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Socio-Economic And Demographic Factors Shaping Attitudes Towards Immigrants in Arab Countries and Turkey

Öznur Özdamar
Bakırçay Üniversitesi
Eleftherios Giovanis
Bakırçay Üniversitesi
Aslı Dolu
asli.dolu@bakircay.edu.tr

Bakırçay Üniversitesi
Sacit Hadi Akdede
Bakırçay Üniversitesi
Ahmet Ali Koç
Akdeniz University

Research Article

Keywords:

Posted Date: August 11th, 2026

DOI: https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-10027401/v1

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Additional Declarations: No competing interests reported.

Abstract

In 2020, Arab countries hosted around 41.4 million migrants and refugees, representing nearly 15% of all international migrants and refugees worldwide. The majority were migrant laborers, but about 9.3 million refugees sought protection, including 3.6 million Syrians under the UNHCR and 5.7 million Palestine refugees with UNRWA. Many Arab nations and Turkey were among the first to receive a large influx of Syrian refugees, providing them with shelter, food, and education. Recently, however, anti-refugee sentiment has increased, with refugees being blamed for social and economic issues. Current theories suggest a link between pro-immigration attitudes and factors such as labor supply, earnings, gender, education, and religiosity. This paper aims to examine whether these theories apply to Arab countries and Turkey by analyzing the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants in these regions.

1. Introduction

By mid-2022, an astonishing 103 million individuals have experienced forced displacement on a global scale. This includes 32.5 million individuals classified as refugees and 4.9 million individuals seeking asylum, all of whom have departed their residences to avoid conflict, violence, and persecution. Approximately 76 percent of the global refugee population resided in low- and middle-income nations. Turkey accommodated around 3.6 million refugees, making it the country with the highest refugee population globally. Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq are the top three nations among the Arab countries that have sponsored 87 percent of all refugees in the area. Lebanon currently has hosted 818,900 refugees, Jordan has hosted 697,800, Egypt has hosted 294,600 and Iraq has hosted 273,700 people (UNHCR, 2022a).

Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq are currently having a substantial number of refugees especially after the Syrian Conflict. Particularly, Jordan and Lebanon have become host countries for Palestinian refugees, and both countries have experienced an influx of migrants due to the recent war in Syria. **Jordan** has the biggest number of refugees in the world. Out of its 5 million people, 1.6 million were Palestinian refugees in 2002, 800,000 Palestinians who had been forced to leave their homes since 1967, and an estimated 300,000 Iraqi refugees (Chatelard, 2002). In contrast to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Syria, those in Jordan were given citizenship in the 1950s, which made it easier for them to become part of regular society (Khawaja, 2003). Considering more recent refugees, Syrians, in Jordan, large number of Syrians are working or looking for work. As of 2002, **Lebanon** is home to several refugees which accounts for over 10% of its population. Many of these individuals are Palestinians. Contrary to Palestinian refugees residing in Syria and Jordan, they are deprived of the opportunity to engage in specialized occupations, acquire or inherit real estate, and exercise fundamental human liberties. After the conclusion of the civil war in Syria, the Lebanese government consistently reported the total count of Syrian refugees as 1.5 million, out of which around 815,000 were officially registered with the UNHCR. The largest demographic consisted of Iraqis, at 55% of the total population, followed by Sudanese and Ethiopians. In 2022, Lebanon's socioeconomic crisis exacerbated. The strain on community resources intensified, causing public institutions to struggle, while the escalating inflation

further hindered access to essential services and assistance for individuals. It has been noted that the burden of accepting refugees is exacerbating the crisis and altering the protective environment. Throughout the year, individuals persistently advocated for the repatriation of Syrians to their country of origin (UNHCR, 2022b). **Egypt** is another country became home to numerous Arab and African migrants, as well as a significant home for hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, Sudanese, and, since 2011, Syrian refugees. UNHCR (2023) reports that Egypt currently accommodates refugees and asylum-seekers from 59 different nations. In Egypt, Syrian refugees do not face isolation in receiving centers or camps. Instead, they are granted the same legal rights as Egyptian citizens, creating a distinct situation for them (Mansour, 2018; Montaser, 2020). In order to achieve financial autonomy, the majority of Syrian refugees have opted to establish their own businesses (Montaser, 2020). **Turkey**, traditionally has been an emigrant country. Starting with the Syrian civil many refugees have started to live in the country. In 2014, the number of Syrian refugees became 1.5 million which was almost 7 times more than the numbers in 2013. In the years that followed 2013, several refugees have relocated away from the southeast region of Turkey and are now dispersed throughout the rest of the country. Recently many refugees from Iraq, Afghanistan and Ukraine also live in Turkey. The first motivation of this paper is to analyse the link between socio-economic and demographic factors shaping attitudes towards increasing number of refugees/immigrants in Arab countries and Turkey. There are few existing studies analysing attitudes towards refugees and immigrants. In other country case studies scholars have questioned whether hostility to refugees stems primarily from a perceived economic threat, a perceived cultural threat, or a combination of both. Economic arguments put the predictions of models of labour market competition and immigrant utilization of public services to the test (Mayda 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). The remainder of this article is structured as follows: literature review, data description and model specification, results, and conclusions.

2. Literature Review

There are few studies analysed the attitudes towards refugees/immigrants in these countries. Considering their tradition of historically being emigration country instead of immigration country, it is not surprising to have few studies compared to the literature on western countries. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the limited number of research yield conflicting outcomes, indicating that attitudes towards refugees/immigrants vary depending on the country, regardless of their shared social and economic difficulties. For example, despite Jordan's economic struggle, humanitarian concerns and cultural affinities seem to have maintained a significant degree of sympathy for the refugees. Similarly, according to Hassan et.al (2019), approximately 92% of Syrians view Egyptians as hospitable and inviting. Approximately 82% of respondents reported that they had not previously sought asylum in any other country. Furthermore, their experimental game revealed that Egyptians exhibit greater kindness towards refugees compared to their fellow Egyptians. Nonetheless, Lebanon's division between Sunni, Shia, and Christian populations offers a significant counterexample. The delicate equilibrium between these groups is in danger of being upset by the flood of Syrian refugees (Alrababa'h et al., 2021). Given Alrababa'h et al. (2021)'s findings, opinions toward Syrian refugees ought to be more unfavorable than

they are in Jordan due to this increased cultural danger. Unfavourable public views toward refugees and negative sentiments against the Syrian people by politicians is common (Francis, 2017) in Lebanon which is similar for some politicians in Turkey as well. Yitmen and Verkuyten (2018) state that a stronger sense of national identification is linked to an increase in negative attitudes in Turkey and it is driven by the perception of threat. However, the presence of humanitarian concern is correlated with the increase positive attitudes.

Our paper aims to analyse the socio-economic and demographic determinants influencing the negative or positive views towards immigrants in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Considering the relevant literature, education, income, gender, age, marital status, employment status and religiosity will be the main independent variables that we will investigate their role on the attitudes towards immigrants. Most of the existing literature analyse the role of those variables on the attitudes towards immigrants in the western countries. For instance, literature highlights the significance of education in enhancing individuals' attitudes towards others. The level of discrimination diminishes among those who attain higher levels of education (Yang, 2021), and their viewpoint and disposition towards immigrants undergo a positive transformation (Malchow-Møller et al., 2008). The literature clearly shows a direct link between education and favorable views towards immigration. However, the reasons for this connection are subject to varying interpretations. A particular research organization focuses examines the correlation between education and immigration emotions in connection to economic factors. According to Mayda (2006) and O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006), individuals with higher levels of education are less inclined to hold anti-immigrant views. In comparison to the extant literature on Turkish attitudes toward refugees/immigrants, the number of studies examining the impact of education in Turkey and Arab countries is relatively limited. A recent report by INGEV (a Human Development Foundation in Turkey) (2020) indicates that individuals who have completed university education or higher are more inclined to agree with the notion that Syrians ought to repatriate. However, the notion that Syrians should repatriate is significantly less supported by individuals with lesser levels of education. It is noteworthy that individuals of higher social standing and educational attainment are the most cognizant of the Turko-Syrian conflict. Conversely, certain studies conducted in Lebanon reveal mixed results that education may foster more favourable attitudes towards immigrants (Ceyhun, 2020) or people with lower levels of education are more likely to support hosting refugees (Ghosn et. al., 2018). However, contrasting evidence suggests that education does not correlate with reduced negativity towards immigration in both Lebanon and Jordan (Dennison and Nasr, 2020). There is a scarcity of studies examining the factors that influence sentiments towards immigrants/refugees in Egypt. The current body of literature mostly examines attitudes towards Syrian refugees, with a broad focus (e.g. Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014), however, there has been a lack of detailed analysis on the role of different determinants in shaping these sentiments. Similarly, there is lack of empirical research analysing the key determinants of the attitudes towards immigrants in Jordan, Egypt and Iraq.

Considering gender, research for western countries undertaken in various nations and circumstances consistently indicates that women generally display more favourable opinions towards immigrants in comparison to males. In a study conducted by Scheepers et.al. (2002), it was discovered that women in

European countries exhibited a higher propensity to endorse immigrant rights and displayed a reduced inclination towards harbouring unfavourable preconceptions. Among the very few studies for Arab world, Alrababa'h et al. (2021) found that women in Jordan are less likely to perceive the impact of refugees as negative, and more likely to oppose policies that would harm refugees. On the other hand, Ponce (2017) suggests that European women also see some immigrants as threat when they think that migrants bring a gender inequal culture. Literature indicates that tolerance is greater among single individuals (Becchetti et al., 2010; Bazan-Monasterio et al., 2021). On the contrary, individuals who are divorced or separated may exhibit a greater degree of pessimism regarding immigration. On certain occasions, marital discord may give rise to heightened concerns concerning financial competition and societal change (Bazan-Monasterio et al., 2021). As a European case study, Butkus et. al. (2016) indicate that individuals who are widowed are about three times more likely to hold negative attitudes towards refugees compared to individuals with different marital circumstances. Research analysing the role of marital status on the attitudes towards refugees in the Arab world and Turkey is limited some studies on Turkey could not find indifference between the different categories of the marital status (e.g. Ozdamar et. al, 2024). The role of income level in shaping attitudes towards immigrants is a multifaceted and often debated topic in the existing literature. Researchers have conducted numerous studies to examine how income may influence attitudes toward immigration and main findings can vary. Low skill and lower-income individuals might be more prone to perceive immigrants as economic rivals, which could result in the development of more negative attitudes (Dustmann et al., 2011). Despite the presence of economic competition between refugees and low-wage Jordanians, Alrababa'h et al. (2021) discovered that there is no consistent correlation between income and attitudes toward refugees. Ghosn et al. (2018) find that respondents with lesser levels of education are more likely to support hosting refugees, while those with medium to high incomes are more likely to be willing to employ refugees in Lebanon. Erişen (2018) discovered that in Turkey, individuals with lower incomes exhibit considerably greater prejudice against Syrians than those with middle and higher incomes.

Studies indicate that younger persons generally exhibit lower levels of hatred towards refugees and other migrant populations (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). In Turkey, there is mixed evidence on the effect of age on the attitudes towards migrants (Erişen, 2018; Ozdamar et. al, 2024) and in a Jordan case study findings are presented that younger people are slightly more positive about the impact of refugees (Alrababa'h et al.; 2021,

Unfortunately, the strand of literature that deals with the attitudes towards immigrants/refugees in Arab Countries in Turkey are limited. Therefore, this paper aims at comparatively analysing the determinants of the attitudes towards immigrants/refugees in 5 different countries to fill this gap.

3. Data Description and Model Specification

This study utilizes secondary data obtained from "World Values Longitudinal Survey (1981–2022)" which is global research that focuses on the empirical examination of societal, political, economic, religious, and cultural values across nations. It aims to assess the impact of the stability or change in values

throughout time on the social, political, and economic development of nations and societies. The survey has been done in more than 120 nations worldwide since 1981. At the moment, WVS is the largest cross-national empirical time-series investigation and the 7th wave of the WVS took place worldwide in 2017–2022. Questions related to attitudes towards immigrants asked only in this last wave. This paper will exploit the data of the last wave (Haerpfer et. al., 2020) and analyse several ordered probit models using different dependent variables representing attitudes towards immigrants measured by responses of individuals to the following statements; *"immigrants fill important jobs vacancies", "immigration increases the crime rate", "immigration increases unemployment", "immigration strengthens cultural diversity", "immigration increases the risks of terrorism", "immigration leads to social conflict", "immigration gives asylum to political refugees who are persecuted elsewhere", "immigration offers people from poor countries a better living", "evaluate the impact of immigrants on the development of the nation".* Responses are provided on a three-point scale. Options for the first statements are "disagree", "hard to say", and "agree". For the statement; "how do you evaluate the impact of immigrants on the development of the nation", options are "bad", "neither bad nor good", and "good". Regarding determinants, we investigate respondents' age, gender (male = 1, female = 2), education (lower = 1, middle = 2, upper = 3)), marital status (married = 1, single = 2, divorced/separated = 3, widowed = 4), income_level (low = 1, medium = 2, high = 3), religiosity (religious = 1, not a religious = 2), employment status (full time = 1, part time = 2, self-employed = 3, retired = 4, housewife = 5, student = 6, unemployed = 7, other = 8).

Descriptive statistics belong to those variables are provided at Table 1. We provide descriptive statistics using the total sample where all 5 countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq) included. For each individual country similar ratios are obtained but for the limited space, we do not report them. There's considerable variation in attitudes toward immigration across different dimensions. The majority tend to view immigrants negatively in terms of crime, unemployment, and social conflict. There's a relatively positive view regarding immigrants filling important job vacancies and strengthening cultural diversity. Considering each statement related to attitudes towards immigrants, we observe that 43.35% of the people disagree with the idea that immigrants fill important jobs vacancies. People who agree with this statement is not less as well (32.33%). Few people think that immigration does not increase the crime rate. Similarly, more people have negative attitudes towards immigrants thinking that they increase the unemployment rate. The perspectives on the impact of immigrants on cultural diversity are more polarized, with 39.73% expressing agreement that immigration enhances cultural diversity, while 34.48% hold a contrary view. A substantial majority (59.52%) believes that immigration increases the risks of terrorism while 16.81% disagree, and 23.67% are uncertain. Similarly, a significant majority (61.72%) thinks that immigration leads to social conflict but 13.70% of people disagree with this thought. Almost half (49.32%) of the total sample supports giving asylum to political refugees while 23.81% disagree meaning that people show a supportive stance in general for humanitarian reasons. Considering the opinions about the impact of immigrants on the nation's development, 68.04% of people shows negative attitudes while a small proportion (9.41%) holds a positive view. An overwhelming majority (83.91%) agrees that, in times of job scarcity, priority should be given to nationals over immigrants, but small percentage (6.59%) disagrees with this statement.

The literature on the attitudes towards immigrants claim that these attitudes seem to vary based on demographic factors such as marital status, religiosity, income, and education. Therefore, we include those variables in our regressions to analyse the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants. The demographic characteristics provided in the statistics offer valuable insights into the composition of the surveyed population. The gender distribution indicates a relatively balanced participation in the survey, with 51.04% male and 48.96% female respondents. Regarding marital status, as a substantial 66.61% of participants identify as married, suggesting that family dynamics and responsibilities could influence perspectives on immigration. Religiosity is a prominent factor, with 70.95% of respondents considering themselves religious. Studies on religiosity and attitudes towards immigrants highlight the role of religious beliefs and values in shaping perceptions (e.g. Scheepers et. al., 2002). Income level and education level provide a socioeconomic context, with a majority falling into the medium-income category (69.92%) and a significant portion having low to medium levels of education (44.52% low, 30.23% medium). With 33.65% of respondents identifying as full-time employees, this group likely constitutes a significant portion of individuals engaged in traditional, full-time work roles. The presence of 27.78% housewives suggests a substantial number of individuals engaged in domestic and caregiving responsibilities. The 11.38% identifies as self-employed and the inclusion of part-time workers is 7.25% of the whole sample. Furthermore, the representation of students at 5.61% and unemployed individuals at 6.11% of the surveyed population.

Table 1
Descriptive statistics

Main Dependent Variables	***Number of observations***	***Percentage (%)***
Immigrants fill important jobs vacancies	5598	100
disagree	2427	43.35
hard to say	1361	24.31
agree	1810	32.33
Immigration increases the crime rate	5598	100
disagree	1084	19.36
hard to say	1,237	22.10
agree	3277	58.54
Immigration increases unemployment rate	5598	100
disagree	637	11.38
hard to say	1278	22.83
agree	3683	65.79
Immigration strengthens cultural diversity	5598	100
disagree	1930	34.48
hard to say	1444	25.79
agree	2224	39.73
Immigration increases the risks of terrorism	5598	100
disagree	941	16.81
hard to say	1325	23.67
agree	3332	59.52
Immigration leads to social conflict	5598	100
disagree	767	13.70
hard to say	1376	24.58
agree	3455	61.72
Note: All statistics are calculated based on the responses in the questionnaire for students.		

Main Dependent Variables	***Number of observations***	***Percentage (%)***
It should be given asylum to political refugees who are persecuted elsewhere	5598	100
disagree	1333	23.81
hard to say	1504	26.87
agree	2761	49.32
Immigration offers people from poor countries a better living	5598	100
disagree	1160	20.72
hard to say	1492	26.65
agree	2946	52.63
Independent Variables		
Gender	5598	100
male	2857	51.04
female	2741	48.96
Marital Status	5598	100
married	3729	66.61
single	1500	26.80
divorced/separated	157	2.80
widowed	212	3.79
Religiosity	5598	100
religious	3972	70.95
not a religious	1626	29.05
Income Level	5598	100
Low	1186	21.19
medium	3914	69.92
high	498	8.90

Note: All statistics are calculated based on the responses in the questionnaire for students.

Main Dependent Variables	***Number of observations***	***Percentage (%)***
Education Level	5598	100
Low	2492	44.52
medium	1692	30.23
high	1414	25.26
Employment Level		
Full time	1884	33.65
Part time	406	7.25
Self-employed	637	11.38
Retired	389	6.95
Housewife	1555	27.78
Student	314	5.61
Unemployed	342	6.11
Other	71	1.27
Age	5598	Mean:39.7 St.Dev: 13.9 Min:18 Max:95
Note: All statistics are calculated based on the responses in the questionnaire for students.		

Following econometric model is used for the empirical analysis;

$$ATI_i = \alpha_0 + \delta' X_i + u_i$$

1

ATI_i is representing each of the nine variables for “attitudes towards immigrants”. Using each of these variables, we estimated 9 different ordered probit regressions to understand the determinants of each attitude. Those nine variables are following;

- *immigrants fill important jobs vacancies*
- *immigration increases the crime rate*
- *immigration increases unemployment rate*

- *immigration strengthens cultural diversity*
- *immigration increases the risks of terrorism*
- *immigration leads to social conflict*
- *it should be given asylum to political refugees who are persecuted elsewhere*
- *immigration offers people from poor countries a better living*

X_i shows the independent variables analysed in the regressions such as age, education level, employment level, gender, marital status, religiosity and income level. Eq. (1) is estimated using ordered probit model.

4. Results

Table 2 presents the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants with a focus on the dependent variable: whether immigrants fill important job vacancies. The analysis is conducted using the data of five countries: Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Each column represents a different country-case estimates the rows shows the coefficient estimations of various independent variables with the corresponding t-statistics in parentheses.

Table 2
Determinants of Attitudes Towards Immigrants Dependent Variable: immigrants fill important jobs vacancies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
age	-0.00378	0.00728	0.00931***	-0.0106***	-0.00547
	(-1.13)	(1.44)	(3.38)	(-3.33)	(-1.45)
(base:male)					
gender	0.340**	0.157	0.0644	0.0373	-0.0596
	(2.97)	(0.97)	(0.97)	(0.43)	(-0.50)
(base:married)					
single	0.141	0.121	0.164*	0.0215	-0.168
	(1.17)	(0.69)	(2.30)	(0.22)	(-1.33)
divorced/seperated	-0.223	0.399	-0.339*	-0.0298	0.435
	(-0.85)	(1.87)	(-2.13)	(-0.10)	(1.60)
widowed	-0.154	-0.0458	0.0333	0.127	0.133
	(-0.82)	(-0.22)	(0.20)	(0.64)	(0.76)
(base:low income)					
medium	0.00922	-0.331*	0.00961	0.306**	-0.0663
	(0.10)	(-2.32)	(0.13)	(2.98)	(-0.81)
high	0.00911	-0.293	-0.00190	0.557***	-0.0486
	(0.07)	(-0.72)	(-0.02)	(4.06)	(-0.22)
(base: full time)					
part-time	0.450**	0.183	-0.130	0.107	0.0499
	(2.78)	(1.09)	(-0.88)	(0.94)	(0.29)
self-employed	0.367**	0.150	-0.112	0.185	-0.147
	(2.73)	(0.84)	(-1.23)	(1.73)	(-0.85)
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
retired	0.561**	-0.0610	0.0243	0.139	0.166
	(3.05)	(-0.22)	(0.21)	(0.63)	(1.15)
housewife	-0.140	-0.168	-0.114	0.124	0.250
	(-0.98)	(-0.93)	(-1.39)	(1.06)	(1.72)
student	-0.158	-0.106	-0.177	0.109	-0.0205
	(-0.77)	(-0.37)	(-1.25)	(0.72)	(-0.10)
unemployed	0.204	0.195	-0.126	0.157	0.173
	(1.23)	(0.74)	(-1.12)	(0.66)	(1.03)
(base: lower education)					
middle education	-0.216*	-0.0487	0.0625	-0.0360	0.0113
	(-2.04)	(-0.42)	(0.95)	(-0.40)	(0.12)
Upper education	-0.366***	-0.149	0.0723	0.0298	-0.0355
	(-3.46)	(-1.12)	(0.93)	(0.32)	(-0.33)
(base: religious)					
Not religious	0.382***	-0.245*	0.105	-0.0633	0.154
	(3.82)	(-2.33)	(1.86)	(-0.85)	(1.60)
N	858	690	1963	1067	1020
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

Robust standard errors are used to account for heteroskedasticity. The findings provide important insights into the ways in which demographic characteristics influence perceptions regarding whether immigrants fill important job vacancies. In Turkey and Lebanon older individuals express more negative attitudes. Regarding gender, being female is associated with more positive attitudes towards immigrants that they fill important job vacancies in Iraq. The 2021 Labor Force Survey of Iraq supports this finding that labour force participation rate of international migrants (67%) was higher than the labour force participation rate of Iraqi citizens (39%) in 2021 (CSO, 2022). This also aligns with existing literature suggesting that females tend to exhibit more inclusive attitudes towards immigrants (e.g. Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Quillian, 1995).

Attitudes vary based on marital status. In general, there are insignificant results except Turkiye. In Turkiye, being single is associated with more positive attitudes, while being divorced or separated is linked to more negative attitudes. According to literature, single individuals show more tolerance (Becchetti et. al, 2010; Bazan-Monasterio et. al., 2021). In contrast, persons who are divorced or separated may display more pessimistic sentiments towards immigration. Marital discord can occasionally result in increased anxieties regarding financial rivalry and societal transformation (Bazan-Monasterio et. al., 2021). Higher education is linked to a more unfavourable opinion of immigrants, according to which they fill key positions in the workforce. It should come as no surprise that the labour force participation rate of migrants in Iraq about doubles that of Iraqi citizens, making economic rivalry for the educated more intense. Consistent with previous research, being nonreligious is correlated with more positive attitudes toward immigrants in Iraq regarding their ability to fill open jobs. In Egypt, however, religious people are more tolerate towards foreigners seeking to fill high-status positions. A lengthy history of religious and cultural diversity in Egypt, coupled with the existence of religious institutions, might contribute to the promotion of religious tolerance.

Considering the results for employment status, part-time workers, retirees, and self-employed individuals are more content with immigrants seeking to replace critical job vacancies than full-time employees. This result is anticipated given that most significant employment openings are for full-time positions. Higher income persons in Lebanon have more favourable attitudes towards immigrants. In Egypt, research findings indicate a contentious outcome where the middle-income group opposes the efforts of immigrants to occupy crucial job positions. Lebanon's economy has traditionally exhibited diversity, encompassing a significant service sector that encompasses finance and tourism. Immigrants may be viewed favourably by those with higher incomes on the grounds that they contribute to the economy, cover skill gaps, and foster the nation's expansion.

Table 3

Determinants of Attitudes Towards Immigrants Dependent Variable: immigration strengthens cultural diversity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
age	-0.00948**	-0.000529	-0.0000538	-0.0138***	0.00259
	(-2.78)	(-0.11)	(-0.02)	(-4.45)	(0.68)
(base:male)					
gender	-0.174	0.304	0.0421	-0.0623	-0.00385
	(-1.46)	(1.85)	(0.64)	(-0.70)	(-0.03)
(base:married)					
single	-0.0763	0.0806	0.0267	-0.240*	0.127
	(-0.66)	(0.48)	(0.36)	(-2.47)	(0.95)
divorced/seperated	-0.440	0.244	-0.331*	-0.581*	0.237
	(-1.64)	(1.15)	(-2.12)	(-2.04)	(0.97)
widowed	0.0951	-0.156	0.221	0.140	0.101
	(0.34)	(-0.74)	(1.21)	(0.72)	(0.59)
(base:low income)					
medium income	0.0173	0.284*	-0.00259	-0.0336	-0.0147
	(0.19)	(1.98)	(-0.04)	(-0.34)	(-0.18)
high income	-0.125	0.892*	-0.269**	0.0297	-0.0358
	(-0.91)	(2.16)	(-2.59)	(0.22)	(-0.16)
(base: full time)					
part-time	0.267	-0.160	0.00143	0.0799	0.421*
	(1.67)	(-0.99)	(0.01)	(0.73)	(2.13)
self-employed	-0.0972	0.0666	-0.0111	0.0878	0.104
	(-0.76)	(0.38)	(-0.12)	(0.80)	(0.61)
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
retired	-0.120	0.133	-0.119	-0.0630	-0.0875
	(-0.60)	(0.51)	(-0.98)	(-0.27)	(-0.61)
housewife	0.0323	-0.291	-0.116	0.154	0.162
	(0.23)	(-1.63)	(-1.44)	(1.28)	(1.14)
student	-0.309	0.418	-0.152	0.259	-0.0987
	(-1.56)	(1.50)	(-1.05)	(1.72)	(-0.48)
unemployed	-0.0135	0.0629	-0.00986	0.262	0.150
	(-0.09)	(0.25)	(-0.09)	(1.07)	(0.86)
(base:lower education)					
middle education	-0.0237	0.154	-0.0118	0.00408	-0.0462
	(-0.23)	(1.32)	(-0.18)	(0.04)	(-0.48)
Upper education	-0.147	0.140	0.00942	0.146	0.156
	(-1.49)	(1.06)	(0.13)	(1.54)	(1.41)
(base: religious)					
Not religious	0.114	-0.192	0.176**	0.00150	0.212*
	(1.15)	(-1.83)	(3.03)	(0.02)	(2.17)
N	858	690	1963	1067	1020
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

Table 3 outlines the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants, specifically focusing on the belief that immigration strengthens cultural diversity, across five different countries: Iraq, Egypt, Turkiye, Lebanon, and Jordan. The results indicate that older individuals tend to hold more negative attitudes in Iraq and Lebanon. These findings align with the existing literature, suggesting that age can influence perceptions of cultural diversity, with older individuals sometimes exhibiting more conservative views (Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Citrin et. al, 1990). Regarding marital status, being divorced/seperated associated with more negative attitudes towards immigration strengthening cultural diversity in Lebanon and Turkiye have negative attitudes towards immigrants compared to the married for views. Amato and DeBoer (2001) suggests that divorced individuals may experience emotional and psychological changes, this can affect their perceptions of cultural diversity and immigration. Economic factors often play a role

in shaping attitudes toward immigrants. Divorced or separated individuals may experience changes in economic circumstances, and this can influence their views on cultural diversity. In Lebanon, results show that single also less tolerant to immigrants compared to the married people. In Western country research, single status is associated with more favourable attitudes toward immigrants. However, given that most singles are young and struggle with economic issues, it is logical to conclude that singles are less tolerant of immigrants.

The relationship between income levels and attitudes towards immigration about their strengthen role on cultural diversity also varies. In Egypt, individuals with higher incomes tend to express more positive attitudes, while in Turkiye, the opposite trend is observed. These divergent results underline the importance of considering the economic context and its intersection with cultural perceptions. Economic factors and wealth inequality may affect Egyptian views toward immigrants. Greater exposure to globalization, international business, and cultural interchange may lead to more positive attitudes in higher-income people. Turkey's culture is diverse, influenced by Europe and the Middle East. However, higher-income people may be more hesitant about immigration because they worry about cultural coherence and national identity. On the other hand, results for Turkey can be consistent with the “fiscal burden model” which anticipates that rich (high income) natives oppose low-skilled immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010).

In Jordan, part-time workers have more positive attitudes than full-time workers, who might perceive more economic competition from immigrants. Religiosity emerges as a significant factor in shaping attitudes towards immigration and cultural diversity. Not being religious is associated with more positive attitudes in Turkiye and Jordan. Non-religious individuals may adhere to more liberal or secular values, which often include tolerance, diversity, and acceptance of different beliefs and backgrounds (Altemeyer, 2003; Jackson and Hunsberger, 1999). This perspective may extend to positive attitudes toward immigrants and cultural diversity. Turkiye has a historical tradition of secularism, and this legacy may contribute to more positive attitudes among non-religious individuals who may embrace a more pluralistic view of society. Similarly, in Jordan, where there is a mix of secular and religious influences, non-religious individuals may be more open to diverse cultural perspectives.

Table 4 presents the results of a regression analysis examining the determinants of attitudes toward immigrants concerning the perception that immigration increases the crime rate. The coefficients for age are generally small and statistically insignificant across all countries. In Lebanon and Jordan, females are strongly connected with much more negative sentiments, particularly in their belief that immigrants contribute to an increase in the crime rate. Moreover, compared to married, being single and widowed in Lebanon is associated with more negative attitudes towards immigrants regarding the perception that immigration increases the crime rate. Our findings support Braungart et al. (1980) that being women, unmarried or lived alone were more likely to be fearful. In Jordan, those with higher incomes are more likely to hold favourable views of immigrants, believing that they do not contribute to an increase in crime rates. Conversely, in Lebanon, those with higher incomes tend to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants. Jordan has historically hosted a substantial number of refugees,

potentially fostering the growth of a more tolerant and inclusive society. It is conceivable that the cultural milieu of Jordan fosters a more tolerant and inclusive stance towards immigrants, a sentiment that may be reinforced by the greater exposure to diverse experiences and perspectives of individuals with higher incomes. On the contrary, the intricate political divisions and immigration history of Lebanon might contribute to the formation of unfavourable perceptions among individuals with higher incomes.

Table 4
Determinants of Attitudes Towards Immigrants Dependent Variable: immigration increases the crime rate

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
age	0.00303	-0.00149	0.000278	0.00576	0.00533
	(0.87)	(-0.29)	(0.09)	(1.65)	(1.11)
(base:male)					
gender	-0.00778	0.157	-0.118	0.273**	0.465**
	(-0.07)	(1.02)	(-1.68)	(2.91)	(2.90)
(base:married)					
single	-0.227	-0.138	0.00451	0.238*	-0.111
	(-1.76)	(-0.82)	(0.06)	(2.17)	(-0.72)
divorced/seperated	-0.191	-0.107	-0.164	0.325	-0.351
	(-0.67)	(-0.53)	(-0.92)	(0.95)	(-1.36)
widowed	-0.345	-0.174	0.110	0.591*	-0.282
	(-1.85)	(-0.81)	(0.59)	(2.35)	(-1.32)
(base:low income)					
medium income	-0.0301	0.0635	-0.0135	0.0108	-0.111
	(-0.34)	(0.42)	(-0.17)	(0.10)	(-1.06)
high income	0.124	-0.232	-0.129	0.441**	-0.774***
	(0.88)	(-0.60)	(-1.11)	(2.88)	(-3.37)
(base: full time)					
part-time	-0.0419	-0.427*	-0.0690	0.173	-0.257
	(-0.26)	(-2.54)	(-0.43)	(1.37)	(-1.30)
self-employed	-0.247	-0.283	0.142	-0.131	0.100
	(-1.83)	(-1.62)	(1.45)	(-1.16)	(0.45)
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
retired	-0.299	-0.425	0.155	-0.0666	-0.0724
	(-1.50)	(-1.59)	(1.22)	(-0.24)	(-0.40)
housewife	-0.242	-0.277	0.202*	-0.388**	-0.334
	(-1.74)	(-1.61)	(2.31)	(-3.03)	(-1.79)
student	-0.344	-0.547*	0.0181	-0.205	-0.253
	(-1.67)	(-2.14)	(0.12)	(-1.28)	(-1.04)
unemployed	0.0729	-0.151	0.150	-0.391	-0.107
	(0.45)	(-0.56)	(1.35)	(-1.63)	(-0.51)
(base:lower education)					
middle education	0.148	-0.0220	-0.0437	0.271**	0.0903
	(1.36)	(-0.19)	(-0.63)	(2.70)	(0.76)
Upper education	0.0816	-0.355**	-0.0865	-0.0730	0.00743
	(0.84)	(-2.75)	(-1.06)	(-0.75)	(0.06)
(base: religious)					
Not religious	0.136	-0.217*	-0.00201	-0.459***	0.130
	(1.28)	(-2.11)	(-0.03)	(-5.77)	(1.10)
N	858	690	1963	1067	1020
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

In Egypt, individuals with higher education and students in general tend to have more positive attitudes, while in Lebanon, the opposite trend is observed. This indicates that the relationship between education and attitudes varies across countries. Being not religious is consistently associated with more positive attitudes toward immigrants regarding crime rates in Egypt and Lebanon. This aligns with the previous findings.

Table 5

Determinants of Attitudes Towards Immigrants Dependent Variable: it should be given asylum to political refugees who are persecuted elsewhere

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
age	-0.00320	-0.00305	0.00275	0.00171	0.00873*
	(-1.03)	(-0.62)	(0.97)	(0.53)	(2.19)
(base:male)					
gender	-0.112	-0.0182	0.0829	-0.0606	0.143
	(-0.99)	(-0.12)	(1.25)	(-0.69)	(1.14)
(**base:married)**					
single	-0.0929	-0.131	0.0527	0.0734	0.0837
	(-0.86)	(-0.81)	(0.71)	(0.71)	(0.62)
divorced/seperated	0.264	-0.0103	-0.441**	-0.0502	0.0119
	(0.90)	(-0.05)	(-3.01)	(-0.17)	(0.05)
widowed	-0.209	-0.103	0.0869	0.0634	-0.0938
	(-0.79)	(-0.52)	(0.47)	(0.29)	(-0.51)
(**base:low income**)					
medium income	0.00777	0.204	0.00744	0.196*	0.0433
	(0.09)	(1.54)	(0.10)	(1.97)	(0.50)
high income	0.0150	0.408	0.0205	0.202	-0.444
	(0.11)	(1.04)	(0.19)	(1.47)	(-1.94)
(base: full time)					
part-time	0.138	-0.549***	0.129	0.167	-0.204
	(0.87)	(-3.36)	(0.88)	(1.34)	(-1.13)
self-employed	-0.248	-0.478**	0.323***	-0.331**	-0.258
	(-1.92)	(-2.61)	(3.52)	(-3.11)	(-1.44)
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
retired	-0.101	0.000299	0.155	-0.237	-0.393*
	(-0.54)	(0.00)	(1.31)	(-0.92)	(-2.57)
housewife	-0.190	-0.256	0.0192	0.0834	-0.166
	(-1.39)	(-1.55)	(0.24)	(0.67)	(-1.09)
student	-0.700***	0.230	0.286	0.104	-0.114
	(-3.55)	(0.90)	(1.95)	(0.72)	(-0.47)
unemployed	0.00644	-0.323	0.0285	0.108	-0.188
	(0.04)	(-1.26)	(0.26)	(0.46)	(-1.03)
(base:lower education)					
middle education	-0.0246	0.149	-0.0213	0.218*	0.107
	(-0.24)	(1.33)	(-0.32)	(2.35)	(1.06)
Upper education	-0.136	-0.0687	-0.0323	0.225*	0.0245
	(-1.37)	(-0.53)	(-0.42)	(2.39)	(0.21)
(base: religious)					
Not religious	-0.0634	0.0611	0.0374	-0.501***	0.186
	(-0.63)	(0.60)	(0.64)	(-6.65)	(1.79)
N	858	690	1963	1067	1020
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

Table 5 displays the findings of a regression that investigates the factors influencing views towards giving asylum to political refugees who face persecution in various countries. In Jordan, higher age is associated with more positive attitudes toward granting asylum to political refugees. This suggests that older individuals in Jordan are more inclined to support asylum for refugees. Similar to previous estimates, our finding for the divorced/separated in Turkiye that they have more negative attitudes towards refugees. Although higher income individuals in Lebanon do not always have positive attitudes towards immigrants, they are favourable to granting asylum to the political refugees for humanitarian reasons. Similarly, having upper education is related with more positive attitudes toward granting asylum in Lebanon. However, regarding employment, part time and self-employed people show more negative

attitudes compared to full-time workers in Egypt and Lebanon, possibly due to concerns about competition in the labour market. However, the self-employed in Turkiye show more pro-refugee attitudes, possibly reflecting the socio-economic situation where refugee workers work cheaper than the citizens. Turkish Red Crescent and World Food Programme (2019) highlight that Syrian refugee, due to language barriers and limited formal qualifications, tend to find employment in low-skilled and vulnerable sectors in which young Turkish people do not prefer to work. These sectors include agriculture, construction, textiles, and low-skilled services.

Table 6
Determinants of Attitudes Towards Immigrants Dependent Variable: immigration increases the risks of terrorism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
age	0.00231	-0.00324	-0.00173	0.00951**	0.00269
	(0.62)	(-0.63)	(-0.55)	(2.64)	(0.58)
(base:male)					
gender	-0.0122	0.00641	-0.0790	0.187	0.437**
	(-0.10)	(0.04)	(-1.13)	(1.96)	(2.62)
(**base:married)**					
single	-0.0754	-0.146	-0.0343	0.285*	0.0305
	(-0.52)	(-0.87)	(-0.43)	(2.54)	(0.19)
divorced/seperated	0.197	0.0730	-0.0423	0.280	-0.0709
	(0.67)	(0.39)	(-0.25)	(0.88)	(-0.24)
widowed	0.0675	0.0362	-0.153	0.355	-0.158
	(0.30)	(0.17)	(-0.90)	(1.62)	(-0.75)
(**base:low income**)					
medium income	-0.0167	-0.0591	-0.0558	-0.0386	-0.0917
	(-0.19)	(-0.42)	(-0.71)	(-0.36)	(-0.87)
high income	-0.0232	-0.324	-0.136	0.334*	-0.357
	(-0.16)	(-0.84)	(-1.15)	(2.26)	(-1.54)
(base: full time)					
part-time	0.0641	-0.403*	-0.309*	0.183	-0.218
	(0.36)	(-2.49)	(-2.11)	(1.38)	(-1.01)
self-employed	-0.314*	-0.339	0.0405	-0.363**	-0.101
	(-2.19)	(-1.82)	(0.40)	(-3.14)	(-0.47)
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
retired	-0.289	-0.305	0.197	-0.155	-0.149
	(-1.36)	(-1.08)	(1.46)	(-0.54)	(-0.82)
housewife	-0.107	-0.151	0.146	-0.352**	-0.480*
	(-0.79)	(-0.86)	(1.64)	(-2.71)	(-2.48)
student	-0.380	-0.255	-0.0876	-0.325*	-0.0378
	(-1.72)	(-0.96)	(-0.62)	(-2.04)	(-0.14)
unemployed	-0.144	0.112	-0.0355	-0.450	0.173
	(-0.79)	(0.41)	(-0.33)	(-1.85)	(0.71)
(base:lower education)					
middle education	0.164	-0.210	-0.0632	0.335**	0.0675
	(1.40)	(-1.79)	(-0.89)	(3.29)	(0.58)
Upper education	0.190	-0.247	-0.140	0.0523	-0.0754
	(1.79)	(-1.84)	(-1.73)	(0.53)	(-0.57)
(base: religious)					
Not religious	0.242*	-0.0206	-0.0717	-0.492***	-0.0477
	(2.08)	(-0.20)	(-1.20)	(-6.13)	(-0.42)
N	858	690	1963	1067	1020
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

Table 6 presents the results of a regression analysis that investigates the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants, specifically focusing on the belief that immigration increases the risks of terrorism. In Lebanon, older individuals, and people with high income and more education are more likely to believe that immigration increases terrorism risks. These findings are consistent with the previous findings. Similar to preceding results, being single is associated with a stronger belief that immigration increases terrorism risks in Lebanon. In Lebanon, nonreligious people hold opposing views. In Iraq, on the other hand, nonreligious people tend to believe more strongly that immigration raises the threat of terrorism. The historical backgrounds of Lebanon and Iraq have influenced their respective perspectives on immigration. With a history of sectarian strife, Lebanon boasts a diverse population, which could

potentially impact the way religious identity and immigration sentiments interact. Iraq has seen a great deal of political unrest and conflict, which could alter people's opinions. Compared to students, part-time workers, housewives or self-employed people in different countries, full time workers believe more in the perception that immigration increases terrorism risks. Full-time employees may have different views on immigration because they might be more worried about loosing their job to an immigrant. They would think that immigrants could compete for jobs, which would raise questions about job security.

Table 7

Determinants of Attitudes Towards Immigrants Dependent Variable: Offers people from poor countries a better living

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
age	0.00191	-0.00574	0.0000957	0.0104**	0.00758
	(0.60)	(-1.10)	(0.03)	(2.93)	(1.76)
(base:male)					
gender	0.0232	0.173	0.0483	-0.00485	0.0189
	(0.20)	(1.02)	(0.73)	(-0.06)	(0.15)
(**base:married)**					
single	-0.0610	-0.165	0.0636	0.209	0.141
	(-0.52)	(-0.95)	(0.86)	(1.95)	(1.00)
divorced/seperated	0.377	-0.162	-0.123	0.984*	0.0658
	(1.45)	(-0.75)	(-0.82)	(2.33)	(0.25)
widowed	0.0158	0.138	0.253	-0.0388	0.283
	(0.07)	(0.64)	(1.42)	(-0.16)	(1.28)
(**base:low income**)					
medium income	-0.0668	0.132	-0.131	0.00246	-0.0310
	(-0.75)	(0.92)	(-1.80)	(0.02)	(-0.35)
high income	-0.299*	0.785	-0.112	0.179	-0.207
	(-2.11)	(1.80)	(-1.04)	(1.24)	(-0.84)
(base: full time)					
part-time	0.354*	-0.109	-0.0287	-0.128	-0.0440
	(2.03)	(-0.66)	(-0.19)	(-1.04)	(-0.23)
self-employed	-0.117	-0.168	0.228*	-0.376***	0.0929
	(-0.92)	(-0.96)	(2.46)	(-3.38)	(0.46)
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
retired	0.281	0.335	0.0760	-0.305	-0.322*
	(1.49)	(1.31)	(0.64)	(-1.09)	(-2.04)
housewife	-0.207	-0.120	-0.0747	-0.0283	-0.0465
	(-1.56)	(-0.63)	(-0.92)	(-0.22)	(-0.29)
student	-0.329	0.425	0.0802	-0.153	0.197
	(-1.60)	(1.42)	(0.61)	(-1.04)	(0.76)
unemployed	-0.282*	0.0767	0.132	-0.119	-0.172
	(-2.01)	(0.27)	(1.19)	(-0.54)	(-0.93)
(base:lower education)					
middle education	-0.0138	-0.0314	-0.0665	0.396***	-0.117
	(-0.13)	(-0.26)	(-1.01)	(4.06)	(-1.09)
Upper education	-0.0624	0.120	-0.144	0.295**	-0.127
	(-0.65)	(0.86)	(-1.89)	(3.03)	(-1.04)
(base: religious)					
Not religious	0.0572	0.140	0.0413	-0.396***	0.204
	(0.55)	(1.31)	(0.72)	(-5.12)	(1.86)
N	858	690	1963	1067	1020
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

The findings of a regression analysis that investigates the factors influencing attitudes toward immigrants—with a particular emphasis on the belief that immigrants "offer people from poor countries a better living"—are displayed in Table 7. The positive coefficient for age in Lebanon suggests that older individuals are more likely to believe that immigration can offer a better living for the people coming from poor countries. Although they have more negative atittudes regarding other perceptions such as crime rates or cultural diversity, old people are aware that their country provides a better living to immigrants. This finding is consistent with some prior research indicating that older individuals may have more personal experiences or a broader perspective on the benefits of immigration. In Lebanon, the positive coefficient for divorced/separated individuals suggests that they are more likely to believe that

immigrants have better living in their countries. This could be related to experiences or perspectives gained through personal life changes. In Lebanon, non-religious people think more that immigration does not offer better living to immigrants. Non-religious individuals may be more inclined to emphasize secular values, including social justice and compassion for marginalized groups. Spini and Doise (1998) for example find that religious tend to be less supportive of human rights than non-religious. Lebanese individuals with advanced levels of education are more inclined to hold a favourable impression that immigrants experience an improvement in their quality of life after immigration. Previous literature also suggests that higher education levels are associated with more favorable views of immigration (Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). The unemployed in Iraq and self-employed in Lebanon thinks that their country do not offer people from poor countries a better living but in Turkiye the self-employed people think opposite. Unemployed individuals in Iraq may believe that immigrants could compete for the limited job opportunities available. The perception that immigrants might be willing to work for lower wages could contribute to concerns about job market competitiveness (Mayda, 2006). The negative coefficient for high-income individuals in Iraq suggests that they are less likely to hold this positive attitude towards immigrants. This result contradicts some literature, as higher-income individuals in some contexts are often found to be more open to immigration (Huber and Oberdabernig, 2016). However, local economic and political factors may explain this discrepancy. Self-employed individuals in Lebanon may worry that immigrants could negatively affect their businesses, potentially through increased competition or disruptions. Perceived economic impact on local businesses is a common driver of negative attitudes towards immigration among self-employed individuals (Ajzenman et. al, 2022). Although Syrian refugees are not permitted to work officially in Turkiye, the availability of a large informal labor market in Turkiye allows them to work in low-wage informal jobs—in exchange for wages much lower than the average low-skill native worker would accept (Balkan and Tümen, 2016). Therefore, self-employed people commonly prefer working with refugees in Turkiye.

Table 8

Determinants of Attitudes Towards Immigrants Dependent Variable: immigration leads to social conflict

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
age	-0.00326	-0.00223	0.000284	0.00630	0.0134*
	(-0.88)	(-0.43)	(0.09)	(1.79)	(2.53)
(base:male)					
gender	-0.113	0.0544	0.0613	0.141	0.381*
	(-0.87)	(0.34)	(0.85)	(1.45)	(2.09)
(**base:married)**					
single	-0.123	-0.0188	-0.0276	0.246*	-0.0487
	(-0.88)	(-0.11)	(-0.34)	(2.20)	(-0.27)
divorced/seperated	0.0276	0.210	-0.0657	0.354	-0.397
	(0.10)	(1.02)	(-0.39)	(0.96)	(-1.32)
widowed	0.0279	0.131	-0.0371	0.530*	-0.579**
	(0.16)	(0.58)	(-0.19)	(2.01)	(-2.61)
(**base:low income**)					
medium income	-0.0200	0.253	0.0244	0.0903	0.0256
	(-0.21)	(1.75)	(0.31)	(0.82)	(0.22)
high income	-0.156	-0.275	-0.0854	0.465**	-0.502
	(-1.07)	(-0.67)	(-0.74)	(3.00)	(-1.96)
(base: full time)					
part-time	0.0956	-0.138	-0.0892	0.0730	-0.0834
	(0.52)	(-0.81)	(-0.53)	(0.54)	(-0.36)
self-employed	-0.199	-0.142	0.125	-0.192	0.614
	(-1.31)	(-0.76)	(1.24)	(-1.62)	(1.92)
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
retired	-0.0234	-0.667*	0.386**	-0.367	-0.307
	(-0.11)	(-2.38)	(2.61)	(-1.28)	(-1.52)
housewife	-0.0321	0.0265	0.0463	-0.345**	-0.143
	(-0.22)	(0.15)	(0.52)	(-2.63)	(-0.69)
student	-0.382	-0.123	0.0292	-0.220	-0.0914
	(-1.80)	(-0.46)	(0.19)	(-1.40)	(-0.34)
unemployed	-0.165	-0.0172	0.102	-0.787***	0.0183
	(-0.94)	(-0.06)	(0.88)	(-3.31)	(0.08)
(base:lower education)					
middle education	0.104	-0.117	-0.111	0.227*	0.0628
	(0.93)	(-1.00)	(-1.59)	(2.24)	(0.47)
Upper education	0.221*	-0.415**	-0.0541	0.0861	-0.0619
	(2.05)	(-3.06)	(-0.64)	(0.87)	(-0.42)
(base: religious)					
Not religious	0.00350	-0.189	-0.152*	-0.480***	0.267
	(0.03)	(-1.82)	(-2.52)	(-5.92)	(1.90)
N	858	690	1963	1067	1020
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

The results of the analysis, presented in Table 8, provide insights into the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants for the belief that immigration leads to social conflict. These findings suggest that older individuals in these countries tend to have more negative attitudes towards immigrants in Jordan. This is consistent with existing literature that highlights the role of age in shaping attitudes, with older individuals often exhibiting more conservative views (Semyonov and Glikman, 2009). Gender plays a significant role in influencing attitudes towards immigrants in Jordan. In Jordan, women are more likely to believe that immigration leads to social conflict. Limited personal interactions with immigrants can lead to the perpetuation of stereotypes and misconceptions (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Older individuals and women who have fewer opportunities for intercultural interactions may be more

susceptible to negative stereotypes about immigrants. Considering our previous findings on the perception that immigrants increase terrorism risks or increase crime rates, our findings for Lebanon in terms of social conflict, is so similar for the people with higher income, educated, single or widowed that they have negative attitudes towards immigrants. Similarly non-religious and housewives have positive values. Similar to educated people in Lebanon, educated people in Iraq also think that immigration creates social conflict but Egyptian educated people think the opposite. Iraq has experienced significant political instability and conflict in recent decades (Looney, 2006). These factors may have shaped attitudes towards immigration, with some educated Iraqis associating immigrants with the potential for social conflict. Egypt, on the other hand, has a different political history and has not experienced recent conflicts on the scale of Iraq. The Egyptian context may be less conducive to perceiving immigrants as a source of social conflict. For Jordan and Egypt, significant results in general are in favor of immigrants that people mostly disagree that immigrants create social conflict. There is one interesting result that unemployed in Lebanon are more likely to disagree with the statement that immigration increases unemployment rate. This finding is consistent with Ceyhun (2020) that fails to establish a relationship between unemployment and negative attitudes towards Syrians in Lebanon. In contrary educated people in Lebanon agree with the perception that immigrants increase unemployment rate. This can be due to the scarce job opportunities for the educated not for all the Lebanese.

Table 9
Determinants of Attitudes Towards Immigrants Dependent Variable: immigration increases unemployment rate",

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
age	-0.00227	0.00258	0.00464	0.00914*	0.0113
	(-0.58)	(0.45)	(1.34)	(2.55)	(1.92)
female	-0.250	0.230	-0.112	0.0850	0.0876
	(-1.79)	(1.28)	(-1.49)	(0.88)	(0.51)
(**base:married)**					
single	-0.388**	-0.211	0.0365	0.0936	-0.0924
	(-2.64)	(-1.14)	(0.43)	(0.86)	(-0.49)
divorced/separated	0.0792	0.150	-0.00307	-0.142	-0.0289
	(0.35)	(0.65)	(-0.02)	(-0.43)	(-0.08)
widowed	0.00713	-0.122	-0.347	0.577	-0.296
	(0.04)	(-0.52)	(-1.78)	(1.86)	(-1.20)
(**base:low income**)					
medium income	-0.0952	0.221	-0.0199	0.265*	0.00414
	(-0.93)	(1.42)	(-0.24)	(2.41)	(0.03)
high income	-0.0974	0.362	-0.199	0.507***	-0.392
	(-0.62)	(0.80)	(-1.65)	(3.43)	(-1.37)
(base: full time)					
part-time	0.0539	-0.175	0.0562	0.0632	-0.166
	(0.27)	(-0.98)	(0.35)	(0.49)	(-0.74)
self-employed	-0.0458	-0.220	0.203	-0.0273	0.0660
	(-0.28)	(-1.09)	(1.91)	(-0.22)	(0.27)
retired	-0.339	-0.636*	0.131	-0.114	-0.123
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	IRAQ	**EGYPT**	**TURKIYE**	**LEBANON**	**JORDAN**
	(-1.44)	(-2.18)	(0.93)	(-0.39)	(-0.57)
housewife	0.131	-0.188	0.168	-0.154	0.0516
	(0.84)	(-0.94)	(1.80)	(-1.15)	(0.26)
student	-0.181	-0.0742	0.161	-0.110	0.603
	(-0.74)	(-0.25)	(0.97)	(-0.73)	(1.68)
unemployed	-0.277	0.225	0.0895	-0.431*	0.170
	(-1.55)	(0.81)	(0.73)	(-1.97)	(0.67)
(base:lower education)					
middle education	0.293*	-0.131	-0.0541	0.239*	0.123
	(2.29)	(-1.02)	(-0.73)	(2.34)	(0.91)
Upper education	0.0815	-0.403**	-0.138	0.277**	0.0503
	(0.74)	(-2.76)	(-1.58)	(2.67)	(0.35)
(base: religious)					
Not religious	-0.00668	-0.0523	0.000290	-0.310***	0.0745
	(-0.05)	(-0.46)	(0.00)	(-3.83)	(0.52)
N	858	690	1963	1067	1020
t statistics in parentheses					
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

The results on attitudes toward immigrants with regard to the belief that immigration raises the unemployment rate are shown in Table 9. Age, wealth, and education all strongly positively correlate with the perception that immigration raises the unemployment rate in Lebanon, in line with earlier research. Older, well-educated, and wealthy people hold unfavorable opinions about immigrants. Furthermore, nonreligious people do not see immigrants negatively, in line with earlier findings for Lebanon. In terms of marital status, being single is linked to more favorable opinions of immigrants in Iraq with regard to the belief that they raise the unemployment rate. Literature suggests that people who are single exhibit greater tolerance (Becchetti et al., 2010; Bazan-Monasterio et al., 2021). On the other hand, those who are separated or divorced could feel more negatively about immigration. Consistent with earlier research, educated individuals in Egypt do not think that immigrants raise unemployment; nevertheless, higher

education is associated with a more negative perception of immigrants, which raises unemployment in Iraq. It should not be shocking that immigrants' labor force participation rates in Iraq about double that of Iraqi citizens, intensifying the economic competition for educated individuals.

Concluding Remarks

A substantial body of study has been carried out by scholars to investigate the factors that influence individuals' attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. However, the existing literature does not provide a detailed study that examines the factors influencing attitudes towards immigrants in most nations that have recently absorbed refugees. This research would take a comparative approach and use different variables to describe attitudes towards immigrants from various perspectives. Our research adds to the current literature and presents empirical findings on the factors that influence attitudes towards immigrants in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq. We utilize data from the World Values 7th Wave in our analysis.

Our findings show that, in Lebanon, older individuals tend to agree that immigrants do not strengthen cultural diversity or filling important job vacancies, rather they think that immigrants increase unemployment rate and risk of terrorism. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that their nation offers a superior standard of living for the people coming from poor countries. Unlike older individuals, non-religious individuals in Lebanon do not have any adverse feelings towards immigrants in terms of their perceived contribution to terrorism, unemployment, social conflict, or crime rates. However, they do not believe that their country is an ideal destination for immigrants seeking a higher quality of life. They think that immigrants should not get asylum. This is because they support their right to live in good conditions in their own countries. In Lebanon, females, single and widowed also tend to agree with a negative statement about immigrants that they increase crime rates. Single and divorced people disagree with the statement that immigrants increase cultural diversity. Likewise, individuals who possess advanced education or greater income levels have unfavorable opinions towards immigrants, perceiving them as the cause of escalating unemployment rates, crime rates, social conflict and risks of terrorism. However, high educated Lebanese are aware that their country provides better living for the people coming from poorer countries and people with high income agree to give asylum to the refugees. While self-employed Lebanese individuals may not believe that immigrants pose an increased risk of terrorism, it is likely that they oppose granting asylum to refugees due to economic concerns. Additionally, they do not view Lebanon as a preferable destination for refugees to reside. In contrast housewives and unemployed people do not agree that they increase those problems and in addition students in Lebanon do not think that immigrants increase the unemployment rate. In contrast to Lebanese, people with higher education in Egypt disagree that immigrants increase social conflict, unemployment rates and crime rates. However, part-time employees in Egypt, most likely for economic reasons, believe that their country should not accept political refugees, even though they do not believe that immigration increases terrorism or crime rates.

Women in Jordan tend to concur with several unfavorable assertions regarding immigrants, such as their alleged contribution to higher crime rates, terrorism, and social conflict, all of which are linked to security concerns. In Iraq, those with advanced education hold the belief that immigrants contribute to the rise in unemployment, fail to occupy crucial job positions, and exacerbate social conflict. The unemployed individuals in Iraq also disagree with the assertion that their country offers a superior standard of living to refugees. As a youthful demographic with anticipated economic prospects, students also hold a dissenting view regarding their country's provision of asylum to migrants. The high immigrant labor force participation in Iraq, which surpasses that of the native population, may explain these findings. In Iraq, there is a lack of acceptance among the elderly towards the idea that immigrants contribute to cultural diversity. However, elderly individuals in Turkey believe that they play a significant role in filling crucial job positions. This view may arise from the phenomenon of youth migration from rural regions to metropolitan areas in Turkey. The self-employed individual in Turkey concurs that Turkey offers a superior standard of living to immigrants and advocates for granting them asylum. Owing to their financial and personal challenges, divorced individuals refute the notion that immigrants contribute to the enhancement of cultural diversity. Substantial earnings Turks hold divergent views on the impact of immigrants on cultural variety. However, the non-religious segment of the population concurs with the notion that immigrants contribute to cultural diversity. Furthermore, they do not perceive immigrants as a source of increased social conflict.

Declarations

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Ethics approval and consent to participate

Not applicable. The study used publicly available secondary survey data and did not involve direct contact with human participants; therefore, ethics approval and informed consent to participate were not required.

Competing interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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