Supplementary Information for: The Electoral Business Cycle of Wikipedia: What Elections Reveal About Partisanship and the Production of Political Knowledge

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S1 Overview

This Supplementary Information File (SIF) provides four sets of materials. Section S2 presents robustness checks for the regression discontinuity design: donut-hole estimation, polynomial-order sensitivity, and a formal density test of the running variable. Section S3 introduces a new analysis of the transition period—the eight to ten weeks between Election Day and the convening of the new Congress on January 3—during which committee assignments are announced, leadership is elected, and the institutional architecture of the new Congress takes shape. Section S4 presents auxiliary descriptive figures: editor turnover and recruitment, content quality across the electoral cycle, a heatmap of editing intensity by week, and a Lorenz curve of edit concentration across Members of Congress. Section S5 reproduces the supplementary tables and figures referenced from the main text.

All analyses use the same edit-level dataset described in the main paper: 1,816,512 Wikipedia revisions to 1,899 Member-of-Congress pages between 2003 and 2022. Code to reproduce every figure and table in this SIF is provided in `SIF_analysis.R`.

S2 RDD Robustness Checks

The main paper's identification rests on a regression discontinuity at Election Day within the recentered electoral cycle. Three standard diagnostic checks support the identification.

Donut-hole RDD

A first concern is that observations in the immediate vicinity of the cutoff might drive the result—for example, if anticipatory editing on the eve of the election or real-time editing on Election Night is qualitatively different from the broader post-election regime. The donut-hole RDD addresses this by excluding observations within $\pm\delta$ of the cutoff and

re-estimating.

Figure S1 and Table S1 show the results across donut radii from $\delta = 0$ (the standard RDD) to $\delta = 0.05$ in cycle units. At $\delta = 0$, the baseline estimates are 1.413 for Republican and 2.048 for Democrat MC pages (both $p < 0.01$). The intermediate donut sizes ($\delta =$ 0.005–0.03) show some instability: the Democratic estimate flips sign at $\delta = 0.005$ and $\delta = 0.01$, and the Republican estimate attenuates and loses significance at $\delta = 0.02$. This reflects the fact that excising the election-week observations—which contain the sharpest concentration of the treatment—mechanically reduces the local contrast the RDD exploits. At $\delta = 0.05$, where the donut spans approximately three weeks on each side, the estimates recover strongly: 0.966 (Republican, $p < 0.01$) and 1.371 (Democrat, $p <$ 0.01). The pattern is consistent with a discontinuity whose sharpest expression falls within the first two weeks of the post-election period—precisely when the most institutional events (committee selections, leadership elections) are announced—but whose broader post-election elevation is visible even when the immediate neighborhood is excluded.

This pattern carries an important implication for interpreting the main paper's RDD estimates: the discontinuity is concentrated in the immediate post-election window rather than distributed smoothly across the post-election half of the cycle. The instability at intermediate donut sizes indicates that the standard RDD estimate draws much of its identifying variation from the first one to two weeks after the election. This is substantively consistent with the supply-side argument—institutional events are front-loaded in the transition period—but it means the RDD should be interpreted as capturing the effect of the election *event and its immediate aftermath*, rather than a uniform shift in the level of editing activity across the entire post-election period.



Figure S1 Donut-hole sensitivity. Each point is the RDD estimate of $\ln(1/\Delta_t)$ after dropping observations within $\pm\delta$ of the cutoff. Shaded bands show 95% confidence intervals.

Table S1 Donut-hole RDD: $\ln(1/\Delta t)$ on electoral cycle, dropping points within $\pm\delta$ of the cutoff

Party	δ	N	Estimate	SE
Republican	0.000	800,423	1.413***	(0.084)
Democrat	0.000	712,089	2.048***	(0.101)
Republican	0.005	785,742	0.793***	(0.094)
Democrat	0.005	698,887	−0.190**	(0.077)
Republican	0.010	773,765	0.390***	(0.129)
Democrat	0.010	687,823	−0.869***	(0.086)
Republican	0.020	753,243	−0.169	(0.136)
Democrat	0.020	669,096	0.131	(0.185)
Republican	0.030	732,276	0.427*	(0.239)
Democrat	0.030	649,439	−0.549*	(0.285)
Republican	0.050	696,933	0.966***	(0.048)
Democrat	0.050	617,332	1.371***	(0.055)

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors via `rdrobust`.

Polynomial-order sensitivity

Gelman and Imbens (2019) caution that high-order polynomials in RDD can produce

spurious results. We re-estimate using local polynomials of orders $p \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ for both editing speed and page views. Figure S2 and Table S2 show the results. For $\ln(1/\Delta_t)$, the Republican estimate ranges from 1.413 ($p = 1$) to 1.739 ($p = 4$), always significant at the 1% level; the Democratic estimate ranges from 2.048 to 2.259. For ln(Views), the Republican estimate ranges from 1.452 to 1.801 and the Democratic estimate from 2.350 to 2.431. The substantive conclusion—a large, positive, and significant discontinuity at Election Day—is invariant to the choice of polynomial order.



Figure S2 Polynomial-order sensitivity. Robust RDD estimates with 95% confidence intervals for $\ln(1/\Delta_t)$ (left) and $\ln(\text{Views})$ (right) at $p \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$.

Table S2 Polynomial order sensitivity for the RDD on $\ln(1/\Delta t)$ and $\ln(\textbf{Views})$

Outcome	Party	p	N	Estimate	SE
ln(TTE)	Republican	1	800,423	1.413***	(0.084)
ln(TTE)	Democrat	1	712,089	2.048***	(0.101)
ln(Views)	Republican	1	313,278	1.563***	(0.067)
ln(Views)	Democrat	1	274,731	2.399***	(0.090)
ln(TTE)	Republican	2	800,423	1.583***	(0.082)
ln(TTE)	Democrat	2	712,089	2.248***	(0.093)
ln(Views)	Republican	2	313,278	1.486***	(0.061)
ln(Views)	Democrat	2	274,731	2.370***	(0.088)
ln(TTE)	Republican	3	800,423	1.609***	(0.080)
ln(TTE)	Democrat	3	712,089	2.079***	(0.087)
ln(Views)	Republican	3	313,278	1.452***	(0.060)
ln(Views)	Democrat	3	274,731	2.431***	(0.099)
ln(TTE)	Republican	4	800,423	1.739***	(0.086)
ln(TTE)	Democrat	4	712,089	2.259***	(0.100)
ln(Views)	Republican	4	313,278	1.801***	(0.081)
ln(Views)	Democrat	4	274,731	2.350***	(0.079)

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. p is the local polynomial order; MSE-optimal bandwidth selection. Robust standard errors via `rdrobust`.

Density of the running variable

We test for a discontinuity in the density of the running variable at the cutoff using the local-polynomial density estimator of Cattaneo et al. (2020), implemented in the `rddensity` package. Table S3 reports the results. The test strongly rejects continuity for both parties ($T = 38.5$, $p < 0.001$ for Republicans; $T = 40.2$, $p < 0.001$ for Democrats).

This result is expected and substantively informative rather than problematic. In a standard RDD, a density discontinuity would suggest that units sort around the cutoff—casting doubt on identification. But in our design, the running variable is the calendar position within the legislative cycle, which is not subject to manipulation by editors. The density discontinuity instead reflects exactly the phenomenon we study: elections cause a sharp increase in the *number of edits*, which mechanically increases the density of the running variable at $c = 0$. The discontinuity in editing frequency is the treatment effect, not a confound.

Figure S3 provides the visual companion: kernel density estimates by party show a

clear spike at $c = 0$, consistent with the surge in editing volume documented in the main text.

Table S3 Cattaneo–Jansson–Ma density test for discontinuity in the running variable

Party	N	T statistic	p value	BW left	BW right
Republican	800,423	38.504	< 0.001	0.032	0.034
Democrat	712,089	40.152	< 0.001	0.029	0.038

Note: Test of continuity of the density of the running variable at $c = 0$.
Implementation: `rddensity::rddensity`, robust jackknife variant.
Rejection reflects the election-driven surge in edit frequency, not manipulation.



Figure S3 Density of the recentered electoral cycle, by party. The vertical dashed line marks the cutoff at $c = 0$. The spike at the cutoff reflects the election-driven surge in edit volume.

S3 The Transition Period: Election Day to January 3

The main paper argues that the post-election editing surge is partly supply-driven: institutional events—committee assignments, leadership elections, caucus formations—generate the documentable facts that editors translate into encyclopedic content. These

events are concentrated in the eight to ten weeks between Election Day and the seating of the new Congress on January 3. This section examines that transition period in detail. We pool across all ten general elections in the sample (2004 through 2022) and align observations on days-since-Election-Day, recovering a high-resolution view of how editing, viewing, and editor composition evolve as the new Congress takes shape.

Daily dynamics

Figure S4 presents four daily-resolution panels. Edit volume (Panel A) peaks sharply in the first week after Election Day, then settles to a sustained elevated baseline through the rest of the transition. Editing speed (Panel B) shows the same pattern in inverse: $\ln(1/\Delta_t)$ jumps at day 0 and gradually decays. Page views (Panel C) display a similar election-week peak with somewhat slower decay; readers' attention persists longer than editorial production. Panel D plots the share of edits made by editors active for thirty days or fewer—a proxy for newly recruited editors. The new-editor share rises during the transition and stays elevated, consistent with H_3 in the main paper: elections function as a recruitment moment for the platform.

A second feature visible in the daily panels is a secondary bump roughly 50–70 days after Election Day. This is the typical window in which committee assignments are announced by party leadership, after caucus organization in late November and early December. The pattern is suggestive of a second supply-side stimulus within the transition: the institutional events that follow caucus organization generate a second wave of editable facts, distinct from the immediate post-election news cycle.



Figure S4 Daily dynamics of the transition period (Election Day to ∼75 days post-election), pooled across all general elections 2004–2022. Panel A: edit volume. Panel B: editing speed $\ln(1/\Delta_t)$**. Panel C:** $\ln$**(Views). Panel D: share of edits by editors active** ≤ 30 **days. Dotted vertical lines mark Election Day (day 0) and the ∼60-day mark when committee assignments typically begin to be announced.**

Transition-window RDD (± 30 days around Election Day)

To complement the cycle-based RDD in the main paper, we estimate a tighter RDD using days-from-nearest-election as the running variable, restricted to a ± 30-day window. Table S4 reports the results. Editing speed jumps by 0.710 for Republican MC pages ($p < 0.05$) and 1.216 for Democratic MC pages ($p < 0.01$), with MSE-optimal bandwidths of approximately 2.6–2.9 days—indicating that the sharpest acceleration occurs in the very narrow window around Election Day. Page views show larger and more precisely estimated effects (1.695 and 2.413, both $p < 0.01$), with wider bandwidths of approximately 5.5 days, consistent with attention persisting somewhat longer than the editorial spike.

The damage rate shows no significant change for Republican MC pages and a small positive coefficient for Democratic pages (0.029, $p < 0.05$). Editor experience drops sharply: -0.954 for Republicans ($p < 0.01$) and -0.480 for Democrats ($p < 0.10$), confirming that the transition period recruits less experienced editors into the editorial community.

The positive damage coefficient for Democratic MC pages in this narrow window deserves comment, since the full-cycle RDD in the main paper finds a small *decline* in damage after elections (-0.013, $p < 0.05$). The two estimates are not contradictory; they capture different phases of the same process. The transition-window RDD, with its MSE-optimal bandwidth of approximately 6 days, isolates the immediate Election Day spike—a period when some low-quality or hastily sourced edits arrive alongside substantive content. The full-cycle RDD averages over the longer post-election period during which experienced gatekeeping editors have already corrected those initial problems. The full-cycle estimate thus reflects the *net* effect after the corrective response, while the transition-window estimate captures the *initial* arrival of edits before gatekeeping has run its course. Both are consistent with the gatekeeping account advanced in the main paper: elections generate a brief influx of lower-quality edits that the community rapidly absorbs and polices.

Table S4 Transition-window RDD: ±30 days around Election Day, all elections pooled (2004–2022)

Outcome	N	BW	Estimate	SE
ln(TTE) Republican	89,536	2.90	0.710**	(0.295)
ln(TTE) Democrat	82,025	2.65	1.216***	(0.330)
ln(Views) Republican	27,436	5.67	1.695***	(0.159)
ln(Views) Democrat	24,562	5.53	2.413***	(0.216)
Damage Republican	89,442	5.52	0.017	(0.014)
Damage Democrat	81,930	6.29	0.029**	(0.014)
Editor Exp Republican	89,536	3.74	−0.954***	(0.184)
Editor Exp Democrat	82,025	2.45	−0.480*	(0.286)

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Running variable: days from nearest election (presidential or midterm). MSE-optimal BW. Robust SE via `rdrobust`.

Decomposition by Member-of-Congress status

Within the transition window, MCs occupy four distinct positions: *newcomers* (in their first 90 days of service), *continuing incumbents* (sitting Members not new to office), *recently departed* (who left within 90 days), and *long-departed* former Members. The supply-side hypothesis predicts that newcomers and incumbents will drive most of the transition-period editing activity, since they are the ones generating institutional events; recently departed Members occupy an intermediate position; long-departed Members should see the smallest effects.

Table S5 and Figure S5 confirm this ordering. Editing speed is fastest for newcomers (-4.41 for Democrats, -5.74 for Republicans) and continuing incumbents (-5.50 and -5.57), and substantially slower for long-departed Members (-6.87 and -6.40). The gap between newcomers and long-departed Members is 1.3–2.5 log units, implying that editing intervals are 4–12 times longer for long-departed MCs. Page views follow a similar gradient, although the newcomer and recently-departed cells contain too few observations with valid view counts for reliable estimation (marked NaN in the table).

A further supply-side fingerprint: the new-editor share is highest for newcomer pages (31% for Democrats, 21% for Republicans), where the most novel institutional information is being produced, and lowest for recently-departed pages (25–26%). Damage rates are low across all cells, with newcomer pages showing the lowest rates (5–7%), suggesting that editors contributing to newly-elected Members' pages are writing substantive encyclopedic content rather than vandalism.



Figure S5 Transition-period dynamics by Member-of-Congress status. ***Newcomer*****: within first 90 days of service.** ***Sitting (continuing)*****: incumbent, not new.** ***Recently left*****: within 90 days of departure.** ***Long-departed*****:** >90 **days post-departure. Error bars: 95% CI.**

Table S5 Transition-period statistics by MC status and party

Status	Party	N	$\ln(1/\Delta t)$	ln(Views)	Damage	% new editors
Newcomer	Democrat	458	−4.406	6.308	0.074	30.6
Newcomer	Republican	529	−5.739	—	0.049	21.0
Sitting (continuing)	Democrat	26,726	−5.500	7.059	0.126	37.0
Sitting (continuing)	Republican	29,349	−5.567	6.590	0.128	36.5
Recently left	Democrat	267	−5.646	—	0.127	26.2
Recently left	Republican	287	−5.622	—	0.084	25.1
Long-departed	Democrat	4,129	−6.873	5.720	0.094	26.8
Long-departed	Republican	6,760	−6.399	6.402	0.118	29.7

Note: "—" indicates insufficient observations for valid page-view computation.

Interpretation

The transition-period evidence reinforces the main paper's argument. The editorial surge is not a single event on Election Day; it is a sustained regime of accelerated editing that lasts until the new Congress begins generating routine legislative facts. The within-transition decomposition by MC status shows that the surge concentrates on Members who are actively producing institutional events—the newly elected and the continuing incumbents—while Members who have been out of office for some time experience much smaller effects. Both the temporal structure of the surge (initial peak plus a secondary bump around the committee-assignment window) and its distribution across MC types are consistent with a supply-side account in which the production of political knowledge tracks the production of political events.

One nuance deserves attention: the newcomer effect is asymmetric by party. Democratic newcomers show the fastest editing in the entire table (-4.406), substantially faster than continuing Democratic incumbents (-5.500)—a gap of over one log unit, implying roughly three times shorter inter-edit intervals. Republican newcomers, by contrast, are slightly *slower* than continuing Republican incumbents (-5.739 vs. -5.567). Two factors likely contribute. First, two of the four presidential elections in our sample were won by Democrats (2008, 2020), and the winning party's newcomers generate the most newsworthy institutional events during the transition—first-time committee assignments, high-profile orientation events, and policy announcements that attract disproportionate editorial attention. This is consistent with H_2 in the main paper. Second, the newcomer cells are small (458 Democratic, 529 Republican transition-period edits), and the Republican newcomer cell lacks valid page-view data entirely, so the asymmetry should be interpreted cautiously. The broader pattern—that newcomers and incumbents attract substantially more editing than departed Members—holds for both parties and is the key supply-side prediction.

S4 Additional Descriptive Evidence

This section presents four descriptive figures that, while not central to the main argument, document features of the data that may be of independent interest.

Editor turnover and recruitment

Figure S6 plots the quarterly count of active editors of MC pages (bars) alongside the share of those editors who are newly active (line, right axis). Election quarters are highlighted in blue. Two patterns are visible. First, the active-editor count has declined over the 2004–2022 period, consistent with the well-documented maturation and consolidation of Wikipedia's editor community. Second, election quarters consistently show elevated active-editor counts and a higher share of new editors than adjacent quarters, even as the underlying baseline declines. Elections appear to be a reliable recruitment vehicle for the political-biography editing community throughout the two decades we study.



Figure S6 Editor turnover and recruitment, 2004–2022. Bars: active editors per quarter, with election quarters highlighted in blue. Line (right axis): share of editors active for 30 or fewer days.

Content quality across the electoral cycle

Figure S7 plots the ORES-classified damage rate by twentieth-of-cycle bins, separately by party. The damage rate falls modestly after the cutoff for both parties. This pattern complements the main-paper finding that elections do not degrade content quality despite recruiting less experienced editors. The fall is consistent with rapid corrective intervention by experienced gatekeepers responding to elevated edit volume.



Figure S7 ORES-classified damage rate across the electoral cycle, by party. Shaded bands: 95% confidence intervals. The post-election period shows no quality deterioration.

Heatmap of editing intensity

Figure S8 visualizes mean editing speed by week-of-cycle and party as a heatmap. The post-election band (just to the right of the dashed cutoff line) is uniformly hotter than the rest of the cycle for both parties, but the Democratic band is slightly hotter, consistent with the asymmetry documented in the main paper for the 2008/2020 cycles, which were Democratic presidential wins.



Figure S8 Heatmap of mean editing speed $\ln(1/\Delta_t)$ by week-of-cycle (x-axis) and party (y-axis). Hotter colors indicate faster editing. The post-election week is uniformly the hottest cell for both parties.

Edit concentration across MCs

Editorial attention is highly unequal across Members of Congress: a small share of Members receives the bulk of edits. Figure S9 presents Lorenz curves for the cumulative distribution of edits across MCs, separately by party. Both parties show pronounced concentration: roughly 20% of MC pages account for the majority of edits, with Gini coefficients in the high range. Democratic and Republican MC pages display similar concentration patterns, indicating that the inequality is not a partisan artifact but a structural feature of how editorial attention distributes across political biographies.



Figure S9 Lorenz curves of edit concentration across Members of Congress, by party. The dotted diagonal is perfect equality. Gini coefficients in the inset.

S5 Tables and Figures Referenced from the Main Text

The remainder of this SIF reproduces the supplementary tables and figures referenced in the main paper.



Figure S10 Robust RDD plots for time-to-edit (top) and page views (bottom), by party. Red: Republican MC pages. Blue: Democrat MC pages. The right y-axis shows human-readable labels. Shaded regions are 95% confidence intervals.

Table S6 Robust Regression Discontinuity: Editor Experience, MC Ideology, and Editor Partisanship

		Conventional		Bias-corrected		Robust	
	N	Est.	SE	Est.	SE	Est.	SE
Editor Experience, Republican MC	800423	-0.428	0.046	-0.452	0.046	-0.452***	0.047
Editor Experience, Democrat MC	712089	-0.391	0.044	-0.409	0.044	-0.409***	0.049
MC Ideology (dim1), Republican MC	287874	-0.005	0.003	-0.007	0.003	-0.007*	0.004
MC Ideology (dim1), Democrat MC	228581	0.007	0.003	0.008	0.003	0.008***	0.003
Editor Leaning (R), Republican MC	800423	0.032	0.005	0.035	0.005	0.035***	0.005
Editor Leaning (R), Democrat MC	712089	-0.003	0.003	-0.003	0.003	-0.003	0.003

Note:
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S7 Cox PH Models: Time Between Edits (Baseline)

	timeElapsed					
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
Republican	0.076***	0.134***	0.130***	0.084***	0.075***	0.153***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.016)
woman		0.364***	0.344***	0.031***	0.002	−0.035***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
african_american		0.243***	0.215***	0.116***	0.096***	0.036***
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
hispanic		0.284***	0.272***	−0.025***	−0.050***	−0.073***
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
asian_pacific		0.343***	0.334***	0.097***	0.079***	0.074***
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)
afterElection			0.073***	0.022***	0.010***	0.096***
			(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
damage			0.318***	−0.025***	−0.033***	−0.112***
			(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
damage_lag			0.735***	0.574***	0.558***	0.614***
			(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
lnPageCreation_surv				−0.097***	−0.108***	−0.065***
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
lnViews_surv				0.341***	0.261***	0.263***
				(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
lnViewsLag_surv					0.080***	0.044***
					(0.001)	(0.003)
FA					−0.046***	0.008
					(0.005)	(0.012)
Stub					−0.486***	0.313***
					(0.008)	(0.078)
ideology_dim1						0.024
						(0.018)
N	1512512	1499108	1496379	580915	580089	193925
R-squared	0.001	0.025	0.072	0.393	0.402	0.255
Max. R-squared	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Log Likelihood	−20008357.000	−19800153.000	−19723725.000	−6984424.000	−6969244.000	−2138661.000
Wald Test	2196.090*** (df = 1)	40560.890*** (df = 5)	130897.500*** (df = 8)	312175.800*** (df = 10)	307374.500*** (df = 13)	63291.310*** (df = 14)
LR Test	2198.824*** (df = 1)	37268.160*** (df = 5)	112512.900*** (df = 8)	289563.000*** (df = 10)	297997.900*** (df = 13)	57004.370*** (df = 14)
Score (Logrank) Test	2197.158*** (df = 1)	41029.570*** (df = 5)	135320.800*** (df = 8)	335326.500*** (df = 10)	335795.500*** (df = 13)	65770.500*** (df = 14)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table S8 Cox PH Models: Split by Party of MC

	timeElapsed	
	Republican MC	**Democrat MC**
	Model 1	**Model 2**
woman	0.052***	−0.085***
	(0.010)	(0.007)
african_american	−0.146***	0.059***
	(0.026)	(0.009)
hispanic	0.034**	−0.125***
	(0.017)	(0.013)
asian_pacific		0.087***
	(0.000)	(0.011)
afterElection	0.097***	0.095***
	(0.006)	(0.007)
damage	−0.120***	−0.108***
	(0.010)	(0.012)
damage_lag	0.613***	0.610***
	(0.011)	(0.013)
lnPageCreation_surv	−0.069***	−0.076***
	(0.005)	(0.005)
lnViews_surv	0.264***	0.258***
	(0.003)	(0.004)
lnViewsLag_surv	0.032***	0.067***
	(0.003)	(0.004)
FA	0.074***	−0.020
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Stub	0.230***	0.659***
	(0.087)	(0.184)
ideology_dim1	0.049**	0.048
	(0.021)	(0.034)
N	108355	85570
R-squared	0.240	0.275
Max. R-squared	1.000	1.000
Log Likelihood	−1132989.000	−872490.100
Wald Test	33626.180*** (df = 12)	29836.820*** (df = 13)
LR Test	29681.900*** (df = 12)	27545.320*** (df = 13)
Score (Logrank) Test	34907.960*** (df = 12)	31242.710*** (df = 13)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table S9 Cox PH Models: Interaction Effects

	timeElapsed			
	Party×Elec	**Gender×Elec**	**Race×Elec**	**Views×Elec**
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Republican	0.147***	0.153***	0.153***	0.150***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
afterElection	0.089***	0.096***	0.102***	0.220***
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.015)
woman	−0.035***	−0.034***	−0.035***	−0.033***
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
african_american	0.036***	0.036***	0.061***	0.037***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)
hispanic	−0.073***	−0.073***	−0.058***	−0.069***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.010)
asian_pacific	0.074***	0.074***	0.073***	0.075***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
damage	−0.112***	−0.112***	−0.112***	−0.114***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
damage_lag	0.614***	0.614***	0.614***	0.613***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
lnPageCreation_surv	−0.065***	−0.065***	−0.065***	−0.066***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
lnViews_surv	0.263***	0.263***	0.263***	0.273***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
lnViewsLag_surv	0.044***	0.044***	0.044***	0.044***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
FA	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.0002
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Stub	0.313***	0.313***	0.312***	0.305***
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)
ideology_dim1	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.027
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Republican:afterElection	0.013			
	(0.009)			
woman:afterElection		−0.002		
		(0.010)		
african_american:afterElection			−0.047***	
			(0.015)	
afterElection:hispanic			−0.027	
			(0.019)	
afterElection:lnViews_surv				−0.019***
				(0.002)
N	193925	193925	193925	193925
R-squared	0.255	0.255	0.255	0.255
Max. R-squared	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Log Likelihood	−2138660.000	−2138661.000	−2138655.000	−2138625.000
Wald Test	63291.480*** (df = 15)	63290.790*** (df = 15)	63292.430*** (df = 16)	63305.930*** (df = 15)
LR Test	57006.280*** (df = 15)	57004.400*** (df = 15)	57015.640*** (df = 16)	57074.830*** (df = 15)
Score (Logrank) Test	65772.530*** (df = 15)	65775.500*** (df = 15)	65775.530*** (df = 16)	65770.550*** (df = 15)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table S10 Cox PH Models: Editor Characteristics and the Election

	Experience×Elec	timeElapsed Leaning×Elec	Full
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Republican	0.083***	0.040***	0.105***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.016)
EditsByEditor	0.005***		−0.002*
	(0.001)		(0.001)
MeanRepublicanEditor		0.137***	0.199***
		(0.008)	(0.014)
ideology_dim1			−0.015
			(0.019)
afterElection	0.046***	−0.024***	0.101***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.013)
woman	0.083***	0.085***	−0.029***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
african_american	0.097***	0.104***	0.029***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
hispanic	0.072***	0.076***	−0.083***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
damage	−0.027***	−0.049***	−0.124***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)
damage_lag	0.559***	0.555***	0.613***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
lnViews_surv	0.342***	0.339***	0.262***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
lnViewsLag_surv			0.046***
			(0.003)
FA	−0.067***	−0.060***	0.010
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.012)
Stub	−0.514***	−0.508***	0.316***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.078)
lnPageCreation_surv			−0.066***
			(0.003)
EditsByEditor:afterElection	−0.004***		0.003**
	(0.001)		(0.001)
MeanRepublicanEditor:afterElection		0.091***	
		(0.010)	
afterElection:MeanRepublicanEditor			−0.056***
			(0.019)
afterElection:ideology_dim1			0.049***
			(0.012)
N	580915	580915	193925
R-squared	0.394	0.395	0.256
Max. R-squared	1.000	1.000	1.000
Log Likelihood	−6983538.000	−6983060.000	−2138516.000
Wald Test	306971.200*** (df = 12)	307326.500*** (df = 12)	63605.450*** (df = 18)
LR Test	291334.700*** (df = 12)	292290.200*** (df = 12)	57292.890*** (df = 18)
Score (Logrank) Test	330619.800*** (df = 12)	330639.700*** (df = 12)	66064.230*** (df = 18)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table S11 Cox PH Models: Presidential Election Window (pm 15 days)

	All (interaction)	timeElapsed Republican MC	Democrat MC
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Republican	0.410***		
	(0.104)		
afterElection	0.002	−0.131***	−0.011
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.045)
woman	−0.065*	−0.152**	0.014
	(0.035)	(0.067)	(0.042)
african_american	−0.073	−0.241	0.066
	(0.051)	(0.185)	(0.057)
hispanic	−0.219***	−0.041	−0.130
	(0.073)	(0.166)	(0.081)
asian_pacific	0.040		
	(0.062)		
damage	−0.111**	−0.120*	0.040
	(0.045)	(0.071)	(0.070)
damage_lag	0.585***	0.698***	0.460***
	(0.048)	(0.068)	(0.068)
lnPageCreation_surv	−0.110***		
	(0.024)		
lnViews_surv	0.263***	0.274***	0.243***
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.029)
lnViewsLag_surv	0.046***	0.011	0.108***
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.030)
FA	−0.248***	0.005	−0.501***
	(0.080)	(0.109)	(0.116)
Stub	−0.644	−0.503	
	(1.002)	(1.003)	(0.000)
ideology_dim1	−0.293***	−0.572***	0.747***
	(0.111)	(0.131)	(0.185)
Republican:afterElection	−0.137**		
	(0.060)		
EditsByEditor		0.045***	0.018**
		(0.008)	(0.009)
MeanRepublicanEditor		0.617***	0.077
		(0.121)	(0.111)
N	5268	2674	2594
R-squared	0.218	0.213	0.253
Max. R-squared	1.000	1.000	1.000
Log Likelihood	−39232.500	−18112.610	−17423.380
Wald Test	1369.670*** (df = 15)	692.600*** (df = 13)	758.790*** (df = 12)
LR Test	1296.671*** (df = 15)	639.352*** (df = 13)	757.573*** (df = 12)
Score (Logrank) Test	1405.782*** (df = 15)	715.219*** (df = 13)	779.189*** (df = 12)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table S12 Robust RDD for Members Who Left Congress: Election Effect on Post-Departure Editing

		Conventional		Bias-corrected		Robust	
	N	Est.	SE	Est.	SE	Est.	SE
ln(TTE), Left Congress, Republican	116852	0.666	0.094	0.690	0.094	0.690***	0.110
ln(TTE), Left Congress, Democrat	82156	0.571	0.099	0.562	0.099	0.562***	0.117
ln(Views), Left Congress, Republican	54977	1.857	0.098	1.841	0.098	1.841***	0.115
ln(Views), Left Congress, Democrat	42376	2.435	0.095	2.513	0.095	2.513***	0.103

Note:

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S13 Robust RDD (Presidential Elections pm 15 days): Time-to-Edit, Views, Damage

		Conventional		Bias-corrected		Robust	
	N	Est.	SE	Est.	SE	Est.	SE
ln(Time-to-Edit), Republican MC	21048	0.103	0.402	-0.110	0.402	-0.110	0.448
ln(Time-to-Edit), Democrat MC	19947	1.264	0.486	1.130	0.486	1.130*	0.671
ln(Views), Republican MC	9076	0.392	0.404	0.580	0.404	0.580	0.577
ln(Views), Democrat MC	7395	0.393	0.403	0.200	0.403	0.200	0.433
Damaging Edit, Republican MC	21038	-0.108	0.041	-0.112	0.041	-0.112**	0.056
Damaging Edit, Democrat MC	19901	0.032	0.033	0.029	0.033	0.029	0.044

Note:

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S14 Robust RDD (Presidential Elections pm 15 days): Editor Experience, Ideology, Partisanship

		Conventional		Bias-corrected		Robust	
	N	Est.	SE	Est.	SE	Est.	SE
Editor Experience, Republican MC	21048	0.506	0.340	0.405	0.340	0.405	0.478
Editor Experience, Democrat MC	19947	-1.030	0.375	-1.080	0.375	-1.080**	0.488
MC Ideology (dim1), Republican MC	7208	-0.055	0.017	-0.063	0.017	-0.063***	0.022
MC Ideology (dim1), Democrat MC	7160	0.051	0.025	0.063	0.025	0.063**	0.030
Editor Leaning (R), Republican MC	21048	0.622	0.010	0.622	0.010	0.622***	0.010
Editor Leaning (R), Democrat MC	19947	-0.030	0.025	-0.016	0.025	-0.016	0.030

Note:

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S15 Bandwidth Sensitivity: ln(Time-to-Edit)

		Conventional		Bias-corrected		Robust	
	N	Est.	SE	Est.	SE	Est.	SE
Republican, MSE-optimal BW	800423	1.357	0.082	1.413	0.082	1.413***	0.084
Democrat, MSE-optimal BW	712089	1.980	0.100	2.048	0.100	2.048***	0.101
Republican, BW = 0.10	800423	0.427	0.036	0.860	0.036	0.860***	0.051
Democrat, BW = 0.10	712089	0.434	0.038	0.820	0.038	0.820***	0.055
Republican, BW = 0.20	800423	0.336	0.026	0.347	0.026	0.347***	0.037
Democrat, BW = 0.20	712089	0.415	0.028	0.280	0.028	0.280***	0.039

Note:
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S16 Heterogeneity Analysis: ln(Time-to-Edit) by Demographic Group

		Conventional		Bias-corrected		Robust	
	N	Est.	SE	Est.	SE	Est.	SE
Women MC	192455	1.189	0.091	1.235	0.091	1.235***	0.101
Men MC	1320057	1.565	0.078	1.619	0.078	1.619***	0.079
African-American MC	79152	1.213	0.099	1.180	0.099	1.180***	0.115
Non-African-American MC	1419956	1.761	0.079	1.817	0.079	1.817***	0.080
Hispanic MC	37740	-0.122	0.189	-0.222	0.189	-0.222	0.203
Non-Hispanic MC	1461368	1.799	0.076	1.853	0.076	1.853***	0.077

Note:
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Figure S11 Forest plot of robust RDD estimates with 95% confidence intervals for all outcomes.



Figure S12 Kaplan-Meier survival curves for the time between consecutive edits (in log hours), by party (top), gender (middle), and electoral period (bottom).

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