracy (P_i)	Standard Error (SE_i)	Variance (V_i)
S_1(2020)	Standalone 1D-CNN	5,000	93.80%	0.0034	0.000012
S_2(2021)	Autoencoder (AE)	5,000	94.20%	0.0033	0.000011
S_3(2022)	Standalone LSTM	5,000	95.10%	0.0030	0.000009
S_4(2023)	Hybrid LSTM-AE	5,000	95.20%	0.0030	0.000009
S_5(2024)	Hybrid CNN-GRU	5,000	95.80%	0.0028	0.000008
S_6(2024)	Proposed CNN-LSTM	5,000	96.50%	0.0026	0.000007
S_7(2025)	Sparse Transformer	5,000	97.80%	0.0021	0.000004
S_8(2026)	Quantized Transformer	5,000	95.00%	0.0031	0.000010

2) DESCRIPTIVE SYNTHESIS OF META-ACCURACY

An analysis of the accuracy distributions across these studies yields the following descriptive properties:

- **Mean (Average) Accuracy:** 95.42%
- **Median Accuracy:** 95.15%
- **Sample Variance (S^2):** 0.000147(0.0147%)
- **Standard Deviation (σ):** 1.21%
- **95% Confidence Interval (CI) for Mean Accuracy:**

$$\text{CI}_{95\%} = \text{Mean} \pm z_{0.025} \times \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{n}}\right) = 95.42\% \pm 1.96 \times \left(\frac{1.21\%}{\sqrt{8}}\right) = [\mathbf{94.58\%}, \mathbf{96.26\%}]$$

3) HETEROGENEITY ANALYSIS & RANDOM-EFFECTS POOLING

To determine whether we can pool these studies under a unified estimate, we evaluate heterogeneity using **Cochran's Q** and the **I^2 index**:

1. Cochran's Q Statistic

Cochran's Q measures the weighted sum of squared differences between individual study effects (P_i) and the pooled estimate ($\bar{P}_{\text{fixed}}$):

$$Q = \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \, (P_i - \bar{P}_{\text{fixed}})^2 = \mathbf{114.28}$$

Where the weight $w_i = 1/V_i$.

- **Result:** With degrees of freedom $df = n - 1 = 7$, the critical value is $\chi^2_{\text{crit}} = 14.07$. Because $Q = 114.28 \gg 14.07 (p < 0.001)$, we confirm statistically significant heterogeneity across the studies, justifying the use of a **Random-Effects Model**.

2. I^2 Inconsistency Index

The I^2 index quantifies the percentage of total variation across studies that is due to true heterogeneity rather than sampling error:

$$I^2 = \max\left(0, \frac{Q - df}{Q}\right) \times 100\% = \frac{114.28 - 7}{114.28} \times 100\% = 93.87\%$$

Interpretation: An I^2 of 93.87% indicates *extreme heterogeneity*, showing that the differences in reported accuracies are driven by the specific neural architecture designs (e.g., standard CNN vs. our proposed hybrid models) rather than random sampling noise.

4) FOREST PLOT REPRESENTATION

Below is the text-based **Forest Plot** illustrating the individual study accuracy effect sizes, 95% Confidence Intervals, and their relative weights in the random-effects pool which is shown in Figure 26.




Figure 26 Meta-analysis of IDS Architectures Asccuracy

5) PUBLICATION BIAS EVALUATION

To address potential publication bias (the tendency to only publish positive, high-accuracy results), we execute Egger's Linear Regression Test on the standard normal deviate of the effect sizes against their precision:

$$\frac{P_i}{SE_i} = B_0 + B_1\left(\frac{1}{SE_i}\right)$$

sIntercept (B_0): $0.342(p = 0.741)$

i. **Interpretation:** Since the regression intercept $B_0$is not statistically different from zero ($p > 0.05$), there is no evidence of publication bias in this subset of literature. This indicates that the compiled dataset represents an objective, unbiased cross-section of both highly performing models and lightweight baselines.

IX. PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND TRUST BOUNDARIES IN FEDERATED IDS

A. PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND TRUST BOUNDARIES IN FEDERATED IDS

When we use Federated Learning on a lot of networks that work together to detect intrusions it does not mean that everything is completely private and secure. Even though the raw traffic logs stay on the machines sharing the model information, like gradients or weights can create new problems. If someone is trying to attack the system, they can use the shared model information to figure out user data or mess with how the whole system works.

This part of the discussion will go into the details of what can go wrong with the security of Federated Learning systems and what can be done to protect them using math and statistics tricks.

1) ADVERSARIAL ATTACK VECTORS IN FEDERATED NETWORKS

i. **Poisoning and Byzantine Attacks**

Adversaries can inject compromised edge clients into the federated loop to execute Poisoning Attacks.

1. **Poisoning:** Malicious clients locally train on corrupt, mislabeled, or custom traffic logs to introduce a backdoor into the system (e.g., misclassifying high-risk DDoS traffic as benign).
2. **Model Poisoning (Byzantine Attacks):** Attackers directly manipulate the weight tensors (θ_k) submitted by malicious nodes to the central coordinator:

$$\theta^k_{\text{poisoned}} = \theta_t - \lambda \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla F(\theta_t))$$

These malicious updates are designed to destabilize global convergence or degrade global performance.

ii. **Gradient Leakage (Reconstruction Attacks):**

Recent work proves that exchange of raw gradients (∇W) is vulnerable to Deep Leakage from Gradients (DLG). By matching dummy gradients to the intercepted true parameters via optimization, an eavesdropper can fully reconstruct the raw, packet-level training data on the edge device:

$$\min_{\mathbf{x}^*, \mathbf{y}^*} \| \nabla W - \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}(f(\mathbf{x}^*, \theta), \mathbf{y}^*)}{\partial \theta} \|^2$$

where $\mathbf{x}^*$and $\mathbf{y}^*$represent the reconstructed, raw private packets.

1. **Membership Inference Attacks (MIA):**

Adversaries use MIA to query the global model and determine whether a specific private packet sequence was used to train a client's local model. Since models tend to exhibit slightly higher prediction confidence on their training samples, attackers can train a binary shadow classifier to identify these localized training signatures, compromising client data privacy.

2) CRYPTOGRAPHIC AND MATHEMATICAL DEFENSES

1. **DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY (DP):**

Differential Privacy mathematically guarantees that the inclusion or exclusion of any single private packet sequence in a training run will not significantly impact the output distribution of the aggregated model. In practice, clients apply local DP (LDP) by clipping the ℓ_2-norm of their local update gradients to a threshold C, and subsequently injecting calibrated Gaussian noise:

$$\widetilde{\nabla} L_k = \frac{\nabla L_k}{\max\left(1, \frac{\| \nabla L_k \|_2}{C}\right)} + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 C^2 \mathbf{I})$$

The scale of the injected noise is directly governed by the target privacy budget (ϵ, δ), where lower ϵvalues correspond to stronger privacy guarantees.

2. **SECURE AGGREGATION (SECAGG):**

To prevent the central server from inspecting individual client updates, **Secure Aggregation** relies on multi-party cryptographic masking. Before transmitting updates, clients collaborate in pairs to add symmetric, zero-sum secret keys to their weights:

$$y_i = \theta_i + \sum_{j>i} s_{i,j} - \sum_{j<i} s_{j,i} \,(\mathrm{mod} q)$$

When the server sums the updates, the symmetric pairwise keys ($s_{i,j}$) cancel out, allowing the server to compute the correct global aggregate without ever exposing the individual client updates (θ_i).

3. **Homomorphic Encryption (HE):**
   Under Homomorphic Encryption, the central parameter server executes mathematical aggregation operations directly on encrypted local weights without decrypting them first:

$$\mathrm{Enc}(\theta_{\mathrm{global}}) = \mathrm{Enc}(\theta_1) \oplus \mathrm{Enc}(\theta_2)$$

   1. **System Constraint:** While HE provides robust, mathematical privacy guarantees against compromised servers, it introduces substantial computational overhead. This overhead often limits the use of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) on low-power edge nodes.
   2. **Gradient Compression and Sparsification:** Gradient compression reduces communication overhead while serving as a baseline privacy shield. By applying top-k sparsification and threshold-based quantization (e.g., Ternary Gradients), the framework only transmits high-variance weights:

$$\mathrm{Compress}(\theta_i) = \mathrm{Quantize}\big(\mathrm{Top}_k(\theta_i, p)\big)$$

   3. **System Advantage:** Eliminating low-variance weights disrupts reconstruction optimization loops, preventing gradient-leakage and reconstruction attacks.

B. DEPLOYMENT AND COMMUNICATION CRITERIA

1) TRAINING PROTOCOL

Deep models are initialized and trained globally on the server utilizing historical benchmark profiles (e.g., CICIDS2018). Client nodes subsequently execute decentralized fine-tuning using local traffic profiles across 5 local epochs ($E = 5$) to adapt to local traffic conditions.

2) INFERENCE PIPELINE

The lightweight, compressed inference pipeline is compiled into an INT8 Quantized ONNX/TFLite binary. This binary runs as a background system daemon on localized hardware targets (e.g., Raspberry Pi 4). It utilizes less than 1.0Wof power and holds memory footprint strictly under 120 MB.

3) COMMUNICATION EFFICIENCY

Parameter updates are sparse; rather than synchronizing full layers, only weights that exceed a variance threshold are transmitted. By grouping communication over local MQTT or Apache Kafka brokers, local communication latency remains below 37 ms, ensuring real-time response times.

C. SYSTEM ADVANTAGES AND COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS

1) KEY ADVANTAGES

i. **Alert Fatigue Reduction:** Gains a practical 40% fortieth reduction in local spam alerts, preventing nuisance notifications on innocent network spikes.
ii. **Privacy Safeguard:** Local data never truly leaves the client, and instances of gradient updates are not only protected by the elastic federated learning architecture but also as they include Gaussian differential privacy noise to prevent reconstruction attacks.
iii. **Ultra-light-weight footprint**: Fits well within microcontrollers and edge-gateways, spending < 5%<5% of the total system CPU capacity.

2) COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS

i. **A Cold Start Problem:** In case an edge node in the environment has never been seen before, due to its newness and high rate of non-threatening, unknown patterns, it could experience short-term false positives until the next round of federating data refines the global weights for all nodes.
ii. **Loss Due to Quantization:** The conversion of the floating-point weight values from FP32 format to 8-bit signed integer (INT8) results in less than 1/100th of one percent loss in accuracy, which represents a very significant tradeoff between detection time and total system delay.

X. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS AND EMERGING PARADIGMS

As federated learning converges with resource-constrained edge ecosystems, several pioneering frontiers are emerging. This section establishes a concrete, high-impact research agenda organized across ten strategic research domains which is shown in **Figure 27**.




Figure 27 Edge Security Paradigm Overview

A. HARDWARE, COMPRESSION AND LIFECYCLE PARADIGMS

1) DEEP TINYML HARDWARE CO-DESIGN

i. **Research Agenda:** Current modern edge nodes are highly limited in resources. Going forward, we need to move away from the conventional post-training compression and move toward Hardware-Algorithm Co-Design. This means developing custom deep learning cores (e.g., CNN-LSTM, Sparse Attention engines, to name a few) in direct co-design with embedded Neuromorphic Processors and Tensor Processing Units (TPUs) on microcontrollers.

ii. **Key Challenge:** Design compiler-level mapping tools that automatically convert hybrid network structures into the most localized, optimized instruction sets with no degradation in precision and no runtime memory spikes.

2) CONTINUAL AND LIFE-LONG LEARNING ON THE EDGE

i. **Research Continuity:** Non-stationarity in the network environment leads to the decline of model performance over time (concept drift). There is an urgent need to study continual learning methods for on-device learning, such as Elastic Weight Consolidation (EWC) and experience replay, which allow the model stored locally to update its weights.

ii. **Primary Issue:** Overcoming the well-known problem of "catastrophic forgetting," which refers to diminished detection of baseline anomalies when a model is trained on new attack vectors, while keeping the edge memory footprint as small as possible.

3) GREEN AI AND ENERGY-EFFICIENT COMPUTE

i. **Research Agenda:** Training and running deep models across millions of edge devices introduces substantial cumulative energy consumption. Future IDS research must prioritize Green AI metrics, actively optimizing the ratio of classification performance to carbon output (Joules/Inference).

ii. **Key Challenge:** Designing specialized loss functions (similar to our L_{stealth}) that explicitly penalize high-energy operations, alongside investigating sub-INT8 quantization schemes (such as 2-bit or 4-bit binary neural networks).

B. INTELLIGENCE, AGENT AND COGNITIVE ADAPTATION

4) LLM-BASED AND GENERATIVE AGENT IDS

i. **Introduction:** Advancements in Generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs) have the potential to transform intrusion detection systems. Our future efforts will examine the concept of Local LLM Agents (Tiny-LLMs) at the edge gateways functioning as cognitive security analysts and be capable of rendering model alerts in the form of security summaries that are explainable.

ii. **Main Challenge:** The most difficult problem will be achieving severe compression of LLMs to less than 1B parameters to allow local inference on-device within strict memory budgets. Adding to the complexity of the challenge will be the need to design methods to entirely eliminate model hallucination in the context of interpreting unstructured packets of network traffic.

5) ZERO-DAY ATTACK GENERATION AND GAN-BACKED LEARNING

i. **Research Agenda:** We need to think about how we're protecting our models. If we only use information to test them, they can be easily tricked by new attacks that we have not seen before. We should try using tools called Generative Adversarial Networks or GANs to simulate these new attacks at the edge so our models can learn how to defend themselves against these potential threats.

ii. **Key Challenge:** The main problem is making sure that these GANs work correctly and do not get confused when they are used on different devices that are not connected to each other and may be sending wrong information. We have to make sure that the GAN training is stable even when it is used on these kinds of devices.

6) CYBER DIGITAL TWINS (CDTS)

i. **Research Agenda:** We are looking into combining Cyber Digital Twins with FL-IDS. This lets us simulate how industrial SCADA and IoT networks behave in time. By creating a copy of the physical edge environment, the IDS can test new deep learning model updates against simulated threats safely before using them live.

ii. **Key Challenge:** The main problem is keeping the twin and the real network, in sync in real time without slowing down the network. This is tricky because we do not want to add work that hurts performance. We need to make sure the virtual twin and the physical network stay in sync. The goal is to achieve this without adding much network overhead.

C. PRIVACY, TRUST, AND THE SECURITY FRONTIER

7) QUANTUM-SAFE AND POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY (PQC)

i. **Research Agenda:** The rise of computers poses a threat to current cryptographic methods. These methods are used to secure model updates in networks where data is shared across devices. Future systems that detect intrusions and work with shared data must use cryptography that's safe from quantum computers. This cryptography is based on math problems related to lattices. It will protect data during transmission.

ii. **Key Challenge:** One major problem is that the new cryptographic keys require a lot of processing power and bandwidth. This makes them impractical, for devices that have limited power and resources. These devices are often found at the edge of the network.

8) ON-DEVICE EXPLAINABLE AI (XAI)

i. **Research Agenda:** Deep learning models are really hard to understand which makes it tough for security teams to trust them. We need to look into Explainable AI techniques that can work on devices like quick and easy to understand explanations to give a clear reason for every alert that is generated.

ii. **Key Challenge:** We have to find a way to make explanation frameworks work faster so they can figure out which features are important, in time while the model is still running.

9) DECENTRALIZED TRUST AND WEB3 INTEGRATION

i. **Research Agenda:** Centralized parameter servers are a point of failure in federated learning networks. Future architectures should look into Web3 and blockchain to create systems. These systems would allow peers to share model weights directly using contracts to check updates, from local clients.

ii. **Key Challenge**: The main issue is that distributed blockchains have latency and transaction fees. These can slow down model synchronization in time. We need to prevent this from happening.

10) MULTI-AGENT EDGE INTELLIGENCE ORCHESTRATION

i. **Research Agenda:** In cities one model can't handle all local problems. We need systems where different edge nodes work together. These nodes could be CNN-LSTM agents, Autoencoder agents or Transformer agents. They must coordinate to find, analyze and stop threats.
ii. **Key Challenge:** We need to create protocols that let different edge agents work together smoothly. These protocols must handle threats at once and work in real-time even when the network is unstable.

XI. CONCLUSION

In this systematic review, we have presented a comprehensive, PRISMA-compliant synthesis of 237 peer-reviewed studies published between January 2020 and June 2026, establishing a definitive benchmark at the convergence of Federated Learning, TinyML, and resource-constrained network security. By decoupling the literature into a rigorous, multi-dimensional taxonomy, this work successfully bridges the gap between theoretical deep representation learning and on-device hardware compilation.

Our statistical evaluation represents the first empirical meta-analysis in this domain. The execution of a formal One-way ANOVA and subsequent post-hoc Tukey HSD tests mathematically validated that parallel Spatio-Temporal hybrids (such as our optimized CNN-LSTM) and linear-attention transformers yield statistically superior detection accuracy compared to standard standalone baselines ($p < 0.0001$). Furthermore, our random-effects meta-analysis on homogeneous CICIDS2018 datasets confirmed a pooled random accuracy of 95.39% (95% confidence interval: 94.53% to 96.25%), while Egger's linear regression proved the absence of systemic publication bias ($p = 0.741$).

On the engineering frontier, this review systematically synthesized advanced model compression pipelines (including mixed-precision INT8/INT4 quantization, structured and dynamic pruning, singular value decomposition, and teacher-student knowledge distillation) and edge-native runtimes compiled for physical hardware accelerators. We demonstrate that hardware-device co-design, exemplified by frameworks like MCUNet and Google Coral Edge TPU compilation, is the key enabling mechanism to resolve the accuracy-resource bottleneck on embedded systems.

As we look toward the post-2026 landscape, the security paradigm is rapidly shifting toward cognitive and autonomous systems. The strategic roadmap established in this work highlights that future research must navigate the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), Cyber Digital Twins (CDTs), on-device continual and life-long learning, and local, compressed Large Language Model (Tiny-LLM) agents. By balancing classification accuracy, operational latency, mathematical privacy, and Green AI carbon and energy efficiency, this work provides cyber-physical security architects, researchers, and defense engineers with a seminal, statistically validated foundation to engineer the next generation of silent, collaborative, and highly resilient intrusion detection systems.

XII. AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS STATEMENT

Amlan Kumar Sarkar conceived the core idea of the study and designed the overall structure of the comprehensive review. He led the literature search strategy, screening, and selection of relevant studies, and was primarily responsible for the conceptual framework of Whispering Machines, deep learning architectures, and their application to stealthy intrusion detection in resource-constrained environments. He conducted the comparative analysis across datasets and environments (IoT, SCADA, Android, and cloud), synthesized the results, and drafted the original manuscript, including figures, tables, and technical discussions.

Pawan Kumar contributed significantly to the methodological analysis and critical evaluation of the reviewed studies, including performance metrics, latency considerations, and alert-fatigue mitigation techniques. He assisted in validating the comparative insights, refining the taxonomy of models, and strengthening the discussion on deployment feasibility, federated learning compatibility, and privacy-preserving inference. He also reviewed, edited, and improved the manuscript for clarity, technical accuracy, and scholarly presentation.
Both authors contributed to the interpretation of results, participated in revising the manuscript critically for important intellectual content, approved the final version for submission, and agree to be accountable for all aspects of the work.

XIII. DATA AVAILABILITY

The datasets used in this study are publicly available. CICIDS2018 is available from the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity repository. The NSL-KDD dataset is publicly accessible from the University of New Brunswick repository. The BoT-IoT dataset is available from the UNSW Canberra Cyber dataset archive. The Drebin Android

malware dataset is publicly available for research use. All datasets can be accessed from their respective official sources.

XIV. FUNDING DECLARATION

Funding: Not applicable.

XV. COMPETING INTERESTS

No, I declare that the authors have no competing interests as defined by Nature Portfolio, or other interests that might be perceived to influence the results and/or discussion reported in this paper.

XVI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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